Situationism and the Concept of a Situation

Abstract: The concept of a situation underlying the debate between moral situationists and dispositionists conceals various underexplored complexities. Some of those issues have been engaged recently in the so‐called psychology of situations, but they have been slow to receive attention in mainstream philosophy. I invoke various distinctions among situations, and show how situationists have selectively chosen certain types of situations that, for conceptual reasons, skew the argument in their favour. I introduce the concept of a ‘virtue‐calibrated situation’, and argue that if the person–situation debate is to move forward in philosophy as it has in psychology, it must focus on such situations. I bring to bear evidence from analytic and continental philosophy, as well as from social and personality psychology.     

Consistent egoists and situation managers: two problems for situationism

According to philosophical “situationism”, psychological evidence shows that human action is typically best explained by the influence of situational factors and not by “global” and robust character traits of the agent. As a practical implication of their view, situationists recommend that efforts in moral education be shifted from character development to situation management. Much of the discussion has focused on whether global conceptions of virtue and character, and in particular Aristotelian virtue ethics, can be defended against the situationist challenge. After several rounds of debate, both sides claim victory, and they seem to have reached a stalemate. In this paper, I refocus the debate on the arguments offered in support of situationism itself. I argue that two serious problems have so far gone unnoticed in the literature. First, the argument in support of situationism is unsound. It is based on evidence that agents’ morally relevant behavior reliably covaries with morally irrelevant situational variables. Using the example of egoism, I show that this evidence does not warrant the situationist inference because the evidence permits a plausible alternative interpretation. Second, I argue that the situationists’ advocacy of situation management is at odds with their core thesis because situation management requires exactly the type of agency they reject as unrealistic.     

Absolute Other: Lacan's ‘Big Other’ as Adjunct to Critical Social Psychological Analysis?

Lacanian theory offers a series of promising conceptualization – amongst then the notion of the ‘big Other’– which, despite their obvious analytical value, have been curiously neglected by critical social psychology. This paper concerns itself with an overview of this concept of the ‘big Other’ particularly in reference to how it may benefit critical social psychological analyses. The explanatory value of this notion is introduced via a series of Lacanian paradoxes (the Other as vanishing‐point of inter‐subjectivity that cannot itself be subjectivized; the Other as simultaneously ‘inside’ and ‘outside’; the Other as both embodiment of the social substance and yet also the site of the unconscious). I then move on to show how this notion opens conceptual opportunities for social psychological conceptualizations of the formation of the social. I close by demonstrating what the ‘big Other’ offers critical social psychological analyses of power.     

Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics

Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what “empirical adequacy” or “empirical inadequacy” actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see to what extent virtue ethics might fail to meet this standard. I argue that the situationists frequently misconstrue the empirical commitments of virtue ethics. More importantly, depending on what we mean by empirical adequacy, either virtue ethics has no need to be empirically adequate or where it does have such a need, the psychological evidence fails to show that it is empirically inadequate. An additional contribution the paper intends to make is to provide a more detailed discussion of the explanatory nature of virtue ethics.     

Non-Ideal Virtue and Situationism

Several philosophers, known as situationists, have argued that evidence in social psychology threatens to undermine Aristotelian virtue ethics. An impressively large amount of empirical evidence suggests that most people do not consistently act virtuously and lack the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Since possessing moral virtues requires these features, situationists have argued that Aristotelianism does not accurately describe the character traits possessed by most people, and so the theory cannot lay claim to various theoretical advantages such as explanatory power and egalitarian character education. In contrast to previous defenses which either downplay the relevance of psychological evidence or revise philosophical conceptions of virtue to fit the data, this paper appeals to previously neglected psychological evidence on self-efficacy and mental contrasting in combination with “non-idealized” interpretations of Aristotelian moral virtue to support the view that the available empirical evidence is compatible with widespread possession of virtuous character. These “non-idealized” interpretations of virtuous character allow for serious deviations from virtuous conduct, especially in the contexts described by the psychology experiments. Furthermore, decades of research on mental contrasting and self-efficacy suggest that subjects in the psychology experiments acted for reasons and possessed the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Hence, situationists are mistaken in thinking that, based on the empirical data, Aristotelianism is deprived of various theoretical advantages.

     

Social strategies in self-deception

How do people deceive themselves? I argue that although self-deception tends to be conceptualized as something that happens ‘within an individual’, it can also be a process that is distributed across the social context of a self-deceiver. In this paper I will, first, conceptually distinguish different strategies of such ‘social self-deception’. Second, I will incorporate these into the two main conceptualizations of self-deception: intentionalism and deflationism. Finally, I will show how the proposed re-conceptualization of self-deception can be beneficial to conceptual, moral and empirical research.     

Four Core Social‐Psychological Motivations to Undertake Collective Action

Collective action against collective disadvantage is a theoretically and socially relevant phenomenon that has received increased scientific attention in recent years. Because recent work combines different theoretical traditions, the last decade can be rightly called an ‘age of integration’. In this article, I take stock and look ahead by briefly reviewing four core social‐psychological motivations for undertaking collective action (based on identity, morality, emotion, and efficacy). I then review recent accumulating evidence for an encompassing social‐psychological model of collective action that integrates all four core motivations. Based on this model's shortcomings, I close by calling for an ‘age of innovation’ for which I propose a theoretical and research agenda.     

Volume contents and author index for Volume 10, 2009

Although there are very few published studies on the issue, there is much anecdotal evidence that, despite all its undisputed benefits, meditation practice can have psychologically deleterious effects. In this paper I will describe a body-based model for understanding trauma, the Trauma Resiliency model, and suggest it might be a helpful tool in anticipating, preventing and/or mitigating these effects. I will argue that Buddhist traditions are replete with frameworks, tools and techniques for addressing some of the psychological pitfalls highlighted. However, some of these methods may have been ‘lost in translation’ as Buddhist meditation training has been adapted for a Western audience. I will make the case that, somewhat ironically, in operational terms some of the secular modalities for teaching mindfulness (such as MBSR) may be psychologically ‘safer’ than those offered in a (Western) Buddhist context. I will call for further inquiry about how to mitigate and protect against psychological harms in Buddhist meditation training.     

Simulation and Irrationality

Abstract

In this paper, I hope to show how a recent theory in the philosophy of mind concerning how we ‘read’ the minds of others—namely, Heal's version of simulation theory—is consistent with the view that the kind of understanding we bring to bear on the irrational is different in kind from the way we understand one another in the course of everyday life. I shall attempt to show that Heal's version of simulation theory (co-cognition) is to be favoured over its rival ‘theory theories’ in the light of its accommodation of deeply irrational mental states. I claim that simulation theory preserves an asymmetry of psychological explanation which is not similarly preserved by a theory theory account, and I argue that this preservation of asymmetry is an advantage of Heal's account.     

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COGNITIVE BEHAVIOUR THERAPY ‐ RIVAL PARADIGMS OR COMMON GROUND?3

The author suggests that contemporary enthusiasm for cognitive‐behavioural therapy reflects our longing for swift, rational help for psychological suffering. Competition for funding threatens the psychoanalytic presence in the public sector. The psychoanalytic and cognitive‐behavioural models are contrasted, and the relative richness of the psychoanalytic paradigm outlined. The author suggests that a cognitive model is commonsensical, but less complex, with less potential explanatory and therapeutic power. She discusses how the analytic stance is always under pressure to ‘collapse’ into simpler modes, one of which resembles a cognitive one. This also occurs inevitably, she argues, when attempts are made to ‘integrate’ the two models. Cognitive and ‘integrated’ treatments nevertheless have the advantage that they are less intrusive and hence more acceptable to some patients. Selected empirical process and outcome research on cognitive and psychoanalytic therapies is discussed. Brief psychotherapies of either variety have a similar, modestly good outcome, and there is some evidence that this may be based more on ‘dynamic’ than ‘cognitive’ elements of treatment. Formal outcome studies of more typical psychoanalytic psychotherapy and of psychoanalysis itself begin to suggest that these long and complex treatments are effective in the more comprehensive ways predicted by the model.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

Inside it was orange squash concentrate: trainees’ experiences of reflective practice groups within clinical psychology training

Despite many clinical psychology training programmes utilising reflective practice groups (RPGs) to develop reflective practice (RP) skills, there remains little research examining how trainees experience these groups. This study uses interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to explore the experiences of eight qualified clinical psychologists who attended RPGs on one United Kingdom (UK) clinical psychology training programme. A purposive sample was recruited for single, semi-structured interviews. Five superordinate themes were identified: ‘The process: there were so many layers’; ‘The impact: an ongoing process’; ‘Commitment: I hated it, but I still went’; ‘The facilitator: a presence who was not always present’; and ‘Getting through it: finding ways to cope’. The findings illustrate the varied and complex experiences of the participants. Whilst the experience was often difficult, the participants were committed to attending and sought out ways to navigate it. The results are conceptualised in terms of existing psychological theory and literature. A critique of the research and suggestions for future studies are offered, including exploring the views of group facilitators and comparing how groups are utilised within different training programmes. Recommendations are made on the development of future RPGs, which include consideration of the facilitation style and the groups’ frequency and size.     

Law,Charity and Taboo or Kant's Reversal of St. Paul's Spirit‐Letter Opposition and its Theological Implications

This article gives the first account of Kant's reversal of St. Paul's Spirit‐Letter opposition. By means of such reversal Kant defines both charity and law as obtaining a complete autonomy from ‘profane’ life. In Kant's interpretative framework Judaism and Jews represent the ‘profane’, whereas Christ symbolizes the complete transcendence of the empirical. I shall discuss how different Jewish writer – Walter Benjamin, Georg Simmel and Franz Baermann Steiner – respond to such a body‐spirit dichotomy in which ‘the Jew’ functions as the representation of that which is devalued as the material, the bodily.     

The ‘healthy’ family*

The importance of concepts and hypotheses about ‘healthy’ families for family therapists is stressed. A number of different approaches to defining ‘health’ is described. Concepts and hypotheses of family therapists from different schools are integrated into a more encompassing theory, thereby focusing on statements with respect to personality, cognition, behaviour, communication, relationship, role, family system and network. It is noted that family therapy literature lacks information about ‘healthy’ families. Moreover, nearly all statements are non-scientific and normative as they are not founded on empirical research.     

The role of removal and elimination in Nietzsche’s model of self-cultivation

ABSTRACT

In this paper I call into question the commonplace assumption in Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship that ideal psychological self-cultivation comes about solely by means of the sublimation of all of one's drives. While the psychological incorporation of one’s drives and instincts plays a crucial role in promoting what Nietzsche considers a higher self, I argue that some degree of removal and elimination of particular drives and instincts could be, perhaps necessarily is, involved in ideal cases. Yet I will suggest that we should not think of these cases as constituting ‘repressions’. I will seek to offer a better characterization of the discussions of productive removal and elimination in Nietzsche’s texts, and consider how they fit in his model of self-cultivation. Nietzsche’s texts demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which certain kinds of removal and elimination can lead to greater integration for the would-be exemplary individual. My reading, I argue, helps to better understand the instances in the texts where Nietzsche valorizes the removal of particular drives and instincts.     

Linguistics and the explanatory economy

I present a novel, collaborative, methodology for linguistics: what I call the ‘explanatory economy’. According to this picture, multiple models/theories are evaluated based on the extent to which they complement one another with respect to data coverage. I show how this model can resolve a long-standing worry about the methodology of generative linguistics: that by creating too much distance between data and theory, the empirical credentials of this research program are tarnished. I provide justifications of such methodologically central distinctions as the competence/performance and core/periphery distinction, and then show how we can understand the push for simplicity in the history of generative grammar in this light.

     

Measurement as transcendental–empirical <Emphasis Type="Italic">écart</Emphasis>: Merleau-Ponty on deep temporality

Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection conceptualizes the transcendental and the empirical as intertwined, emerging only via an écart. I advance this concept of transcendental empirical écart by studying the problem of measurement in science, in both general and quantum mechanical contexts. Section one analyses scientific problems of measurement, focusing on issues of temporality, to show how measurement entails a transcendental that diverges with the empirical. Section two briefly interprets this result via Merleau-Ponty’s concept of depth, to indicate how measurement reveals a temporality that is not an already given ground that would guarantee the transcendental in advance: temporality is instead ‘deep,’ itself engendering a divergence of transcendental and empirical operations that first allows for measurement and sense.     

Mind knowledge in infancy: The emergence of intentional communication

When and how infants and young children start to understand that persons are entities different from ‘non-persons ’ is the central issue addressed in this paper. A critical examination is presented of empirical research inspired by the ‘theory of mind ’ approach and relative to the knowledge about the mind exhibited by pre-school children (2–5 years of age). In considering what kind of psychological knowledge pre-linguistic children may acquire, it is argued that the most significant developmental phenomenon is the grasp of the concept of intentional communication, as distinct from both agency and instrumentality. Intentional communication, so defined, implies the capacity to represent and influence the other person's attentional state about aspects of the world, and at the same time to represent the other person as capable of understanding one's communicative intentions.