Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality: Temporality,Truth, Modality,and Identity

The essay introduces a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal modal semantics based on part-whole, rather than class, theory. Formalizing Edmund Husserl’s theory of inner time consciousness, §3 uses his protention and retention concepts to define a relation of self-awareness on intentional events. §4 introduces a syntax and two-valued semantics for modal first-order predicate object-languages, defines semantic assignments for variables and predicates, and truth for formulae in terms of the axiomatic version of Edmund Husserl’s dependence ontology (viz. the Calculus [CU] of Urelements) introduced by The Ontology of Intentionality I & II. It then uses the §3 results to define the modalities of truth, and §5 extends the semantics to identity claims. §6 defines and contrasts synthetic a priori truths to analytic a priori truths, and §7 compares Brentano School noetic semantic and Leibnizian possible-world semantic perspectives on modality. The essay argues that the modal logics it defines semantically are two-valued, first-order versions of the type of language which Husserl viewed as the language of any ontology of experience (i.e. of any science), and conceived as the logic of intentionality.     

HALF‐TRUTHS

Half‐truths are statements that have some insight or truth in them, but do not amount to a final or definitive truth that all competent judges should be able to accept. Complete truth requires that the relevant interpretative structures can be taken for granted, and can be expected to be understood by all competent language users. Disciplines such as philosophy, history, and sociology do contain a small number of complete truths, concerning some logical relations or such matters as the year of Columbus' arrival in the new world or recorded vote totals in some elections. But most of what they yield (the most interesting part) will consist of half‐truths.     

Naming,Saying, and Structure

It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world's structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law‐hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint‐carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing perspicuous from mere truths do not allow Lewis and Sider to properly impose constraints on grammar.     

Does Truth Matter? Introduction to Papers by Jody Davies,Shlomit Gadot,and Donnel Stern

Each of these three essays touches on the universal meaning and relevance of truth. Yet all are dealing with the relational truths that survive and hold us after the 2016 election amounted to a loss of certain assumed truths of everyday life.

Donnel Stern asks, If relational truth is constructed, dialogical, multiple, how does this belief survive when we find ourselves outraged, by what seem like cavalier untruths—lies, some kind of runaway, twittered, subjective truth? He argues that a credible, measurable, objectivity about certain truths indeed survives perfectly well within our overall relational worldview.

Shlomit Gadot adds that truth, relational truth, does and can exist most stably in our essential recognition of the multiplicity of (often relationally shaped) premises, frameworks, perspectives on truth. What “matters” when truth becomes threatened with serious shattering (here in a clash with love) is that she begins with an effort at genuine openness to the truth of the other.

Jody Davies implies that relational truth at virtually in all levels is embedded with the trauma narrative of truth, its meanings, and motivated hiding as we know it clinically. Truth survives its subjective shattering by recognizing that within the sociopolitical realm, we are being abused and traumatized by political authority and an abusive father.

The complexity of relational truth may involve creatively grieving certain certainties about truth that we may have experienced as lost. Truth in these three essays may lie in our overall effort to be equal to the full complexity of that loss and, paradoxically, to become expanded and more deeply connected through that experience.     

What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the “Hard Problem”1

Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.     

Free Will,Foreknowledge, and Future‐Dependent Beliefs

Recently, a time‐honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: (A) if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on (A). This argument is interesting in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing (A) to block incompatibilism.     

Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker‐than‐classical K₃ logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to—whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non‐classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities.     

Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and Yogācāra Buddhism's theory of the three natures

IntroductionNa¯ga¯rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ that ‘The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma¯dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that all phenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The former, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth; while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. This paper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the Tibetan Pra¯sangika Ma¯dhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them. It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge's (hereafter Go rampa 1429-1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the two truths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate in a way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or identity.     

Negative truths and truthmaker principles

This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither absences, nor totality states of affairs, nor Graham Priest and J.C. Beall’s ‘polarities’ (Beall, 2000; Priest, 2000) are up to the job. The second horn, meanwhile, is problematic because restricting the truthmaker principle to atomic truths, or weakening it to the thesis that truth supervenes on being, undercuts truthmaker theory’s original motivation. The paper ends by arguing that truthmaker theory is, in any case, an under-motivated doctrine because the groundedness of truth can be explained without appeal to the truthmaker principle. This leaves us free to give the ommonsensical and deflationary explanation of negative truths that common-sense suggests.     

Analyticity and Justification in Frege

That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification, respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists. Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched.     

Deutscher's problem is not Popper's problem

The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth entails the knowability of all truths. Correctly understood, the antirealistic conditions on a proposition's truth do not require that the proposition possess a verification-procedure which, when executed under the given conditions, issues in an agent's recognition of truth, but merely that there be a verification-procedure which, under these conditions, takes the value true. The knowability paradox and the related idealism problem (that antirealism seems, but is not, committed to the necessary existence of an epistemic agent) draw attention to the fact that certain propositions, those that are about verification-procedures themselves, may under certain conditions take the value true despite their unperformability under these circumstances. Thus these propositions' procedures can only be performed when the propositions are false, and they gain the appearance of antirealistic impossibility (e.g., that there is an unknown truth). This differs from the unperformability that antirealists object to, pertaining merely to matters of execution rather than to the logical structure of the procedures themselves. The force of antirealism's notion of epistemic truth is piecemeal, rather than consisting in a blanket characterization of truth as knowable.     

Lies,Damn Lies,and Expectations: How Base Rates Inform Lie–Truth Judgments

We are biased towards thinking that people are telling the truth. Our study represents the first test of how beliefs about the base rate of truths and lies affect this truth bias. Raters were told either 20, 50 or 80% of the speakers would be telling the truth. As the speaker delivered their statement, participants indicated moment by moment whether they thought the speaker was lying or being truthful. At the end of the statement, they made a final lie–truth judgment and indicated their confidence. While viewing the statement, base rate beliefs had an early influence, but as time progressed, all conditions showed a truth bias. In the final judgment at the end of the statement, raters were truth biased when expecting mostly truths but did not show a lie bias when expecting mostly lies. We conclude base rate beliefs have an early influence, but over time, a truth bias dominates. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic and Syncretic Dimensions to Śāntarakṣita's Presentation of the Two Truths

It is common for philosophers from the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhist thought to offer a presentation of the two truths, ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and conventional truth (sa?v?tisatya), as a vehicle for presenting their views on the ontological status of entities. Though there is some degree of variance, generally ultimate truths are described as objects known by an awareness of knowing things as they are. Conventional truths are objects as conceived by a mistaken awareness, one that superimposes a mode of existence onto objects that is not actually there. These two truths are contrasted (one is accurate; one is not) and used as a vehicle for understanding the ontological status of phenomena and the means by which they are known. ?āntarak?ita (725–788 CE) was among the most important Madhyamaka thinkers in Indian Buddhist history, yet his presentation of the two truths has several features that signal its uniqueness. This paper will discuss two particular unique dimensions to ?āntarak?ita's views on the two truths: his integration of aspects of Cittamatra/Yogācāra thinking, including the rejection of external objects, into his presentation of conventional truths, and the dynamic way in which conventional truths are not merely presented as objects of a mistaken awareness, but rather as an important soteriological step in the process of realizing the ultimate. This syncretic and dynamic integration of Yogācāra thought, where its ideas are fully engaged and incorporated into an over-arching Madhyamaka philosophical system is a key component to the thought of one of the most important, influential, and innovative figures in the late period of Indian Madhyamaka, and one which has yet to be fully acknowledged in secondary literature.     

Supervenience,Repeatability, & Expressivism

Expressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non-normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non-normative properties are repeatable when it is possible for numerically distinct individuals to share them. Second, I show if the modal truth that stands in need of explanation entails that there are individuals exactly alike in repeatable non-normative respects that cannot normatively differ, then standard expressivist accounts of normative supervenience as a conceptual truth are unsuccessful. Expressivist metasemantics for normative terms, together with constitutive facts about the non-cognitive attitudes essentially involved in normative thought, strongly suggest that repeatable supervenience could not be a conceptual truth. I argue, finally, that although repeatable supervenience bears the marks of a conceptual truth, expressivists should be content to treat it as an ordinary normative truth, and to explain it the same way they explain other normative truths.     

A PEIRCEAN RESPONSE TO THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE

The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self‐defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their non‐truth‐tracking origins, when it is precisely this claim that relies upon the normativity under attack. This article cites Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) to argue that such self‐defeat can be avoided by expanding upon the basic structure of the argument put forth by Griffiths and Wilkins, provided that one embraces a version of realism that corresponds with Peirce's doctrine of final causation. So construed, final causation reconciles real generals (including real moral values) with natural selection and undergirds further speculation of moral facts within values per se.     

真理、符合与收缩论

The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “s is true iff p”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.     

Why suppress the truth? U.S., Canadian and english approaches to the exclusion of illegally obtained real evidence in criminal cases

Conclusion Analysis of the U.S., Canadian and English approaches to excluding illegally obtained real evidence, which passes the threshold test of authenticity, probative value and relevance, reveals various ways in which poisoned truths are treated in criminal legal systems. A person who has no interaction with the criminal legal system may of course be considerably sympathetic to the English rule which attempts always to reveal the immediate truth. For if one considers only an individual criminal case, the English rule certainlyappears to value truth above all else. However, a contextual analysis makes it clear that there is a systemic effect in always revealing the truth that may result in fewer incidents of the truth being revealed in the future than if the immediate truth were suppressed in a particular case. The U.S. and Canadian exclusionary rules recognize the systemic harm of automatically revealing all truths the moment the truths become apparent. While the U.S. courts have had trouble agreeing on the rationale for excluding illegally obtained real evidence, they have come up with a rule which in the end balances the immediate harm of exclusion of the truth and the systemic harm of its inclusion. The U.S. rule is also very predictable, clearly setting out when a future truth is threatened by revealing an immediate truth. The Canadian rule is in the early stages of development, and, while there is a clearly stated rationale that seeks a justice of truth, it is not sufficiently concrete to allow one to predict when the rationale of a justice of truth will be achieved. In the final analysis, and in contrast to the English exclusionary rule, both the Canadian and U.S. rules address thesystemic harm of always including illegally obtained real evidence.     

LOGICAL TRUTH IN MODAL LOGIC

In this paper, I consider the criticism due to Hartry Field, John Pollack, William Hanson and James Hawthorne that the Kripkean requirement that a logical truth in modal logic be true at all possible worlds in all quantified model structures is unmotivated and misses some logical truths. These authors do not see the basis for making the logical truth of a modal sentence turn on more than the model structure given by one reading of the modal operator(s) which occur in the sentence. The primary goal here is to motivate the Kripkean requirement.