The Phenomenology of Near-Death Consciousness in Past-Life Regression Therapy: A Pilot Study

Although past-life regression therapy has not been shown to be the re-experiencing of a verifiable previous biological existence, therapists have noted similarities between the phenomenology of post-death awareness reported by regressed subjects and the phenomenology of near-death experiences (NDEs). This paper reports the results of a pilot study exploring those similarities as far as the therapeutic modality normally accommodates post-death phenomena. Similarities and differences between NDEs and post-death regression phenomena suggest new avenues of research.     

现象学作为一种第一哲学:马里翁、雅尼科与里希尔

文章围绕现象学能否作为第一哲学这一热点问题,展现了多米尼克·雅尼科、马克·里希尔与让-吕克·马里翁之间的争论.雅尼科忠实于现象学还原的观念,反思它具体给予我们的意义关联,坚决反对将现象学作为第一哲学,而提倡一种极简主义的现象学.马里翁则从尝试设置对现象的范畴分析之基础出发,进一步澄清现象学的偶然性的特异性,在现象学的意义上使另一种第一哲学的轮廓清晰可见.但是,马里翁的给予现象学暗示着只有一种把握凭自身出现和显示的现象的可能方式,这是为里希尔所不能赞同的,里希尔自发的意义构成的现象学在此提供了另外一种选择.     

Merleau-Ponty's Modification of Phenomenology: Cognition,Passion and Philosophy

This paper problematizes the analogy that Hubert Dreyfus has presented between phenomenology and cognitive science. It argues that Dreyfus presents Merleau-Ponty's modification of Husserl's phenomenology in a misleading way. He ignores the idea of philosophy as a radical interrogation and self-responsibility that stems from Husserl's work and recurs in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. The paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the phenomenological reduction. It shows that his critical idea was not to restrict the scope of Husserl's reductions but to study the conditions of possibility for the thetic acts. Merleau-Ponty argued, following Husserl's texts, that the thetic acts rest on the basis of primordial pre-thetic experience. This layer of experience cannot, by its nature, be explicated or clarified, but it can be questioned and unveiled. This is the recurrent task of phenomenological philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty understands it.     

梦意识现象学初探——关于想象、梦与超越论现象学

文章试图运用"双重自我"的概念,结合想象现象对一般梦现象进行现象学上的考察,并期望借助考察的结论给清明之梦一个现象学的解释。在文章的最后,还将用梦作比喻,探讨它对超越论现象学的启示。     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.     

Identity and Difference: A Hundred Years of Analytic Philosophy

At its origins, analytic philosophy is an interest in language, science, logic, analysis, and a systematic rather than a historical approach to philosophical problems. Early analytic philosophers were famous for making clear conceptual distinctions and for couching them in comprehensible and lucid sentences. It is argued that this situation is changing, that analytic philosophy is turning into its mirror image and is thereby becoming more like the kind of philosophy that it used to oppose.