The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.     

Regret aversion and decision process quality: Effects of regret salience on decision process carefulness

A considerable amount of past research has examined the effects of regret aversion on which options decision makers choose. However, past research has largely neglected to address the effect of regret aversion on the decision process. We conducted five experiments to examine the effect of making regret salient on decision process quality. We predicted that increased regret aversion would lead to more careful decision processing. The results consistently supported this prediction across the different decision situations, incentive structures, regret salience manipulations, and dependent variables used. In all experiments making regret salient led decision makers to take significantly longer to reach a decision. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 4 it also led participants to collect significantly more information before making a choice. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers’ memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7–10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers' memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7-10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Holistic Information Integration in Child Decision Making

Weighted‐additive (WADD) strategies require decision makers to integrate multiple values weighted by their relevance. From what age can children make choices in line with such a WADD‐strategy? We compare multi‐attribute decisions of children (6–7; 8–10; 11–12‐year‐olds) with adults in an open information‐board environment without pre‐decisional information search. In two experiments, we classify decision strategies based on individual choice patterns and find that in all age groups the majority of participants are users of a WADD‐strategy. Simple decision heuristics such as lexicographic strategies were applied rarely by children and not at all by adults. In two additional follow‐up studies, we further investigate the underlying process of WADD‐application by analysing decision latencies in combination with a retrospective think‐aloud study. Results suggest that children did not apply WADD‐strategies in a deliberate fashion in our experiments. Overall, our findings demonstrate that the ability to make good and quick decisions by holistically integrating information is already present in young children. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

决策过程中的调节匹配效应及其机制

以大学生为被试,运用实验法探讨了决策过程中调节定向与信息搜索模式之间的匹配效应及其机制。结果显示：(1) 促进定向组被试决策时更偏好基于属性的信息搜索模式,而预防定向组被试决策时更偏好基于选项的信息搜索模式;(2)当两种调节定向组被试分别使用各自所偏好的信息搜索模式制定决策时,达成了调节匹配,相比调节不匹配,这种匹配使被试对其所做选择给出了更积极的评价,即出现了调节匹配效应;(3)加工流畅性可以部分地解释这种调节匹配效应。     

The effect of accountability on susceptibility to decision errors

Recent research indicates that accountability can influence both what and how people think and might reduce decision makers' susceptibility to a variety of common judgment and choice errors. It is proposed that accountability can reduce decision errors if (1) decision makers are able to anticipate which response will be evaluated as more rational, and without concerns about accountability decision makers tend to select a different response, or (2) the normatively correct response can be identified by the more thorough and complex information processing associated with accountability. Consistent with the first proposition, four experiments demonstrated that accountability can reduce the sunk cost effect. The findings suggest that this debiasing effect reflects the subjects' expectation that they would be evaluated more favorably if they ignored sunk costs. Contrary to the second proposition, the prediction that accountable decision makers, due to their more thorough and multidimensional processing, would exhibit more consistent preferences across preference elicitation procedures was not supported in two studies. Finally, as hypothesized, accountability did not reduce a variety of decision errors for which the correct response was not known and was unlikely to be identified with more thorough information processing. These results are consistent with the notion that accountability effects in decision making are driven by the desire to be favorably evaluated and avoid criticism by others.     

On the role of recognition in decision making

In 2 experiments, the authors sought to distinguish between the claim that recognition of an object is treated simply as a cue among others for the purposes of decision making in a cue-learning task from the claim that recognition is attributed a special status with fundamental, noncompensatory properties. Results of both experiments supported the former interpretation. When recognition had a high predictive validity, it was relied on (solely) by the majority of participants; however, when other cues in the environment had higher validity, recognition was ignored, and these other cues were used. The results provide insight into when, where, and why recognition is used in decision making and also question the elevated status assigned to recognition in some frameworks (e.g., D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002).     

Are we aware of our ability to forget? Metacognitive predictions of directed forgetting

It is often important to accurately predict not only what information we will later remember, but also what information we are likely to forget. The present research examined these abilities in the context of item-method directed forgetting, to determine whether people are aware of their strategic control of remembering and forgetting, as well as what cues are used when making metacognitive judgments. Participants studied words, each of which was followed by a cue to remember (R) or forget (F) the word for an upcoming test, and also made predictions of how likely they would be to later recall each word. When asked to recall all of the words, regardless of cue, both recall and predicted recall were fairly sensitive to the R or F instructions, despite some overconfidence. A similar and stronger pattern was found when words were assigned positive or negative point values as cues to remember or forget. These findings suggest that item-based cues to remember or forget information can be successfully utilized when making metacognitive judgments, and that people are fairly aware of the control they have over both remembering and forgetting information.     

The impact of domain-specific beliefs on decisions and causal judgments

Extensive evidence suggests that people often rely on their causal beliefs in their decisions and causal judgments. To date, however, there is a dearth of research comparing the impact of causal beliefs in different domains. We conducted two experiments to map the influence of domain-specific causal beliefs on the evaluation of empirical evidence when making decisions and subsequent causal judgments. Participants made 120 decisions in a two-alternative forced-choice task, framed in either a medical or a financial domain. Before each decision, participants could actively search for information about the outcome (“occurrence of a disease” or “decrease in a company's share price”) on the basis of four cues. To analyze the strength of causal beliefs, we set two cues to have a generative relation to the outcome and two to have a preventive relation to the outcome. To examine the influence of empirical evidence, we manipulated the predictive power (i.e., cue validities) of the cues. Both experiments included a validity switch, where the four selectable cues switched from high to low validity or vice versa. Participants had to make a causal judgment about each cue before and after the validity switch. In the medical domain, participants stuck to the causal information in causal judgments, even when evidence was contradictory, while decisions showed an effect of both empirical and causal information. In contrast, in the financial domain, participants mainly adapted their decisions and judgments to the cue validities. We conclude that the strength of causal beliefs (1) is shaped by the domain, and (2) has a differential influence on the degree to which empirical evidence is taken into account in causal judgments and decision making.     

Comparative judgments with missing information: a regression and process tracing analysis

We had participants decide which one of two applicants was better qualified for a scholarship. They also judged the difference between them (comparative judgment). The applicants were described by features (grades) in different subjects (dimensions). The grades on some dimensions were missing (unique dimensions) for an alternative while all the grades were available on other dimensions (common dimensions). In a conventional regression analysis, we found that decision makers gave more weight to dimensions when they were common than when they were unique. However, this commensurability effect was limited to medium important dimensions and did not apply to dimensions of high or low importance. We also observed how participants retrieved information for the choice alternatives and analysed how importance and commensurability are reflected in the processing prior to the decision. Features on more important or common dimensions were inspected earlier than features on less important or unique dimensions. Participants preferred dimensional transitions and inspected features on unique dimensions longer than their common counterparts. This finding suggested that participants used inferences when features were missing. We propose an outline of a decision heuristic to describe decision making with missing information.     

Decision makers calibrate behavioral persistence on the basis of time-interval experience

A central question in intertemporal decision making is why people reverse their own past choices. Someone who initially prefers a long-run outcome might fail to maintain that preference for long enough to see the outcome realized. Such behavior is usually understood as reflecting preference instability or self-control failure. However, if a decision maker is unsure exactly how long an awaited outcome will be delayed, a reversal can constitute the rational, utility-maximizing course of action. In the present behavioral experiments, we placed participants in timing environments where persistence toward delayed rewards was either productive or counterproductive. Our results show that human decision makers are responsive to statistical timing cues, modulating their level of persistence according to the distribution of delay durations they encounter. We conclude that temporal expectations act as a powerful and adaptive influence on people's tendency to sustain patient decisions.     

Single-process versus multiple-strategy models of decision making: Evidence from an information intrusion paradigm

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a “take-the-best” (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the “irrelevant” information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.     

Early Stage Alzheimer's Disease Disrupts Encoding of Contextual Information

Two experiments examined whether impairments in recognition memory in early stage Alzheimer's disease (AD) were due to deficits in encoding contextual information. Normal elderly (NE) and patients diagnosed with mild stage AD learned one of two tasks. In Experiment 1 correct recognition memory required participants to remember not only what items they had experienced on a given trial but also when they had experienced them; Experiment 2 required that participants remember only what they had seen, not when they had seen it. Large recognition memory differences were found between the AD and NE groups in the experiment where time tagging was crucial for successful performance. An error analysis indicated that this was not due to the perseveration of previous learned responses. In Experiment 2, the only requisite for successful recognition was remembering what one had experienced; memory of the temporal record was not necessary for successful performance. In this instance, recognition memory for the NE and AD groups was identical. Taken together these results suggest that memory deficits found in early stage AD are partly due to impaired processing of contextual cues that provide crucial information about when events occur.     

Copy if dissatisfied,innovate if not: contrasting egg-laying decision making in an insect

The use of conspecific cues as social information in decision making is widespread among animals; but, because this social information is indirect, it is error-prone. During resource acquisition, conspecific cues also indicate the presence of competitors; therefore, decision makers are expected to utilize direct information from resources and modify their responses to social information accordingly. Here, we show that, in a non-social insect, unattractive egg-laying resources alter the behavioural response to conspecific cues from avoidance to preference, leading to resource sharing. Females of the adzuki bean beetle Callosobruchus chinensis avoid laying eggs onto beans that already have conspecific eggs. However, when we provided females with bean-sized clean glass beads with and without conspecific eggs, the females preferred to add their eggs onto the beads with eggs. The glass beads, once coated with water extracts of adzuki beans, enabled the females to behave as if they were provided with the beans: the females preferred bean-odoured glass beads to clean glass beads and they avoided the substrates with eggs. When females are provided with unattractive egg-laying substrates only, joining behaviour (i.e. copying) might be advantageous, as it takes advantage of information about positive attributes of the substrate that the focal animal might have missed. Our results suggest that given only unsatisfactory options, the benefits of copying outweigh the costs of resource competition. Our study highlights the importance of integrating multiple information sources in animal decision making.     

决策者的认知特征对决策过程及企业战略选择的影响

在不确定环境下,企业的最高决策者的个人特性和行为对于企业的战略决策起着关键的作用。本研究探讨决策者的认知特征对于战略决策的过程以及最终形成的战略决策的影响。研究采用情境实验法,根据某企业的实际情形编写了一个商业案例,案例提供了决策者所需要的信息,并制造出高不确定的情境。148名来自大学管理学院的学生被要求对于该案例进行分析并填写有关量表。对数据进行结构方程模型的分析后得到如下结果：决策者的认知复杂性和认知需要与他们对企业内外环境的周密分析具有显著的正向关系,而且通过后者影响到对于环境中蕴含的机会的判断,并最终影响是否进入某项业务的决策。     

Paradoxical effects of base rates and representation in category learning

The inverse base rate effect (IBRE) continues to be a puzzling case of decision making on the basis of conflicting information in human category learning. After being trained via feedback over trials to assign combinations of cues to high- and low-frequency categories, participants tend to respond with the low-frequency category to an otherwise perfectly conflicting pair of test cues, contrary to the category base rates. Our Experiment 1 demonstrated that decision making on the basis of an explicit summary of the cue-outcome and outcome base rate information from the standard learning task does not result in the effect. The remaining experimental conditions evaluated the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effect by systematically exploring experimental deviations between the standard learning task and the pure decision-making task. In partial disagreement with both recent theoretical accounts of the effect, these experiments indicate that asymmetric outcome representation and profound base rate neglect are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Broader theoretical implications are discussed.     

Verbalization of Decision Strategies in Multiple‐Cue Probabilistic Inference

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inference, people choose between alternatives based on several cues, each of which is differentially associated with an alternative's overall value. Various strategies have been proposed for probabilistic inference (e.g., weighted additive, tally, and take‐the‐best). These strategies differ in how many cue values they require to enact and in how they weight each cue. Do decision makers actually use any of these strategies? Ways to investigate this question include analyzing people's choices and the cues that they reveal. However, different strategies often predict the same decisions, and search behavior says nothing about whether or how people use the information that they acquire. In this research, we attempt to elucidate which strategies participants use in a multiple‐cue probabilistic inference task by examining verbal protocols, a high‐density source of process data. The promise of verbal data is in their utility for testing detailed information processing models. To that end, we apply protocol analysis in conjunction with computational simulations. We find converging evidence across outcome measures, search measures, and verbal reports that most participants use simplifying heuristics, namely take‐the‐best. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Advantages of Predictive Interval Forecasts for Non‐Expert Users and the Impact of Visualizations

Three experiments demonstrated advantages over conventional deterministic forecasts for participants making temperature estimates and precautionary decisions with predictive interval weather forecasts showing the upper and lower boundaries within which the observed value is expected with a specified probability. Participants using predictive intervals were better able to identify unreliable forecasts, expected a narrower range of outcomes, and were more decisive than were participants using deterministic forecasts. Predictive interval format was also manipulated to determine whether adding visualizations enhanced understanding. Some participants using visualizations misinterpreted predictive intervals as expressions of diurnal fluctuations (deterministic forecasts). Almost no misinterpretations occurred when the predictive interval was expressed in text alone. Moreover, no advantages were found for visualizations over text‐only formats, demonstrating that visualizations, especially those investigated in these studies, may not be suitable for expressing this concept. Thus, predictive intervals are both understandable and advantageous to non‐expert decision makers, as long as they are carefully expressed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.