A theory of catharsis

This paper first discusses the history of the idea of catharsis, suggesting that the differences between the advocates of catharsis and its critics may be reconcilable. A definition of emotion is proposed which involves interactions between biological, psychological, and social systems. This definition gives rise to a theory of catharsis which seems to reconcile the claims of the advocates of catharsis with the criticisms that have been made of their claims. The discussion of the theory also suggests methods of testing it. As a preliminary example of one such test, the results of a pilot study of the effects of laughter on tension levels are presented.     

The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure

In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.     

Ethnicity in America and feeling "American"

Ethnic group acculturation remains a concern in the United States today. In the present study, the authors explored the extent to which members of three ethnic groups (White American women, African American women, and Cuban American women) perceived themselves to be "American," how much each group felt that its members were perceived as being American by White Americans, and how these perceptions related to beliefs about their own group's economic and social status. The results showed that African Americans felt American but felt that they were not perceived as such by White Americans. African Americans also reported feeling economically and socially excluded. In contrast, Cuban Americans reported neither feeling they were American nor believing they were perceived as such by White Americans, but feelings of inclusion increased with length of residence. Implications of these results for the common ingroup identity model are discussed.     

On feeling understood and feeling well: The role of interdependence

The present research examined whether people feel happier and healthier when they feel more understood in daily social interactions. A two-week diary study showed that people reported greater life satisfaction and fewer physical symptoms on days in which they felt more understood by others. Moreover, we found that individuals who tend to see themselves in relations to others (i.e., women or those scored high on interdependent self-construal measure) showed a stronger association between daily felt understanding and daily life satisfaction or physical symptoms. These findings demonstrate that daily social experiences, such as felt understanding, are associated with daily well-being, particularly for individuals with greater interdependent self-construal.     

Formalization of Damasio's theory of emotion, feeling and core consciousness

This paper contributes an analysis and formalization of Damasio's theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are 'emotion', 'feeling' and 'feeling a feeling' (or core consciousness). In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of relevant notions of representation used by Damasio. As part of this analysis, specifications of representation relations have been verified and confirmed against the simulation model.     

The emotional feeling as a combination of two qualia: A neurophilosophical-based emotion theory

It is argued that the emotional feeling comprises the following two emotional qualia. (1) A nucleus feeling or primary emotional quale, which is the phenomenological counterpart of the end product of appraisal by the central nervous system. (2) The experience of being urged to emotion-related reflection or secondary emotional quale, which is the phenomenological counterpart of the brain's decision to inhibit pre-programmed emotional behaviour, and to initiate emotion-related reflections. Different brain modules regulate these two qualia, and thus each can be experienced independently of the other. The primary emotional quale is related to activation of the amygdala, it is emotion specific, and neutral with respect to affect. The secondary emotional quale is related to activation of the orbito-prefrontal cortex (O-PFC), and includes affective aspects.

It is argued that emotional behaviour is regulated by the following three neural mechanisms, two of which two are directly related to the two qualia. (1) An evolutionary ancient system (amygdala-system), which comprises the amygdalae and subcortical nuclei, and which activates pre-programmed emotional behaviour. (2) An evolutionary recent system (PFC-system), comprising the prefrontal cortex, which inhibits pre-programmed emotional behaviour, activates emotional reflection, generates and evaluates behavioural alternatives. In contrast to the pre-programmed behaviour, the behavioural alternatives are more likely to serve long-term goals. (3) A default mechanism, which gives rise to default (i.e., “just do something”) behaviour. The first two systems are mutually competitive, while the third mechanism takes over if either the competition between the first two mechanisms, or the decision process of the PFC-system, takes too long. This default mechanism involves the function of the medial-prefrontal cortex (M-PFC).     

Aristotle's ontogenesis: a theory of individuation which integrates the classical and developmental perspectives

The effects of the classical/developmental split in analytical psychology are described. No underlying issues explaining the nature of the split have been clearly enunciated. The schools can, however, be distinguished by their differing epistemologies. These are the hermeneutic and transcendental branches of phenomenology. The use of these epistemologies leads their proponents to either an immanent or transcendent concept of the divine, respectively. The theoretical break between Freud and Jung can, in part, be attributed to their espousal of determinism and teleology, respectively. This conflict has been continued in analytical psychology with the developmentalists most often advocating determinism, and the classicists usually championing teleology. The dissimilar causal theories lead to different concepts of the nature of individuation. Aristotle's fourfold theory of causality, of which determinism and teleology are two categories, can be seen to be an ontogenic theory rather than a classification of causal influences. Applying his theory to the process of individuation provides an ontogenesis that more accurately describes the process itself, and unifies the developmental and classical theories. Intimations of this formulation in Jung's work are described. More explicit conceptions of this idea in the work of two contemporary analytical psychologists and that of Wilfred Bion are also presented.     

Thinking about thinking and feeling about feeling

Traditional clinical psychology generally posits "mental" events that differ from "behavioral" events. Mental events are not publicly observable, take place in a different dimension from overt behavior, and are the topic of primary concern. For example, mental events are often taken to be causes of troublesome overt behavior. In addition, the mental events themselves may be regarded as troublesome, independent of their relation to any specific overt behavior. Therapy is usually aimed at fixing these troublesome mental events, under an assumption that improvement in the client's status will follow in due course. Behavior analysis has its own position on the relations among clinical matters, overt behavior, and such private events as thinking and feeling. In a behavior-analytic view, private events are behavioral phenomena rather than mental phenomena. They are not initiating causes of behavior; rather, they are themselves caused by antecedent conditions, but they may contribute to discriminative control over subsequent behavior, both verbal and nonverbal. Verbal processes are viewed as vitally important in understanding troublesome behavior. However, the circumstances that cause both the troublesome private events and the troublesome behavior in the first place still need to be addressed. Finally, clinical behavior analysis will need to market its insights into diagnosis and treatment very adroitly, because it rejects the mentalism upon which most traditional forms of therapy are predicated and the mentalism that most consumers expect to encounter.