作为一项权利的人的尊严

The concept of human dignity and the relationship between dignity and human rights have been important subjects in contemporary international academia. This article first analyzes the different understandings of the concept of dignity, which has left great influences in history (including the “theory of attribution-dignity”, the “theory of autonomy-dignity” or the “theory of moral completeness/achievement-dignity”, and the “theory of end-in-itself-dignity”); it then exposes the obvious defects of these modes of understanding; finally, it tries to define dignity as a moral right to be free from insult. Meanwhile, the relationship between human dignity and human rights is clarified as a result of this research: Rather than being the foundation of human rights, human dignity is one of human rights. The idea of dignity nevertheless has a particular status in ethics in that it embodies a kind of core moral concern, representing a basic demand rooted in the human self or individuality, and hence representing an important aspect of human rights. We may anticipate that sooner or later, the idea of human dignity will become, together with other human rights, the only intangible cultural heritage of human society. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (6): 85–92     

Autonomy,life as an intrinsic value,and the right to die in dignity

This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not able to comprehend their own interests in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable. I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family. The author’s research interests include bioethics, free speech, tolerance and ethics in the media.     

Disease as a value statement

In an attempt to examine the unconscious roots of values, this paper explores Gotthard Booth's psychosomatic theory that disease is a message of the whole person. It outlines his work in describing distinctive personality types who characteristically become ill through the disease of the organ system that is dominant for their life-style. The disease represents accommodation in the person's object relatedness and as such reflects the operation of unconscious values and indicates possibilities for therapy. Because the cultural environment helps condition the dominant organ response, Booth's work also has relevance for developing a sociology of value and suggests a prophylactic role for religion.     

A defense of peace as a human right

Abstract

Recent years have seen increased debate about the contributions that human rights make to the creation of conditions of peace. However, less attention has been paid to the claim that peace itself is a genuine human right. Whereas some critics argue that a focus on rights results in an overly formal juridical account of peace at the expense of a more robust notion of positive peace, others contend that a legal framework of rights is all that is needed to eliminate violent conflict. In this paper I strike a position between these two arguments and articulate a normative defense of the human right to peace embedded within a broader discourse of social justice. I do so by demonstrating that a right to peace is a genuine human right because it satisfies appropriate justificatory tests, including those concerning its scope, the duties it generates, and its economic feasibility.     

Dependence and a Kantian conception of dignity as a value

Kantian moral concepts concerning respect for human dignity have played a central role in articulating ethical guidelines for medical practice and research, and for articulating some central positions within bioethical debates more generally. The most common of these Kantian moral concepts is the obligation to respect the dignity of patients and of human research subjects as autonomous, self-determining individuals. This article describes Kant’s conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values, and draws on the work of several contemporary Kantian philosophers who employ the distinction to make sense of some common moral intuitions, feelings, and norms. Drawing on this work, the article argues that the conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values is indispensable in the context of considering our obligations to those who are dependent and vulnerable.     

Health as a value: methodological and theoretical considerations

The concept of value placed on health is very important in several different theoretical approaches to the study of health behavior. In practice, however, health value is generally assumed to be universally high rather than being directly measured. If this assumption is incorrect, then theories that include health value have rarely been adequately tested. This paper presents a short 4-item Likert scale designed to measure the value placed on health. Norms from the utilization of this scale in five different samples are presented. Health value is found to increase with age among girls, but the increase apparently stops by late adolescence, before full adult levels of health value are achieved. Middle-aged women place a higher value on health than do middle-aged men, although no comparable sex difference appears in a sample of undergraduates. Consistent with theoretical predictions, both health locus of control beliefs and beliefs in the efficacy of certain preventive health behaviors correlate more highly with the performance of those same behaviors 5 to 9 months later among respondents who place a high value of health relative to those who do not value health so highly. However, this interaction is found only when it can be safely assumed that health is the primary value underlying the behavior. The importance of considering a variety of values in addition to health as possible motivators of preventive health behavior is stressed.     

Interal locus of control as a value

Internal and external subjects, who previously filled out Rotter's (1966) I-E scale, were asked to score the I-E scale of “another student”. Subjects were exposed to “an other's” score of either 0, 5, 10, 16, or 23, and were asked to rate themselves and the “other” on an evaluative questionnaire. It was predicted that ratings of the “other” would increase in positivity to the extent the “other” scored as an internal. A reverse direction was predicted for an index of negative evaluations. The predictions were confirmed. The results suggest that internal locus of control is a societal value. The findings did not support either Hannah's (1973) hypothesis that internals are more responsive to a need for social approval, or Byrne's (1969) similarity hypothesis.     

Love and Privacy

How much privacy must be sacrificed by the partners in a romantic relationship? I begin by showing that we are obligated to reveal to our lovers information about ourselves that we believe could possibly cause them to withdraw their affections from us. If we were to conceal this information, then the lover would be mistaken about whom they loved, yet continue to respect obligations towards, and make sacrifices for, us. I conclude, though, by discussing some problems with both the intelligibility of this obligation and our ability to fulfil it. These problems arise from epistemological and metaphysical problems connected with the notion of a self.     

Privacy and democracy

The meaning of privacy has been frequently disputed in the philosophical and legal literature since Warren and Brandeis first argued for it as a distinct and important personal and social value. Nevertheless, while the meaning of privacy is held to be vague, there is general agreement that Warren and Brandeis were correct in their assessment of its value. Theorists of democracy, on the other hand, have been ambivalent towards the realm of the private. This paper interrogates the intersection between privacy and democracy, questioning the place of privacy as a distinctly democratic value.     

Schedule-induced aggression as a function of fixed-ratio value

Pigeons responding for food on fixed-ratio reinforcement schedules attacked live target birds when the ratio value was increased, but not when the value was decreased. The frequency of attacks peaked several days after ratio value change, and then gradually decreased to an original level.