Robert Boyle and the Machine Metaphor

The seventeenth–century chemist and philosopher Robert Boyle argued that the world is like a clockwork machine. This led to the problems of the place of a Creator and of how one can explain the directed, "final–cause" nature of organisms. Boyle thought that he could wrap everything up in one neat package, with a clear place for a designing God, but of course the coming of Darwinism casts doubt on this. Nevertheless, Boyle's thinking does have some very interesting implications for the way in which we today should consider the science/religion relationship.     

Understanding a corporate symbol

After discussing the nature of corporate symbols and the factors involved in understanding them, this paper reports two studies. We test various conjectures about the process of comprehension using a single, complex corporate symbol. Three sources of information are shown to contribute to an individual's understanding of the symbol: (1) the purpose ofthe communication; (2) the properties of the symbol–graphical and referential; and (3) the context in which the symbol is seen. We also show that the process is constrained in predictable ways. We consider these studies to be a step in the development of a psychological theory to inform the process of designing symbols.     

The Concept of Harm and the Significance of Normality

Many believe that severe intellectual impairment, blindness or dying young amount to serious harm and disadvantage. It is also increasingly denied that it matters, from a moral point of view, whether something is biologically normal to humans. We show that these two claims are in serious tension. It is hard explain how, if we do not ascribe some deep moral significance to human nature or biological normality, we could distinguish severe intellectual impairment or blindness from the vast list of seemingly innocent ways in which we fail to have as much wellbeing as we could, such not having super‐intelligence, or not living to 130. We consider a range of attempts to draw this intuitive normative distinction without appealing to normality. These, we argue, all fail. But this doesn't mean that we cannot draw this distinction or that we must, implausibly, conclude that biological normality does possess an inherent moral importance. We argue that, despite appearances, it is not biological normality but rather statistical normality that, although lacking any intrinsic moral significance, nevertheless makes an important moral difference in ways that explain and largely justify the intuitive distinction.     

Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?

In this paper we raise the question whether technological artifacts can properly speaking be trusted or said to be trustworthy. First, we set out some prevalent accounts of trust and trustworthiness and explain how they compare with the engineer’s notion of reliability. We distinguish between pure rational-choice accounts of trust, which do not differ in principle from mere judgments of reliability, and what we call “motivation-attributing” accounts of trust, which attribute specific motivations to trustworthy entities. Then we consider some examples of technological entities that are, at first glance, best suited to serve as the objects of trust: intelligent systems that interact with users, and complex socio-technical systems. We conclude that the motivation-attributing concept of trustworthiness cannot be straightforwardly applied to these entities. Any applicable notion of trustworthy technology would have to depart significantly from the full-blown notion of trustworthiness associated with interpersonal trust.     

Power corrupts (or does it?): An examination of the boundary conditions of the antisocial effects of experienced power

One of the most common conclusions in the power literature is that when people feel powerful, they behave in selfish and antisocial ways. While this conclusion tends to permeate the literature, research also recognizes that there are factors that can mitigate the corrupting nature of power, and that the experience of power may also lead to more positive and prosocial outcomes. In this article, we review findings that illustrate how individual differences, the contexts in which people experience power, and their construal of power all help determine how powerful people will ultimately behave toward others. We then consider these findings in totality, and suggest that they may articulate a more complex conceptualization of power as it relates to social behaviors. Specifically, we suggest considering not only the amount of power one has but also focusing on the way individuals experience power may provide a way to reconcile the disparate findings in the social power literature. We argue that research should expand upon the possible dualistic nature of power, and how the existence of both positive and negative construals of power can influence behaviors.     

Preflexes and internal models in biomimetic robot systems

The next generation of neuroprostheses, which are aimed at the restoration of natural movement of paralysed body parts or at the natural interaction with external devices, will be quite similar to biomimetic robot systems which attempt to duplicate the organization of the biological motor control system. In the paper, we review some of the organizing principles that have emerged in the last few years and might provide useful guidelines for a biomimetic design.     

Sensational Thinking A Teaching/Learning Model for Creativity

Change, the acknowledged constant: The paradox of two seeming opposites contained as one. In the world today we find ourselves challenged by a multitude of paradoxical problems and our need to resolve these issues drives a change process, the nature of which is dynamic and complex. Dynamic change is recognized as a process of moving from one state or form to another, in ways that appear chaotic, non-linear, and unpredictable (Gleick, 1987). This results from the interactions between and among individual component parts of a system (Gleick, 1987; Bohm & Peat, 1987; Goodwin, 1991), and studies to understand how and why this type of change occurs have found that dynamic change is a creative process that occurs naturally in physical, biological and social systems.     

Bio-Inspired Design of Soft Robotic Assistive Devices: The Interface of Physics,Biology, and Behavior

Wearable assistive robotic devices are characterized by an interface, a meeting place of living tissue and mechanical forces, at which potential and kinetic energy are converted to one or the other form. Ecological scientists may make important contributions to the design of device interfaces because of a functional perspective on energy and information exchange. For ecological scientists, (a) behavioral forms are an assembly of whole functional systems from available parts, emerging in energy flows, and (b) nature explores for informationally based adaptive solutions to assemble behavioral forms by generating spontaneous patterns containing fluctuations. We present data from ongoing studies with infants that demonstrate how infants may explore for adaptive kicking solutions. Inspired by the ecological perspective and data from developing humans, ecological scientists may design interfaces to assist individuals with medical conditions that result in physical and/or mental impairment. We present one such device, what is called the “second skin,” to illustrate how a soft, prestressed material, worn on the skin surface, may be used synergistically with synthetic and biological muscles for assisting action. Our work on the second skin, thus far, suggests a set of ecologically inspired principles for design of wearable assistive robotic devices.     

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.     

Mechanisms for Robust Cognition

To function well in an unpredictable environment using unreliable components, a system must have a high degree of robustness. Robustness is fundamental to biological systems and is an objective in the design of engineered systems such as airplane engines and buildings. Cognitive systems, like biological and engineered systems, exist within variable environments. This raises the question, how do cognitive systems achieve similarly high degrees of robustness? The aim of this study was to identify a set of mechanisms that enhance robustness in cognitive systems. We identify three mechanisms that enhance robustness in biological and engineered systems: system control, redundancy, and adaptability. After surveying the psychological literature for evidence of these mechanisms, we provide simulations illustrating how each contributes to robust cognition in a different psychological domain: psychomotor vigilance, semantic memory, and strategy selection. These simulations highlight features of a mathematical approach for quantifying robustness, and they provide concrete examples of mechanisms for robust cognition.     

Transfer of adaptation between ocular saccades and arm movements

Previous studies found little or no transfer of adaptation from reactive saccades to arm pointing movements, which suggests that the two motor systems rely on distinct adaptive mechanisms. However, this conclusion is based on experiments about the adaptation of response amplitudes, which is known to follow somewhat different principles than the adaptation of response directions. In the present study, we therefore investigate whether adapting the direction of reactive saccades will transfer to arm movements. We also test transfer in the opposite direction, from the arm to the eyes. Participants executed aimed saccades or arm movements from a central starting point towards visual targets in the participants' frontal plane. Targets were presented in eight possible locations along a circle of 20 cm radius about the starting point; each remained for 200 ms in one position, and was then displaced along the circle by -15 degrees . Participants from group E adapted to these double-stepped targets while executing eye movements, and were then tested for transfer while executing arm movements. The reciprocal design was used in participants from group A. Adaptive change in group A was about 14 degrees , while in group E it was only about 7 degrees . Transfer of adaptation was substantial, and was more pronounced when using the arm (i.e., eye-to-arm transfer in group E) rather than the eyes (i.e., arm-to-eye transfer in group A). Strong aftereffects were yielded in both groups. This pattern of findings implies that the adaptive change observed in our study was mainly based on recalibration rather than on cognitive strategies (strong aftereffects), that eyes and arm had access to a common adaptive mechanism (substantial transfer), and that the arm had better access than the eyes (larger adaptation and transfer when using the arm). When considering this outcome along with the available literature, it appears that arm and eyes may rely sometimes on a common and sometimes on distinct adaptive mechanisms, depending on the adapted parameter and on the nature of the motor task.     

Anxiety and depression: toward overlapping and distinctive features

ABSTRACT

This Special Issue of Cognition and Emotion addresses one of the cardinal concerns of affective science, which is overlapping and distinctive features of anxiety and depression. A central finding in the study of anxiety and depression is that they are moderately highly correlated with each other. This leads us to the question: What is behind this co-occurrence? Possible explanations relate to poor discriminant validity of measures; both emotional states are associated with negative affect; stressful life events; impaired cognitive processes; they share a common biological/genetic diathesis. However, despite a set of common (nonspecific) features, anxiety and depression are clearly not identical emotional states. Differences between them might be best viewed, for example, through their heterogeneous and multi-layered nature, adaptive functions and relations with regulatory processes, positive affect, and motivation or complex cognitive processes. In this introduction we consider several approaches (e.g. functional approach; tripartite model and content-specificity hypothesis) to which most research in this Special Issue is relevant. In addition, we have asked contributors to this Special Issue to indicate how their own studies on comparisons between anxiety and depression and models on anxiety and depression move this area of research to more mature science with applicability.     

Distributed learning: Educating and assessing extended cognitive systems

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualizing how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalizing cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one’s cognition and to efficiently find and organize (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students’ use of the internet during exams.     

Perceptual Content,Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction

Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. Among the perceptible properties are colors and shapes, for example, and there is a long philosophical tradition of drawing and refusing to draw metaphysical distinctions between them. This paper makes a claim about the information-theoretic approach to perceptual cognition in order to argue for a fundamentally epistemological distinction between colors and shapes. What makes shapes and colors seem so different to us is how we carry information about their presence around us. In particular, we can come to know more about the shapes on the basis of perceiving them than we can come to know about the colors. One interesting feature of how this distinction is drawn is that it partially vindicates Locke’s claim that our ideas of primary qualities like shapes resemble them in ways our ideas of colors do not.     

Flexible Computerized Adaptive Tests to Detect Misconceptions and Estimate Ability Simultaneously

The Scaling Individuals and Classifying Misconceptions (SICM) model is an advanced psychometric model that can provide feedback to examinees’ misconceptions and a general ability simultaneously. These two types of feedback are represented by a discrete and a continuous latent variable, respectively, in the SICM model. The complex structure of the SICM model brings difficulties in estimating both misconception profile and ability efficiently in a linear test. To overcome this challenge, this study proposes a flexible computerized adaptive test (FCAT) design as a new test delivery method to increase test efficiency by administering an individualized test to examinees. We propose three item selection methods and two transition criteria to determine adaptive steps based on the needs of estimating one or two latent variables. Through two simulation studies, we demonstrate how to select an appropriate item selection method for an adaptive step and what transition criterion should be used between two adaptive steps. Results reveal the combination of the item selection method and the transition criterion could improve the estimation accuracy of a specific latent variable to a different extent and thus provide further guidance in designing an FCAT.     

A conditional logic for abduction

We propose a logic of abduction that (i) provides an appropriate formalization of the explanatory conditional, and that (ii) captures the defeasible nature of abductive inference. For (i), we argue that explanatory conditionals are non-classical, and rely on Brian Chellas’s work on conditional logics for providing an alternative formalization of the explanatory conditional. For (ii), we make use of the adaptive logics framework for modeling defeasible reasoning. We show how our proposal allows for a more natural reading of explanatory relations, and how it overcomes problems faced by other systems in the literature.