《老子》形而上学研究

善是道德价值。它是私意的表达。因此,《老子》认为,善恶是非不分,需要破除。言即知识,是对事实的陈述。它有所限定,即局限性,彼此有别,因此也要放弃。有即万物。有具有主体性。有即现象,为假,不是事物的本来。事物的本来即道。作为本来的道,即本、即生。作为本的道是某种可能性,故不可说。作为生的道,未能成形,故不可说。道不可道。假的有、巧的真、善的名都遮蔽了道：事物的本来。故需要反,即还原。     

论亚里士多德的善

善是存在的本体。它是幸福。最完美的幸福是沉思。对于这种活动,人们不能够言说（称赞）。善是好。好是主体的私意的表达。这意味着善依据于主体的自愿、私意,并能够带来欢乐。善是真它陈述了现象的关系。真仅仅关注现象而不是作为存在的真正的善因此,真的善其实并不真。     

Cognition and motivation in emotion

The role of cognition--and to some extent motivation--in emotion, the ways meaning is generated, unconscious appraising, and the implications of this way of thinking for life-span development are addressed. It is argued that appraisal is a necessary as well as sufficient cause of emotion and that knowledge is necessary but not sufficient. This position is examined in light of what is known about emotions in infants and young children, the effects of drugs on acute emotions and moods, and recent patterns of thought about the brain in emotions. The discussion of how meaning is generated is the core of the article. Automatic processing without awareness is contrasted with deliberate and conscious processing, and the concept of resonance between an animal's needs and what is encountered in the environment is examined. The idea that there is more than one way meaning is achieved strengthens and enriches the case for the role of appraisal in emotion and allows the consideration of what is meant by unconscious and preconscious appraisal and the examination of how they might work.     

波函数的实在性分析

波函数是量子力学的核心概念。波函数的实在性问题一直是科学实在论与反实在论争论的焦点之一。20世纪上半叶量子力学研究主要是检验量子力学的理论是否正确或完备,仅有少量量子技术产品问世。1935年爱因斯坦、波多尔斯基和罗森(EPR)发表的《能认为量子力学对物理实在的描述是完备的吗?》一文,提出了EPR关联——量子纠缠,直接引发了对量子力学基本问题的论争。(Einstein,Podolsky and Rosen,pp.777-780)基于EPR量子纠缠,1993年本内特(Bennett)等6位科学家在《物理评论快报》发表题为《经由经典和EPR通道传送未知量子态》的重要论文,引发了一系列有关量子信息与量子技术的研究,形成了量子信息理论、量子控制论、量子技术等新的量子科技理论。量子纠缠     

The origin of the after-effect of movement

Previous experimental work on the origin of the after-effect of seen movement is discussed and the relevance of the argument from transfer, which is generally used to demonstrate that the effect is central, is brought into question. The problem is reformulated in terms of whether a retinal contribution is necessary throughout the aftereffect and experiments are described which support the hypothesis that it is necessary. It is suggested that perception of the movement after-effect also involves normal movement perception, which itself is dependent on the integrity of cerebral functioning.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Causal decision theory

On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. In other words, vagueness is a type of indeterminacy. On the standard alternative, vagueness is a type of ignorance: if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then, even though it is metaphysically settled whether Harry is bald, we cannot know whether Harry is bald. On my view, vagueness is neither a type of indeterminacy nor a type of ignorance. Rather, it is sui generis.     

Turing's Analysis of Computation and Theories of Cognitive Architecture

Turing's analysis of computation is a fundamental part of the background of cognitive science. In this paper it is argued that a re-interpretation of Turing's work is required to underpin theorizing about cognitive architecture. It is claimed that the symbol systems view of the mind, which is the conventional way of understanding how Turing's work impacts on cognitive science, is deeply flawed. There is an alternative interpretation that is more faithful to Turing's original insights, avoids the criticisms made of the symbol systems approach and is compatible with the growing interest in agent-environment interaction. It is argued that this interpretation should form the basis for theories of cognitive architecture.     

Healing the wounds and the wounds of healing: a journey of the spirit

This article is a reflective narrative about the death of a parent told from the perspective of her daughter. It is an experience-based account. This shared journey of mother and child links the familiar realm of the conscious and known self to a realm that is not known in the same way and is not merely the self. It is as if one end is in the midst of life's struggles and crises and the other in another realm; yet the whole works together as a single force. In this way the idea is introduced that the very challenges and trauma of life can be a wound that is a healing of wounds, in so far as it prompts recognition of the realm that is out of sight, though the wound certainly is real enough.     

康德的综合和分析概念

先天综合判断如何可能的问题是康德《纯粹理性批判》的基本问题。可能性问题是先验真理问题,而综合正是回答先天综合判断真理问题的关键。本文对康德综合概念的四重含义进行了考察,它们是逻辑学的综合概念、认识论的综合概念、方法论的综合概念、存在论的综合概念。本文对相关的分析概念进行了连带的考察,但是同时指出综合概念是整个批评的基石和线索之所在。     

It's Personal—Or Not At All: On God as Love/r

Abstract : Henriksen discusses what it means that God is personal, with special regard to the claim that God is love. If God is love, God must be understood as personal. This approach is related to different elements concerning human life and human freedom, and how to engage in human life. Also the radical alternative is suggested: instead of understanding God as love, the alternative is considered that death is God (as the final and strongest power there is). This alternative shows that it is the most likely interpretation of actual human conduct to opt for the alternative that God is love. Hence, to understand God as love is part of what it means to relate humanely and with hope to what is taking place in human life.     

道德与人伦——论伦理中的强制性因素与非强制性因素

从对社会成员的约束力来看,伦理可以分为两个部分,一个部分是强制性的,一个部分是非强制性的。前一个部分就是人们通常所说的道德,后一个部分可以称为人伦。道德与人伦既相互对立,又相辅相成,此消彼长。从某种意义上说,这种对立统一实际上是个体自由与集体意志在伦理领域中的表现。就世界范围看,伦理的人伦化是当代社会的一个重要趋势。从伦理内部来讲,这种趋势的产生与传统的伦理模式的失落有关。区分道德与人伦有着重要的意义。它有利于更好地发挥伦理的作用与功能,促进和谐社会的构建。     

Assessing change with the extended logistic model

The purpose of this article is to define a method for the assessment of change. A reinterpretation of the extended logistic model is proposed. The extended logistic model for the assessment of change (ELMAC) allows the definition of a time parameter which is supposed to identify whether change occurs during a period of time, given a specific event or phenomenon. The assessment of a trend of change through time, on the basis of the time parameter which is estimated at different successive occasions during a period of time, is also considered. In addition, a dispersion parameter is calculated which identifies whether change is consistent at each time point. The issue of independence is taken into account both in relation to the time parameter and the dispersion parameter. An application of the ELMAC in a learning process is presented. The interpretation of the model parameters and the model fit statistics is consistent with expectations.     

Retinal size as a determiner of the direction of size distortion in figural after-effects

When dealing with size distortions, the direction of the distortion is determined by the retinal size of the T-figure with respect to the retinal size of the I-figure. When the T-figure is retinally smaller than the I-figure it is distorted toward appearing even smaller; when it is retinally larger than the I-figure it is distorted toward appearing even larger; and when the two are retinally equal, there is no distortion. If the T-figures are too much larger or smaller than the I-figure, the distortion ceases. The traditional distance paradox is observed where the distance is defined retinally. The apparent size of the figures is irrelevant to a prediction of what sort of distortion takes place. Sutherland's hypothesis that apparent size determines the direction of distortion when retinal sizes are equated is not supported.     

Two Conceptions of the Physical

The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception , it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object-based conception , it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.     

Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?

This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. This essay suggests two ways in which the agent is involved in the process of overcoming this obstacle.     

Ontic Structural Realism and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

Recently, there has been a debate as to whether or not the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (the PII) is compatible with quantum physics. It is also sometimes argued that the answer to this question has implications for the debate over the tenability of ontic structural realism (OSR). The central aim of this paper is to establish what relationship there is (if any) between the PII and OSR. It is argued that one common interpretation of OSR is undermined if the PII turns out to be false, since it is committed to a version of the bundle theory of objects, which implies the PII. However, if OSR is understood as the physical analogue of (sophisticated) mathematical structuralism then OSR does not imply the PII. It is further noted that it is (arguably) a virtue of OSR that it is compatible with a version of the PII for possible worlds.     

ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM*

Abstract: Ontological naturalism is the view that our best construal of what there is, is what science says there is. This paper argues that while such a doctrine is very appealing, unfortunately, determining what there is, is neither as simple, nor as straightforward, as ontological naturalism would have it seem. Determining what there is, it is claimed, involves three steps. First, one must decide which part of scientific discourse should be taken as true. One must then regiment that part of scientific discourse, and finally, one has to apply a criterion for ontological commitment to that regimented discourse. This paper will concentrate on the first and third of these tasks. It is argued that resolving the tasks these steps put before us requires the employment of philosophical maneuvers, that is, maneuvers that neither originate within, nor are ratified by, the practice of science. But these are maneuvers that the ontological naturalist is not entitled to. Thus, ontological naturalism is not a feasible doctrine.     

The Virtue of Epistemological Dualism

The article tries to answer the following question: what is the most promising epistemological strategy if my objective is the construction of a theory which gives me the opportunity to decrease the risk of getting to what is actually absolute, that is, to irreversible negative actions (irreversible as a theory might not be, but as an action often is)? The answer proposed is a form of epistemological dualism which means that I metaphysically believe (that is, I programmatically and systematically believe, without certainly knowing it) that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is dualistic. More specifically, I metaphysically believe that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is not saturated: in any theory there is an ideal error, because there is no theory which is totally saturated by reality, and any reality can actualize the ideal error, because there is no reality which is totally saturated by theory.