Mental rotation: An event-related potential study with a validated mental rotation task

Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded while subjects performed a validated mental rotation task, taken from the cognitive psychology literature. These ERPs show a late posterior negativity relative to a baseline condition requiring all of the same perceptual and cognitive processes except for the mental rotation itself. Our tentative identification of this posterior negativity with mental rotation is further supported by the finding that it varies systematically with the amount of mental rotation required on a trial by trial basis in the experimental task. We conclude that this late negativity is an ERP marker of the mental rotation process, and that this process engages primarily posterior brain regions.     

Processing two tasks with varying task order: central stage duration influences central processing order

In a recent study, Sigman and Dehaene (2006, PLoS Biology, 4, 1227–1238) reported that perceptual processing duration influences processing order of two tasks in the psychological refractory period paradigm (PRP). The present study examines whether the duration of central processes also influences processing order. For this purpose, we employed letter tasks with different central processing durations and varied task order in the PRP. In one part of the experiment, a tone discrimination task was combined with a similar time-consuming letter discrimination task. In the other part, the tone task was combined with a more time-consuming letter task, which required a mental rotation of the letter thereby prolonging central processing. If the duration of central processes influences processing order, participants should perform the tone task first more often when it is presented with the more time-consuming mental rotation task, than when it is presented with the similar time-consuming letter task. The results clearly confirm this prediction and thus show that not only perceptual processing duration but also central processing duration affects processing order in a dual-task situation. We suggest that the reported effect mirrors a tendency of participants to minimize total reaction time to both tasks by reducing slack time.     

The Role of Gesture in Supporting Mental Representations: The Case of Mental Abacus Arithmetic

People frequently gesture when problem‐solving, particularly on tasks that require spatial transformation. Gesture often facilitates task performance by interacting with internal mental representations, but how this process works is not well understood. We investigated this question by exploring the case of mental abacus (MA), a technique in which users not only imagine moving beads on an abacus to compute sums, but also produce movements in gestures that accompany the calculations. Because the content of MA is transparent and readily manipulated, the task offers a unique window onto how gestures interface with mental representations. We find that the size and number of MA gestures reflect the length and difficulty of math problems. Also, by selectively interfering with aspects of gesture, we find that participants perform significantly worse on MA under motor interference, but that perceptual feedback is not critical for success on the task. We conclude that premotor processes involved in the planning of gestures are critical to mental representation in MA.     

Priming in deduction: a spatial arrangement task

The mental model theory assumes that people reason by manipulating mental representations of states of the word, called "mental models." In the present study we used a new deduction task based on diagrammatic premises. We show that a premise can prime other premises that induce similar mental models in a way analogous to the case of words with related meanings, which prime one another. We present three experiments. In Experiment 1 we used an evaluation task. In Experiment 2, a construction task was used. The priming effect was obtained in both cases. In a third experiment we show that the priming effect was still present when partcipants were instructed to ignore a prime displayed before the premises. In all three experiments we compared determinate and indeterminate problems and found faster responses in the former.     

The effects of driving environment complexity and dual tasking on drivers’ mental workload and eye blink behavior

The goal of the present study was to assess the effectiveness of eye blink behavior in measuring drivers’ mental workload. Previous research has shown that when mental workload increases with the primary task difficulty, blink frequency drops. On the opposite, the number of blinks increases when a cognitive secondary task has to be performed concurrently. However, the combined effects of the primary task difficulty and dual-tasking on blink rate have not been investigated. The present study was thus designed to vary systematically both the primary driving task and the cognitive secondary task demand to examine their combined effects on blink rate. The driving task was manipulated by varying the complexity of a simulated driving environment. The cognitive load was manipulated using a concurrent simple reaction time task or a complex calculation task. The results confirmed that eye blink frequency was a sensitive measure to elicit increased mental workload level coming from the driving environment. They also confirmed that blink rate increased with the introduction of a cognitive secondary task while blink duration was not affected. However, eye blink behavior did not provide a clear mental workload signature when driving task demands and dual-task conditions were varied simultaneously. The overall picture goes against the suitability of eye blink behavior to monitor drivers’ states at least when external and internal demands interact.     

Mental planning and the Tower of London task

The Tower of London (TOL) task has been used extensively as a test of planning ability in neuropsychological patients and normal populations. Participants are asked to preplan mentally a sequence of moves to match a start set of discs to a goal, and then to execute the moves one by one. The mental preplanning stage has been identified as critical to efficient performance. The current experiments examined whether manipulations of mental preplanning influence performance on the TOL. In Experiment 1, the effect of different planning instructions was examined. Those told to make full mental plans spent considerably longer in planning than participants given no specific planning instructions, yet there was no effect of instruction condition on the efficiency of executing plans. Experiment 2 investigated whether people were able to plan mentally, by looking at their ability to identify intermediate states of an optimum mental plan. Results indicated that most individuals could make accurate preplans up to two subgoals ahead, but not three. However, making an efficient preplan did not result in better subsequent execution of moves to solve the TOL trial. It is concluded that people can make effective mental plans for a limited number of moves. However, on the TOL task, mental preplanning does not offer benefits in terms of quicker performance, or more accurate solution. The nature of planning in the TOL task is therefore questioned.     

The role of prior task experience in temporal misestimation

The effect of experience with a preceding task on the accuracy of predictions of duration was examined in three experiments, where two tasks comprising similar or different mental operators were performed consecutively. Results supported an anchoring account of misestimation, which states that misestimation occurs because predictions are anchored to the duration of the preceding task. Preceding performance of a longer task led to overestimation on a shorter task with similar mental operators (Experiment 1), whereas preceding performance of a shorter task comprising similar or different mental operators led to underestimation on a longer task (Experiments 1 to 3). Contrary to the planning fallacy account (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), these findings indicate that preceding task performance is considered when predicting duration, but that using such information does not necessarily improve accuracy.     

The role of prior task experience in temporal misestimation

The effect of experience with a preceding task on the accuracy of predictions of duration was examined in three experiments, where two tasks comprising similar or different mental operators were performed consecutively. Results supported an anchoring account of misestimation, which states that misestimation occurs because predictions are anchored to the duration of the preceding task. Preceding performance of a longer task led to overestimation on a shorter task with similar mental operators (Experiment 1), whereas preceding performance of a shorter task comprising similar or different mental operators led to underestimation on a longer task (Experiments 1 to 3). Contrary to the planning fallacy account (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), these findings indicate that preceding task performance is considered when predicting duration, but that using such information does not necessarily improve accuracy.     

比例推理的过度使用及其认知机制:一项发展性的负启动研究

从抑制控制模型出发,采用负启动范式探究过度使用比例推理的认知机制。研究包括3个实验,以小学生、中学生和大学生为被试,分别考察了抑制控制在解决缺值应用题、图片推理任务中的作用,以及数字比(整数比、非整数比)是否对抑制控制过程有影响。结果发现:小学生、中学生和大学生在两类实验任务中均出现了负启动效应,但负启动量不存在年级差异;在图片推理任务中,不同数字比类型下的负启动量具有显著差异。研究结果支持了抑制控制模型的观点,即成功解决问题不仅需要掌握问题的内在逻辑,更需要对不恰当策略进行抑制;在解决问题的过程中,无论是儿童、青少年还是成人都需要抑制控制的参与,三者在抑制控制效率上没有差异;数字比类型对抑制过程有影响,但仅限于图片推理问题。     

Problem Variables that Promote Incubation Effects

Three studies sought to determine whether incubation effects could be reliably generated in a problem‐solving task. Experimental variables manipulated were the duration of the interval between two problem‐solving opportunities and the activity performed by the problem solvers during the interval. A multi‐solution anagram task was used which required problem solvers to generate five‐letter words from the letters in a ten‐letter “starter” word until they could produce no more words. After a break (the incubation period) the problem solvers returned to the anagram task anew. Some participants also engaged in an activity related to the anagram task during the break which was expected to prime potential solutions that would emerge during the second problem‐solving attempt. In all conditions problem solvers were able to generate new responses after the break, thus demonstrating a reliable incubation effect. The optimal incubation period was between 15 and 30 min long. The priming task increased the number of solutions to the anagram task on the second attempt, suggesting that exposure to solution ideas during the incubation period may facilitate an incubation effect during problem solving.     

Mental causation and explanatory exclusion

Kim argues that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event. The existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate this principle. We can avoid violating it only if we suppose that mental causal relationships supervene on physical causal relationships. I argue that although his solution is attractive in many respects, it will not do as it stands. I propose an alternate understanding of supervenient causation which preserves the advantages of Kim's account while avoiding the problems. My analysis involves appeal to counterfactuals. Any counterfactual analysis must confront the problem that mental states appear to be screened off from causal relevance by physical states. I argue that screening off is not a problem, because cases in which mental states appear to be screened off are cases in which background conditions are not held constant.     

The relation between problem categorization and problem solving among experts and novices

These investigations were conducted to examine the relationship between problem-solving ability and the criteria used to decide that two classical mechanics problems would be solved similarly. We began by comparing experts and novices on a similarity judgment task and found that the experts predominantly relied on the problems' deep structures in deciding on similarity of solution, although the presence of surface-feature similarity had a clear adverse effect on performance. The novices relied predominantly on surface features, but were capable of using the problems' deep structures under certain conditions. In a second experiment, we compared groups of novices, at the same level of experience, who tended to employ different types of reasoning in making similarity judgments. Compared to novices who relied predominantly on surface features, novices who made greater use of principles tended to categorize problems similarly to how experts categorized them, as well as score higher in problem solving. These results suggest that principles play a fundamental role in the organization of conceptual and procedural knowledge for good problem solvers at all levels.     

Dissociable stages of problem solving (I): temporal characteristics revealed by eye-movement analyses

Understanding the functional neuroanatomy of planning and problem solving may substantially benefit from better insight into the chronology of the cognitive processes involved. Based on the assumption that regularities in cognitive processing are reflected in overtly observable eye-movement patterns, here we recorded eye movements while participants worked on Tower of London (TOL) problems that comprised an experimental manipulation of different task demands. Single-trial saccade-locked analyses revealed that higher demands on forming an internal problem representation were associated with an increased number of gaze alternations between start state and goal state, but did not show any effect on the durations of these inspections of the states. In contrast, higher demands on actual planning in terms of mental manipulations of working memory contents coincided with a prolonged duration of the very last inspection of the start state (i.e., immediately preceding movement execution) but did not show any effect on the number of gaze alterations. Differential task demands on internalization and planning processes during problem solving hence selectively affect different eye-movement parameters. Moreover, these findings complement previous neuroimaging data on dissociable contributions of left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in problem solving with novel evidence for a corresponding dissociation in the eye-movement patterns reflecting the associated cognitive processes.     

Dual‐Aspect Monism

In this article, I am interested in dual‐aspect monism as a solution to the mind‐body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under‐represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual‐aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated (and interact) with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this (cor)relation. It fits well with our ordinary picture of the world, as well as with the scientific picture. It gives its rightful place to the phenomenal, qualitative, subjective character of experience, instead of reducing it or eliminating it. It does not unnecessarily multiply ontological categories. It can come in many versions, and is compatible with other interesting views, such as panpsychism.     

代数应用题项目生成的结构分析方法

自动化项目生成是近年来兴起的测量领域, 是一种以项目认知加工理论为基础的原则性项目设计(principled item design)模式。其中, 如何在项目认知模型基础上, 通过任务结构分析的方式系统全面的鉴别和提取任务特征是一个关键环节。基于已有文献中代数应用题的命题分析法、网络语言分析法、关系-函数分析法、任务分析地图等四种结构分析方法, 研究探索了能够服务于自动化项目生成的代数应用题任务结构分析方法。该分析表明, 前三种方法分别对应于个体解题过程需要形成的三种中介表征, 即问题陈述背后的命题表征、事件时空关系的情境模型、以及变量间数量关系的问题模型, 第四种方法从过程角度分析了问题解决的认知需求。然而, 要实现项目生成的特征提取需求, 尚需对现有四种方法所揭示问题特征的心理现实性、特征提取的系统性和完备性、任务领域的适用范围、以及不同方法的整合等问题开展进一步研究。     

Reasoning bias for the recall of one's own beliefs in a Smarties task for adults

While many studies in the theory of mind (ToM) literature have investigated how we understand others' mental states, few have explored the mechanism by which we reflect on our own mental states. This study examined how adults reflect on their own and others' mental states within the same ToM task. To do so, we modified the Smarties task, one of the traditional ToM tasks for children. The results showed that adult participants were biased by outcome knowledge when recalling their false belief and that the participants who overestimated their false belief also overestimated the mental states of a naive other. These results were analogous to young children's failure in the Smarties task. Considering the current findings, we discuss possible cognitive processes that are common across children and adults when reflecting on their own mental states and the mental states of others.     

The relationship between sustained attention and cognitive performance in 17–24‐month old toddlers

The purpose of this study was to investigate individual differences in sustained attention and task performance with toddlers. Participants were 61 17–24‐month old toddlers. Indices of sustained attention (duration of attention and frequency of off‐task glances) were assessed during two 4 min problem solving tasks, and then related to problem solving and the mental scale of the Bayley scales of infant development‐II (BSID‐II). As expected, toddlers who attended to tasks for longer periods of time were more successful at problem solving, and had higher scores on the BSID‐II than toddlers who attended for shorter periods of time. In addition, older toddlers had longer attention spans, more frequent off‐task glances, and were more successful at problem solving than younger toddlers. Interestingly, toddlers with more frequent off‐task glances had longer attention spans, were more successful at problem solving, and had higher BSID‐II scores than peers with fewer off‐task glances. These findings suggest that although behavioural indices can be used to identify sustained attention, the relationship between behaviours thought to capture distractibility and attention is more complex than had been previously assumed. Results are discussed in the context of current theories of infant attention and cognitive performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of intertrial interval and instructional format on skill acquisition and maintenance for children with autism spectrum disorders

We replicated and extended the study by Koegel, Dunlap, and Dyer (1980) by examining the effects of 3 intertrial‐interval (ITI) durations on skill acquisition in 2 children with autism spectrum disorders. Specifically, we compared the effect of short (2 s), progressive (2 s to 20 s), and long (20 s) ITIs on participants’ mastery of tacts or intraverbals presented in massed‐trial and varied‐trial instructional formats. We also measured (a) stereotypic and problem behavior during the ITI, (b) maintenance of skills, and (c) responding to novel adults and settings. Results showed that short ITIs in a varied‐trial format produced the most efficient acquisition of skills; however, most ITI durations produced more efficient skill acquisition in a varied format compared to a massed format. The trial format and ITI duration associated with the lowest levels of stereotypic and problem behavior during the ITI and responding during maintenance and novel adult and setting probes differed across participants.     

Cognitive load on working memory both encourages and discourages reasoning bias regarding the mental states of others

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about the mental states of others. An increasing number of studies have revealed that working memory (WM) plays an important role in ToM. The present study applied WM loads to adults during a ToM task in order to investigate the impact on mental‐state reasoning performance. The task required participants to estimate the probabilities of several possible behaviours for a protagonist following the presentation of a ToM story. Participants were also required to maintain a meaningless two‐ (light WM load) or seven‐letter English alphabet string (heavy WM load) during story comprehension and mental‐state reasoning. The results show that the combination of light WM load applied during story comprehension with heavy WM load during mental‐state reasoning results in an overestimation of the probability that the protagonist's behaviour will accord with a participant's knowledge. Conversely, a heavy WM load applied during story comprehension, regardless of the type of WM load during mental‐state reasoning, did not result in this probability estimation bias. We discuss these findings from the perspective of a WM representation account.