共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
合作指数与描述方式对儿童囚徒困境博弈中合作行为的影响 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
本研究采用囚徒困境任务,考察了91名10~12岁儿童和101名成人在博弈决策中合作行为的特点。并分别考察合作指数和描述方式这两个变量对个体合作性的影响。结果表明:(1)描述方式对儿童的合作行为有显著影响,表现为\"回避\"描述中较之\"趋向\"描述有更多合作行为,而描述方式对成人则无影响。(2)儿童对合作指数不敏感,平均合作率显著高于成人,表现出合作倾向;成人平均合作率随合作指数的升高而升高,但始终处于几率水平之下,表现出竞争倾向。 相似文献
2.
合作是人类行为的核心,也是儿童社会性发展的重要体现。孤独症儿童因神经生理、时间同步以及运动能力等缺陷,导致其在社会交往中合作能力不足。研究发现,人际同步可促进儿童的合作行为。通过人际同步干预,孤独症儿童的联合注意、积极情绪及运动技能等与合作相关的能力获得改善,神经系统得到激活,社会适应能力也有所提高。人际同步干预目前仍在同步机制、感知互动质量等方面存在局限性,未来除了关注同步形式、节奏频率及个体差异等变量对孤独症儿童合作行为的作用机制外,还应关注他们在复杂开放式社交场景中的感知互动质量。 相似文献
3.
利用囚徒困境范式,考察了合作指数CI（0.1~0.9）与社会距离（亲密、陌生）对个体合作行为的影响。结果发现,社会距离和合作指数均会对合作行为产生影响,两者的交互效应不显著;合作率会受到合作指数的促进作用,但不会随合作指数的增高立即增长;在CI = 0.1~0.9这9个水平下,亲密被试间的合作率均显著高于陌生被试间的合作率。这一结果说明,合作指数对合作行为的促进作用存在阈值;社会距离缩小可促进个体的合作倾向增强,并更快地达到合作水平;合作指数与社会距离相互独立地影响合作行为。 相似文献
4.
5.
本研究采用重复囚徒困境实验范式,考察了社会距离和合作指数对不同年龄青少年（初中生、高中生和大学生,且每个年龄段的被试数为40名）在博弈决策中的合作行为的影响。结果发现：（1）随着年龄的增加,青少年合作行为的总体趋势表现为下降;（2）社会距离对大学生的合作行为的正向作用显著,而中学生的合作行为却不受其影响;（3）个体合作率会受到合作指数的促进作用,但这种促进作用在大学生中表现的更为显著。即随年龄增长,个体会更少的采取合作行为,并且个体是否采取合作在更大程度上基于当前博弈中的收支情况和与博弈对象之间的社会距离。 相似文献
6.
儿童孤独症也称自闭症(autism)是一种广泛性发育障碍,其临床表现为社交功能损伤、沟通能力损伤以及存在刻板的行为、兴趣和动作。根据相关文献就孤独症分类作一综述,并提出了早期家庭干预的具体措施。 相似文献
7.
研究采用事件相关电位技术从隐喻语义理解角度考察了高功能孤独症成人非字面语义理解中的行为特点及脑半球参与模式。行为结果显示：高功能孤独症成人对新异隐喻句的反应时最长,两类隐喻句的反应时均长于普通成人,但错误率上两组被试间无差异。脑电结果显示：高功能孤独症组对新异隐喻句的N400波幅最大,未出现半球偏侧化现象,传统隐喻句在左半球的N400波幅大于右半球,两类隐喻句的N400波幅均大于正常被试。结论：高功能孤独症成人具备隐喻理解能力,并对新异隐喻的理解做出更多努力,但右脑功能异常仍旧存在,左右半球在总体功能或神经联通性上仍旧弱于常人。 相似文献
8.
罗蓉;左子玲;武厚;刘芳彤 《心理学探新》2024,(2):176-183
孤独症儿童问题行为相当普遍,其中自伤性行为、攻击性行为和自我刺激行为发生频率高,其破坏性和危险性令人担忧。研究通过功能性行为评估,分析学前(2-5岁)孤独症儿童三种典型问题行为背后的功能原因,设计相应的干预方案,采用单一被试A-B-A倒返实验设计对问题行为进行干预。采用单一被试研究数据分析指标Tau-U进行分析,数据显示,经过4周干预,三名学前孤独症儿童问题行为的发生频率显著降低,干预有效。研究表明应用功能性行为评估诊断孤独症儿童问题行为,据此实施干预可有效减少问题行为,促进其适应性行为建立。 相似文献
9.
选取两所幼儿园大、中、小班共155儿童为被试,采取实验班和控制班前后测的设计,对实验班儿童进行为期四周的合作游戏训练,探讨合作游戏训练对学前儿童合作行为的影响。结果表明：游戏形式的合作行为训练显著地提高了学前儿童的合作行为水平;不同年龄班、不同性别学前儿童合作行为训练差异不显著。 相似文献
10.
11.
高功能自闭症(High-Functioning Autism, HFA)个体智力正常, 但也面临着严重的社会功能障碍。对威胁性情绪面孔的注意偏向与HFA个体社会功能的发展密切相关。梳理相关研究发现, HFA个体在自动加工阶段和情绪目标参与阶段, 不存在威胁性情绪面孔注意偏向; 而在任务与情绪无关的控制加工阶段, 存在威胁性情绪面孔注意偏向。针对HFA个体威胁性情绪面孔注意偏向的理论解释主要有杏仁核理论、强烈世界理论和执行功能理论等。神经生理机制方面, HFA个体对威胁性情绪面孔的注意偏向可能与其异常的皮下及皮层通路功能有关, 同时可能会受5-羟色胺系统基因及催产素水平等的影响。未来研究可在综合考虑研究方法及个体因素的基础上, 进一步探究其加工特征及神经生物机制, 着力开发科学有效的干预策略。 相似文献
12.
量子决策模型是近10年来提出的一种新型决策模型, 用以解释那些违背经典决策模型的现象。虽然当前的量子决策模型能够解释囚徒困境中的分离效应, 但其中却存在一些困难, 即会产生反常的概率关系以及无法精确拟合分离效应量较大的实验结果。本研究在分析当前量子决策模型困难的基础上, 结合齐当别思想对模型进行改进和优化。结果表明, 研究所构建的量子决策模型克服了当前模型中的困难, 并且能够预测囚徒困境博弈中由他人收益差距改变而引起的分离效应变化趋势。本研究还是一次启发式决策模型与计算式决策模型相结合的探索。 相似文献
13.
Savage于1954年提出"确定事件原则"这一概念,Tversky和Slafir(1992)通过实验发现,人们在不确定条件下的决策过程中,会出现违背确定事件原则的现象,并把这种现象称为"分离效应"。尽管已经有很多对于二次赌博中分离效应的机制研究并产生很多分歧,但对于囚徒困境范式中是否存在分离效应以及其机制并没有一致的结果。本文对囚徒困境中的分离效应进行了验证性实验,虽然整体结果上与Shafir与Tversky(1992)的结论相吻合,但被试专业背景对结果有显著效应。同时,按照Lambdin和Burdsal(2007)对分离效应的操作定义,结果发现分离效应没有出现,文章对其原因进行了讨论。 相似文献
14.
Bauminger N Solomon M Aviezer A Heung K Gazit L Brown J Rogers SJ 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2008,36(2):135-150
This study of Israeli and American preadolescent children examined characteristics of friendship in 44 children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFASD) compared to 38 typically developing children (TYP), as they interacted with a close friend Participants were 8-12 years of age (HFASD: Israel, n = 24; USA, n = 20; TYP: Israel, n = 23; USA, n = 15), and were matched on SES, receptive language vocabulary, child age, and gender (each study group included one girl). Multidimensional assessments included: individual behaviors of target children and observed child-friend interactions during construction and drawing scenarios; target child's and friend's self-perceived mutual friendship qualities; and mother-reported characteristics (friendship's duration/frequency; friend's age/gender/disability status). Overall, children with HFASD displayed a number of differences on individual and dyadic friendship measures. Both age and verbal abilities affected friendship behaviors. Children with HFASD and their friends perceived friendship qualities similarly, suggesting that preadolescents with HFASD have capacities for interpersonal awareness. Between-group similarities also emerged on several complex social behaviors, suggesting that friendship follows a developmental trajectory in autism and may enhance social interaction skills in autism. 相似文献
15.
Tessa Haesevoets Dries H. Bostyn Chris Reinders Folmer Arne Roets Alain Van Hiel 《决策行为杂志》2019,32(1):61-78
The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed. 相似文献
16.
The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, users take the risk that such agents act in ways opposed to the users’ preferences or goals. It is often argued that people use trust as a cognitive shortcut to reduce the complexity of such interactions. Here we formalise this by using the methods of evolutionary game theory to study the viability of trust-based strategies in repeated games. These are reciprocal strategies that cooperate as long as the other player is observed to be cooperating. Unlike classic reciprocal strategies, once mutual cooperation has been observed for a threshold number of rounds they stop checking their co-player’s behaviour every round, and instead only check it with some probability. By doing so, they reduce the opportunity cost of verifying whether the action of their co-player was actually cooperative. We demonstrate that these trust-based strategies can outcompete strategies that are always conditional, such as Tit-for-Tat, when the opportunity cost is non-negligible. We argue that this cost is likely to be greater when the interaction is between people and intelligent agents, because of the reduced transparency of the agent. Consequently, we expect people to use trust-based strategies more frequently in interactions with intelligent agents. Our results provide new, important insights into the design of mechanisms for facilitating interactions between humans and intelligent agents, where trust is an essential factor. 相似文献
17.
Toshio Yamagishi Nobuhiro Mifune James H. Liu Joel Pauling 《Asian Journal of Social Psychology》2008,11(3):196-207
Japanese ( N = 48) and New Zealander ( N = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner's dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another's group memberships (mutual-knowledge condition). In the unilateral-knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual-knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral-knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner's cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group. 相似文献
18.
社会两难的行为动机研究认为,害怕和贪婪是人们选择不合作的原因。信任的心理学研究为社会两难的合作行为提供了另一种观点,即害怕被利用的背后实际上体现了博弈者对对方的信任的缺失。鉴于传统社会两难范式存在难以区分信任和合作两个因素的问题,本研究设计了“信任一合作”二阶段模拟实验,通过操作重复信托博弈中的信息反馈,研究虚拟多人信托博弈中初始信任和基于经验的信任对随后的公共财物两难博弈中合作行为的影响,结果发现：（1）初始信任对基于经验的信任的建立具有一定的积极影响,但是它对合作行为的作用远不如随后的基于经验的信任;（2）基于经验的信任水平高的被试在随后的公共财物两难博弈中也表现出较高的合作行为。 相似文献
19.
Carolyn Henriette Declerck Christophe Boone Toko Kiyonari 《The Journal of social psychology》2014,154(1):74-88
Shame is considered a social emotion with action tendencies that elicit socially beneficial behavior. Yet, unlike other social emotions, prior experimental studies do not indicate that incidental shame boosts prosocial behavior. Based on the affect as information theory, we hypothesize that incidental feelings of shame can increase cooperation, but only for self-interested individuals, and only in a context where shame is relevant with regards to its action tendency. To test this hypothesis, cooperation levels are compared between a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma (where “defect” may result from multiple motives) and a sequential prisoner's dilemma (where “second player defect” is the result of intentional greediness). As hypothesized, shame positively affected proselfs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Hence ashamed proselfs become inclined to cooperate when they believe they have no way to hide their greediness, and not necessarily because they want to make up for earlier wrong-doing. 相似文献
20.
Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献