The Origins of Wittgenstein's Imaginary Scenarios: Something Old, Something New

The imaginary scenarios that appear in nearly every work of the later Wittgenstein – ones involving laughing cattle, disembodied eyes that see, and the like – are decidedly absent from the Tractatus. What necessitated this change in methodology? A comparison of the Tractatus with the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein's first major work after his return to philosophy, reveals that these devices are the product of something old and something new. The rationale for these devices is already present in the notion of a “propositional variable,” but Wittgenstein had little use for them until he rejected the phenomenological language and laconic style of the Tractatus.     

Something Old,Something New: Revisiting Guilford's Conception of Creative Problem Solving

Over the course of his career, Guilford produced a remarkable body of research on creative thought. Today, this research is remembered primarily for its articulation of the notion that divergent thinking plays a key role in creative thought. However, a number of other capacities relevant to understanding creative thought were identified in the course of this research effort. In this article, I review this research program as a whole with special reference to those capacities that warrant more attention in current studies of creativity. Implications for current research are discussed.     

Constructing a New Theory From Old Ideas and New Evidence

A central tenet of constructivist models of conceptual development is that children's initial conceptual level constrains how they make sense of new evidence and thus whether exposure to evidence will prompt conceptual change. Yet little experimental evidence directly examines this claim for the case of sustained, fundamental conceptual achievements. The present study combined scaling and experimental microgenetic methods to examine the processes underlying conceptual change in the context of an important conceptual achievement of early childhood—the development of a representational theory of mind. Results from 47 children (M age = 3.7 years) indicate that only children who were conceptually close to understanding false belief at the beginning of the study, and who were experimentally exposed to evidence of people acting on false beliefs, reliably developed representational theories of minds. Combined scaling and microgenetic data revealed how prior conceptual level interacts with experience, thereby providing critical experimental evidence for how conceptual change results from the interplay between conceptions and evidence.     

Social and Gendered Readings of Illness Narratives

This essay recognizes that the interactions that define medical care are problematic and that narrative is invoked to overcome these strains. Being grounded in science, medicine, too, might be influenced by a particular world-view that arose in the natural philosophy of the Scientific Revolution. If narrative responds to this sort of medicine, it may retain traces of this mindset. A feminist approach responds to this viewpoint and may used beneficially to analyze both the story of medicine and the stories within medicine. Tensions discussed from this perspective are those between sickness and health and those between patient and provider; also questioned are suitable form(s) of narrative and whose narratives are valued. Suggestions for broadening narrative to address these issues include letting the body speak for itself, overcoming the power differential in the patient/provider interaction and using standpoints to foster a more equal and just medical system.     

Reaching Higher in Community Psychology: Social Problems, Social Settings, and Social Change

Forty years after the founding of community psychology, we have yet to deliver on the full promissory note of our birth, where we were poised to address social problems, social settings, and social change. Despite some success, we are at risk for selling ourselves short, for dying out in the discipline of psychology, and for failing to improve the common good. Given changes in demographics and in the safety net, the problem of entrenched disparities is even more urgent—in perception of the other, in the provision of opportunities for development, and in outcomes. Envisioning and enabling will be critical as we work with unified purpose toward a cumulative science where failure will not be predictable.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the mid-west ECO Conference in Community Psychology held in Saugatuck, Michigan, October 2004.     

From Social Withdrawal to Social Confidence: Evidence for Possible Pathways

Children born with a possible predisposition toward shyness face many social challenges. Researchers over the past four decades have begun to identify specific factors that influence shy children’s social skill development and their level of peer acceptance. The purpose of this article is to review factors across each developmental stage that have been found to either promote or hinder the development of social competence and peer acceptance in shy children. These factors include physiological differences, caregiver influences, emotion socialization, friendships, general peer support, coping skills, organized social activities, and socioeconomic status.     

From Social Withdrawal to Social Confidence: Evidence for Possible Pathways

Children born with a possible predisposition toward shyness face many social challenges. Researchers over the past four decades have begun to identify specific factors that influence shy children’s social skill development and their level of peer acceptance. The purpose of this article is to review factors across each developmental stage that have been found to either promote or hinder the development of social competence and peer acceptance in shy children. These factors include physiological differences, caregiver influences, emotion socialization, friendships, general peer support, coping skills, organized social activities, and socioeconomic status.     

Minority Influence,Social Change,and Social Stability

From Moscovici (Social influence and social change. London, Academic Press; 1976) on, a growing body of research on minority influence has been conducted within the social psychology mainstream. A general guideline of most of the research on this topic associates minority influence with social change and innovation. Minorities have been considered as challengers to social stability, and their dynamics have been considered in relation to the mechanisms through which social changes occur and established norms are modified and evolve in human society. In the present paper, we try to extend this viewpoint by suggesting that it represents only one side of a much more complex story. We consider the conditions under which minorities produce social change as well as the conditions under which they are, instead, inclined to defend the status quo. We then suggest that an integrative account of different approaches – namely, social identity, social dominance, and system justification – might contribute to expanding the theoretical frame of minority influence.     

Anomalous Evidence,Confidence Change,and Theory Change

A novel experimental paradigm that measured theory change and confidence in participants' theories was used in three experiments to test the effects of anomalous evidence. Experiment 1 varied the amount of anomalous evidence to see if “dose size” made incremental changes in confidence toward theory change. Experiment 2 varied whether anomalous evidence was convergent (of multiple types) or replicating (similar finding repeated). Experiment 3 varied whether participants were provided with an alternative theory that explained the anomalous evidence. All experiments showed that participants' confidence changes were commensurate with the amount of anomalous evidence presented, and that larger decreases in confidence predicted theory changes. Convergent evidence and the presentation of an alternative theory led to larger confidence change. Convergent evidence also caused more theory changes. Even when people do not change theories, factors pertinent to the evidence and alternative theories decrease their confidence in their current theory and move them incrementally closer to theory change.     

Defining Background Information: A Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper discusses an aspect of the problem of old evidence which I call here the general problem of old evidence. The probability of old...     

HIV, Sex, and Social Change: Applying ESID Principles to HIV Prevention Research

The HIV epidemic has been the most significant public health crisis of the last 2 decades. Although Experimental Social Innovation and Dissemination (ESID) principles have been used by many HIV prevention researchers, the clearest application is the series of model-building and replication experiments conducted by Kelly and colleagues. The model mobilized, trained, and engaged key opinion leaders to serve as behavior change and safe-sex endorsers in their social networks. This paper illustrates how ESID principles were used to develop, test, and disseminate an innovative social model and discusses the challenges of applying ESID methodology in the midst of a public health emergency.     

Historical Inductions: New Cherries,Same Old Cherry-picking

In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic and an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism.     

Emotion in Schizophrenia: Old Mystery, New Understanding

Early theories of schizophrenia emphasized emotional features, yet empirical research into the nature of emotion in schizophrenia has only recently been conducted. Drawing from the paradigms developed by emotion researchers and theorists, a number of replicable findings on emotion in schizophrenia have now emerged. Compared with nonpatients, schizophrenia patients exhibit very few outward displays of emotion, yet they exhibit subtle, microexpressive displays. Schizophrenia patients report experiencing strong emotions in response to emotional material, yet they do not often report experiencing strong pleasant emotions in daily living. These emotion disturbances have important social and intervention implications, and they point to a number of important directions for research.     

The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change

The task of social psychology is to explain the flexibility of human beings in creating and relating to their social worlds. Social identity and self-categorization theories provide a thoroughgoing interactionist framework for achieving such a task. However, in order to do so, it is necessary to avoid reductionist misreadings of the theories that would explain human social action simply by reference to psychological processes, without examining how the play of process depends on the cultural and structural settings in which they occur. More specifically, to the extent that self-categories shape social action, flexibility is achieved through the categories to which we belong, the others with whom we compare ourselves, and the dimensions along which such comparisons occur. These are not a fixed aspect of the human condition but are a focus for argument precisely because of their world-making consequences.