Attention training to reduce attention bias and social stressor reactivity: an attempt to replicate and extend previous findings

Cognitive theories suggest that social anxiety is maintained, in part, by an attentional bias toward threat. Recent research shows that a single-session of attention modification training (AMP) reduces attention bias and vulnerability to a social stressor (Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, &; Taylor, 2008). In addition, exercise may augment the effects of attention training by its direct effects on attentional control and inhibition, thereby allowing participants receiving the AMP to more effectively disengage attention from the threatening cues and shift attention to the neutral cues. We attempted to replicate and extend previous findings by randomizing participants (N = 112) to a single-session of: a) Exercise + attention training (EX + AMP); b) Rest + attention training (REST + AMP); c) Exercise + attention control condition (EX + ACC); or d) Rest + attention control condition (REST + ACC) prior to completing a public speaking challenge. We used identical assessment and training procedures to those employed by Amir et al. (2008). Results showed there was no effect of attention training on attention bias or anxiety reactivity to the speech challenge and no interactive effects of attention training and exercise on attention bias or anxiety reactivity to the speech challenge. The failure to replicate previous findings is discussed.     

The lag effect and differential organization theory: nine failures to replicate

In our first experiment, we tried to replicate and extend previous results that had provided seemingly convincing support for a differential organization explanation of the monotonically increasing lag effect in free recall. However, we failed to obtain the lag effect. Eight additional experiments also failed to replicate the lag effect. In all, we made 918 observations of performance on items repeated at each of three lags, and the mean percentage of correct free recall varied by less than one percentage point. These results suggest that there are boundary conditions limiting the generality of the monotonically increasing lag effect in free recall. In addition, caution should be exercised in accepting certain previous findings as strong evidence for a differential organization explanation of the phenomenon.     

Individual differences in conditional reasoning: A dual-process account

Dual-process theories of conditional reasoning predict that relationships among four basic logical forms, and to intellectual ability and thinking predictions, are most evident when conflict arises between experiential and analytic processing (e.g., Stanovich & West, ). To test these predictions, 210 undergraduates were presented with conditionals for which the consequents were either weakly or strongly associated with alternative antecedents (i.e., WA and SA problems, respectively). Consistent with predictions, modus ponens inferences were not related to inferences on the uncertain forms (affirmation of the consequent, denial of the antecedent). On WA problems, modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the antecedent were related to each other and to verbal ability. Modus ponens was linked to verbal ability only when disabling conditions were activated. In accord with the predictions of Stanovich and West (), on most problems, thinking dispositions predicted variance in inferences independently from verbal ability. We argue that a largely automatic experiential processing system governs performance on modus ponens, unless disablers are activated. Consciously controlled analytic processing predominates on the uncertain forms and, under some conditions, on modus tollens.     

Effects of memory load in a word-naming task: Five failures to replicate

Paap and Noel’s (1991) recent demonstration that increased memory load facilitates naming of low-frequency irregular words has been taken as strong support for dual-route theories of word naming (e.g., Coltheart, 1978). Others, however, (Jared, personal communication, March 1993; Strain, personal communication, April 1993) have been unable to replicate this effect. In the present research, five different attempts were made to determine the crucial experimental conditions required for successful replication of the Paap and Noel findings. None of these experiments produced results at all similar to those reported by Paap and Noel. A number of explanations for these failures to replicate, in terms of individual differences between Paap and Noel’s subjects and the present subjects, were evaluated. Most of these explanations were not supported by the data. The present results call into question the generalizability of the Paap and Noel findings and, hence, the strength of support they provide for dual-route theories.     

The effect of emotion on interpretation and logic in a conditional reasoning task

The effect of emotional content on logical reasoning is explored in three experiments. Theparticipants completed a conditional reasoning task (If p, then q) with emotional and neutral contents. In Experiment 1, existing emotional and neutral words were used. The emotional value of initially neutral words was experimentally manipulated in Experiments 1B and 2, using classical conditioning. In all experiments, participants were less likely to provide normatively correct answers when reasoning about emotional stimuli, compared with neutral stimuli. This was true for both negative (Experiments 1B and 2) and positive contents (Experiment 2). The participants' interpretations of the conditional statements were also measured (perceived sufficiency, necessity, causality, and plausibility). The results showed the expected relationship between interpretation and reasoning. However, emotion did not affect interpretation. Emotional and neutral conditional statements were interpreted similarly. The results are discussed in light of current models of emotion and reasoning.     

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N =?993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.     

The processing of negations in conditional reasoning: A meta-analytic case study in mental model and/or mental logic theory

We present a meta-analytic review on the processing of negations in conditional reasoning about affirmation problems (Modus Ponens: “MP”, Affirmation of the Consequent “AC”) and denial problems (Denial of the Antecedent “DA”, and Modus Tollens “MT”). Findings correct previous generalisations about the phenomena. First, the effects of negation in the part of the conditional about which an inference is made, are not constrained to denial problems. These inferential-negation effects are also observed on AC. Second, there generally are reliable effects of a negation in the clause referred to by the categorical premise, and these referred-negation effects are constrained to the logically fallacious AC and DA inferences. All findings are presented and discussed in relation to contemporary mental model (MM) and mental logic (ML) theories. It is argued that a double-negation elimination hypothesis provides a sufficient explanation of inferential-negation effects within both MM theory and ML theory, if the latter is extended by a validating search for counter examples. Both MM and ML theories adhere to a processing scheme that allows them to incorporate an account of referred-negation effects based on the thesis that counter-example frequency is modulated by the scope of a contrast class delineated by a false affirmative. We conclude that MM and ML theories provide adequate processing schemes to accommodate for the explanatory hypotheses, at least in principle. In practice, both approaches remain equivocal as regards the connectivity and interactivity with long-term memory knowledge invoked in generating, manipulating, and testing the mental representations of negative state of affairs.     

Chronometric evidence for memory retrieval in causal conditional reasoning: The case of the association strength effect

According to many models of conditional reasoning, correct responses to the uncertain forms affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA) rely on the retrieval of an alternative antecedent from semantic memory. The main prediction issuing from this hypothesis of online retrieval is that the associative strength of the relevant information in long-term memory affects the latency of its retrieval and then of the correct response of uncertainty to AC and DA. This prediction was tested in 64 adults who performed a syllogism evaluation task with familiar causal conditional premises. As predicted, correct responses of uncertainty to AC and DA were not only more frequent but also faster when the antecedent term was weakly rather than strongly associated with the consequent. In line with the semantic framework, we also observed that this strength effect in response times was reversed for incorrect responses of certainty to AC.     

Paranormal belief and errors of probabilistic reasoning: The role of constituent conditional relatedness in believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

The present study examines the extent to which stronger belief in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life-after-death is associated with a proneness to making conjunction errors (CEs). One hundred and sixty members of the UK public read eight hypothetical scenarios and for each estimated the likelihood that two constituent events alone plus their conjunction would occur. The impact of paranormal belief plus constituents’ conditional relatedness type, estimates of the subjectively less likely and more likely constituents plus relevant interaction terms tested via three Generalized Linear Mixed Models. General qualification levels were controlled for. As expected, stronger PK beliefs and depiction of a positively conditionally related (verses conditionally unrelated) constituent pairs predicted higher CE generation. ESP and LAD beliefs had no impact with, surprisingly, higher estimates of the less likely constituent predicting fewer - not more - CEs. Theoretical implications, methodological issues and ideas for future research are discussed.     

Feature binding and attention in working memory: A resolution of previous contradictory findings

We aimed to resolve an apparent contradiction between previous experiments from different laboratories, using dual-task methodology to compare effects of a concurrent executive load on immediate recognition memory for colours or shapes of items or their colour–shape combinations. Results of two experiments confirmed previous evidence that an irrelevant attentional load interferes equally with memory for features and memory for feature bindings. Detailed analyses suggested that previous contradictory evidence arose from limitations in the way recognition memory was measured. The present findings are inconsistent with an earlier suggestion that feature binding takes place within a multimodal episodic buffer Baddeley, (2000 Baddeley, A. D. 2000. The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11): 417–423. (doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01538-2)[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and support a subsequent account in which binding takes place automatically prior to information entering the episodic buffer Baddeley, Allen, & Hitch, (2011 Baddeley, A. D., Allen, R. J. and Hitch, G. J. 2011. Binding in visual working memory: The role of the episodic buffer. Neuropsychologia, 49: 1393–1400. (doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.042)[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Methodologically, the results suggest that different measures of recognition memory performance (A′, d′, corrected recognition) give a converging picture of main effects, but are less consistent in detecting interactions. We suggest that this limitation on the reliability of measuring recognition should be taken into account in future research so as to avoid problems of replication that turn out to be more apparent than real.     

Phonological priming in the lexical decision task: A failure to replicate

Some models of the lexicon predict that recognition of words should produce activation spreading to phonologically related words. Consistent with this prediction, Hillinger (1980) demonstrated priming in a visual lexical decision task for word targets preceded by graphemically similar or graphemically dissimilar primes that rhymed with the target. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether this phonological priming effect occurred automatically or because of subject strategies. Although semantically associated primes produced significant facilitation in Experiment 1, no evidence of phonological priming was obtained. Experiments 2 to 5 were conducted in an attempt to obtain the phonological priming effect. Experiment 5 was a replication of one of Hillinger’s experiments. In none of these experiments was phonological priming observed. These results indicate either that the lexicon is not organized such that spreading activation occurs on the basis of phonological similarity, or that visual lexical decisions are made without phonological mediation.     

Temporal constraint on choice: Sensitivity and bias in multiple schedules

In multiple schedules of reinforcement, ratios of responses in successive components are relatively insensitive to ratios of obtained reinforcers. An analysis is proposed that attributes changes in absolute response rates to concurrent interactions between programmed reinforcement and extraneous reinforcement in other components. The analysis predicts that ratios of responses in successive components vary with reinforcer ratios, qualified by a term describing the reinforcement context, that is, programmed and extraneous reinforcers. Two main predictions from the analysis were confirmed in an experiment in which pigeons' responses were reinforced in the components of a multiple schedule and analog extraneous reinforcement was scheduled for an alternative response in each component. Sensitivity of response and time ratios to reinforcer ratios in the multiple schedules varied as a function of the rate of extraneous reinforcers. Bias towards responding in one component of the multiple schedule varied as an inverse function of the ratios of extraneous reinforcer rate in the two components. The data from this and previous studies of multiple-concurrent performance were accurately predicted by our analysis and supported our contention that the allocation of behavior in multiple-schedule components depends on the relative values of concurrently-available reinforcers within each component.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

Probabilities,causation, and logic programming in conditional reasoning: reply to Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2016)

Oaksford and Chater (2014 Oaksford, M., &; Chater, N. (2014). Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 269–295. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.877401[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 269–295) critiqued the logic programming (LP) approach to nonmonotonicity and proposed that a Bayesian probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning provided a more empirically adequate theory. The current paper is a reply to Stenning and van Lambalgen's rejoinder to this earlier paper entitled ‘Logic programming, probability, and two-system accounts of reasoning: a rejoinder to Oaksford and Chater’ (2016) in Thinking and Reasoning. It is argued that causation is basic in human cognition and that explaining how abnormality lists are created in LP requires causal models. Each specific rejoinder to the original critique is then addressed. While many areas of agreement are identified, with respect to the key differences, it is concluded the current evidence favours the Bayesian approach, at least for the moment.