A discriminated rapid-acquisition laboratory procedure for human continuous choice

Previous continuous choice laboratory procedures for human participants are either prohibitively time-intensive or result in inadequate fits of the generalized matching law (GML). We developed a rapid-acquisition laboratory procedure (Procedure for Rapidly Establishing Steady-State Behavior, or PRESS-B) for studying human continuous choice that reduces participant burden and produces data that is well-described by the GML. To test the procedure, 27 human participants were exposed to 9 independent concurrent random-interval random-interval reinforcement schedules over the course of a single, 37-min session. Fits of the GML to the participants' data accounted for large proportions of variance (median R²: 0.94), with parameter estimates that were similar to those previously found in human continuous choice studies [median a: 0.67; median log(b): -0.02]. In summary, PRESS-B generates human continuous choice behavior in the laboratory that conforms to the GML with limited experimental duration.     

An Algorithm to Improve Test Answer Copying Detection Using the Omega Statistic

The omega (ω) statistic is reputed to be one of the best indices for detecting answer copying on multiple choice tests, but its performance relies on the accurate estimation of copier ability, which is challenging because responses from the copiers may have been contaminated. We propose an algorithm that aims to identify and delete the suspected copied responses through probability sampling and bootstrapping. In doing so, the bias in copier ability estimation will be determined and used to update the ability estimate for calculating the modified omega (ω^m), a new statistic based on the ω. The performance of ω^m and ω were compared in a Monte Carlo simulation study under 40 typical testing conditions (2 test lengths x 4 sample sizes x 5 levels of copying). In almost all conditions, the ω^m had the same or better controlled Type I error and higher power than ω. The increase in power was particularly eminent when the source's estimated ability was higher than the copier and when 20% or 30% of items were copied. These findings support the use of the ω^m as a replacement of ω to detect answer copying in multiple choice exams.     

Methodological appraisals, advice, and historiographical models

In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion^* M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.I argue, among other things, (I) that thesis-LW is defended on some very dubious assumptions; (II) that Worrall's criterion^* M falters under three clear cases two of which at least^*M should accomodate, and that part of^* M's failure can be linked to its being hooked to thesis-LW. By arguments analogous to the ones which serve^* M, I show thatcontra John Worrall and John Watkins, thesis-LW is testable; finally, (III) if we accept arguments for thesis-LW and^* M we are left with a skeptical conclusion with respect to the choice of a historiographical model which Worrall by parity of reasoning should accept, but does not.     

How to Revise a Total Preorder

Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x ⁺ and x ⁻, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the framework presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts.     

Testing the reference-dependent model: an experiment on asymmetrically dominated reference points

Standard choice theory assumes choice to be independent of the point of reference. Based on a number of studies which challenge this assumption, Tversky and Kahneman have proposed a reference-dependent model which captures the influence of reference points on individual choice. If choice is reference-dependent, switching the reference point so that it is first dominated by x and then by y increases the likelihood of choosing y. Switching the location of an asymmetrically dominated reference point without altering the dominance relationship should also influence reference-dependent choice in a predicted manner. In this paper the reference-dependent model is tested in two experiments which focus on asymmetrically dominated reference points. The results of these experiments give further confirmation to the reference-dependent model. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The significance of rank difference coefficients of correlation

The coefficients of rank difference correlation that are barely significant at six different levels of significance are given forN's of 2 to 30. Most of the values were obtained by translation of Olds' tables of probabilities for various values of d ². Comparison of these data with those obtained by four other methods indicates that one method yields values more appropriate than those obtained from Olds' data for coefficients significant at the .01 level forN's from 11 to 25. This method also provides a convenient means of obtaining approximate values of coefficients significant at the .01 level forN's above 30. Need for caution in evaluating the significance of coefficients obtained from data involving tie rankings is indicated. The article concludes with recommendations as to choice of methods of determining the significance of rank difference coefficients.     

Value-based choice: An integrative,neuroscience-informed model of health goals

Objective: Traditional models of health behaviour focus on the roles of cognitive, personality and social-cognitive constructs (e.g. executive function, grit, self-efficacy), and give less attention to the process by which these constructs interact in the moment that a health-relevant choice is made. Health psychology needs a process-focused account of how various factors are integrated to produce the decisions that determine health behaviour.

Design: I present an integrative value-based choice model of health behaviour, which characterises the mechanism by which a variety of factors come together to determine behaviour. This model imports knowledge from research on behavioural economics and neuroscience about how choices are made to the study of health behaviour, and uses that knowledge to generate novel predictions about how to change health behaviour. I describe anomalies in value-based choice that can be exploited for health promotion, and review neuroimaging evidence about the involvement of midline dopamine structures in tracking and integrating value-related information during choice. I highlight how this knowledge can bring insights to health psychology using illustrative case of healthy eating.

Conclusion: Value-based choice is a viable model for health behaviour and opens new avenues for mechanism-focused intervention.     

Against the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mind</Emphasis> Argument

The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argument.     

Pavlovian conditioned stimulus effects upon instrumental choice behavior are reinforcer specific

In a transfer-of-control experiment with rats, Pavlovian CSs were tested for the specificity of their effects. The instrumental behavior consisted of a discriminative, conditional two-lever choice task in which qualitatively different appetitive reinforcers were contingent upon the two correct choices. In a Pavlovian phase, subjects experienced conditioning to establish either a CS⁺ or CS^? for one reinforcer or a CS⁺ or CS^? for the other reinforcer. Finally, in a test, these CSs were presented when there was the opportunity to make choice responses. The CS⁺s evoked choices of the lever which had eventuated in the reinforcer that had served as the Pavlovian US, while the CS^?s showed only a slight tendency to evoke the other choice responses. When the CSs were compounded with the original S^Ds, the CS⁺s had little effect upon the vigor of responding while the CS^?s reduced the vigor of responding to the S^D for the reinforcer that was the same as the US used in establishing the CS^?. The results are discussed in terms of associative mediational theory and the reinforcer specificity of Pavlovian conditioned excitation and inhibition.     

Coherent choice functions under uncertainty

We discuss several features of coherent choice functions—where the admissible options in a decision problem are exactly those that maximize expected utility for some probability/utility pair in fixed set S of probability/utility pairs. In this paper we consider, primarily, normal form decision problems under uncertainty—where only the probability component of S is indeterminate and utility for two privileged outcomes is determinate. Coherent choice distinguishes between each pair of sets of probabilities regardless the “shape” or “connectedness” of the sets of probabilities. We axiomatize the theory of choice functions and show these axioms are necessary for coherence. The axioms are sufficient for coherence using a set of probability/almost-state-independent utility pairs. We give sufficient conditions when a choice function satisfying our axioms is represented by a set of probability/state-independent utility pairs with a common utility.     

Maximal weakly-intuitionistic logics

This article introduces the three-valuedweakly-intuitionistic logicI ¹ as a counterpart of theparaconsistent calculusP ¹ studied in [11].I ¹ is shown to be complete with respect to certainthree-valued matrices. We also show that in the sense that any proper extension ofI ¹ collapses to classical logic.The second part shows thatI ¹ is algebraizable in the sense of Block and Pigozzi (cf. [2]) in a way very similar to the algebraization ofP ¹ given in [8].In the last part of the paper we suggest the definition of certain hierarchies of finite-valued propositional paraconsistent and weakly-intuitionistic calculi, and comment on their intrinsic interest.     

Entertainment as a Creature Comfort: Self-Control and Selection of Challenging Media

A between-subjects experiment examined selective exposure to films in an imagined self-control scenario, and if exposure would be systematically related to perceptions of the film content as challenging, enjoyable, and a should versus a want choice. Across 3 measures of selective exposure—using open-ended choice, closed-ended choice, and prospective ratings—participants in the depletion condition were less likely to select films that were cognitively challenging, affectively challenging, or a should choice. In contrast to nondepleted participants, depleted participants were more likely to select films they expected being fun, suspenseful, and less appreciated. These results provide support for the proposition that users’ momentary self-control capacity and their perception of challenge provided by content predict media choice.     

A response to the critique of rational choice theory: Lakatos' and Laudan's conceptions applied

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice ‘pathologies’ – inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions – are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules.     

Henkin Quantifiers and the Definability of Truth

Henkin quantifiers have been introduced in Henkin (1961). Walkoe (1970) studied basic model-theoretical properties of an extension L _* ¹(H) of ordinary first-order languages in which every sentence is a first-order sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. In this paper we consider a generalization of Walkoe's languages: we close L _* ¹(H) with respect to Boolean operations, and obtain the language L ¹(H). At the next level, we consider an extension L _* ²(H) of L ¹(H) in which every sentence is an L ¹(H)-sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. We repeat this construction to infinity. Using the (un)-definability of truth – in – N for these languages, we show that this hierarchy does not collapse. In addition, we compare some of the present results to the ones obtained by Kripke (1975), McGee (1991), and Hintikka (1996).     

A Logic for Multiple-source Approximation Systems with Distributed Knowledge Base

The theory of rough sets starts with the notion of an approximation space, which is a pair (U,R), U being the domain of discourse, and R an equivalence relation on U. R is taken to represent the knowledge base of an agent, and the induced partition reflects a granularity of U that is the result of a lack of complete information about the objects in U. The focus then is on approximations of concepts on the domain, in the context of the granularity. The present article studies the theory in the situation where information is obtained from different sources. The notion of approximation space is extended to define a multiple-source approximation system with distributed knowledge base, which is a tuple (U,R_P)_{Pßf N}(U,R_P)_{P\ss_f N}, where N is a set of sources and P ranges over all finite subsets of N. Each R _P is an equivalence relation on U satisfying some additional conditions, representing the knowledge base of the group P of sources. Thus each finite group of sources and hence individual source perceives the same domain differently (depending on what information the group/individual source has about the domain), and the same concept may then have approximations that differ with the groups. In order to express the notions and properties related with rough set theory in this multiple-source situation, a quantified modal logic LMSAS ^D is proposed. In LMSAS ^D , quantification ranges over modalities, making it different from modal predicate logic and modal logic with propositional quantifiers. Some fragments of LMSAS ^D are discussed and it is shown that the modal system KTB is embedded in LMSAS ^D . The epistemic logic S5^D_nS5^D_n is also embedded in LMSAS ^D , and cannot replace the latter to serve our purpose. The relationship of LMSAS ^D with first and second-order logics is presented. Issues of expressibility, axiomatization and decidability are addressed.     

On the asymptotic distribution of Pearson’s X 2 in cross-validation samples

In categorical data analysis, two-sample cross-validation is used not only for model selection but also to obtain a realistic impression of the overall predictive effectiveness of the model. The latter is of particular importance in the case of highly parametrized models capable of capturing every idiosyncracy of the calibrating sample. We show that for maximum likelihood estimators or other asymptotically efficient estimators Pearson's X ² is not asymptotically chi-square in the two-sample cross-validation framework due to extra variability induced by using different samples for estimation and goodness-of-fit testing. We propose an alternative test statistic, X _xval ², obtained as a modification of X ² which is asymptotically chi-square with C−1 degrees of freedom in cross-validation samples. Stochastically, X _xval ² ≤ X ². Furthermore, the use of X ² instead of X _xval ² with a χ _C −1² reference distribution may provide an unduly poor impression of fit of the model in the cross-validation sample. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Michael V. Levine. Requests for reprints should be sent to Albert Maydeu-Olivares, Faculty of Psychology, University of Barcelona, P. Valle de Hebrón, 171, 0835 Barcelona, Spain.     

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.     

The evaluation of linear forms

This presentation deals with the evaluation and transformation of linear forms. Especial emphasis is given to implicit methods in which it is not necessary to find the explicit values,x _i . The relation of the Aitken triple product matrixCA ^–1 B to the result of a linear transformation of linear forms is noted, and the numerical computation of this triple product matrix is indicated with the use of the simple Abbreviated Doolittle solution. Application is also made to the evaluation ofA ^–1 and ofA ^–1 C.