Hospes: The Wabash Center as a Site of Transformative Hospitality

Abstract. The Wabash Center for Teaching and Learning in Theology and Religion is a place of hospitality and its staff the epitome of the “good host.” This essay explores the meaning of hospitality, including its problematic dimensions, drawing on a number of voices and texts: Jacques Derrida's Of Hospitality; Henri M. Nouwen's Reaching Out: The Three Movements of the Spiritual Life, N. Lynne Westfield's Dear Sisters: A Womanist Practice of Hospitality, Arthur Sutherland's I Was a Stranger: A Christian Theology of Hospitality, and Kathleen Norris's “Hospitality.” Beginning with the claim that hospitality is concerned with power and grace, the essay explores the relationship between hospitality and teaching, and the modes by which the Wabash Center helps teachers both find their identities and heal.     

WEIGHTED LOTTERIES IN LIFE AND DEATH CASES

Faced with a choice between saving one stranger and saving a group of strangers, some people endorse weighted lotteries, which give a strictly greater chance of being saved to the group of strangers than the single stranger. In this paper I attempt to criticize this view. I first consider a particular version of the weighted lotteries, Frances Kamm's procedure of proportional chances, and point out two implausible implications of her proposal. Then, I consider weighted lotteries in general, and claim (1) that the correct thing to distribute is not the chance of being saved but the good of being saved, (2) that assigning some chance to the single stranger is not the only way to give a positive (and equal) respect to the people concerned, and (3) that the weighted lottery appears to be deceptive since it would show the respect to the single stranger in a negligible way.     

The ‘Connection’ Health Care Providers Make with Dying Patients

SUMMARY

The literature confirms illness and hospitalisation can become spiritual encounters for patients and their families. Further, it has been established that both patients and their families are better equipped to deal with loss and change if they have a healthily developed spiritual sense of self. The aim of the study sought to determine the benefit or otherwise of a previous model of spiritual care. It asked ‘from the perspective of the nurse and other health care providers, what constitutes spiritual care giving?’ An ethnography was undertaken where data consisted of field notes, interviews, records, and diary entries. This paper reports on interview data, from which themes were derived. The major theme titled their space is expressed via a new model of spiritual care. It was shown that when caring for patients and their relatives, nurses and other health care professionals enter the world of the other to determine the other's needs. In so doing they typify agapé (altruistic love), where the individual cares for a complete stranger as if that stranger were family. This connection with the patient and their family is the foundation for spiritual care.     

Reply to Commentaries by Dodi Goldman and Avgi Saketopoulou

In this newly fashioned dialogue that allows us three respondents to continue our first-round discussions, I treasure the opportunity of learning more about Farhi's and Milner's works through the lenses of Dodi Goldman and Avgi Saketopoulou. Both respondents bring additional important historical information to this virtual roundtable, giving me another chance of re-reading Farhi's text through these new perspectives. I think that Goldman's information about Milner's interest in the natural science contributes a great deal to my understanding of her amazing capacity to tolerate her patient's changing psychotic states. I also learn a lot from Saketopoulou's sensitive discussion of the patient's last phone call to Milner shortly before her death in which the patient informs Milner that she had failed her in similar ways as Winnicott had failed Milner. I suggest a slightly different reading of the word failure and propose that the patient's utterance was a sign of a renewed strength rather than a statement of utter disappointment. A discussion of the place of phantasy in the intra-uterine life of a baby is also included in my response.     

Hegel's real habits

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a “second nature.” This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life, if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call “real habits.” First, I show that a criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive—Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale—concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life.     

Hume's Foundational Project in the Treatise

In the Introduction to the Treatise Hume very enthusiastically announces his project to provide a secure and solid foundation for the sciences by grounding them on his science of man. And Hume indicates in the Abstract that he carries out this project in the Treatise. But most interpreters do not believe that Hume's project comes to fruition. In this paper, I offer a general reading of what I call Hume's ‘foundational project’ in the Treatise, but I focus especially on Book 1. I argue that in Book 1 much of Hume's logic is put in the service of the other sciences, in particular, mathematics and natural philosophy. I concentrate on Hume's negative thesis that many of the ideas central to the sciences are ideas that we cannot form. For Hume, this negative thesis has implications for the sciences, as many of the texts I discuss make evident. I consider and criticize different proposals for understanding these implications: the Criterion of Meaning and the ‘Inconceivability Principle’. I introduce what I call Hume's ‘No Reason to Believe’ Principle, which I argue captures more adequately the link Hume envisions between his logic, in particular his examination of ideas, and the other sciences.     

Global government or global governance? Realism and idealism in Kant's legal theory

Did Kant believe we need a world government? It has been a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship whether Kant endorsed the creation of a world state or merely a voluntary federation of states with no coercive power. I argue that Kant's main concern was with a global juridical condition, which he regarded as a rational requirement given the equal freedom and equality of individuals. However, he recognized that implementing this rational ideal requires sensitivity to contingent aspects of world politics. I will argue that Kant offers an ideal theory not disentangled from realist considerations and that he adopts what I will call methodological realism: the attempt to realize the requirements of Right (Recht) in a world governed by its own laws and mechanisms. I will illustrate this interpretation with Kant's discussion of the right of nations (Völkerrecht). The confusion in regard to Kant's actual position on the matter, I will argue, is a direct consequence of Kant's methodological realism. The article concludes by showing how Kant’'s ideas and methods can inspire us to rethink global institutions for our current global challenges.     

Subjectivity in Motion: Caribbean Women's (Dis)Articulations of Being from Fanon/Capécia to the Wonderful Adventures of Mrs. Seacole in Many Lands

In this essay I show that texts by early Caribbean women writers, such as the Wonderful Adventures of Mrs. Seacole in Many Lands, reveal and resist the effects of colonial paradigms by leaving textual traces of how such paradigms can effectively be countered and overturned. I arrive at such a reading of Seacole via an analysis of Frantz Fanon's (mis)reading of Mayotte Capécia's turn‐of‐the‐century novel, Je suis martiniquaise, in light of advances in postcolonial and feminist theory. I argue that doing so can bring us to recognize the contributions that early writings by Caribbean women have made to a broader understanding of the nature of being, across differences of “race,” class, and geography. I consider how we might recover in Capécia important models that Fanon himself replicates, yet dismisses, that predate Capécia's own text and that can be located in a text like Seacole's. In the end, I come to contend that Mary Seacole's text is more than a mere record of a “free colored” woman's life in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is, to use today's postcolonial parlance, an interventionist, hybrid text that attempts to subvert dominant discourse while participating in its circuits.     

Plato on a Mistake about Pleasure

Plato argues in Republic IX that people are often mistaken about their own pleasures and pains. One of the mistakes he focuses on is judging that an experience of ours is pleasant when, in fact, it is not. The view that such a mistake is possible is an unpopular one, and scholars have generally been dismissive of Plato's position. Thus Urmson argues not only that this position is deeply flawed, but also that it results from a confusion on Plato's part. In this paper, I show that Urmson's criticism is misguided. I then defend Plato against the idea that it is impossible for someone to make the mistake in question. In doing so, I bring out details in Plato's text and show that his account of the phenomenology involved in making this mistake is far more sophisticated than has so far been recognized.     

Insidious syncretism in the political philosophy of Huai‐nan‐tzu 1

This is a study of the ninth chapter of the Huai‐nan‐tzu, a Chinese philosophical text compiled in the mid‐second century BC. The chapter (entitled Chu‐shu [The techniques of the ruler]) has been consistently interpreted as a proposal for a benign government that is rooted in the syncretic Taoist principles of the Huai‐nan‐tzu and is designed to serve the best interests of the people. I argue, on the contrary, that the text makes skilful (and deliberately deceptive) use of vocabulary from the major philosophical traditions of the day, in an attempt to subdue all philosophical sectarianism and wrench various antecedent philosophical ideas into the justification of a supreme political state. The best interests of the people are understood as nothing more than their material needs, since the text also denies that the ruler's subjects are possessed of ‘minds’ in any philosophical sense. It is this process of systematically undermining other philosophical traditions that I call ‘insidious syncretism. ‘     

THE SERMON ON MOUNT MORIAH: FAITH AND THE SECRET IN THE GIFT OF DEATH

This essay is an investigation of three attempts to think faith. I find my starting place in Jacques Derrida's The Gift of Death, 1 one of the most important treatments of Christianity in Derrida's later thought, which was increasingly insistent in its engagement with religious questions up until his death in 2004. This reading of The Gift of Death will focus particularly on the question of secrecy and its relationship with faith, leading necessarily to an account of Derrida's reading of two of his primary references in this text: the second essay of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals 1 and Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling. 1 Rather than simply rendering a judgment on Derrida's reading, I will endeavor to read these texts together, extending (or expanding upon) Derrida's reading while questioning some of the positive formulations he makes in his own name – all the while remaining attentive to the gambles involved in thinking faith.     

Shame,Publicity, and Self‐Esteem

Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself; but on the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? I begin by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then present a theory of shame according to which shame is a response to the subject's perception that he is not thought of in the way he intrinsically values himself for being thought of by someone else. Then I go on to suggest some refinements to this basic view. First, the subject of shame is primarily concerned about his audience's attitudes toward him, not what they believe about him. And second, there may be one particular attitude which he values himself for inspiring. There is no very perspicuous term for this attitude, so I call it ‘proto‐respect’ – the attitude a social animal directs toward those it regards as valuable allies or bad enemies.     

Traces of Reduction: Marion and Heidegger on the Phenomenon of Religion

In his work, Being Given, Jean‐Luc Marion calls for a phenomenological investigation of the givenness (donation) of the phenomenon. As a phenomenologist of religion, Marion aims to give a philosophical account of the possibility of revelation, something which by definition is unconditionally given. In Being Given, he contends that his phenomenological reduction to unconditional givenness (in the figure of the saturated phenomenon) can account for religious phenomena in a way that respects the subject matter, all the while remaining philosophically neutral. In this paper I argue that Marion's aim to maintain strict philosophical neutrality interferes with his attempt to respect the subject matter of his own investigation, i.e., the givenness of revelation, since revelation is recognizably given, even as possibility, only in the non‐neutral context of an interpretive tradition. I establish the latter claim with recourse to Heidegger's early hermeneutic sketches of ‘primordial Christian religiosity.’ In turn, I call for a phenomenological Destruktion of Marion's work in order to release its potential as a non‐neutral investigation of a distinctively Catholic religiosity.     

Fichte's Fictions Revisited

Fichte's most influential presentation of his Wissenschaftslehre, which coincides with his tenure at Jena, has, ironically, been subjected to incredulity, misunderstanding, and outright hostility. In a recent essay, noted scholar Daniel Breazeale has undertaken to challenge this history of neglect and misunderstanding by pointing to the significance of striking passages from Fichte's writings in which he asserts that his philosophical system is fictional. At the same time, Breazeale also notes some of the tensions between this fictionalist reading of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre and Fichte's equally forceful insistence on the reality of his system. In this essay, I argue that these two sides of Fichte's conception of his philosophy can, in fact, be reconciled by looking more carefully at distinctions that Fichte himself draws between realities, philosophical fictions, and mere fabrications. What results is a clearer picture of Fichte's conception of transcendental philosophy that builds upon Breazeale's valuable insights.     

Zhuangzi and relativistic scepticism

Chad Hansen is one of the strongest proponents of the view that the important second chapter of Zhuangzi's Inner Chapters (The Qi Wu Lun) reveals Zhuangzi to be a relativistic sceptidst. Hansen argues that Zhuangzi is a sceptic because he is first and foremost a relativist. Hansen's argument is essentially that Zhuangzi's perspectivism, his belief that one's linguistic and conceptual perspective determines what one claims to know, makes him a thorough going relativist and sceptic. I agree that Zhuangzi is a perspectivist, but disagree with Hansen's portrayal of him as a relativistic sceptic. I first show that there is an important ambiguity in Hansen's argument. I then proceed to argue that important passages in the Qi Wu Lun (in particular the butterfly dream passage,) reveal serious problems with Hansen's interpretation of Zhuangzi's philosophical stance, I maintain that Zhuangzi is neither a sceptic nor a perspectival relativist. He is rather a perspectival realist.     

Jung,Winnicott and the divided psyche

In his review of Memories Dreams Reflections, Winnicott diagnosed Jung as suffering from a psychic split, and characterized the content and the structure of analytical psychology as primarily moulded and conditioned by Jung's own defensive quest for a ‘self that he could call his own’. This pathologizing analysis continues to be endorsed by contemporary Jungian writers. In this paper I attempt to show that Winnicott's critique is fundamentally misguided because it derives from a psychoanalytic model of the psyche, a model that regards all dissociation as necessarily pathological. I argue that Jung's understanding of the psyche differs radically from this model, and further, that it conforms by and large to the kind of dissociative model that we find in the writings of Frederic Myers, William James and Theodor Flournoy. I conclude that a fruitful relationship between psychoanalysis and analytical psychology must depend upon an awareness of these important differences between the two psychic models.     

Personal Identity and the Importance of One's Own Body: A Response to Derek Parfit

In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs.