Detection of the relevant type of locomotion in infancy: crawlers versus walkers

Human infants show a preference for individuals who are similar to them. Using point-light displays of human walkers and crawlers as stimuli, we examined whether infants' preference for the motions of crawling and walking changes between, before, and after the onset of bipedal walking. The results show that crawling and walking infants prefer the types of locomotion that are similar to their own, respectively. These indicate that the infants detect the similarities between the motions they performed and they observed, which provides the behavioral evidence that the production of a particular motion is connected to its perception in infancy.     

The role of self-produced movement and visual tracking in infant spatial orientation

In two longitudinal studies, infants were trained at 12 and 18 months to find an object hidden in one of two identical wells in a Plexiglas box. On the test trial, normal access was blocked and infants were either guided by their mother or allowed to move on their own to another opening on the opposite side. In Experiment 1 significantly more correct responding occurred after active movement than after passive at 12 months, with correct responding related to high visual tracking. In contrast, at 18 months correct search without tracking predominated among both movement conditions. A difference between the conditions in the position of the mother on the test trial was ruled out as a contributor to performance on the basis of data from Experiment 2. When opaque sides were inserted to prevent tracking in Experiment 3, active movement no longer facilitated correct search at 12 months, thus indicating that the tracking and not the active movement per se was the critical factor.     

The perception of causality in infancy

Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.     

The role of active locomotion in space perception

It has been shown that active control of locomotion increases accuracy and precision of nonvisual space perception, but psychological mechanisms of this enhancement are poorly understood. The present study explored a hypothesis that active control of locomotion enhances space perception by facilitating crossmodal interaction between visual and nonvisual spatial information. In an experiment, blindfolded participants walked along a linear path under one of the following two conditions: (1) They walked by themselves following a guide rope and (2) they were led by an experimenter. Subsequently, they indicated the walked distance by tossing a beanbag to the origin of locomotion. The former condition gave participants greater control of their locomotion and thus represented a more active walking condition. In addition, before each trial, half the participants viewed the room in which they performed the distance perception task. The other half remained blindfolded throughout the experiment. Results showed that although the room was devoid of any particular cues for walked distances, visual knowledge of the surroundings improved the precision of nonvisual distance perception. Importantly, however, the benefit of preview was observed only when participants walked more actively. This indicates that active control of locomotion allowed participants to better utilize their visual memory of the environment for perceiving nonvisually encoded distance, suggesting that active control of locomotion served as a catalyst for integrating visual and nonvisual information to derive spatial representations of higher quality.     

The development of spatial understanding in infancy

This paper examines the development of spatial understanding between 8 and 24 months. In particular, it examines whether young infants code changes in the position of an object or themselves in geographic or egocentric terms. The infants sat in a baby chair which was attached to a circular table in such a way that either the infant could be rotated around the edge of the table or the table-top itself could be rotated. Rotation of infant or table could be performed independently or simultaneously. Infants were shown an object which was then hidden under one of either two or three identical cups sitting on the table. Before the infant was allowed to search for the toy, either the table, the infant, or both were rotated, a procedure which resulted in an invisible displacement of the object in terms of geographical and/or egocentric spatial position. Rotations of 60, 90, 120, and 180° were used. Three groups of infants were tested, one cross-sectional (12–24 months), one longitudinal (12–24 months), and one consisting of a group of infants already known to be accelerated in object concept development (8–20 months). The cross-sectional results indicated that egocentric responding continues well into the second half of the second year of life. Even with fortnightly exposure to the tasks, egocentric responding was still evident in some longitudinal babies as late as 19 months. The results of the accelerated group suggest that acceleration through the sequence of object concept development facilitates development of spatial understanding in a wider sense, that is, in the sense of understanding the interrelation of positions in space. The implications of these results for competing theories of the source of object concept errors are discussed.     

The recognition of mentalistic agents in infancy

The ability to construe ourselves and others as agents with minds having mental states such as perceptions, attention, desires and beliefs, is critical to humans' social, linguistic, and cognitive competence. When and how this ability becomes available to us during development is therefore of particular theoretical importance. Historically, most work in this area has concentrated on the ability of three- and four-year-olds to predict and explain behaviors based on false beliefs. With recent advances in the methods available for studying cognition in pre-verbal infants however, more research is now focused on earlier age groups. In this review, arguments are presented for and against the presence of a rudimentary 'theory of mind' in infancy, with evidence discussed from three sources: (1) infants' active interactions with people; (2) infants' passive observations of people; and (3) infants' interactions with, and observations, of non-human agents.     

The social context of imitation in infancy

Infants increasingly generalize deferred imitation across environmental contexts between 6 and 18 months of age. In three experiments with 126 6-, 9-, 12-, 15-, and 18-month-olds, we examined the role of the social context in deferred imitation. One experimenter demonstrated target actions on a hand puppet, and a second experimenter tested imitation 24h later. When the second experimenter was novel, infants did not exhibit deferred imitation at any age; when infants were preexposed to the second experimenter, all of them did. Imitating immediately after the demonstration also facilitated deferred imitation in a novel social context at all ages but 6 months. Infants' pervasive failure to exhibit deferred imitation in a novel social context may reflect evolutionary selection pressures that favored conservative behavior in social animals.     

The kinematics of locomotion toward a goal

A mathematical model is developed that treats rats in runways as uniformly accelerated bodies. The purpose of the model is to permit conversion of the continuously varying measures of runway speeds at different points in the alley into three invariant parameters of performance: start latency, acceleration, and brakepoint. This simple model fits most of the data examined, and changes in the parameters throw new light on phenomena such as the partial reinforcement acquisition effect. In particular, it is shown that partially reinforced rats accelerate faster but cease accelerating earlier in the runway than do continuously reinforced rats. This explains the qualitative differences often found between start and goal speed measures. The analysis takes as its unit patterns of terminal behavior rather than the rate of the responses that constitutes them, and thus may permit coherent treatment of instrumental and operant behavior.     

The emergence of kind-based object individuation in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.     

The development of ordinal numerical knowledge in infancy

A critical question in cognitive science concerns how numerical knowledge develops. One essential component of an adult concept of number is ordinality: the greater than and less than relationships between numbers. Here it is shown in two experiments that 11-month-old infants successfully discriminated, whereas 9-month-old infants failed to discriminate, sequences of numerosities that descended in numerical value from sequences that increased in numerical value. These results suggest that by 11 months of age infants possess the ability to appreciate the greater than and less than relations between numerical values but that this ability develops between 9 and 11 months of age. In an additional experiment 9-month-old infants succeeded at discriminating the ordinal direction of sequences that varied in the size of a single square rather than in number, suggesting that a capacity for non-numerical ordinal judgments may develop before a capacity for ordinal numerical judgments. These data raise many questions about how infants represent number and what happens between 9 and 11 months to support ordinal numerical judgments.     

The early origins of goal attribution in infancy

We contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance', however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfamiliar human actions and actions of novel objects lacking human features. It is argued that previous failures to show goal-attribution to unfamiliar actions were due to the absence of these cues. We report a modified replication of Woodward (1999) showing that when a salient action-effect is presented, even young infants can attribute a goal to an unfamiliar manual action. This study together with other recent experiments reviewed support the 'wide scope' approach indicating that if the cues of goal-directedness are present even 6-month-olds attribute goals to unfamiliar actions.     

The impact of object carriage on independent locomotion

The current study examined whether carrying objects in one's hands influenced different parameters associated with independent locomotion. Specifically, 14- and 24-month-olds walked in a straight path under four conditions of object carriage – no object (control), one object carried in one hand (one object-one hand), two objects carried in each of the hands (two objects-two hands), and one object carried in both hands simultaneously (one object-two hands). Although carrying objects failed to influence a variety of kinematic parameters of gait, it did affect children's arm postures, with children adopting less mature arm positions when carrying objects. Finally, arm position was related to walking skill, but only for older children when they were not carrying objects. These findings indicate that although a relation does exist between arm positions and gait parameters, this relation is easily disrupted by carrying loads, even small ones.     

Sex-typing in infancy: The role of the father

Recent research on mother-infant interaction has provided little empirical support for the role of environmental factors in early sex-role development. In this paper, considerable support for the father's role is presented. Specifically, the research on mother- and father-infant interaction patterns is reviewed in order to describe developmental changes in the nature of differential treatment of the sexes during the first two years of life. Together, the studies reviewed highlight the importance of the father in early sex-role socialization, delineate a developmental model of the early differential treatment of the sexes, and provide clues as to the origins of later childhood sex differences in verbal and visual-spatial abilities.     

The importance of being in earnest

Certain remarks in the Tractatus, taken together with a passage in a letter Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, suggest that at one time Wittgenstein inclined toward a psychologistic theory of language. But textual considerations with regard to the former and a special interpretation of the latter allow us to interpret these statements in a way that is consistent with Wittgenstein's later views.     

The Thatcher illusion and face processing in infancy

Adults readily detect changes in face patterns brought about by the inversion of eyes and mouth when the faces are viewed upright but not when they are viewed upside down. Research suggests that this illusion (the Thatcher illusion) is caused by the interfering effects of face inversion on the processing of second-order relational information (fine spatial information such as the distance between the eyes). In the current study, 6-month-olds discriminated 'thatcherized' faces when they were viewed upright but not when they were viewed upside down. These results are consistent with the notion that 6-month-olds are sensitive to second-order relational information while processing faces.