Why a Victim's Age is Irrelevant When Assessing the Wrongness of Killing

Intuitively, all killings are equally wrong, no matter how old one's victim. In this paper we defend this claim — The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis — against a challenge presented by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen. Lippert-Rasmussen shows The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis to be incompatible with two further theses: The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious Thesis and The Equivalence Thesis. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that, of the three, The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis is the least defensible. He suggests that the most convincing considerations apparently in favour of the Equal Wrongness thesis may be satisfied just as well if we adopt an alternative principle, a 'Prioritarian View' about the wrongness of killing. We argue that The Prioritarian View does not resolve the trilemma: it too is inconsistent with the other two theses. Instead, we argue, the most plausible resolution of the trilemma involves a rejection, rather, of The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious Thesis. In its place, we offer an attractive principle that is compatible with both The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis as well as The Equivalence Thesis.     

Why the Practice of Medicine is Not a Phronetic Activity

This essay argues that the practice of medicine is not a phronetic activity in the original Aristotelian sense of that term. Jonsen and Toulmin are two philosophers who have conflated the techne of medicine with phronesis. This conflation ignores Aristotle's crucial distinction between techne and phronesis and his use of the medical analogy. It is argued that medical reasoning is similar to phronesis but does not exemplify it. Phronesis will not save the life of medical ethics. The concept could be utilized as a moral prosthetic.     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

The Ethics of Economic Sanctions: Why Just War Theory is Not the Answer

Res Publica - On 24 December 2017, the UN Security Council imposed its toughest sanctions yet on North Korea. The measures, intended to thwart nuclear ambitions, are some of the most extensive...     

A Bad Disease, a Fatal Cure: Why Sterilization is Permissible and the Autonomy of Medicine is Not

The debate in this issue regarding the Roman Catholic condemnationof the morality of sterilization is puzzling for Protestants.As I will argue the puzzlement arises on two grounds. First,why would anyone object to direct sterilization for the cureor prevention of disease? Second, if one wanted to challengesuch an objection on moral grounds why would one turn to medicineto do so? For Christian ethics there is nothing wrong in principlewith direct sterilization when there are good reasons for precludingthe possibility of an additional pregnancy; and it is a serioustheological mistake to treat medicine as an independent moralauthority.     

Doing Good at Work Feels Good at Home,but Not Right Away: When and Why Perceived Prosocial Impact Predicts Positive Affect

When and why does the experience of helping others at work spill over into positive affect at home? This paper presents a within‐person examination of the association between perceived prosocial impact at work and positive affect at home, as well as the psychological mechanisms that mediate this relationship. Sixty‐eight firefighters and rescue workers completed electronic diaries twice a day over the course of 1 working week. Random‐coefficient modeling showed that perceived prosocial impact predicted positive affect at bedtime. This relationship was mediated by perceived competence at the end of the working day and positive work reflection during after‐work hours but not by positive affect at the end of the working day. The findings demonstrate that the experience of helping others at work has delayed emotional benefits at home that appear to be channeled through the cognitive mechanisms of perceived competence and reflection rather than through an immediate affective boost.     

Metaphor for Teaching: Good Teaching is Like Good Sex

Based on a real teaching experience in the classroom, the author reflects on the dynamics of gender, race/ethnicity, power, and privilege in the context of an undergraduate course in Christian sexual ethics. Through this analysis of pedagogical style and process initiated by a challenging moment at the midpoint of the semester, the author develops ten guiding principles for good teaching, using the metaphor that “good teaching is like good sex,” which emphasize the necessary elements and outcomes of a positive learning environment: intimacy, flexibility, creativity, satisfaction, care and attentiveness, vulnerability, fun and playfulness, reciprocity, full engagement, and risk‐taking. This experience provided the foundation for planning and assessment for the author's courses since.     

The Bias Paradox: Why it's Not Just for Feminists Anymore

The bias paradox emerges out of a tension between objectivism and relativism.If one rejects a certain the conception objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality (i.e., if all views are biased), how, then, can one hold that some epistemic perspectives are better than others? This is a problem that has been most explicitly dealt with in feminist epistemology, but it is not unique to feminist perspectives. In this paper, I wish to clearly lay out the nature of the paradox and the various attempts to avoid it. I also intend to show why it is a problem for any epistemological view that rejects absolute objectivity. Finally, I wish to briefly outline a possible solution to the paradox, a solution that requires recognizing that rationality necessarily requires both objective and subjective elements.     

Why the Negation Problem Is Not a Problem for Expressivism

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non‐normative cases, and this problem is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden.     

Atypical Gender Development: Why I Did Not Sign the GIRES-Review

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the review on Atypical Gender Development, published by the Gender Identity Research and Education Society (GIRES) in the International Journal of Transgenderism 9(1), 2006, pp. 29–44. Although appreciating the initiative of GIRES, the author, who was invited to join the signatories of the review chose to not do so for five major reasons: (1) The phenomenology of transgenderism displays such a great variety that it can not be explained by any individual factor, be it constitution, morphology, hormones or psychology. (2) The role of the Bed nucleus of the area striata of the hypothalamus is overemphasized in the review. (3) Regrets after SRS challenge biological explanations of transsexualism. (4) Dwelling on biological explanations may, as the history of sexology shows, be used in favor as well as against subject. (5) Striving for legal and social acknowledgement of transgendered persons and improvement of treatment conditions does not need biology as an argument.     

Equality of Authority as the Aristotelian Common Good

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Gracious Play: Discipline,Insight, and the Common Good

The article is a theological reflection on the vocation of university teaching that describes the heart of the matter of what faculty do in the classroom. The author draws on personal narrative, social‐psychological analyses of how insight occurs and contexts for insights are constructed, and sociological accounts of shifts that have altered significantly the context of university teaching and learning at the cusp of the millennium to make her case. She argues that the vocation of university teaching involves creating spaces of gracious play that are potentially transformative for students and faculty. Creating such spaces, however, draws faculty into an asceticism that can be understood as a spiritual path. The article is a revision of the author's 1999 St. Elizabeth Seton Lecture at the College of Mount St. Joseph, Cincinnati, Ohio.