Probability and radical behaviorism

The concept of probability appears to be very important in the radical behaviorism of Skinner. Yet, it seems that this probability has not been accurately defined and is still ambiguous. I give a strict, relative frequency interpretation of probability and its applicability to the data from the science of behavior as supplied by cumulative records. Two examples of stochastic processes are given that may model the data from cumulative records that result under conditions of continuous reinforcement and extinction, respectively.     

Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.     

Phenomenology,behaviorism and psychotherapy

Abstract

t “Everything begins with subjective states,” is the basic position of Phenomenology, and only through subjectivity imate reality be reached. Behaviorism, on the contrary, sees “mind” as part of the material world—the and behavior as determining man's essence (man is what he does). “Change,” which is the goal of every therapy, is attend by altering behavior which leads to changes in attitudes. The best way to alter beliefs is by controlling the behavioral cognition itself.     

A transpersonal critique of behaviorism

Behavioral psychology has been neglected by pastoral psychologists to the hurt of both. An examination of the principles of behaviorism and some of the data on the behavioral treatment of the neuroses is followed by an analysis of B.F. Skinner's philosophy of science. A critique is developed from the perspective of transpersonal psychology, concluding with a possible reconciliation of the opposites of behavioral and transpersonal ways of knowing.     

Psychological behaviorism and behaviorizing psychology

Paradigmatic or psychological behaviorism (PB), in a four-decade history of development, has been shaped by its goal, the establishment of a behaviorism that can also serve as the approach in psychology (Watson's original goal). In the process, PB has become a new generation of behaviorism with abundant heuristic avenues for development in theory, philosophy, methodology, and research. Psychology has resources, purview and problem areas, and nascent developments of many kinds, gathered in chaotic diversity, needing unification (and other things) that cognitivism cannot provide. Behaviorism can, within PB's multilevel framework for connecting and advancing both psychology and behaviorism.