On the explanatory power of hallucination

Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.

     

Ambiguity aversion: the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities

Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion. The ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky (1995). We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a experiment that confirms our hypothesis.     

The explanatory power of theism

Special thanks to Alvin Plantinga, Michael Detlefsen and William Alston for many helpful suggestions.     

Explanations versus applications: the explanatory power of valuable beliefs

People hold beliefs that vary not only in their perceived truth, but also in their value to the believer--their meaning, relevance, and importance. We argue that a belief's value is determined, at least in part, by its explanatory power. Highly valuable beliefs are those that can uniquely explain and organize a diverse set of observations. Less valuable beliefs, in contrast, are those that can be explained by other observations, or that explain and organize few observations. The results of three experiments are consistent with these hypotheses. These experiments demonstrate that applying either scientific or religious beliefs to explain other observations increases the perceived value of those beliefs, whereas generating explanations for the existence of beliefs decreases their perceived value. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for people's resistance to explaining their own beliefs, for the perceived value of science and religion, and for culture wars between people holding opposing beliefs.     

The explanatory power of local miracle compatibilism

Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge, I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist’s analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism.     

The explanatory power of the substance view of persons.

The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author (1) presents a brief definition of the substance view; (2) argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such (e.g., when on is temporarily comatose), why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and (3) responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception.     

Understanding and estimating the power to detect cross-level interaction effects in multilevel modeling

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 97(5) of Journal of Applied Psychology (see record 2012-18665-001). The article contained production-related errors in a number of the statistical symbols presented in Table 1, the Power in Multilevel Designs section, the Simulation Study section, and the Appendix.] Cross-level interaction effects lie at the heart of multilevel contingency and interactionism theories. Researchers have often lamented the difficulty of finding hypothesized cross-level interactions, and to date there has been no means by which the statistical power of such tests can be evaluated. We develop such a method and report results of a large-scale simulation study, verify its accuracy, and provide evidence regarding the relative importance of factors that affect the power to detect cross-level interactions. Our results indicate that the statistical power to detect cross-level interactions is determined primarily by the magnitude of the cross-level interaction, the standard deviation of lower level slopes, and the lower and upper level sample sizes. We provide a Monte Carlo tool that enables researchers to a priori design more efficient multilevel studies and provides a means by which they can better interpret potential explanations for nonsignificant results. We conclude with recommendations for how scholars might design future multilevel studies that will lead to more accurate inferences regarding the presence of cross-level interactions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.     

从“想”到“做”——卢比孔模型的解释力和应用

卢比孔模型包括四个阶段(前决策、前行动、行动和后行动)、三种意向(目标、执行和评价)及调控机制,旨在勾画愿望如何转换为具体行动。过往的研究聚焦于心理定势和执行意向,近年则扩及于消费和健康心理学等领域中。透过对照何谓好理论的准则及检视其他动机理论的局限,卢比孔模型的优点呈现为建构上的简约,能区分动机和意志过程并体现其复杂性,且应用广泛。针对此模型的拓展,可就往昔被忽略的环节进行更细致的研究。     

The emergence of representation in search: Understanding the hider as an independent agent

Corrigan's results point the way toward a reconceptualization of how the development of representation affects search. The child does not cognitively recreate the invisible displacements of the object. Instead she seems to understand that the hider is an independent agent who can use simple hiding strategies that the child does not directly perceive. This representational skill for search, we propose, is one realization of a general representational capacity that emerges late in the second year. The general capacity is defined structurally as the ability to coordinate two sensorimotor systems into a single skill. Although there seem to be some discontinuities in the emergence of the representational capacity, its development is mostly gradual and continuous.     

Understanding the nature of the general factor of intelligence: the role of individual differences in neural plasticity as an explanatory mechanism

The nature of the general factor of intelligence, or g, is examined. This article begins by observing that the finding of a general factor of intelligence appears to be inconsistent with current findings in neuroscience and cognitive science, where specific connections are argued to be critical for different intellectual abilities and the brain is argued to develop these connections in response to environmental stimuli. However, it is then observed that if people differed in neural plasticity, or the ability to adapt their connections to the environment, then those highly developed in one intellectual ability would be highly developed in other intellectual abilities as well. Simulations are then used to confirm that such a pattern would be obtained. Such a model is also shown to account for many other findings in the field of intelligence that are currently unexplained. A critical period for intellectual development is then emphasized.     

The spatial representation of power in children

Previous evidence demonstrates that power is mentally represented as vertical space by adults. However, little is known about how power is mentally represented in children. The current research examines such representations. The influence of vertical information (motor cues) was tested in both an explicit power evaluation task (judge whether labels refer to powerless or powerful groups) and an incidental task (judge whether labels refer to people or animals). The results showed that when power was explicitly evaluated, vertical motor responses interfered with responding in children and adults, i.e., they responded to words representing powerful groups faster with the up than the down cursor key (and vice versa for powerless groups). However, this interference effect disappeared in the incidental task in children. The findings suggest that children have developed a spatial representation of power before they have been taught power–space associations formally, but that they do not judge power spontaneously.     

The roots of violence: converging psychoanalytic explanatory models for power struggles and violence in schools

This paper demonstrates that several psychoanalytic models taken together converge to collectively explain school violence and power struggles better than each does alone. Using my own experience in doing psychoanalytically informed community intervention, I approach the problem of school violence from a combination of Adlerian, Stollerian, dialectical social systems, and Klein-Bion perspectives. This integrated model is then applied to the Columbine High School massacre in Littleton, Colorado.     

Bayesian structural equation modeling: A more flexible representation of substantive theory

This article proposes a new approach to factor analysis and structural equation modeling using Bayesian analysis. The new approach replaces parameter specifications of exact zeros with approximate zeros based on informative, small-variance priors. It is argued that this produces an analysis that better reflects substantive theories. The proposed Bayesian approach is particularly beneficial in applications where parameters are added to a conventional model such that a nonidentified model is obtained if maximum-likelihood estimation is applied. This approach is useful for measurement aspects of latent variable modeling, such as with confirmatory factor analysis, and the measurement part of structural equation modeling. Two application areas are studied, cross-loadings and residual correlations in confirmatory factor analysis. An example using a full structural equation model is also presented, showing an efficient way to find model misspecification. The approach encompasses 3 elements: model testing using posterior predictive checking, model estimation, and model modification. Monte Carlo simulations and real data are analyzed using Mplus. The real-data analyses use data from Holzinger and Swineford's (1939) classic mental abilities study, Big Five personality factor data from a British survey, and science achievement data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Uncle Toros: Towards Understanding Genocide through Dreams

In the fictional short story “Uncle Toros,” an aging survivor of the Armenian genocide has a recurring nightmare in which he is visited by an image of a Turkish police chief who would recruit, from Uncle Toros's native village, Armenian youth for the military. This dream is studied in terms of its image of the walnut tree, rotation about it (the alchemical circulatio), elements of Kundalini yoga (especially a blockage in Uncle Toros's throat), the idea of sacrifice (real vs. psychological), and the Jungian archetypes of the collective unconscious. The problem of identification with evil for the Armenian is raised, along with the need for an Auseinandersetzung (confrontation) through the inner experience of the unconscious with its phantom narratives and healing strength of the feminine.