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1.
Stéphanie Ruphy 《Synthese》2006,151(3):325-330
Ontology is taken by Moulines as supervenient on science: what kinds of things there are is determined by our well-confirmed theories. But the fact is that today, science provides us with a multiplicity of well-confirmed theories, each having its own ontological commitments. The modest, ontological form of reduction advocated by Moulines (this volume) restores hope of putting some ontological order in the “huge chaotic supermarket of science”. In this paper I show that any claim on the amount of order obtained by reduction does not only always remain “temporally qualified” but, worse for the reductionist with a taste for ontological order, that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers. 相似文献
2.
Dan Mcarthur 《Synthese》2006,151(2):233-255
In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the
laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that
fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply
in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental
physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing
a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account
of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable.
I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such
as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the
EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether
abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses. 相似文献
3.
Leszek Koczanowicz 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):141-149
The aim of my paper is to show the discussion concerning the idea of cosmopolitan society. I intend to examine the structure
and content of the argumentation which put into question the very notion of cosmopolitanism, as well as the contemporary content
of this concept. I will look at nationalistic discourse as presented, for instance, by Gertrude Himmelfarb, which puts emphasis
on national values as an indispensable part of group and individual identity. On the other hand, I am going to analyze left-wing
evaluation of cosmopolitanism (for instance, that of Chantal Mouffe) as an ideologically motivated attempt to hide the real
contradictions of the contemporary world. Finally, I will prove that these critiques cannot undermine the concept of cosmopolitanism,
but they force us to rethink a way in which cosmopolitan society can be achieved. If cosmopolitan society is to emerge, we
need to reconstruct the idea of democracy and the notion of multi-cultural pluralistic society. I propose such rethinking
of cosmopolitanism by the introduction of the notion of “dialogical cosmopolitanism,” which refers to M.M. Bakhtin’s concept
of dialogue and G.H. Mead’s idea of “taking the role of the other.” 相似文献
4.
Nina Degele 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(1-4):743-755
The German Council for Research, Technology and Innovation defines the “information society” as a type of society where the acquirement, storage, processing, exchange, diffusion and utilization of knowledge inclusive of their technological possibilities of interactive communication, here become increasingly important. In this notion, knowledge has become the decisive factor for economic growth and technological advance. As a social scientist I transform the term “information society” into processes of automatization of knowledge, which is called its informatization and computerization. It is argued that these processes affect the societal condition of knowledge in that the part of knowledge relating to the contents diminishes while the importance of the technical and/or formal part increases. In contrast to the claim of many social scientists, this trend does not lead to a superficial or shallow type of knowledge. What is changing is the social requirement of professional skills and qualifications. The great looming question about information society then is: Which knowledge do people need to behave competently, effectively and successfully in a world full of computers? The structure of this article is as follows. First I will have a look at the micro‐level of the composition of knowledge, next I will proceed to the historical shift from subject‐specific knowledge to media‐competence and finally I will talk about the meaning of the evolving dominance of—what I will call “media‐competent experts”. 相似文献
5.
The Logic of Knowledge Based Obligation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Deontic Logic goes back to Ernst Mally’s 1926 work, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens [Mally. E.: 1926, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens, Leuschner & Lubensky, Graz], where he presented
axioms for the notion ‘p ought to be the case’. Some difficulties were found in Mally’s axioms, and the field has much developed.
Logic of Knowledge goes back to Hintikka’s work Knowledge and Belief [Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Cornell University Press] in
which he proposed formal logics of knowledge and belief. This field has also developed quite a great deal and is now the subject
of the TARK conferences. However, there has been relatively little work combining the two notions of knowledge (belief) with the notion
of obligation. (See, however, [Lomuscio, A. and Sergot, M.: 2003, Studia Logica 75 63–92; Moore, R. C.: 1990, In J. F. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate (eds.), Readings in Planning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, CA]) In this paper we point out that an agent’s obligations are often dependent on what the agent knows, and indeed one cannot reasonably be
expected to respond to a problem if one is not aware of its existence. For instance, a doctor cannot be expected to treat
a patient unless she is aware of the fact that he is sick, and this creates a secondary obligation on the patient or someone
else to inform the doctor of his situation. In other words, many obligations are situation dependent, and only apply in the
presence of the relevant information. Thus a case for combining Deontic Logic with the Logic of Knowledge is clear. We introduce the notion of knowledge based obligation and offer an S5, history based Kripke semantics to express this notion, as this semantics enables us to represent how information
is transmitted among agents and how knowledge changes over time as a result of communications. We consider both the case of
an absolute obligation (although dependent on information) as well as the (defeasible) notion of an obligation which may be
over-ridden by more relevant information. For instance a physician who is about to inject a patient with drug d may find out that the patient is allergic to d and that she should use d′ instead. Dealing with the second kind of case requires a resort to non-monotonic reasoning and the notion of justified belief which is stronger than plain belief, but weaker than absolute knowledge in that it can be over-ridden. This notion of justified
belief also creates a derived notion of default obligation where an agent has, as far as the agent knows, an obligation to
do some action a. A dramatic application of this notion is our analysis of the Kitty Genovese case where, in 1964, a young woman was stabbed
to death while 38 neighbours watched from their windows but did nothing. The reason was not indifference, but none of the
neighbours had even a default obligation to act, even though, as a group, they did have an obligation to take some action
to protect Kitty.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conferences SEP-2004, and DALT-2004. 相似文献
6.
Arnold Levison 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1-4):132-146
The question of the nature of our knowledge of society has recently been raised in an interesting form by Peter Winch in his monograph, The Idea of a Social Science, and debated in recent issues of Inquiry by A. R. Louch and Winch himself. In this paper I attempt to contribute to this discussion by attacking the problem of the nature of the empirical bases of social scientific knowledge, the main point in dispute between Winch and Louch. I try to construct an argument to show that in specifying the ‘data’ of social science, we have to introduce an element of ‘interpretive understanding’ which radically alters the meaning of the term ‘empirical base’ in social scientific contexts, thus supplementing Winch's argument in his reply to Louch. At the same time, my argument shows, I believe, that this view of the nature of social science does not lead to any arbitrary restrictions on the methods of research pursued by social scientists, as is sometimes imagined. What the argument leads to is the conclusion that our knowledge of society involves distinctive epistemological features that differentiate this kind of knowledge from the kind of knowledge we have in the natural sciences. 相似文献
7.
How Knowledge Works 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
John Hyman 《The Philosophical quarterly》1999,49(197):433-451
The doctrine that knowledge is a species of belief has encouraged philosophers to confuse the question of what knowledge is and the question of how it can be acquired. But we can form a conception of knowledge by asking how knowledge gets expressed in our mental lives and in our conduct, instead of asking where it comes from. Accordingly, knowledge can be defined as the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts. I examine the nature of reasons, and the relationship between reasons, facts and beliefs; I consider the question of whether animals without language are capable of knowledge; and I briefly criticize Wittgenstein's doctrine that I cannot be said to know that I am in pain. 相似文献
8.
Forms of emergent interaction in General Process Theory 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Johanna Seibt 《Synthese》2009,166(3):479-512
General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry
and everyday practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be technically defined as concrete,
dynamic, non-particular individuals called general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism
that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense
concept of activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the notion of a general process. General
processes are not individuated in terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of their dynamic
relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional
mereology, albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a brief sketch of basic notions and strategies
of the GPT-framework I show how the latter may be applied to distinguish between causal, mechanistic, functional, self-maintaining,
and recursively self-maintaining interactions, all of which involve ‘emergent phenomena’ in various senses of the term. 相似文献
9.
Robert T. Pennock 《Synthese》2012,185(1):5-20
What is the definition of life? Artificial life environments provide an interesting test case for this classical question.
Understanding what such systems can tell us about biological life requires negotiating the tricky conceptual boundary between
virtual and real life forms. Drawing from Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of a game and a Darwinian insight about classification,
I argue that classifying life involves both causal and pragmatic elements. Rather than searching for a single, sharp definition,
these considerations suggest that life is a cluster concept with fuzzy boundaries and that there are multiple legitimate ways
to make the notion precise for different scientific purposes. This pluralist, realist account avoids unnecessary border disputes
by emphasizing how science negotiates such questions in relation to theory and evidence. I also discuss several objections
to this approach, including a “moral hesitation” some have to allowing broader application of the concept of life to include
artificial life. 相似文献
10.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
11.
Tim Connolly 《Dao》2011,10(4):487-505
A perspectivist theory is usually taken to mean that (1) our knowledge of the world is inevitably shaped by our particular
perspectives, (2) any one of these perspectives is as good as any other, and (3) any claims to objective or authoritative
knowledge are consequently without ground. Recent scholarship on Nietzsche, however, has challenged the prevalent view that
the philosopher holds (2) and (3), arguing instead that his perspectivism aims at attaining a greater level of objectivity.
In this essay, I attempt a structurally similar reinterpretation of Zhuangzi’s perspectivism. I argue that while the Chinese
thinker sees all knowledge as perspective-dependent, he thinks that some perspectives are broader and more accurate than others.
He utilizes shifts in perspective precisely in order to attain these superior perspectives, which constitute what he calls
da zhi 大知, or “greater knowledge.” Whereas Nietzsche sees his perspectivism as methodologically continuous with the sciences, Zhuangzi’s
“greater knowledge” has the goal of ensuring our survival and well-being in the everyday world. 相似文献
12.
Keith Breen 《Res Publica》2007,13(4):381-414
This article argues that productive work represents a mode of human flourishing unfortunately neglected in much current political
theorizing. Focusing on Habermasian critical theory, I contend that Habermas’s dualist theory of society, with its underpinning
distinction between communicative and instrumental reason, excludes work and the economy from ethical reflection. To avoid
this uncritical turn, we need a concept of work that retains a core emancipatory referent. This, I claim, is provided by Alasdair
MacIntyre’s notion of ‹practice’. The notion of ‹practice’ is␣significant in suggesting an alternative conception of human
productivity that is neither purely instrumental nor purely communicative, but rather both simultaneously: a form of activity
which issues in material products and yet presumes a community of workers engaged in intersubjective self-transformation.
However, we can endorse MacIntyre’s notion of ‹practice’ only if we reject his totalizing anti-modernism and insist on the
emancipatory potentialities of modern institutions. 相似文献
13.
William Edward Morris 《Synthese》1990,82(3):375-398
Fred Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow of Information is an extended attempt to develop a philosophically useful theory of information. Dretske adapts central ideas from Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of communication, and applies them to some traditional problems in epistemology. In doing so, he succeeds in building for philosophers a much-needed bridge to important work in cognitive science. The payoff for epistemologists is that Dretske promises a way out of a long-standing impasse — the Gettier problem. He offers an alternative model of knowledge as information-based belief, which purports to avoid the problems justificatory accounts face. This essay looks closely at Dretske's theory. I argue that while the information-theoretic framework is attractive, it does not provide an adequate account of knowledge. And there seems to be no way of tightening the theory without introducing some version of a theory of justification — the very notion Dretske's theory was designed to avoid. 相似文献
14.
Longuenesse B 《Psychological research》2012,76(2):220-228
Many philosophers as well as many biological psychologists think that recent experiments in neuropsychology have definitively
discredited any notion of freedom of the will. I argue that the arguments mounted against the concept of freedom of the will
in the name of natural causal determinism are valuable but not new, and that they leave intact a concept of freedom of the
will that is compatible with causal determinism. After explaining this concept, I argue that it is interestingly related to
our use of the first person pronoun “I.” I discuss three examples of our use of “I” in thought and language and submit a few
questions I would like neuropsychologists to answer concerning the brain processes that might underlie those uses. I suggest
answering these questions would support the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will I have offered in part 1. 相似文献
15.
Joseph Shieber 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,66(2):61-70
In this paper, I develop and discuss an argument intended to demonstrate that the Molinist notion of middle knowledge, and
in particular the concept of counterfactuals of freedom, is incompatible with the notion of personal responsibility (for created
creatures). In Sect. 1, I discuss the Molinist concepts of middle knowledge and counterfactuals of freedom. In Sect. 2, I
develop an argument (henceforth, the Transfer of Negative Responsibility Argument, or TNRA) to the effect that, due to their
construal of the concepts of middle knowledge and counterfactuals of freedom, Molinists are not entitled to the notion that
individuals are personally responsible—even for those actions that they freely perform. I then discuss the only two promising
strategies for rejecting the argument in Sects. 3 and 4. Finally, in Sect. 5, I contend that, although TNRA may be unsuccessful
as an internal argument against the Molinist, either of the possible strategies for rejecting TNRA poses a difficulty for
the Molinist. Both response strategies force the Molinist into adopting a popular compatibilist strategy for rejecting a common negative argument against compatibilism. Thus, if Molinism represents a libertarian—i.e.,
incompatibilist—account of human freedom (as, e.g., Flint claims in his recent Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, noting that libertarianism is one of the “twin bases of Molinism”), then the discussion of TNRA poses, if not a dilemma, at the very least a serious challenge for the Molinist. 相似文献
16.
The economics of science 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Arthur M. Diamond 《Knowledge, Technology, and Policy》1996,9(2-3):6-49
Increasing the “truth per dollar” of money spent on science is one legitimate long-run goal of the economics of science. But
before this goal can be achieved, we need to increase our knowledge of the successes and failures of past and current reward
structures of science. This essay reviews what economists have learned about the behavior of scientists and the reward structure
of science. One important use of such knowledge will be to help policy-makers create a reward structure that is more efficient
in the future. 相似文献
17.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(5):467-479
In this paper I ask whether the University has a special role to play in democratic societies. I argue that the modern University
can no longer lay claim to a research monopoly since nowadays research is conducted in many places outside of the University.
The University can, however, still lay claim to a kind of knowledge monopoly which has to with the central role Universities
play in the definition of what counts as scientific knowledge. The problem is, however, that the University’s knowledge monopoly
is predominantly understood in epistemological terms. This leaves only one role for the University in a democratic society,
viz., that of the expert. Based on ideas from John Dewey and Bruno Latour I suggest a different way to understand the distinction
between ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ knowledge. Against this background I argue that the University can contribute towards
the democratisation of knowledge if it articulates the difference between scientific and everyday knowledge in non-epistemological
terms.
相似文献
Gert BiestaEmail: |
18.
Lynne Rudder Baker 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(1):47-59
Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the
thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails
only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to
Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like
the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the “intermediate state” (if there is one). 相似文献
19.
Emma Ruttkamp 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(4):275-289
AbstractIn this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate the power of the full-blown employment of this paradigm in the philosophy of science by discussing the main applications of model-theoretic realism to traditional problems in the philosophy of science.I discuss my views of the nature of logic and of its role in the philosophy of science today. I also specifically offer a brief discussion on the future of cognitive philosophy in South Africa. My conclusion is a general look at the nature of philosophical inquiry and its significance for philosophers today. 相似文献
20.
Ethiopian Jewish immigrants in Israel are one of the most ancient communities in the world, one that has been detached from
the known Jewish world for about 2,500 years. Throughout this very long period of isolation, the Ethiopian Jewish community
maintained Jewish tradition and dreamed over the centuries to unite with the rest of the Jewish world and immigrate to the
Jewish state—Israel. But this transition occurred within a short time from an agrarian society in Ethiopia (traditional culture)
with an oral culture to a knowledge society in Israel (modern culture) with a written culture. Most studies that examine cultural
transition focus on anthropological, sociological, and cultural aspects; but there are nearly no studies that examine the
technological knowledge of non-literate populations. The purpose of this study is to examine and characterize technological
knowledge among this population—the case of Ethiopian non-literate immigrants in Israel. The study involved in-depth interviews
to examine technological knowledge through using technological appliances in their everyday life, assembly of two simple technological
systems, and a home technology profile compared to the general population in Israel. Participants included 50 non-literate
Ethiopian immigrants between the ages of 40–60. The results of our study are surprising in that we have shown that non-literate
immigrants adapt to a technology-rich environment at an average degree with respect to the general population in Israel. Also,
comparing technological knowledge between traditional and modern cultures shows participants’ wide range of knowledge without
ability to read and write. Illiteracy does not preclude the development of knowledge in general, technological knowledge particularly,
and does not prevent non-literate populations from acquiring knowledge in a new environment. 相似文献