On Russell's principle of induction

An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.The authors would like to thank the two anonymous referees and Jeff Paris for their helpful and encouraging remarks. It goes without saying, of course, that the responsibility for any further errors, ambiguities or whatever, is entirely ours.We would also like to acknowledge the support given by the Centre of Logic. Epistemology and History of Science of the University of Campinas and, in the case of French, the Brazilian Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), in the preparation of this work.     

Explaining Rigidity and Pragmatism in Political Leaders: A General Theory and a Plausibility Test from the Reagan Presidency

Classic studies of a few extreme, almost pathological cases of rigidity in political leaders (e.g., Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations debacle) have tended to obscure the fact that virtually all leaders alternate between periods of pragmatic flexibility and rigid intransigence in the face of political opposition or unpleasant facts. This study develops a general theoretical framework for explaining rigidity and flexibility in political leaders by extending insights from classic studies of extreme cases to everyday policymaking and by integrating these findings with more recent theoretical and empirical work in political psychology. The plausibility of hypotheses derived from this framework is investigated by examining the conditions associated with pragmatism and rigidity in 15 cases from the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The results are generally consistent with the proposed model, which stresses person-situation interaction and traces rigidity to the arousal of leaders' sources of self-validation in a particular policy context. I conclude by evaluating the implications of this new framework for other areas of theory and research.     

The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality

Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe six Parmenidean theories of being Russell held, including: literal in 1903; universal in 1912; timeless in 1914; transcendental in 1918–1948. The transcendental theory underlies the primary level of Russell's modal logic. In Part IV, I examine Rescher's view that Russell and modal logic did not mix.The United States Naval Academy Research Council kindly provided a summer 1988 research grant for work on this essay. This essay was presented at the Bertrand Russell Society Meeting during the December 1988 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C.