Explanatory Unification

Explanations contribute to our understanding of the world byembedding phenomena into general nomic patterns that we recognize in the world. Manyof these patterns are, of course, causal ones, but the declaration as ``causal' often fails to determinethe explanatory power of the pattern. More important is the systematization capacity and the empiricalcontent of the pattern or theory with respect to explanations. We can specify these parameters moreprecisely within the framework of the structuralist view of theories.     

Inductive and Explanatory Irrelevance

Philosophical Studies -     

Explanatory Style and Illness

Explanatory style is an individual difference that influences people's response to bad events. The present article discusses the possibility that a pessimistic explanatory style makes illness more likely. Several studies suggest that people who offer internal, stable, and global explanations for bad events are at increased risk for morbidity and mortality. We tentatively conclude that passivity, pessimism, and low morale foreshadow disease and death, although the process by which this occurs is unclear.     

Explanatory style and health

Explanatory style, the habitual way an individual explains the causes of bad and good events, is reliably associated with future health. In this article, we review evidence from three studies which demonstrate a significant relationship between pessimism (the belief that bad events are caused by internal, stable, and global factors and good events are caused by external, unstable, and specific factors) and an increased risk for infectious disease, poor health, and early mortality. We suggest two possible mechanisms which might mediate the link between pessimism and poor health. Finally, we propose that interventions aimed at changing a pessimistic outlook might lower the probability of future illness. Supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship to Leslie P. Kamen; U.S. Public Health Service Grant MH-19064 and National Institute of Aging Grant AG05590 to Martin E. P. Seligman; U.S. Public Health Service Grant MH40142-01A1 to Martin E.P. Seligman, Joan S. Girgus, and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema. Supported in part by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Determinants and Consequences of Health-Promoting and Health-Damaging Behavior.     

Explanatory style and health

Explanatory style, the habitual way an individual explains the causes of bad and good events, is reliably associated with future health. In this article, we review evidence from three studies which demonstrate a significant relationship between pessimism (the belief that bad events are caused by internal, stable, and global factors and good events are caused by external, unstable, and specific factors) and an increased risk for infectious disease, poor health, and early mortality. We suggest two possible mechanisms which might mediate the link between pessimism and poor health. Finally, we propose that interventions aimed at changing a pessimistic outlook might lower the probability of future illness.     

Shyness: conceptualization and measurement

The concept of shyness and its measurement were investigated in a series of studies (total N = 1,687). Data collection and analysis proceeded in three phases: the revision and continued development of a measure of shyness, the Social Reticence Scale; a psychometric comparison among five measures of shyness; and an examination of the factor structure underlying the construct of shyness. Phase 1 assessed the reliability and validity of the Social Reticence Scale, including ratings of videotaped monologues and ratings by significant others. Phase 2 compared the five shyness measures with one another on indices of internal consistency and with other relevant measures of emotionality, personality, relationships, and behavior. Items from the five shyness measures were combined in a factor analysis in Phase 3, and the resulting factors were correlated with the self-report and rating data obtained in Phase 2. Overall, the results from these studies confirmed that the shyness measures were valid, reliable, and empirically distinct from measures of related constructs. Behavioral validity was observed for several of the shyness scales. Additional analyses suggested that three interpretable factors underlie responses to the shyness scales but provided little support for drawing conceptual distinctions among types of shyness. Discussion focuses on the implications of these data for the measurement and conceptualization of shyness.     

Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection

It is observed that in ordinary everyday causal explanations often just one causal factor is mentioned. One causal factor carries the explanatory burden, even if there are several causal factors that are responsible for the event to be explained. This paper deals with the question of how to account for this explanatory selection. I argue for a pragmatic stance towards explanation, that we must attend to the question–answer situation as a whole and the context of the explanation. The context of an explanation includes the inquirer's and the explainer's beliefs and presuppositions relevant for the explanation-seeking question, and these are encoded in a reference class. Furthermore I argue that the explanation-giving answer contains an implicit counterfactual claim, the explanation-giving counterfactual. The solution to the problem of explanatory selection is to be found in the presuppositions encoded by the reference class and the eg-counterfactual. In short we select as explanatory that factor which, together with the presupposition encoded in the reference class we believe will make the eg-counterfactual true. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap

Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an explanatory problem - an explanatory gap - but does not imply the existence of immaterial mental properties. Levine introduced this notion of the explanatory gap almost two decades ago. Purple Haze allows Levine to situate the explanatory gap in a broader philosophical context. He engages with those who hold that the explanatory gap is best understood as implying anti-materialist metaphysical conclusions. But he also seeks to distance himself from contemporary naturalistic philosophical theorizing about consciousness by arguing that reductive and eliminative theories of consciousness all fail. Levine's work is best seen as an attempt to firmly establish a definite status for the mind-body problem, i.e. that the mind-body problem is a real, substantive epistemological problem but emphatically not a metaphysical one. Because Levine's work is tightly focused upon contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy of mind, there is little discussion of the broader conceptual background to the mind-body problem. My aim here is to place Levine's work in a broader conceptual context. In particular, I focus on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in the belief that doing so will allow us better to understand and evaluate Levine's arguments and their place in contemporary theorizing about mentality and consciousness.     

Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism.

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Chronic pain conceptualization and religious interpretation

The pastoral counselor often interviews patients suffering from chronic pain. Many of them express religious notions about their suffering. This article examines some traditional concepts of pain and types of religious interpretations, and proposes appropiate roles for the pastoral counselor.     

The conceptualization and measurement of attributions

Substantial knowledge has been gained about the information processing that underlies attribution, biases and errors in the perception of causation and responsibility, and several types of consequences of attribution. We have far less systematic information about the adequacy of those measures typically employed to elicit attributions. Several issues in the conceptualization and measurement of attributions are explored in this paper, drawing on confirmatory factor analyses of attributions in two related samples. Central issues include: (1) the validity and reliability of several types of attributional measures; (2) the relationship between dispositional and situational attributions; and (3) the specificity and meaning of particular attributional categories.