Russell's Early Theory of Denoting

The ancient Greek method of analysis has a rational reconstruction in the form of the tableau method of logical proof. This reconstruction shows that the format of analysis was largely determined by the requirement that proofs could be formulated by reference to geometrical figures. In problematic analysis, it has to be assumed not only that the theorem to be proved is true, but also that it is known. This means using epistemic logic, where instantiations of variables are typically allowed only with respect to known objects. This requirement explains the preoccupation of Greek geometers with questions as to which geometrical objects are ‘given’, that is, known or ‘data’, as in the title of Euclid's eponymous book. In problematic analysis, constructions had to rely on objects that are known only hypothetically. This seems strange unless one relies on a robust idea of ‘unknown’ objects in the same sense as the unknowns of algebra. The Greeks did not have such a concept, which made their grasp of the analytic method shaky.     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.     

On Russell's principle of induction

An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.The authors would like to thank the two anonymous referees and Jeff Paris for their helpful and encouraging remarks. It goes without saying, of course, that the responsibility for any further errors, ambiguities or whatever, is entirely ours.We would also like to acknowledge the support given by the Centre of Logic. Epistemology and History of Science of the University of Campinas and, in the case of French, the Brazilian Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), in the preparation of this work.     

Non‐human Support: Broadening the Scope of Attachment Theory

Attachment theory proposes that people form strong social ties because certain relationships provide feelings of security and support. Traditionally, theorists and researchers have assumed that because this process is innate and evolved, only human targets are capable of meeting a person's needs for security. Recent research challenges this assumption by demonstrating that an array of targets, such as places and pets, can also satisfy needs for security, particularly under conditions of threatened or absent connection to other people. We bring together these diverse findings and discuss how they enrich our understanding of the nature and operation of attachment processes and related phenomena. Specifically, this line of research contributes to a comprehensive picture of the diverse means by which people flexibly seek and maintain psychological security both within and outside of their close, interpersonal relationships. It also raises new research questions concerning the similarities and differences between human and non‐human support.