Temporal order judgment criteria are affected by synchrony judgment sensitivity

Synchrony perception for audio-visual stimulus pairs is typically studied by using temporal order judgment (TOJ) or synchrony judgment (SJ) tasks. Research has shown that estimates of the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) obtained using these two methods do not necessarily correspond. Here, we investigate the hypothesis that the PSS estimate obtained in a TOJ task is shifted in the direction of the most sensitive part of the synchrony judgment curve, as obtained in an SJ task. The results confirm that criterion shifts in the TOJ task move the PSS toward regions of the audio-visual temporal interval continuum where discriminations are most sensitive.     

Children's time perception as affected by order of stimulus presentation

Two groups of 5- to 6-yr.-old children estimated the time required to view 15 color slides containing an assortment of familiar objects. In one group, the pictures appeared in categorical order. A second group viewed the same 15 slides in a random order. The results showed that, although picture-recall was similar for the two groups, children in the category group estimated significantly longer durations than subjects in the random condition. The findings were discussed in the context of Ornstein's 1969 storage size hypothesis.     

The measurement of differential thresholds for lifted weights by microcomputer-controlled apparatus

The measurement of differential thresholds (DLs) for lifted weights normally involves lengthy test sessions. This is due partly to the statistical techniques for measuring the threshold and partly to the methods adopted to present the stimuli. Attempts to speed up test procedures tend to produce unreliable DL estimates, or to measure the sense of force or effort rather than weight perception. To facilitate the measurement of DLs for lifted weights, an Apple microcomputer was programmed to generate Wetherill tracking procedures and was interfaced with two stimulus bearing turntables. Various lifting methods are easily implemented, and DLs are reliably and quickly measured. The adaptation of the apparatus for general use in investigating the haptic sense modality is discussed.     

Bias and error in human judgment

Currently prevalent views of human inference are contrasted with an integrated theory of the epistemic process. The prevailing views are characterized by the following orienting assumptions: (1) There exist reliable criteria of inferential validity based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing. (2) Motivational and cognitive factors bias inferences away from these criteria and thus enhance the likelihood of judgmental error. (3) The layperson's epistemic process is pluralistic; it consists of a diverse repertory of information-processing strategies (heuristics, schemas) selectively invoked under various circumstances. By contrast, the present analysis yields the following conclusions: (1) There exist no secure criteria of validity. (2) Psychological factors that bias inferences away from any currently accepted criteria need not enhance the likelihood of error. (3) The inference process may be considered unitary rather than pluralistic. The various strategies and biases discussed in the literature typically confound universal epistemic process with specific examples (or contents) of such processes. Empirical support for the present analysis is presented, including evidence refuting proposals that specific contents of inference are of universal applicability; evidence suggesting that people do not, because of a reliance on subnormative heuristics, underutilize nonnative statistical information—rather, people seem unlikely to utilize any information if it is nonsalient or (subjectively) irrelevant; and evidence demonstrating that the tendency of beliefs to persevere despite discrediting information can be heightened or lowered by introducting appropriate motivational orientations.     

Observer recorder error as affected by different tasks and different expectancy inducements

Four experiments were designed to investigate the effects of systematic observer/recorder error on experimental results where experimenters had been induced to expect certain results. In the first experiment, experimenters were induced to expect certain outcomes for three different tasks. No observer error nor experimenter-effects were observed. Postexperimental interviews indicated some suspiciousness as well as failure to understand the hypotheses on the part of experimenters. In the second experiment expectancies were induced in observers who did not act as experimenters. No observer effects were noted, and again postexperimental interviews indicated manipulation failure. In the third experiment experimenters were asked to attempt to influence subjects' responses. Three tasks were used, but in two of these tasks observer error was controlled rather than measured. No differences in subjects' responses were noted for any of the measures. However, significant observer/recorder error was noted for both male and female experimenters in the task where such error was measurable. In the fourth experiment experimenters were again asked to influence subjects' responses. For the two tasks used observer error was measured. A predicted Task × Observer Error Interaction was obtained. Again, no differences in subjects' responses were noted.     

Temporal order judgment in dyslexia

Hari et al. (Brain 174:1373-1380, 2001) demonstrated that dyslexics showed a sluggish attention capture in both visual hemifields. Additionally, they indicated a left-right asymmetry in the perception of temporal order of two visual stimuli (they performed worse than controls only if the stimulus in the left hemifield preceded that in right hemifield). They suggested that a left-sided minineglect is associated with dyslexia. We hypothesized that if a kind of neglect syndrome is responsible for the asymmetry they found, dyslexics should not only show a left-right asymmetry in temporal order judgment of two laterally presented stimuli but also perform equally well as controls when the stimuli are vertically aligned. Our results indicated that in both tasks dyslexics performed generally worse than normal readers. The results suggest that dyslexics suffer from a more general problem of order discrimination.     

Time and moral judgment

Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.     

The role of effective lever length in the perception of lifted weights

Objects are lifted through a system of body levers and, since the force required to lift objects decreases as the effective lever length is shortened, it was hypothesized that the perceived heaviness of objects would be less when they were lifted with the elbow bent than with it extended. Cans lifted from greater initial angles were consistently judged to be lighter by blindfolded Ss.     

Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informational length and order of presentation as determinants of persuasion

The present paper explores the notion that an important difference between prior operational definitions of “cue” or “heuristic” information versus “message argument” information has to do with differential processing difficulty, and relative ordinal position of these two information types. In previous work, “cue/heuristic” information typically differed from “message argument” information not only in its contents, but also in it being (1) briefer, and (2) presented prior to the message information. We find that it is relative brevity and ordinal position rather than contents that ultimately explain the differences in persuasive impact between “cue/heuristic” versus “message argument” information. In so far as both “cues” and “message arguments” can vary in brevity and order with which they are presented, these findings are consistent with the view that these two information types do not necessarily differ in their persuasive impact.     

Trial order and retention interval in human predictive judgment

The influences of order of trial type and retention interval on human predictive judgments were assessed for a cue that was reinforced on half of its training presentations. Subjects observed 10 cue-outcome presentations (i.e., reinforced trials) and 10 cue-alone presentations (i.e., nonreinforced trials) in one of three different orders: all nonreinforced trials followed by all reinforced trials(latent inhibition), reinforced and nonreinforced trials interspersed (partial reinforcement), or al lreinforced trials followed by all nonreinforced trials (extinction). Ratings were based mainly on the most recent event type (i.e., a recency effect) when the test occurred immediately after training but were based mainly on initial event types (i.e., a primacy effect) when the test occurred after a 48-h delay. The subjects tested both immediately and with a long retention interval did not exhibit this shift to primacy (i.e., the recency effect persisted). These results demonstrate noncatastrophic forgetting and the flexible use of trial order information in predictive judgments.