Nietzsche on Nobility and the Affirmation of Life

In this paper I explore Nietzsche's thinking on the notions of nobility and the affirmation of life and I subject his reflections on these to criticism. I argue that we can find at least two understandings of these notions in Nietzsche's work which I call a 'worldly' and an 'inward' conception and I explain what I mean by each of these. Drawing on Homer and Dostoyevsky, the work of both of whom was crucial for Nietzsche in developing and exploring his notion of worldly nobility and affirmation, I then go on to argue that Nietzsche provides us with no concrete examples of worldly nobles and that, given his historicism, he cannot. Thus Nietzsche's thinking here is broken-backed. I turn, therefore, to explore the inward notions of nobility and affirmation. Discussing Montaigne and Napoleon in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy, I argue that we can make good sense in Nietzschean terms of someone's affirming his own life in an inward sense. This, however, opens up the difference between someone's affirming his own life and his affirming life überhaupt, and I argue that Nietzsche needs to be able to make sense not just of the former but also of the latter. Referring once again to Dostoyevsky, I suggest that Nietzsche can only do so by accepting the idea that all human beings possess dignity qua human beings. This thought is, however, one that he rejects. Thus Nietzsche's reflections in this area cannot be rendered finally plausible since they depend upon something which can find no room in his philosophy.     

Women’s anger, epistemic personhood, and self-respect: an application of Lehrer’s work on self-trust

I argue in this paper that the work of Keith Lehrer, especially in his book Self-Trust has applications to feminist ethics; specifically care ethics, which has become the leading form of normative sentimentalist ethics. I extend Lehrer??s ideas concerning reason and justification of belief beyond what he says by applying the notion of evaluation central to his account of acceptance to the need for evaluation of emotions. The inability to evaluate and attain justification of one??s emotions is an epistemic failure that leads one not to act on one??s own aspirations and desires and treat those desires as if they did not exist. I argue that this is a common condition among women in patriarchal societies because patriarchy can cause women to believe that they are not worthy of their trust concerning what they accept, specifically acceptance of their anger over their own mistreatment. As a result, many women are unable to realize the self-protective role of their anger. All of this reflects a lack of what I shall call epistemic personhood, a concept based on Lehrer??s theory concerning the keystone role of self-trust in the epistemic arch of rationality, justification and knowledge. Lastly, I use this concept of epistemic personhood to develop a care ethical account of self-respect that counters the Kantian account.     

Losing Hope: Injustice and Moral Bitterness

In this article, I defend a conception of bitterness as a moral emotion and offer an evaluative framework for assessing when instances of bitterness are morally justified. I argue that bitterness is a form of unresolved anger involving a loss of hope that an injustice or other moral wrong will be sufficiently acknowledged and addressed. Orienting the discussion around instances of bitterness in response to social and political injustices, I argue that bitterness is sometimes morally justified even if it is ultimately undesirable to bear. I then suggest that focusing only on the harms and risks of bitterness can distract from its positive role as a moral reminder about a past or persistent injustice, indicating that there is still moral and often political work left to do. Finally, I address the concern that bearing bitterness may lead to despair and inaction. I respond by arguing that moral agents can and do persist in their moral and political struggles with bitterness, and without hope that their efforts will be successful.     

The Social Costs and Benefits of Anger as a Function of Gender and Relationship Context

On the basis of Social Role Theory and a social functional view of emotions, we argue that gender differences in anger experiences and expression are related to men??s and women??s relationship context. We hypothesized that women in traditional relationship contexts would express their anger less directly, and would suppress their anger more, due to expected negative social appraisals. We compared anger reactions to a conflict situation in a traditional and egalitarian relationship context. Eighty-two Dutch adult participants (43 women and 39 men) were recruited partly by students in a psychology class, and partly by a snowball method. They were invited to participate only if they had a steady relationship of minimally one year. The results show that women report more intense subjective anger in both contexts, but that the expression of anger differed with relationship context. In traditional relationships women tend to suppress their anger more than men, while men report to express their anger directly more than women. This difference in anger expression was mediated by negative social appraisals. In egalitarian relationships, this difference was not found.     

Negative emotionality influences the effects of emotion on time perception

In this study I used a temporal bisection task to test if greater overestimation of time due to negative emotion is moderated by individual differences in negative emotionality. The effects of fearful facial expressions on time perception were also examined. After a training phase, participants estimated the duration of facial expressions (anger, happiness, fearfulness) and a neutral-baseline facial expression. In accordance to the operation of an arousal-based process, the duration of angry expressions was consistently overestimated relative to other expressions and the baseline condition. In support of a role for individual differences in negative emotionality on time perception, temporal bias due to angry and fearful expressions was positively correlated to individual differences in self-reported negative emotionality. The results are discussed in relation both to the literature on attentional bias to facial expressions in anxiety and fearfulness and also, to the hypothesis that angry expressions evoke a fear-specific response.     

Anger and the virtues: a critical study in virtue individuation

Aristotle and others suggest that a single virtue – ‘good temper’ – pertains specifically to anger. I argue that if good temper is a single virtue, it is constituted by aspects of a combination of other virtues. I present three categories of anger-relevant virtues – those that (potentially) dispose one to anger; those that delay, mitigate, and qualify anger; and those required for effortful anger control – and show how virtues in each category make distinct contributions to good temper. In addition to clarifying the relationship between anger and the virtues, my analysis has theoretical implications for virtue individuation more generally, and practical implications for character cultivation.     

The rage we should have: Comments on Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage

In The Case for Rage, Myisha Cherry demonstrates that antiracist rage can be instrumentally valuable, a fitting response to racism, and, therefore, wrong for us to dismiss. That is, on Cherry's account, antiracist anger is useful, fitting, and (in some sense) permissible. In this article, I argue that we should go beyond saying that this antiracist rage is permissible, that the correct thing to say is that people should have antiracist anger, and that anger should be of a (somewhat) specific intensity. I further argue that this antiracist anger must also involve action, because the mere experiencing of Lordean rage is not a sufficient act of “resistance.” I lastly argue that we should countenance more “destructive” forms of antiracist rage as permissible, including what Cherry calls “ressentiment rage.”     

Physicalism,Qualia Inversion,And Affective States

I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is nota possibility we should take seriously. The principlereason is that if someone's qualia were inverted inthe specified manner there is reason to believe thephenomenal difference would manifest itself inbehaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, Isuggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, arepartly constituted by an affective component whichwould be inverted along with the connected qualia. Theresulting affective inversions will, given theintimate connections that exist between emotions andbehaviour, likely manifest themselves in behaviour, inwhich case the underlying phenomenal differences canbe functionally captured. Second, I argue that othersense modalities lack the structural featuresnecessary for undetectable inversion which, because oftheir analogy with colour qualia, weakens theplausibility of such an inversion in the original caseof vision.     

Detection of emotional facial expressions and anti-expressions

Detection of emotional facial expressions has been shown to be more efficient than detection of neutral expressions. However, it remains unclear whether this effect is attributable to visual or emotional factors. To investigate this issue, we conducted two experiments using the visual search paradigm with photographic stimuli. We included a single target facial expression of anger or happiness in presentations of crowds of neutral facial expressions. The anti-expressions of anger and happiness were also presented. Although anti-expressions produced changes in visual features comparable to those of the emotional facial expressions, they expressed relatively neutral emotions. The results consistently showed that reaction times (RTs) for detecting emotional facial expressions (both anger and happiness) were shorter than those for detecting anti-expressions. The RTs for detecting the expressions were negatively related to experienced emotional arousal. These results suggest that efficient detection of emotional facial expressions is not attributable to their visual characteristics but rather to their emotional significance.     

时间任务需求对无关情绪面孔注意捕获的影响

注意捕获是指与任务无关的刺激能够不自觉地吸引注意的现象。实验一采用视觉搜索任务,考察与主任务无关的情绪面孔的注意捕获水平及其机制,实验二进一步探究时间任务需求对无关情绪面孔注意捕获的影响。结果发现:与其他情绪面孔相比,愤怒的情绪面孔捕获了更多的注意,且受到整体情绪加工的影响;时间任务需求影响了目标刺激的注意选择,但愤怒优势效应不受到时间任务需求的影响,因此可能是一种较为自动化的加工过程。     

On Gratitude to Nature

In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest the right kind of goodwill or care toward one. In particular, I argue that it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest a level of final care toward one beyond what can be legitimately expected or demanded of them. However, because nature does not manifest any level of goodwill or care, it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I end by noting that it can still be fitting to be grateful that certain things are true about nature (e.g. that it provides many benefits to humans).     

Facial age cues and emotional expression interact asymmetrically: age cues moderate emotion categorisation

Facial attributes such as race, sex, and age can interact with emotional expressions; however, only a couple of studies have investigated the nature of the interaction between facial age cues and emotional expressions and these have produced inconsistent results. Additionally, these studies have not addressed the mechanism/s driving the influence of facial age cues on emotional expression or vice versa. In the current study, participants categorised young and older adult faces expressing happiness and anger (Experiment 1) or sadness (Experiment 2) by their age and their emotional expression. Age cues moderated categorisation of happiness vs. anger and sadness in the absence of an influence of emotional expression on age categorisation times. This asymmetrical interaction suggests that facial age cues are obligatorily processed prior to emotional expressions. Finding a categorisation advantage for happiness expressed on young faces relative to both anger and sadness which are negative in valence but different in their congruence with old age stereotypes or structural overlap with age cues suggests that the observed influence of facial age cues on emotion perception is due to the congruence between relatively positive evaluations of young faces and happy expressions.     

成人与幼儿面部表情注意偏好的眼动研究

本研究选取45名3-5岁幼儿和39名大学本科生作为被试。实验材料为恐惧、愤怒、悲伤、惊讶和高兴五种面部表情图片。用Tobbi眼动仪记录被试观察表情图片时的眼动轨迹。结果发现：（1）成人偏好高兴表情,并在高兴表情上的注视时间和次数显著大于幼儿;（2）成人偏好注视眼部,幼儿偏好注视嘴部。结果表明,面部表情注意偏好的发展具有社会依存性,趋向于偏好积极情绪,这种发展变化与面部表情部位的注意偏好相关。     

Errors in identifying and expressing emotion in facial expressions, voices, and postures unique to social anxiety

The purpose of the present study was to see if 7-10-year-old socially anxious children (n = 26) made systematic errors in identifying and sending emotions in facial expressions, paralanguage, and postures as compared with the more random errors of children who were inattentive-hyperactive (n = 21). It was found that socially anxious children made more errors in identifying anger and fear in children's facial expressions and anger in adults' postures and in expressing anger in their own facial expressions than did their inattentive-hyperactive peers. Results suggest that there may be systematic difficulties specifically in visual nonverbal emotion communication that contribute to the personal and social difficulties socially anxious children experience.     

Development of perceptual expertise in emotion recognition

How do children’s early social experiences influence their perception of emotion-specific information communicated by the face? To examine this question, we tested a group of abused children who had been exposed to extremely high levels of parental anger expression and physical threat. Children were presented with arrays of stimuli that depicted the unfolding of facial expressions, from neutrality to peak emotions. The abused children accurately recognized anger early in the formation of the facial expression, when few physiological cues were available. The speed of children’s recognition was associated with the degree of anger/hostility reported by the child’s parent. These data highlight the ways in which perceptual learning can shape the timing of emotion perception.     

IV—Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's Challenge, Frege's Answer

Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.     

Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience

Empiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors (if any) need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic delusions, one which resists the trade-off view of pragmatic benefits and epistemic costs. Though monothematic delusions are often characterized by appeal to their epistemic costs, they can play a positive epistemic role, and this is a surprising conclusion on which, so I argue, all empiricists can agree. Thus, I show that all empiricists have the notion of epistemic innocence at their disposal.     

Visual search for expressions and anti-expressions

We used visual search to explore whether the preattentive mechanisms that enable rapid detection of facial expressions are driven by visual information from the displacement of features in expressions, or other factors such as affect. We measured search slopes for luminance and contrast equated images of facial expressions and anti-expressions of six emotions (anger, fear, disgust, surprise, happiness, and sadness). Anti-expressions have an equivalent magnitude of facial feature displacements to their corresponding expressions, but different affective content. There was a strong correlation between these search slopes and the magnitude of feature displacements in expressions and anti-expressions, indicating feature displacement had an effect on search performance. There were significant differences between search slopes for expressions and anti-expressions of happiness, sadness, anger, and surprise, which could not be explained in terms of feature differences, suggesting preattentive mechanisms were sensitive to other factors. A categorization task confirmed that the affective content of expressions and anti-expressions of each of these emotions were different, suggesting signals of affect might well have been influencing attention and search performance. Our results support a picture in which preattentive mechanisms may be driven by factors at a number of levels, including affect and the magnitude of feature displacement. We note that indirect effects of feature displacement, such as changes in local contrast, may well affect preattentive processing. These are most likely to be nonlinearly related to feature displacement and are, we argue, an important consideration for any study using images of expression to explore how affect guides attention. We also note that indirect effects of feature displacement (for example, changes in local contrast) may well affect preattentive processing. We argue that such effects are an important consideration for any study using images of expression to explore how affect guides attention.