The acquisition of scientific knowledge: the influence of methods of questioning and analysis on the interpretation of children's conceptions of the earth

Studies of children's knowledge of the Earth have led to very different conclusions: some appear to show that children construct their own, non‐scientific ‘theories’ (mental models) of the flat, hollow or dual Earth. Others indicate that many young children have some understanding of the spherical (scientific) Earth, and that their knowledge lacks the coherence of mental models. The reasons for these contrasting views were tested by interviewing French children (N = 178) aged 5–11 years and varying the different methods used in previous research, namely the types of questions (open and forced‐choice), the form of representation (two‐dimensional pictures and three‐dimensional models), and the method of analysis (the mental model theorists' coding scheme and a statistical test for associations using MANOVA). Forced‐choice questions resulted in higher proportions of scientific answers than open questions, and children appeared to have naïve mental models of the Earth only when the mental model theorists' coding scheme was used. These findings support the view that children tend to have ‘fragments’ of scientific knowledge, and that naïve mental models of the Earth are methodological artifacts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions

When students learn scientific theories that conflict with their earlier, naïve theories, what happens to the earlier theories? Are they overwritten or merely suppressed? We investigated this question by devising and implementing a novel speeded-reasoning task. Adults with many years of science education verified two types of statements as quickly as possible: statements whose truth value was the same across both naïve and scientific theories of a particular phenomenon (e.g., “The moon revolves around the Earth”) and statements involving the same conceptual relations but whose truth value differed across those theories (e.g., “The Earth revolves around the sun”). Participants verified the latter significantly more slowly and less accurately than the former across 10 domains of knowledge (astronomy, evolution, fractions, genetics, germs, matter, mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves), suggesting that naïve theories survive the acquisition of a mutually incompatible scientific theory, coexisting with that theory for many years to follow.     

Adults' representations of the Earth: Implications for children's acquisition of scientific concepts

When children are asked to draw the Earth they often produce intriguing pictures in which, for example, people seem to be standing on a flat disc or inside a hollow sphere. These drawings, and children's answers to questions, have been interpreted as indicating that children construct naïve, theory‐like mental models of the Earth (e.g. Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992 ). However, recent studies using different methods have found little or no evidence of these mental models, and report that many young children have some scientific knowledge of the Earth. To examine the reasons for these contrasting findings, adults (N = 350) were given the drawing task previously given to 5‐year‐old children. Fewer than half of the adults' pictures were scientific, and 15% were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings. Up to half of the answers to questions (e.g. ‘Where do people live?’) were non‐scientific. Open‐ended questions and follow‐up interviews revealed that non‐scientific responses were given because adults found the apparently simple task confusing and challenging. Since children very probably find it even more difficult, these findings indicate that children's non‐scientific responses, like adults', often result from methodological problems with the task. These results therefore explain the discrepant findings of previous research, and support the studies which indicate that children do not have naïve mental models of the Earth.     

Taking a naïve other's perspective to debias the hindsight bias: Did it backfire?

Hindsight bias is a phenomenon that occurs when outcome knowledge interferes with the ability to accurately recall judgments made in a previous, naïve state. Also known as the “knew it all along” bias, we aimed to diminish the bias by having individuals take the perspective of a naïve other, as a way of encouraging acceptance that they had, in fact, not known it all along. Adult participants were given blurry-to-clear images incrementally until they were able to identify the object and were then re-presented with the same sequence of images and asked to make a judgment about when they had identified the item correctly the first time. They were also asked to judge when they thought a naïve peer (Experiments 1 and 2), or a naïve child (Experiment 2) could identify the objects. Results showed a robust hindsight bias in all perspectives, and sporadic success at eliminating the bias. When taking the perspective of a naïve peer, there were failures and successes; when taking the perspective of a naïve child, there was an ultra-debiasing, or a reverse hindsight bias. However, did the manipulation backfire? We conclude that while the manipulation of thinking like a naïve child may have eliminated the bias, participants seemed to use an “adults know best” rule rather than accepting past naivete for themselves.     

Yearning for certainty and the critique of medicine as “science”

A debate has simmered concerning the nature of clinical reasoning, especially diagnostic reasoning: Is it a “science” or an “art”? The trend since the seventeenth century has been to regard medical reasoning as scientific reasoning, and the most advanced clinical reasoning is the most scientific. However, in recent years, several scholars have argued that clinical reasoning is clearly not “science” reasoning, but is in fact a species of narratival or hermeneutical reasoning. The study reviews this dispute, and argues that in a theoretical sense, the dispute rests upon a naïve—but very popular—caricature of what constitutes “science reasoning.” But, if the dispute rests upon just such a caricature, why is it so persistent? The study concludes by suggesting that we, as patients and as physicians, have deep psychological tendencies that incline us to adopt the very naïve “science” concept/model of diagnostic reasoning, even if (or when) we understand its inaptness.     

Naïve Realism,Privileged Access,and Epistemic Safety

Working from a naïve‐realist perspective, I examine first‐person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive‐realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first‐person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.     

Naïve Realism,Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem

This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off’ problem for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur, ones that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any particular view about the psychological nature of hallucinatory experience to handle the screening off problem. Consequently, room opens up for naïve realists to endorse whatever theory of hallucinatory experience seems to best capture the distinctive nature of such episodes.     

Mental models or methodological artefacts? Adults' naïve responses to a test of children's conceptions of the earth

Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) claim that children's drawings and answers to questions show that they have naïve, theory‐like ‘mental models’ of the earth; for example, they believe it to be flat, or hollow with people inside. However, recent studies that have used different methods have found little or no evidence of these misconceptions. The contrasting accounts, and possible reasons for the inconsistent findings, were tested by giving adults (N=484) either the original task (designed for 5‐year olds) or a new version in which the same drawing instructions and questions were rephrased and clarified. Many adults' responses to the original version were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings and answers. The new version elicited substantially fewer non‐scientific responses. These findings indicate that even adults find the original instructions and questions ambiguous and confusing, and that this is the principal reason for their non‐scientific drawings and answers. Since children must find the task even more confusing than adults, this explanation very probably applies to many of their non‐scientific responses, too, and therefore accounts for the discrepant findings of previous research. ‘Naïve’ responses result largely from misinterpretation of Vosniadou and Brewer's apparently simple task, rather than from mental models of the earth.     

Naïve Realism,Seeing Stars,and Perceiving the Past

It seems possible to see a star that no longer exists. Yet it also seems right to say that what no longer exists cannot be seen. We therefore face a puzzle, the traditional answer to which involves abandoning naïve realism in favour of a sense datum view. In this article, however, I offer a novel exploration of the puzzle within a naïve realist framework. As will emerge, the best option for naïve realists is to embrace an eternalist view of time, and claim that in the relevant case, one sees a still existent star‐stage located somewhere in the distant past.     

Children's representations of the earth: A methodological comparison

Investigation of children's understanding of the earth can reveal much about the origins and development of scientific knowledge. Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) claim that children construct coherent, theory‐like mental models of the earth. However, more recent research has indicated that children's knowledge of the earth is fragmented and incoherent. By testing the influence of question type (open vs. forced‐choice questions) and medium (drawings vs. 3‐D models) on the responses of 6‐year‐olds (N=59), this study investigated whether, and how, methodological differences account for the discrepant findings of previous research. Both the use of drawings and of open questions (Vosniadou and Brewer's methods) were found to increase the apparent incidence of naïve mental models. Moreover, the combination of 3‐D models and forced‐choice questions elicited more scientifically correct responses and higher proportions of scientific and inconsistent mental models than the combination of drawings and open questions. It is argued that children know more about the earth than the mental model theorists claim, and that naïve mental models of the earth are largely artifactual.     

The Value of Perception

This paper develops a form of transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental naïve realism, the naïve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. Rather, naïve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting a transcendental attitude towards naïve realism is that it promises to make the naïve realist theory of perception, in some sense, immune to falsification. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental naïve realism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, and suggests one way of understanding the claim that naïve realism is immune to falsification.     

Investigating Links from Teacher Knowledge,to Classroom Practice,to Student Learning in the Instructional System of the Middle-School Mathematics Classroom

Using data collected in 125 seventh-grade and 56 eighth-grade Texas classrooms in the context of the “Scaling Up SimCalc” research project in 2005–07, we examined relationships between teachers’ mathematics knowledge, teachers’ classroom decision making, and student achievement outcomes on topics of rate, proportionality, and linear function—three important and cognitively demanding prealgebra topics. We found that teachers’ mathematical knowledge was correlated with student achievement in only one study out of three. We also found a lack of correlations between teachers’ mathematical knowledge and critical aspects of instructional decision making. Curriculum and other learning resources (e.g., technology, student–student interactions) are clearly important factors for student learning in addition to, and in interaction with, teachers’ mathematical knowledge. Our results suggest that mathematics knowledge for teaching may have a nonlinear relationship with student learning, that those effects may be heavily mediated by other instructional factors, and that short-term content knowledge gains in teacher workshops may not persist in classroom instruction. We discuss a need in the field for richer models of how “mathematical knowledge for teaching” works in the context of complete instructional systems.     

Children and adolescents’ understandings of family resemblance: A study of naïve inheritance concepts

This paper aims to provide developmental data on two connected naïve inheritance concepts and to explore the coherence of children's naïve biology knowledge. Two tasks examined children and adolescents’ (4, 7, 10, and 14 years) conceptions of phenotypic resemblance across kin (in physical characteristics, disabilities, and personality traits). The first task required participants to predict and explain feature outcomes in both an offspring and a sibling, in a modified version of the phenotypic similarity task. In the second task, participants offered explanations for instances of parent‐offspring dissimilarity and grandparent‐offspring resemblance (phenotypic difference task). The inclusion of two tasks and a broad age range revealed significant age trends between 4 and 10 years in naïve inheritance concepts. However, there was little consistency in children's inheritance explanations within or across tasks. The findings are discussed with reference to debates concerning the development and structure of naïve biology concepts.     

什么是智力？成年人的朴素智力理论

朴素智力理论是没有系统学习科学智力理论的成年人对智力的经验性认识。对成年人朴素智力理论的研究有助于了解个体如何建立对客观世界的理解。本文从对智力本质的理解、朴素智力理论的影响因素、对自己或他人智商的估计三个视角介绍了有关成年人朴素智力理论的研究。成人对智力本质的理解有跨文化的一致性,大多包括问题解决、言语能力、社会能力三个方面,这与科学智力理论有一定的相似;成人的朴素智力理论也受到环境、文化、“聪明人”原型年龄的影响;成人对智商的估计有中等程度的准确性。总的来说,成年人对智力的朴素认识是比较准确的。不同层面的个体经验很可能塑造了智力的朴素理论。     

Subjectivity in heterophenomenology

I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.     

Effects of Personal Epistemology on the Understanding of Multiple Texts

We examined whether the text understanding of students holding naïve and sophisticated epistemological beliefs was differentially affected by text format, also controlling for effects of gender, word decoding, and prior knowledge on understanding. The participants were 39 Norwegian first-year teacher students, and the topic of reading was attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It was found that only readers holding sophisticated epistemological beliefs displayed adequate understanding when reading multiple, partly conflicting, texts about ADHD, whereas students holding naïve epistemological beliefs gained better understanding when reading a single textbook-like source with identical content. This finding, however, depended on the level of understanding being measured by the criterial task, with only the task measuring deeper situational text understanding showing an interaction between epistemological beliefs and text format. This study provides evidence that not only knowledge itself, but also personal beliefs about knowledge, may enhance or constrain deeper understanding of multiple texts.     

Naïve realism and capturing the “wisdom of dyads”

Two studies provided evidence for the role of naïve realism in the failure of individuals to give adequate weight to peer input, and explored two strategies for reducing the impact of this inferential bias. Study 1 demonstrated that dyad members see their own estimates as more “objective” than those of their partners and that this difference in perceived objectivity predicts the degree of underweighting. Compelling participants to assess their own versus their partners' objectivity prior to revising estimates decreased underweighting, an effect that was mediated by differences in perceived objectivity. Study 2 showed that the increase in accuracy that results from requiring dyad members to offer joint estimates via discussion is largely retained in subsequent individual estimates. Both studies showed that underweighting is greater when dyad members disagree on the issue about which they are making consensus estimates—a finding that further supports a “naïve realism” interpretation of the phenomenon.     

Wired for Society: Cognizing Pathways to Society and Culture

While cognitive scientists increase their tentative incursions in the social domains traditionally reserved for social scientists, most sociologists and anthropologists keep decrying those attempts as reductionist or, at least, irrelevant. In this paper, we argue that collaboration between social and cognitive sciences is necessary to understand the impact of the social environment on the shaping of our mind. More specifically, we dwell on the cognitive strategies and early-developing deontic expectations, termed naïve sociology, which enable well-adapted individuals to constitute, maintain and understand basic social relationships. In order to specify the way in which the demanding character of typical social relationships can be recognized in situ, we introduce the concept of “deontic affordances”. Finally, we shed light on the continuum that might relate a primitive naïve sociology, dedicated to the processing of invariant properties of the social life and a mature naïve sociology, necessary for dealing with the variable properties of cultural forms of life.     

Indigenizing and Decolonizing the Teaching of Psychology: Reflections on the Role of the Non‐Indigenous Ally

Canada's 2015 Truth and Reconciliation Commission published 94 Calls to Action including direction to post‐secondary institutions “to integrate Indigenous knowledge and teaching methods into classrooms” as well as to “build student capacity for intercultural understanding, empathy, and mutual respect.” In response, Canadian universities have rushed to “Indigenize” and are now competing to hire Indigenous faculty, from a limited pool of applicants. However, it is missing the true spirit of reconciliation for non‐Indigenous faculty to continue with the status quo while assigning the sole responsibility of Indigenizing curriculum to these new hires. How can non‐Indigenous psychology professors change their teaching to ensure that all students acquire an appreciation of traditional Indigenous knowledge about holistic health and healing practices, as well as an understanding of Canada's history of racist colonization practices and its intergenerational effects? Community psychologists, particularly those who have established relationships with Indigenous communities, have an important role to play. In this article, I survey the existing literature on Indigenizing and decolonizing psychological curriculum and share ways in which I have integrated Indigenous content into my psychology courses. I also reflect upon the successes, questions, and ongoing challenges that have emerged as I worked in collaboration with first Anisinaabek First Nations and then Mi'kmaw/L'nu First Nations.     

Reductionism and Antireductionism: Rights and Wrongs

Abstract: Scholars are divided as to whether reduction should be a central strategy for understanding the world. While reductive analysis is the standard mode of explanation in many areas of science and everyday life, many scholars consider reductionism a sign of “intellectual naïveté and backwardness.” This article makes three points about the proper status of antireductionism: First, reduction is, in fact, a centrally important epistemic strategy. Second, reduction to physics is always possible for all causal properties. Third, there are, nevertheless, reasons why we want science to discover properties and explanations other than reductive physical ones.