Quantifiers in ontology

This paper is a reaction to G. Küng's and J. T. Canty's Substitutional Quantification and Leniewskian quantifiers'Theoria 36 (1970), 165–182. I reject their arguments that quantifiers in Ontology cannot be referentially interpreted but I grant that there is what can be called objectual — referential interpretation of quantifiers and that because of the unrestricted quantification in Ontology the quantifiers in Ontology should not be given a so-called objectual-referential interpretation. I explain why I am in agreement with Küng and Canty's recommendation that Ontology's quantifiers not be substitutionally interpreted even if Leniewski intended them to be so interpreted. A notion of an interpretation which is referential but yet which does not interpret as an assertor of existence of objects in a domain is developed. It is then shown that a first order version of Ontology is satisfied by those special kind of referential interpretations which read as Something as epposed to Something existing.Allatum est die 1 Junii 1976     

坚持科学的唯物论和无神论（二）——回顾：五年和八十年

《科学与无神论》杂志顾问龚育之同志的逝世是我们党的马克思主义理论事业的一个重大损失。龚育之一生,笔耕不辍,著作甚丰,撰写了大量文章和著作。1999年完成的"坚持科学的唯物论和无神论——回顾:五年和八十年",是一篇将理论、政策和历史研究同党、国家、民族的发展和兴旺紧密相联系的力作。该文三万多字,是以对话的形式写成的。文稿共分六部分:三令五申、历史传统、触目惊心、心所谓危、理论研究、政策界限。这篇文章出台背景,作者在本文前言中已经说明。勿容置疑,这篇文章在当时有其重大的现实意义,今天重读这篇文章仍然有质有文,做到了理论与实践、历史与逻辑、材料与观点的统一。他才思敏捷、追求真理、独立思考的学术品格,会永远地留在人们的心中。经龚育之同志夫人孙小礼教授的同意,本文将在《科学与无神论》杂志分四次连载。相信这篇文章的魅力、论理和时代的高度,仍然会感染我们,赞叹它对今天现实的重大意义。     

Plotinus: towards an ontology of likeness (On the One and Nous)

Plotinus’ thesis of the relationship between the One and Nous (Intellect) is central to his thought. In dealing with this relationship, he concentrates far more on what makes the One and Nous alike than on what makes them different. This is because by preference he envisages the One as the ‘causal principle () of everything’, in what might be termed a ‘top‐down’ model of metaphysics in which first cause (the One) leads downwards to second cause (Nous). Plotinus is obliged to present the distinction between the One and Nous as relative, not as absolute, precisely because he wants to show that Nous is firmly grounded in the One. The One differs from Nous to no more than the degree, and in no more than the manner, that are necessary for there to be created a Nous which is as like as possible to the One Itself.     

The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (I)

The main source of evidence for psychoanalytic theory comes from the clinical situation. Yet recent empirical studies in verbal conditioning and the social psychology of persuasion indicate that psychoanalysts and therapists of other schools are speciously validating their own theories by unwittingly influencing their patients’ behavior. In the light of this evidence it is small wonder that psychoanalysts consistently ‘validate’ psychoanalytic theory in their clinical practice while therapists of other schools ‘validate’ their own theories in their clinical practice. Although Freud was not unaware of the problems of ‘suggestion’ and the conflicting evidence of rival schools of psychotherapy, he never met these problems successfully. Contemporary psychoanalysts have added little to Freud's original position. One recent attempt, by Fritz Schmidl, to formulate new criteria for the correctness of psychoanalytic clinical interpretations, does not completely escape the problem of suggestion and has new problems of its own.     

The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (III)

Communist ideology is evolving away from its original mould. One of the decisive factors in this process is the rate of acceptance of the ‘Classical’ doctrines by the intellectuals of East‐European countries. In determining the dynamics of the process, the original doctrines and the thinking of the intellectuals are taken as sets of sentences constituting the premisses, and the manifest actual discourse of a Communist country as the set of sentences representing the conclusion. To demonstrate the conclusion from the premisses, heuristic laws are formulated accounting for the various factors conditioning the process of the interaction of Classical Communism and the thinking of the intellectuals. A logical schema of general applicability results, demonstrating the various phases of the evolution of Marxist‐Leninist ideology in East‐European countries.     

Determinism and ontology

In the philosophical literature, there are two common criteria for a physical theory to be deterministic. The older one is due to the logical empiricists, and is a purely formal criterion. The newer one can be found in the work of John Earman and David Lewis and depends on the intended interpretation of the theory. In this paper I argue that the former must be rejected, and something like the latter adopted. I then discuss the relevance of these points to the current debate over the hole argument.     

Meaning and ontology

These are two related essays. The first, “Meaning,” defends the so‐called reference theory against current criticisms. Exemplification and the intentional tie are two subsistents. Subsistence is a mode of existence; mere possibility is another. That requires two distinctions; one among four uses of ‘possible'; one among three uses of ‘same’ in the phrase ‘the same fact'; which in turn permits an adequate account of false belief. The second essay, “Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore,” displays the impact of the fundamental ontological dialectic on the development of Moore's thought. His notion of nonnatural properties provides the early cue. His eventual failure to account for false belief is traced to his eventual nominalism.     

Making ontology sensitive

The characteristic feature of phenomenology is the phenomenological constraint it exerts on its concepts: they should be embodied in concrete cases. Now, one might take that that possible match between concepts and the given would require some ontological foundation: as if the general determination provided by the concept should correspond to a particular piece of given to be found in the object itself as an abstract ??moment??. Phenomenology would then call for an ontology of abstract particulars. Against such view, the author advocates that such ontological foundation is flawed in principle, and that phenomenology as such does not call for any particular ontology: phenomenology rather introduces some kind of phenomenological constraint on the very way of ontological analysis. In order to determine what one can say to be in particular circumstances, one has to consider what one usually says to be in that kind of circumstances: on this alternative view, ontology rests on examples, as paradigmatic applications of concepts. The phenomenological move consists in disclosing how the very content of concepts depends on the ways they are applied, rather than what would be supposed to ??correspond?? to them would depend on their alleged content??as if the latter was independent of any previous connection with the given.     

Against digital ontology

The paper argues that digital ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is digital, and the universe is a computational system equivalent to a Turing Machine) should be carefully distinguished from informational ontology (the ultimate nature of reality is structural), in order to abandon the former and retain only the latter as a promising line of research. Digital vs. analogue is a Boolean dichotomy typical of our computational paradigm, but digital and analogue are only “modes of presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which reality is experienced or conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction. A preferable alternative is provided by an informational approach to structural realism, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge of its structures. The most reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically interacting with each other. The paper is the first part (the pars destruens) of a two-part piece of research. The pars construens, entitled “A Defence of Informational Structural Realism”, is developed in a separate article, also published in this journal.