The Evangelical Necessity of Creedal Confession in the World of Empire

The author argues that in the world of Empire where greed, violence, and idolatry pervade, the Church is challenged to recognise that it exists to witness to the radical, liberating message of the gospel of the crucified and risen Lord, Jesus Christ. The Church is challenged to recognise and acknowledge how it is a beneficiary of Empire, but that its focus is to be on the Lord Jesus Christ and not the ‘Caesars’ who cannot give the life, healing, and forgiveness that only God can give. Faithfulness to the gospel calls for creedal‐confession that becomes both inevitable and necessary because the church's confession is communal. The community in Christ needs one another in order to be faithful through mutual creedal‐remembering and reminding of the identity of the God of Jesus Christ.     

“The Test of a Civilization Is the Way that It Cares for Its Helpless Members”: Violence Against Older Women

Violence against women is a major health risk nationally and internationally. However, despite its impact, violence against older women remains an understudied area. Abuse of older women is frequently unrecognized unless encompassed under “elder abuse.” The purpose of this article is to (1) provide a summary of current research on violence against older women, (2) describe methodological biases in research on violence against older women, (3) discuss methodological biases that have kept the problem of violence against older women hidden from view, and (4) propose new directions for feminist research, advocacy, and therapy.     

BEMBA MYSTICO-RELATIONALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE (AGI) PARTICIPATION IN IMAGO DEI

This article interrogates the challenge artificial general intelligence (AGI) poses to religion and human societies, in general. More specifically, it seeks to respond to “Singularity”—when machines reach a level of intelligence that would put into question the privileged position humanity enjoys as imago Dei. Employing the Bemba notion of mystico-relationality in dialogue with the concepts of the “created co-creator” and Christ the Key, it argues for the possibility of AI participating in imago Dei. The findings show that imaging is a fluid, participatory activity that aims at likeness, but also social harmony. It also argues that God is the only original creator, humans are created creators, and that every aspect of visible existence, including AI, is inherently divine imaging. However, strong imaging is only attainable based on the only One and True Image—Christ, whose union of the material and the divine means that all creation can image, excluding nothing, even AI.     

Mystagogy and Cyrillian Orthodoxy: Christology as Fidelity to a Carnal Presence

Henry Chadwick’s contention that the “nerve-center” of Cyril’s Christology is the Eucharist reconfigures the urgency of his polemic against Nestorius: it is not a question of abstract doctrine, but of the mystery encountered in the liturgy. This contention has been corroborated by patrologists, but its theological implication has not been fully drawn – viz. that mystagogy is the basis of Cyrillian orthodoxy. When this implication is grasped, it entails that the orthodox doctrine of the “unity of Christ” concerns not merely the unity of the historical Jesus with the Logos, but the unity of the encounter with Christ: “mystical union” is not an addendum to the doctrine of the “hypostatic unity,” it is basic to it.     

Voices and Visions from the Margins on Mission and Unity: A disability‐informed reading of the Pauline metaphor of the church as the body of Christ

Disability studies from a missional perspective in the Indian context are rare. Mission and unity cannot be “talked” about without the active inclusion of those in the margins; rather, they are the subject of mission and unity of the church which, in Pauline language, is the body of Christ. With the help of a disability‐informed reading of the Pauline metaphor of church as the body of Christ, an attempt is made to understand the integral constituent of this “body” and its mission and unity. Our deliberations on the metaphor of body make it amply clear that “weaker” members are indispensable for the mission and unity of the church. They are the paradigm for the manifestation of God. Mission and unity of the church depend on the inclusion and equal participation of the margins—the disabled.     

Eucharist: metaphysical miracle or institutional fact?

Presence as ordinarily understood requires spatio-temporal proximity. If however Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is understood in this way it would take a miracle to secure multiple location and an additional miracle to cover it up so that the presence of Christ where the Eucharist was celebrated made no empirical difference. And, while multiple location is logically possible, such metaphysical miracles—miracles of distinction without difference, which have no empirical import—are problematic. I propose an account of Eucharist according to which Christ is indeed really and objectively present in the religiously required sense, without benefit of metaphysical miracles. According to the proposed account, which draws upon Searle’s discussion of “social ontology” in The Construction of Social Reality and The Making of the Social World, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is an institutional fact. I argue that such an account satisfies the requirements for a real presence doctrine.     

Paul and the Revisionists: Did Luther Really Get it All Wrong?

Abstract : After the advent of the “new perspective” on Paul as explicated in E. P. Sanders, Krister Stendahl, and N.T. Wright, we need to ask: did Luther get Paul right? In this essay, Donfried analyzes N.T. Wright along with David Brondos on whether Paul—and Luther—properly interpreted concepts such as “law” or “justification” in light of ancient Judaism(s). In contrast to the “new perspective,” Donfried argues that Paul got the Judaisms of his own era right and Luther got Paul right: we are justified or rightwised before God because of the presence of Jesus Christ in the faith of the one who believes.     

What If the Church Really is the Body of Christ?

Abstract : What does it mean to claim that the church is the body of Christ? Following the lead of the New Testament, Bonhoeffer, Jenson, and Hauerwas, this article articulates how the church becomes the body of Christ through the narrative of Scripture and the practices of worship. As Jesus Christ has a distinctive character, so also the body of Christ has a distinctive character. This character is described through the four classical marks of the church—one, holy, catholic, apostolic. These notae ecclesiae are to be interpreted not only in relation to the inner constitution of the church but ethically in relation to the church's calling to be “shalom church” for the life of the world in peacemaking, doing justice, caring for creation, and defending human dignity. Particular communal practices that embody this character are proposed for the life of the church.     

Christ’s faith,doubt, and the cry of dereliction

According to accounts of the Passion, Christ cries out from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” The cry, I argue, manifests that Christ lacks a belief that God is with him. Given the standard view of faith—belief that p is required for faith that p—it would follow that Christ lost his faith that God is with him just before he died. In this paper, I challenge the standard view by looking at the cognitive requirement of faith. Although faith that p requires some positive cognitive orientation toward p, that orientation need not be belief. I show that reliance is an alternative stance that fulfills the cognitive requirement of faith. Reliance aims at providing sensible guidance for action that is in accord with one’s values/ends. Thinking of the cognitive component of Christ’s faith in terms of reliance makes sense of the doubt manifested in his cry.     

A Lutheran Reflection on The One Mediator,The Saints,and Mary1 in Relation to the Question: How Do Lutherans Understand Prayer for Other People?2

Abstract : In this article, the author offers a critical, appreciative appraisal of The One Mediator, The Saints, and Mary (1992), which was the publication that emerged from the eighth round of the U.S. Lutheran‐Catholic Dialogue. Writing from a Lutheran perspective and using the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ, October 31, 1999) as a critical hermeneutical lens, the author points to Luther's theological conviction concerning how Mary—the mother of the Lord Jesus Christ—and departed saints are to be regarded. Luther's emphasis on Christ the only Mediator was highlighted. Reflection on this text was done in light of the theme of the dialogue's eleventh round, “The Hope of Eternal Life.” Prayer is always in and through Jesus Christ.     

Gandhian Conception of Christ

Gandhi conceived Christ in a very peculiar way. His hermeneutics of New Testament in relation to the person and work of Christ was quite different from the official versions of different denominations within Christianity. He did not accept Christ as “world saviour” in the sense in which the dogmas proclaim. Gandhi’s conception of Christ is thus very “selective” and interesting as he understood Christ as a Satyāgrahi and a great teacher through the Sermon on the Mount. He too viewed the cross of Christ as an example of non-violence. This peculiar Gandhian conception of Christ within the Indian premises was an antidote in a colonial context and to the imported Western Christ into the Indian pluralistic tradition.

     

Self-reported likelihood of sexually aggressive behavior: Attitudinal versus sexual explanations

The present study compared the relative effectiveness of sexuality variables versus attitudes hypothesized to be rape-supportive in the prediction of “likelihood to rape” (LR) and “likelihood to use sexual force” (LF) measures. This research was guided by the suggestion that understanding the variables which underlie LR and LF may shed light on the factors which cause some men to actually commit acts of violence against women. The results were inconsistent with viewing rape as primarily caused by sexual frustration or sexual maladjustment, since sexuality variables were generally not predictive of LF or LR. In contrast, a variety of rape-supportive attitudes and beliefs such as blaming the victim for her rape or viewing sexual violence as sexually arousing to women were successful predictors of both LF and LR. These data were interpreted as supporting theories of rape which consider cultural, socially transmitted attitudes about women and rape to be psychological releasers for sexual aggression. The findings also supported the notion of an “aggression toward women” continuum, rather than a conceptualization of rape as a discrete, isolated phenomenon with its own determinants.     

An Updated Feminist View of Intimate Partner Violence

In this article, we explore intimate partner violence (IPV) from an intersectional, feminist perspective. We describe how an updated feminist view guides us to a perspective on IPV that is more strongly grounded in an antioppressive, nonviolent, socially just feminist stance than a second‐wave gender‐essential feminist stance that suggests that patriarchy is the cause of IPV. At the time we began to work together it seemed that a researcher had to be identified as a “family violence” researcher or a “feminist” researcher of violence against women, and that it wasn't possible to be a feminist researcher who looked beyond patriarchy as the cause of IPV. We advocate critically thinking about essentialist practices in clinical work so that we can maintain an antioppressive, socially just, nonviolent approach to working with clients who experience IPV.     

“OPENNESS TO THE WORLD”: KARL BARTH'S EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY OF CHRIST AS THE PRAY‐ER1

What is at stake in accounts of “prayer” is reflection on a practice that cannot be readily spoken of free from the most important considerations of God, world, human identity and the shape of its performance. Instead, if prayer “is not to become a harmless game and an endlessly babbling chatter” (Karl Rahner), attention needs to be paid to the god or gods that practices of so‐called “prayer” encounter, and it may be that much of what moves in the name of the God of Jesus Christ is, in Barth's terms, no‐god. For Barth not only has the knowledge of the practice of prayer, in a sense, been taken out of our hands in its Christ‐grounding, but its Christ‐shaped performance involves the determination of Christian life and its self‐reflective thought in the pattern of the new life that might be characterised as the properly ordered freedom of self‐dispossessing obedience.     

Contentious Freedom: Sex Work and Social Construction

In this article, Brison extends the analysis of freedom developed in Nancy J Hirschmann's book, The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom, to an area of controversy among feminist theorists: that of sex work, including prostitution and participation in the production of pornography. This topic raises some of the same issues concerning choice and consent as the three topics Hirschmann discusses in her book—domestic violence, the current welfare system in the United States, and Islamic veiling—but it also raises some distinct ones concerning the social construction of sexuality and possible conflicts between the freedom of some women (who may choose to engage in sex work) and the freedom of others (who may be harmed by the contribution of such work to the social construction of categories such as “women” and “sex”).     

The Apotheosis of Home and the Maintenance of Spaces of Violence

The “Home” is ideologically understood as a place of safety and refuge. Such an account cloaks violence against women. The voices of battered women can disrupt that dominant construction of the space of the home, a construction typified by the work of Gaston Bachelard. The space that Bachelard presupposes and theorizes as given is in fact being‐produced, cleaned, and organized by people who themselves may not find in it any solace or respite.     

Pacifism—Fifty Years Later

I suppose I’m writing this because of my 1965 paper on Pacifism. In that essay I argued that pacifism is self-contradictory. That’s a strong charge, and also not entirely clear. Let’s start by trying to clarify the charge and related ones. Pacifism has traditionally been understood as total opposition to violence, even the use of it in defense of oneself when under attack. I earlier maintained (in my well-known “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis” (Narveson, Ethics, 75:4, 259–271, 1965)) that this position is contradictory, if it is intended to mean that one has no right to use violence. While that is perhaps going too far, pacifism as so characterized is surely, as I have later argued, self-defeating in an obvious sense of that expression. But in any case, contemporary theorists who describe their views as pacifist profess to hold no such doctrine—they regard that familiar characterization of pacifism as a caricature. They do express strong opposition to war, but even that is not unlimited. If the chips are genuinely down, they will approve going to war-level self-defense—but they deny that it ever is really necessary, or at least that it is necessary nearly as often as actual war-making behavior among nations would suggest. In this it is not clear that we have a purely philosophical disagreement. How much opposition to war qualifies a view as “pacifist”? That is now very hard to say. After all, all decently liberal thinkers are against violence as a standardly available way of pursuing one’s ends. We all agree that if violence is to be justified, it takes something special. It should be a “last resort,” Just War theorists have classically said, and while ‘last’ is very difficult to pin down, at least, violence should be very far from the first thing a responsible nation thinks of. What’s more, the “something special” is not just that one’s ends are so important. It has to be that the violence would be employed in defense, of self or of other innocent parties under threat. So if there is genuine disagreement, it must be along this line: that we are morally required to make very substantial sacrifices in the pursuits of our otherwise legitimate interests, including our interests in security, in order to avoid using the violence of war. Is this reasonable? I think not. We should, of course, be reasonable, and that includes refraining from violence—except when the violence is necessary to counter the aggressive violence of others. For we reason, on practical matters, in terms of benefits and costs. Agents, especially political agents, can, alas, benefit from violence where that violence is unilateral. Thus it is rational to see to it that it won’t be unilateral. And when it is not unilateral, then the balance is in favor—strongly in favor—of peace. It remains that we must, alas, be able to make war in the possible case that we can’t have peace. When everybody shares the preference for peace, then we can scale down and hopefully even eliminate war-making capability. (Contemporary nations have already scaled down considerably—there have been few wars in the classic sense of military exchanges between states as such in recent times.) But until the scaling down is universal and includes a genuine renunciation of the use of warlike methods to achieve ends other than genuine self-defense, what most of us think of as “pacifism” is a non-option in the near run.     

The Person and work of Christ in the theology of Heinrich Bullinger

In christology, as elsewhere, Bullinger's approach is both biblical and patristic. Although the starting point is biblical, the emphasis is often patristic, especially when he is engaged in controversy. He begins with the Person of Christ — stressing the divinity. This is the basis for what he says on the work of Christ, not least as mediator. This determined his use of traditional language (one Person, two natures), but the emphasis, especially in debates on the Eucharist, is on the distinction of the two natures. The fundamental importance of christology is evident in the way his 1534 work on the two natures of Christ, described as an orthodox and Catholic confession refuting various heresies, prefaces the collected edition of his commentaries on the epistles. It is shown how Bullinger defends the use of non-biblical terms in the classic definition as consonant with Scripture and necessary because of the cunning of heretics. In his biblical approach he uses first testimony, and then argument.     

Gender asymmetry in common couple violence

In companion studies I examine the acceptability of two forms of “common couple violence” that vary in seventy. According to Johnson (1995), common couple violence is enacted equally by both men and women, is therefore gender symmetrical, and can be distinguished from patriarchal terrorism, which often includes frequent and systematic violence enacted by men in the control and domination of women. The 160 randomly selected respondents in Study 1 (representative of a midsize northeastern American university) were asked whether they would be likely to hit their partner, and whether they would expect to be hit, in any one of 10 situations common to a dating relationship. Contrary to the expectations of gender symmetry, 83% of the women indicated they would be at least somewhat likely to hit their partner in any one situation compared to 53% of the men. Men were also more likely to report expecting to be hit (70%) than women (50%). Interactions of gender with dating status or year in school cannot account for these findings: however, women and men differ in their motivations. Although most men enact violence for reasons similar to women—because they are angry or contused—a sizable minority of men invoke violence because of strong feelings like love or hate. Study 2 queried 97 randomly selected students about their willingness to use a more serious form of violence (i.e., beating up their partner). Findings were similar to Study 1 with one exception. In most instances, women report a greater expectation of being beaten.     

“Cow Is a Mother,Mothers Can Do Anything for Their Children!” Gaushalas as Landscapes of Anthropatriarchy and Hindu Patriarchy

This article argues that gaushalas, or cow shelters, in India are mobilized as sites of Hindutva or Hindu ultranationalism, where it is a “vulnerable” Hindu Indian nation—or the “Hindu mother cow” as Mother India—who needs “sanctuary” from predatory Muslim males. Gaushalas are rendered spaces of (re)production of cows as political, religious, and economic capital, and sustained by the combined and compatible narratives of “anthropatriarchy” and Hindu patriarchy. Anthropatriarchy is framed as the human enactment of gendered oppressions upon animal bodies, and is crucial to sustaining all animal agriculture. Hindu patriarchy refers to the instrumentalization of female and feminized bodies (women, cows, “Mother India”) as “mothers” and cultural guardians of a “pure” Hindu civilization. Both patriarchies commodify bovine motherhood and breastmilk. which this article frames as a feminist issue. Through empirical research, this article demonstrates that gaushalas generally function as spaces of exploitation, incarceration, and gendered violence for the animals. The article broadens posthumanist feminist theory to illustrate how bovine bodies, akin to women's bodies, are mobilized as productive, reproductive, and symbolic capital to advance Hindu extremism and ultranationalism. It subjectifies animal bodies as landscapes of nation‐making using ecofeminism and its subfield of vegan feminism.