Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action”. A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency.     

A critique of humanitarian reason: agency,power, and privilege

This paper offers a critical analysis of the work of western humanitarian NGOs operating in the African continent. We argue that in most cases, NGOs and their supporters are deaf to the actual wants, needs, and desires – or, in other words, the agency – of those they are trying to aid. We do this by first offering a series of ways of understanding the ideological commitments that inform the work of many humanitarian NGOs and those who donate to them. In this, we expose the reasons leading to the failure of such individuals and organizations to recognize and take account of the agency of those they seek to help. Second, we offer evidence of the problematic outcome of this failure when coupled with a lack of recognition of the wider context of many of the conflicts that lead to the suffering of those that such NGOs intend to aid. In doing this, we expose the ways in which an NGO's own position can reinforce and contribute to the continuance of this suffering. This, we argue results from the simplified, inaccurate, and de-politicized ways in which NGOs tend to portray the problem of suffering both to those they solicit for donations and in their own conception of the problems and the ‘moral’ role that the organization itself plays in its work.     

On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency

The sense of agency is the experience of being the origin of a sensory consequence. This study investigates whether contextual beliefs modulate low-level sensorimotor processes which contribute to the emergence of the sense of agency. We looked at the influence of causal beliefs on ‘intentional binding’, a phenomenon which accompanies self-agency. Participants judged the onset-time of either an action or a sound which followed the action. They were induced to believe that the tone was either triggered by themselves or by somebody else, although, in reality, the sound was always triggered by the participants. We found that intentional binding was stronger when participants believed that they triggered the tone, compared to when they believed that another person triggered the tone. These results suggest that high-level contextual information influences sensorimotor processes responsible for generating intentional binding.     

On feeling understood and feeling well: The role of interdependence

The present research examined whether people feel happier and healthier when they feel more understood in daily social interactions. A two-week diary study showed that people reported greater life satisfaction and fewer physical symptoms on days in which they felt more understood by others. Moreover, we found that individuals who tend to see themselves in relations to others (i.e., women or those scored high on interdependent self-construal measure) showed a stronger association between daily felt understanding and daily life satisfaction or physical symptoms. These findings demonstrate that daily social experiences, such as felt understanding, are associated with daily well-being, particularly for individuals with greater interdependent self-construal.     

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. In humans, social cognition includes the ability to mindread, and many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we question the motor theory of social cognition and give reasons for our skepticism.     

The assessment of type a behaviour: A critique

Abstract

The validity of type A behaviour (TAB) as a precursor to heart disease is now increasingly subject to debate. This review examines some issues in the assessment of TAB that may have confused rather than clarified such debate. The status and interrelations between four widely used measures of TAB (Jenkins Activity Survey, Framingham Type A Scale, Bortner Rating Scale, and Structured Interview) are described, and a number of problems in their use discussed, including: differing conceptualisations of TAB, drifting criteria of assessment, failure to obtain accurate self-report of TAB, and difficulties associated with the measurement of TAB in populations other than male non-manual workers. Future research should attempt to obviate such difficulties, while elucidating pathogenic behaviours and attitudes, and how these interact with other variables to increase the risk of heart disease. Finally, the value of a state measure of TAB is discussed.     

The fluttering-heart illusion: a new hypothesis

The fluttering-heart illusion is a perceived lagging behind of a colour target on a background of a different colour when the two are oscillated together. It has been proposed that the illusion is caused by a differential in the perceptual latencies of different colours (Helmholtz 1867/1962), a differential in rod-cone latencies (von Kries 1896) and rod-cone interactions (von Grünau 1975, 1976 Vision Research 15 431-436, 437-440; 16 397-401; see list of references there). The purpose of this experiment was to assess the hypothesis that the fluttering-heart illusion is caused by a differential in the perceived velocities of chromatic and achromatic motion. To evaluate this hypothesis, we tested observers possessing normal colour vision and deuteranopes. The perceived delay of a chromatic target relative to an achromatic target was measured as a function of background cone contrast and target colour. For observers with normal colour vision, the perceived delay of the chromatic target is greater in the L-S than the L-M testing conditions. The reverse is observed in deuteranope observers. We suggest that this is caused by the absence of an L-M opponent mechanism contributing to chromatic motion in deuteranopes. Greater background cone contrasts tended to yield smaller perceived delays in both normal and deuteranope observers, indicating that greater chromatic modulation decreases the perceived delay of the colour target. These results support the hypothesis that the fluttering-heart illusion can be explained by a differential in the perceived velocities of chromatic and achromatic motion.     

The social-psychological study of conflict: Rejoinder to a critique

This paper is a rejoinder to Plon's critique of the social psychology of conflict published in this Journal. The rejoinder reviews the history of American social psychology, the meaning of ‘conflict resolution’, the nature of the dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and other related matters, which Plon has apparently misconstrued. The rejoinder criticizes Plon's crude ‘economic determinism’ version of Marxist theory and briefly considers the role of power in politics. The characteristics of the present author's social-psychological approach to conflict is outlined, and it is suggested that such an approach has direct relevance to the intellectual concerns of those who seek to bring about social change.     

The tuning-fork model of human social cognition: a critique

The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer's brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent's brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of grasping is the neural basis of the concept of e.g., grasping.     

The new history of psychology: a review and critique

In the past 30 years, the "new history of psychology" and its adherents have advocated a critical approach to scholarship, increased use of primary sources, a focus on sociopolitical forces, and the active inclusion of psychologists from underrepresented groups. This article argues that many scholars exaggerate the differences between old and new history of psychology, and that where the differences are indeed large, those discrepancies reveal certain limitations unique to the new history approach. These limitations, presented in the form of 5 questions posed to new historians, lead to a discussion of professional issues in the history of psychology.