Are there qualitative differences in the representation of abstract and concrete words? Within-language and cross-language evidence from the semantic priming paradigm

The different organizational frameworks theory proposes that there is a qualitative difference between the representation of concrete and abstract words in memory: Concrete concepts would be primarily organized in terms of semantic similarity whereas abstract concepts would be mainly organized by their association with other concepts. Evidence in support of this proposal has been mostly obtained with neuropsychological populations and, to a lesser extent, with healthy participants. In the present work, we tested the different organizational frameworks theory by using, for the first time, a semantic priming paradigm both within language and across languages. The results revealed that there was priming for both semantically similar and associative relations when words were concrete. However, with abstract words, priming was only observed when pairs and targets were associated. These results do not support the proposal of Crutch and coworkers, suggesting that the experimental paradigm as well as the type of relations tested may modulate the pattern of effects obtained with concrete and abstract words.     

The contributions of language and experience to the representation of abstract and concrete words: Different weights but similar organizations

In the present studies, we evaluated the contributions of language and sensorimotor information to the representation of abstract and concrete words and the possibility that the organizations of the two types of concepts follow different organizational principles: association, for abstract concepts, and semantic similarity, for concrete concepts. In Study 1, we examined the two strongest associates of concrete and abstract words from published free association norms. Study 2 then extended this analysis to individual data collected with a free association task. Language associations were more important for abstract than for concrete words, but for sensorimotor information no differences were observed between the two types of concepts. Also, no clear evidence was found for different qualitative organizational principles for abstract and concrete concepts. Multiple representational systems thus seem to be engaged in the conceptual processing of abstract and concrete concepts, while it remains to be investigated whether their representations follow different organizational principles.     

The different representational frameworks underpinning abstract and concrete knowledge: Evidence from odd-one-out judgements

Recent evidence from neuropsychological investigations of individuals with global aphasia and deep or deep-phonological dyslexia suggests that abstract and concrete concepts are underpinned by qualitatively different representational frameworks. Abstract words are represented primarily by their association to other words, whilst concrete words are represented primarily by their taxonomic similarity to one another. In the current study, we present the first evidence for this association/similarity distinction to be gathered from healthy research participants. Using a semantic odd-one-out task, it is shown that normal participants identify associative connections more quickly than similarity-based connections when processing abstract words, but that the pattern is reversed for concrete words. It is also demonstrated that the typical concrete-word advantage observed in many cognitive tasks is abolished and even reversed when participants have to comprehend the semantic associations between words. The data provide converging evidence for the different representational frameworks hypothesis and suggest that claims based on information from previous neuropsychological investigations can be generalized to normal cognition.     

Contrasting graded effects of semantic similarity and association across the concreteness spectrum

Evidence from healthy individuals and neuropsychological patients with deep dyslexia or semantic refractory access dysphasia suggests that abstract and concrete concepts have different dependencies upon associative and similarity-based representational frameworks. However, the importance of information about semantic similarity for concepts that lie across the full concreteness spectrum has not been investigated. Here we report the performance of healthy individuals on an odd-one-out task involving semantically related word triplets that showed continuous variation for the key variables of concreteness, similarity strength, and association strength. In addition, data from a stroke aphasic patient tested on a matching-to-sample task based on the same abstract, middle-concreteness, and concrete stimuli are also presented. The effects of similarity and association strength upon performance were both shown to interact significantly with concreteness, but in opposite directions. The effect of semantic similarity increased with concreteness but the effect of association decreased with concreteness. This research provides further evidence for the proposal that abstract and concrete words have different dependencies upon associative and similarity-based information. It also develops the proposal by providing data that are consistent with a graded and not binary or ungraded model of the relationship between concreteness and these two forms of semantic relationship.     

Contrasting graded effects of semantic similarity and association across the concreteness spectrum

Evidence from healthy individuals and neuropsychological patients with deep dyslexia or semantic refractory access dysphasia suggests that abstract and concrete concepts have different dependencies upon associative and similarity-based representational frameworks. However, the importance of information about semantic similarity for concepts that lie across the full concreteness spectrum has not been investigated. Here we report the performance of healthy individuals on an odd-one-out task involving semantically related word triplets that showed continuous variation for the key variables of concreteness, similarity strength, and association strength. In addition, data from a stroke aphasic patient tested on a matching-to-sample task based on the same abstract, middle-concreteness, and concrete stimuli are also presented. The effects of similarity and association strength upon performance were both shown to interact significantly with concreteness, but in opposite directions. The effect of semantic similarity increased with concreteness but the effect of association decreased with concreteness. This research provides further evidence for the proposal that abstract and concrete words have different dependencies upon associative and similarity-based information. It also develops the proposal by providing data that are consistent with a graded and not binary or ungraded model of the relationship between concreteness and these two forms of semantic relationship.     

Qualitative differences in the representation of abstract versus concrete words: Evidence from the visual-world paradigm

In the present visual-world experiment, participants were presented with visual displays that included a target item that was a semantic associate of an abstract or a concrete word. This manipulation allowed us to test a basic prediction derived from the qualitatively different representational framework that supports the view of different organizational principles for concrete and abstract words in semantic memory. Our results confirm the assumption of a primary organizational principle based on association for abstract words, different from the semantic similarity principle proposed for concrete words, and provide the first piece of evidence in support of this view obtained from healthy participants. The results shed light on the representational structure of abstract and concrete concepts.     

The meaning of ‘life’ and other abstract words: Insights from neuropsychology

There are a number of long‐standing theories on how the cognitive processing of abstract words, like ‘life’, differs from that of concrete words, like ‘knife’. This review considers current perspectives on this debate, focusing particularly on insights obtained from patients with language disorders and integrating these with evidence from functional neuroimaging studies. The evidence supports three distinct and mutually compatible hypotheses. (1) Concrete and abstract words differ in their representational substrates, with concrete words depending particularly on sensory experiences and abstract words on linguistic, emotional, and magnitude‐based information. Differential dependence on visual versus verbal experience is supported by the evidence for graded specialization in the anterior temporal lobes for concrete versus abstract words. In addition, concrete words have richer representations, in line with better processing of these words in most aphasic patients and, in particular, patients with semantic dementia. (2) Abstract words place greater demands on executive regulation processes because they have variable meanings that change with context. This theory explains abstract word impairments in patients with semantic‐executive deficits and is supported by neuroimaging studies showing greater response to abstract words in inferior prefrontal cortex. (3) The relationships between concrete words are governed primarily by conceptual similarity, while those of abstract words depend on association to a greater degree. This theory, based primarily on interference and priming effects in aphasic patients, is the most recent to emerge and the least well understood. I present analyses indicating that patterns of lexical co‐occurrence may be important in understanding these effects.     

Cognitive Metaphor Theory and the Metaphysics of Immediacy

One of the core tenets of cognitive metaphor theory is the claim that metaphors ground abstract knowledge in concrete, first‐hand experience. In this paper, I argue that this grounding hypothesis contains some problematic conceptual ambiguities and, under many reasonable interpretations, empirical difficulties. I present evidence that there are foundational obstacles to defining a coherent and cognitively valid concept of “metaphor” and “concrete meaning,” and some general problems with singling out certain domains of experience as more immediate than others. I conclude from these considerations that whatever the facts are about the comprehension of individual metaphors, the available evidence is incompatible with the notion of an underlying conceptual structure organized according to the immediacy of experience.     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

Content differences for abstract and concrete concepts

Concept properties are an integral part of theories of conceptual representation and processing. To date, little is known about conceptual properties of abstract concepts, such as idea. This experiment systematically compared the content of 18 abstract and 18 concrete concepts, using a feature generation task. Thirty-one participants listed characteristics of the concepts (i.e., item properties) or their relevant context (i.e., context properties). Abstract concepts had significantly fewer intrinsic item properties and more properties expressing subjective experiences than concrete concepts. Situation components generated for abstract and concrete concepts differed in kind, but not in number. Abstract concepts were predominantly related to social aspects of situations. Properties were significantly less specific for abstract than for concrete concepts. Thus, abstractness emerged as a function of several, both qualitative and quantitative, factors.     

Gender Categories as Dual-Character Concepts?

Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named “dual-character concepts.” Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual-character concept “artist” has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual-character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual-character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual-character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither “man” nor “woman” appeared dual-character-like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow-up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored.     

Bidirectional associations of power and size in a priming task

Recent studies have shown that the size of a word's font affects people's judgements of its power. This result has been regarded as evidence for the association between power and size. It remains unclear, however, whether this association is bidirectional. The present study used a priming paradigm to determine whether processing power words was not only affected by processing size but also whether the reverse was true, consistent with metaphor representation being bidirectional. In Experiment 1, shapes in different sizes were used as priming materials, and power words were used as targets. In Experiment 2, to test the directionality of power and size, we tested two conditions using the exact same tasks but in reverse order: power words priming shapes and shapes priming power words. In Experiment 3, a significant priming effect was replicated when power words primed shapes in a lexical decision task rather than a powerful/powerless decision task. We found an interplay between power and size in all of the experiments. The bidirectional associations between power and size were in line with the strong version of Metaphoric Structuring, which claims that concrete concepts should influence abstract concepts and abstract domains should affect concrete domains. Thus, power is partially understood in terms of size, which demonstrates that abstract concepts are grounded in sensory motor processing.     

Visual and Affective Multimodal Models of Word Meaning in Language and Mind

One of the main limitations of natural language-based approaches to meaning is that they do not incorporate multimodal representations the way humans do. In this study, we evaluate how well different kinds of models account for people's representations of both concrete and abstract concepts. The models we compare include unimodal distributional linguistic models as well as multimodal models which combine linguistic with perceptual or affective information. There are two types of linguistic models: those based on text corpora and those derived from word association data. We present two new studies and a reanalysis of a series of previous studies. The studies demonstrate that both visual and affective multimodal models better capture behavior that reflects human representations than unimodal linguistic models. The size of the multimodal advantage depends on the nature of semantic representations involved, and it is especially pronounced for basic-level concepts that belong to the same superordinate category. Additional visual and affective features improve the accuracy of linguistic models based on text corpora more than those based on word associations; this suggests systematic qualitative differences between what information is encoded in natural language versus what information is reflected in word associations. Altogether, our work presents new evidence that multimodal information is important for capturing both abstract and concrete words and that fully representing word meaning requires more than purely linguistic information. Implications for both embodied and distributional views of semantic representation are discussed.     

词汇具体性对情绪名词效价加工影响的ERP研究

具体性和抽象性是词汇同一特性的两极, 是直接影响词汇加工过程的重要因素。本研究采用快速序列视觉呈现范式, 结合脑电技术探讨在有限注意资源内, 词汇具体性对情绪名词加工过程的影响。结果发现：名词加工早期和晚期阶段的ERP成分受到情绪效价的调节, 情绪词比中性词诱发了更大的N170和LPC波幅; 名词加工早期和晚期阶段的ERP成分也受到词汇具体性的调节, 具体词比抽象词诱发了更大的N170和LPC波幅; 词汇具体性影响情绪名词加工的晚期阶段, LPC波幅能够分辨出不同情绪效价的抽象词, 对于具体词仅能区分出情绪与非情绪, 这说明抽象词可能比具体词负载了更多的情绪信息, 反映出对情绪信息的精细加工过程。     

A Credible-World Account of Biological Models

In a broad brush, biological models are often constructed in two general types: (1) as a concrete model; (2) as an abstract model. A concrete model is a material model such as model organisms, while an abstract model is a mathematical or computational model consists of equations or algorithms. Though there are types of biological models that cannot be strictly categorized as either concrete or abstract, they are falling somewhere in between this spectrum. In view of the fact that biological phenomena are sui generis and distinct from physical phenomena in many respects, using the concepts in standard modeling fails to account for the differences between biological sciences and physical sciences. Drawing from the resources of a credible-world account of models in economic modeling, I propose to reinterpret abstract models and concrete models in the light of the credible world account of models.     

Neural dichotomy of word concreteness: a view from functional neuroimaging

Our perception about the representation and processing of concrete and abstract concepts is based on the fact that concrete words are highly imagined and remembered faster than abstract words. In order to explain the processing differences between abstract and concrete concepts, various theories have been proposed, yet there is no unanimous consensus about its neural implication. The present study investigated the processing of concrete and abstract words during an orthography judgment task (implicit semantic processing) using functional magnetic resonance imaging to validate the involvement of the neural regions. Relative to non-words, both abstract and concrete words show activation in the regions of bilateral hemisphere previously associated with semantic processing. The common areas (conjunction analyses) observed for abstract and concrete words are bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44/45), left superior parietal (BA 7), left fusiform gyrus and bilateral middle occipital. The additional areas for abstract words were noticed in bilateral superior temporal and bilateral middle temporal region, whereas no distinct region was noticed for concrete words. This suggests that words with abstract concepts recruit additional language regions in the brain.     

Language Processing Differences Between Blind and Sighted Individuals and the Abstract Versus Concrete Concept Difference

In the property listing task (PLT), participants are asked to list properties for a concept (e.g., for the concept dog, “barks,” and “is a pet” may be produced). In conceptual property norming (CPNs) studies, participants are asked to list properties for large sets of concepts. Here, we use a mathematical model of the property listing process to explore two longstanding issues: characterizing the difference between concrete and abstract concepts, and characterizing semantic knowledge in the blind versus sighted population. When we apply our mathematical model to a large CPN reporting properties listed by sighted and blind participants, the model uncovers significant differences between concrete and abstract concepts. Though we also find that blind individuals show many of the same processing differences between abstract and concrete concepts found in sighted individuals, our model shows that those differences are noticeably less pronounced than in sighted individuals. We discuss our results vis-a-vis theories attempting to characterize abstract concepts.     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

How Polysemy Affects Concreteness Ratings: The Case of Metaphor

Concreteness ratings are frequently used in a variety of disciplines to operationalize differences between concrete and abstract words and concepts. However, most ratings studies present items in isolation, thereby overlooking the potential polysemy of words. Consequently, ratings for polysemous words may be conflated, causing a threat to the validity of concreteness‐ratings studies. This is particularly relevant to metaphorical words, which typically describe something abstract in terms of something more concrete. To investigate whether perceived concreteness ratings differ for metaphorical versus non‐metaphorical word meanings, we obtained concreteness ratings for 96 English nouns from 230 participants. Results show that nouns are perceived as less concrete when a metaphorical (versus non‐metaphorical) meaning is triggered. We thus recommend taking metaphoricity into account in future concreteness‐ratings studies to further improve the quality and reliability of such studies, as well as the consistency of the empirical studies that rely on these ratings.     

Feature Statistics Modulate the Activation of Meaning During Spoken Word Processing

Understanding spoken words involves a rapid mapping from speech to conceptual representations. One distributed feature‐based conceptual account assumes that the statistical characteristics of concepts’ features—the number of concepts they occur in (distinctiveness/sharedness) and likelihood of co‐occurrence (correlational strength)—determine conceptual activation. To test these claims, we investigated the role of distinctiveness/sharedness and correlational strength in speech‐to‐meaning mapping, using a lexical decision task and computational simulations. Responses were faster for concepts with higher sharedness, suggesting that shared features are facilitatory in tasks like lexical decision that require access to them. Correlational strength facilitated responses for slower participants, suggesting a time‐sensitive co‐occurrence‐driven settling mechanism. The computational simulation showed similar effects, with early effects of shared features and later effects of correlational strength. These results support a general‐to‐specific account of conceptual processing, whereby early activation of shared features is followed by the gradual emergence of a specific target representation.