Influence and development: Two basic paradigms of education

The article discusses two basic paradigms of western educational theory, namely the concept of “influence” and the concept of “development”. Two historical contextes are analyzed, John Locke's theory of human learning and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of natural development. Both theories are rejected in favour of a position beyond “influence” and “development”. This position of a theory of education (Erziehung) is marked with the term “moral communication”.     

The Limits of Toleration in John Locke's Liberal Thought

In the following paper I attempt to show how in Locke's liberalthought the individual is subject to a complex operation involvingliberation and subjugation. In A Letter on Toleration (1685),Locke argues that the individual's inward beliefs should be freed fromthe coercion of Church and State. To ensure liberty of conscience, theindividual's soul should be constituted in practice – notstructured by violence but negotiated by rational persuasion. However,as I suggest, the authority of reason is not established without anelement of violence. In his writings on education, Locke maintains thatthe right to care for one's soul should be enjoyed only after rigorousmoral training. Thus, the individual's conscience is to be freed fromoutward violence of ecclesiastic and civil powers only after first, inyouth, being subject to the moral discipline of esteem, disgrace, andshame, the inward violence of which discloses limits in Locke'sdiscourse on toleration.     

王充的教育心理思想研究

该文系统研究了王充的教育心理思想,内容包括基本观点、学习心理思想、德育心理思想、差异与教师心理思想等。     

The Establishment Of The Standard History Ofphilosophy of Education and Suppressed Traditions of Education

History of education emerges during the course of the nineteenth century in Germany and is marked by four features. It is educational, and not scientific in nature, because it was written primarily for teacher education and training; it is national, or even nationalistic; it is oriented almost exclusively towards German philosophy; and it is indebted to Lutheran Protestantism. This model of pedagogical historiography leaves its mark on the historiographies that emerged later in England, France, and the United States. Taking the example of Rousseau, this contribution makes it clear that these Lutheran and idealist premises lead to a one-sided historiography, so that the republican tradition in which Rousseau stood could be suppressed. On this basis, the paper points up the methodological necessity in historical research to examine contexts, giving up the idea of one history of education in favor of reconstruction of various traditions. The gain lies in making visible suppressed transnational languages that educational reflection made use of for centuries. In particular, a connection is revealed between the republican education of the eighteenth century in Europe and the concern with the issue of the good citizen that has preoccupied the American discussion from Jefferson to the Pragmatists to Diane Ravitch.     

Constructivism and education: education as an interpretative transformational process

This paper provides an analysis of the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead with regards the relationship between experience, meaning, language and thinking. It discusses how experience, meaning, language and thinking are based on the creative and constructive actions of individuals. Unlike what is the case in so-called radical constructivism, it is argued that the actions of the individual should be understood in a transactional way. The paper shows the implication of a transactional constructivism for education, arguing that education is the medium in which the creative and constructive actions of individuals come together in a social environment.     

Forms of trust in education and development

In this article an analysis of trust is given and two basic forms of trust are distinguished, viz., trust in powers and trust in inclinations. These forms of trust allow us to gain a better understanding in the pivotal role trust plays in the relationship between caretakers, parents and children. It is argued that it makes no sense to speak about basic mistrust of infants, and that having unlimited trust in the inclinations of adults is only a virtue in children. By having trust in both the powers and inclinations of children, parents stimulate the development of their self-confidence and moral identity.     

William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind about Human Action and Freedom

ABSTRACT

Locke’s influential discussion of agency in the chapter ‘Of Power’ in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding underwent important changes between the first and second edition. He reconsidered many of his central claims about the mind’s deliberation about actions. Locke’s position in the two editions is not only different but, as he himself points out, sometimes incompatible. This has suggested to some commentators that his change of mind was at least partly due to an external influence. Locke himself gestures towards this conclusion in the new ‘Epistle’ in the second edition Essay. One view is that William Molyneux was a notable influence, while another position is that Ralph Cudworth’s work on free will, either directly or indirectly through the influence of his daughter Damaris Masham, was an important influence. The position I develop in this paper is that the strongest candidate for an important external influence on Locke’s second edition revision is Molyneux’s close associate and friend, Irish philosopher and Archbishop of Dublin, William King. I argue that King’s criticism is a plausible influence on Locke’s reconceptualization of will and desire. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, King’s criticism appears to have been instrumental in Locke’s new emphasis on the agent’s capacity to determine what to value.     

Global basic structure and institutions: The WTO as a practical example

In this article, I discuss the location of the sources of global poverty and injustice. I take it as granted that the members of the globally lowest income group live in unacceptable conditions and suffer from injustice. Yet the source of this injustice is a debatable question. Often the existing global institutions are seen as major causes behind this injustice. By taking the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as a practical example, I aim to show that blaming the institutions as such can lead to misguided conclusions. The WTO, in fact, is quite just if one merely analyses its institutional structure. I argue that the major source of injustice are rather the prevailing power structures and the conduct of individual governments within this institutional framework, in other words the metaprocedural unfairness in the trade negotiations. I further argue that applications of Rawlsian theory of justice tend to be misleading at the global institutional level, as they focus disproportionately on the institutional structure, and tend to underestimate the relevance of the conduct of governments and the existing power structures, which allow powerful countries to use the institutional framework unjustly in their favour.     

道德困境研究的范式沿革及其理论价值

通过评述道德困境研究范式的发展过程, 系统阐释了经典两难法、加工分离法、CNI模型法和CAN算法的优缺点和理论价值。后来的研究范式均在一定程度上克服了之前研究范式的局限。加工分离法克服了经典两难法的加工纯粹性假设等局限, CNI模型法在加工分离法基础上进一步分离了道德困境决策的多种心理过程, CAN算法则修正了CNI模型法的序列加工的不恰当预设。研究范式的沿革启示研究者综合应用新方法来解决研究争议和重新审视以往道德理论, 合理应用新方法来探索其他具有潜在冲突性的研究议题。总之, 本文为道德困境及相关研究提供了方法学参考。     

康德道德研究中道德规律与道德史的内在矛盾

康德从抽象的个人建立道德规律,与他所谓的人类的道德史相矛盾。解决的办法:是团体、社会性与集体思想作为个人先在的规定性与责任与道德的源泉。     

Applicability of systems philosophy to the futuristic science of education: Dissident vistas

This dissertation is a futuristic exploration into “dissident vistas” in pedagogical science and, in fact, in human sciences in general. The scope of educational research is often narrowed and distorted by the sociopolitical needs of the established academic elite. The mainstream of the present tradition of pedagogical theory and research has failed to focus on the phenomenon of education as a whole in order to open new perspectives for its beneficial influence on the society. There has been, for decades now, a growing need for education to become a change agent —a strategic tool for serious search after goals and models relevant to the future progress of the human society. Proper new scientific attempts are necessary if education is to be seriously considered as such a change agent. It is the firm conviction of the author that any attitude of today's educationalists towards their work, other than that of serious obligation towards the future of mankind, would be ethically unsound. Certain ambiguity has always surrounded the concept of education: is education a whole system or is it a vague set of very different things (human aspirations, social conditions, intentional input, contextual circumstances, natural processes etc.)? This ambiguity must be reduced, if any explicit discussion of the role of education is sought. In pedagogical science, and indeed in most human sciences, there are very few ontological premises, and certainly no axioms, that the majority of scientists would generally agree on. Systematic ontological and epistemological study of the phenomenon of education is almost nonexistent. It is to this end that this research is hoped to contribute.     

The VIA inventory of strengths,positive youth development,and moral education

ABSTRACT

The VIA Inventory of Strengths and the VIA model were originally developed to assess and study 24 character strengths. In this paper, I discuss how the VIA Inventory and its character strength model can be applied to the field of moral education with moral philosophical considerations. First, I review previous factor analysis studies that have consistently reported factors containing candidates for moral virtues, and discuss the systematic structure and organization of VIA character strengths. Second, I discuss several issues related to the VIA model, including a lack of previous studies that directly support the moral justifiability of the model and the presence of a fundamental virtue component required for optimal moral functioning in virtue ethics, phronesis, practical wisdom, in the model. Finally, I propose future directions for research on the VIA model in order to address the aforementioned issues and facilitate the application of the model in moral education.     

Integrating cognitive and emotion paradigms to address the paradox of aging

ABSTRACT

Thirty years ago, the subfields of emotion and cognition operated relatively independently and the associated science reflected the tacit view that they were distinct constructs. Today, questions about the integration of cognition and emotion are among the most interesting questions in the field. I offer a personal view of the key changes that fuelled this shift over time and describe research from my group that unfolded in parallel and led to the identification of the positivity effect.     

孟子荀子教育思想比较

孟子和苟子分别以“性善论”和“性恶论”为教育思想的道德基础。在教育方法上孟子强调由内而外,“反求诸己”的自我教育;而苟子强调外在的礼义教化,“隆礼”、“尊师”。他们教育的目的都是为了实现儒家的“仁政”。     

学习论视角下的教育工效学理论模型的发展与应用

教育工效学是工效学研究中长期被忽视的重要研究领域,其发展以各教育工效学模型的提出为主线。本文从模型设计、模型应用和学习论视角出发,分析了Kao模型,Smith模型和六角轴模型的理论基础,发现现有的这三个模型在设计上多从工效学角度出发,与学习论的结合不够紧密。为了给信息化教学系统设计提供更有价值的理论模型和更可行的设计方法,有必要从工效学原理与教学理论的深度衔接入手,并基于学习论的视角给模型应用和完善提供一些可行的建议。     

教育变革语境中未成年人道德观念的错位与德育革新

当下教育变革中德育革新的乏力,引发了现时德育的虚弱与苍白。这种虚弱与苍白的德育现状一定程度上导致了未成年人道德观念的错位。要矫正未成年人的错误道德观念,要使错位恢复到原位,德育必须向真正的德育回归。真正德育的达致,必须革新德育。这种革新应沿着德育者形象、德育的内容、德育的方式三个维度展开。     

The importance of examples for moral education: An Aristotelian perspective

The paper develops and contrasts two views about the role of examples in moral education — one based on R.M. Hare's recent two-level conception of moral reasoning and one based on Aristotle's conception ofphronesis. It concludes that a Harean view leads to a harmful and impoverished form of moral education by encouraging children to ignore or distort the complexity of particular moral judgments. It also concludes that an Aristotelian view, by emphasizing the importance of rich examples such as those found in literature, enables children to develop and exercise a capacity for moral judgment that is sensitive to the complexities of particular moral judgments. Finally, the role of examples in public moral education in liberal pluralist societies is examined.     

Refining our understanding of the VIA Classification: Reflections on papers by Han,Miller, and Snow

ABSTRACT

Han, Miller, and Snow have written three thoughtful critiques of the VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues. In this response, I emphasize five points. First, I suggest the concept of practical wisdom may be understood in terms of three VIA strengths: prudence, judgment, and perspective. Second, recognizing that the VIA Classification is a structural model of individual traits, rather than a moral theory, can address some concerns about the model, including its failure to account for the unity of the virtues. Third, I review a three-virtue model that has emerged in recent research on the VIA strengths may provide essential elements for a taxonomy of virtue. Fourth, I raise several issues associated with the application of the VIA Classification to moral education. Finally, though the model demonstrates substantial generalizabilty across Westernized populations, research in traditional indigenous cultures remains insufficient. I conclude with a series of questions for future research.     

Humanizing education: Subjective and objective aspects

I propose that there are four standards to be met if a given educational enterprise is to be considered humane: (1) the practice to be mastered must be socially justified; (2) the disciplines pursued to master the practice must be appropriate to the practice; (3) the practice must be owned by the learner; and (4) this ownership must itself meet certain ethical requirements. The paper emphasizes the problem of ownership. It argues for a view of ownership that is communitarian. This view sees ownership as a function of identification or membership. People become committed to certain educational ends in virtue of the fact that they see themselves as members of a group and the ends as the ends of the group. It is central to this view that ownership of ends does not require full understanding or rational appraisal of such ends. I argue that a rational appraisal of ends is difficult when a novice seeks to appraise the ends of some practice both because the ends of the practice are internal to it in a way that makes grasping such ends difficult prior to mastery of the practice and because initiation into the practice will change the individual's standards of appraisal.