On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions

This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine??s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine??s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.     

On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance.     

Meanings,propositions, and verbs

The event template for a verb is a lexical representation of the type of event that the verb can denote. Manner of motion verbs have a simple template: An entity is engaged in a manner of motion activity (e.g., walk). Change of location verbs have a different template: An entity changes from one location to another (e.g., arrive). We propose, and support empirically, that these templates determine the propositional structures of sentences in which the verbs are used.     

The value problem and the nature of knowledge

Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. If he is right, the value problem (as we know it) is not a real problem. I will argue in this paper that he is wrong about the generality claim: knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and yet he is right about the formality claim—there is more to the intuition than just the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. What this amounts to, I will argue, is that there is still a value problem but that the guiding intuition can tell us how to solve it.     

Perdurantism,fecklessness and the veil of ignorance

Philosophical Studies - There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion...     

On constructive functions ranging over propositions

It is shown that there is no constructive extensional truth-value mapping from the speciesP of all propositions into known constructive structures P.I thank W. Friedrich for discussion and a referee for remarks on this paper.     

Arbitrary reference,numbers, and propositions

Reductionist realist accounts of certain entities, such as the natural numbers and propositions, have been taken to be fatally undermined by what we may call the problem of arbitrary identification. The problem is that there are multiple and equally adequate reductions of the natural numbers to sets (see Benacerraf, 1965), as well as of propositions to unstructured or structured entities (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; King, Soames, & Speaks, 2014; Melia, 1992). This paper sets out to solve the problem by canvassing what we may call the arbitrary reference strategy. The main claims of such strategy are 2. First, we do not know which objects are the referents of proposition and numerical terms since their reference is fixed arbitrarily. Second, our ignorance of which object is picked out as the referent does not entail that no object is referred to by the relevant expression. Different articulations of the strategy are assessed, and a new one is defended.     

Imagery,propositions, and the form of internal representations

This paper has four major sections: First, we review the basic arguments offered by Pylyshyn (Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 80, 1–24) and others against using imagery as an explanatory construct in psychology. Second, we consider each of these points and find none that speak against any but the most primitive notions of imagery. Third, we review the results of various experiments on imagery. In each case, we compare two explanations of the findings: one which assumes the existence of a surface image manifesting emergent properties, and one which assumes that all internal representations are coded in terms of “abstract propositions.” We find imagery hypotheses to be at least as adequate as those based on propositional representation. Finally, we conclude that debate about the ultimate foundations of internal representation is fruitless; the empirical question is whether images have properties that cannot be derived directly from more abstract propositional structures.     

Situation models,propositions, and the fan effect

According to theories of language comprehension, people can construct multiple levels of representation: the surface form, the propositional text base, and the situation model. In this study, I looked at how the referential nature of memory probes affects the experience of retrieval interference. All the subjects memorized sentences about objects in locations (e.g., “The potted palm is in the hotel”). When memory probes were sentences and, therefore, referential and most closely associated with the situation model level, no interference was observed during retrieval for information that could be integrated into a common situation model. In contrast, interference was observed in such cases when the memory probes were concept pairs (POTTED PALM-HOTEL) and hence not directly referential. This is interpreted to mean that nonreferential memory probes involve surface form and text base representations more than do referential sentence probes.     

Nineteen propositions concerning the nature of effective thinking for career management in a turbulent world

It is argued that some of the literature on post-formal thinking, wisdom, expertise and cognition can contribute substantially to the theory and practice of careers guidance, counselling and management, but has not yet done so. Material from these interrelated strands of the adult cognitive development literature is discussed, with particular reference to the changing nature of careers. On the whole, the research and theory examined point in similar directions, and share some key concepts of relevance to careers. Propositions concerning the thought-processes characterising effective management of careers by individuals are put forward. Implications of the propositions for careers guidance and counselling are discussed