Bad for me or bad for us? Interpersonal orientations and the impact of losses on unethical behavior

The present research examines the role of allocations of losses versus gains on the emergence of unethical behavior as a function of people's social value orientation. The authors demonstrate that (a) proselfs regard unethical behavior to prevent losses as more justified than prosocials (Study 1) and (b) proselfs engage in more unethical behavior to prevent losses than prosocials (Study 2). These differences are explained by prosocials' greater concern for harm to interdependent others in the domain of losses. A third study further substantiates these findings by revealing that unethical behavior to prevent losses increases among prosocials as harm to others is reduced. In sum, these results reveal that depending on whether people attend only to their self-interest or also consider the outcomes of others, losses either may increase or curtail unethical conduct. Considering social value orientations thus may reconcile conflicting theoretical perspectives on the impact of losses on social decisions.     

Injustice for All or Just for Me? Social Value Orientation Predicts Responses to Own Versus Other's Procedures

In two experiments, the authors investigated how differences in social value orientation predict evaluations of procedures that were accorded to self and others. Proselfs versus prosocials were either granted or denied an opportunity to voice an opinion in a decision-making process and witnessed how someone else was either granted or denied such an opportunity. Consistent with the hypothesis, procedural evaluations of both proselfs and prosocials were influenced by own procedure when other was granted voice, but only proselfs were influenced by own procedure when other was denied voice. These findings were particularly attributable to prosocials' tendency to evaluate a situation where no-voice procedures are applied consistently between persons more positively than proselfs. It is concluded that proselfs are focused on procedural justice and injustice for self more than prosocials, whereas prosocials value equality in procedures more than proselfs-even when equality implies injustice for all.     

Social dilemmas as strong versus weak situations: Social value orientations and tacit coordination under resource size uncertainty

This study investigates how environmental uncertainty in resource dilemmas influences the decisions of participants differing in social value orientations. We argue that under resource size certainty people anchor their decisions on tacit coordination rules such as the equal division rule, whereas under resource size uncertainty people rely more on their own social value orientations to determine their choice behavior. The results corroborate our line of reasoning. When the size of the resource was certain, proselfs as well as prosocials anchored their decisions on the equal division rule. Under resource size uncertainty, the equal division rule appeared to lose its coordinating potential, inducing proselfs to harvest more than prosocials.     

大学生在社会困境中的公平决策:社会价值取向的影响

通过两项研究考查大学生在社会困境中的行为决策及公平感体验,检验社会价值取向的影响作用,有效被试分别为85名和84名。结果表明:(1)亲社会者比亲自我者更倾向做公平决策;信息对称比不对称条件更促进被试做公平决策;女生比男生更倾向做公平决策。(2)性别在社会价值取向与信息对称性对公平决策的影响中起调节作用,社会价值取向显著影响男生的公平决策,信息对称性显著影响女生的公平决策。(3)社会价值取向显著影响个体对不公平的容忍度,亲社会者更不容忍不公平行为。(4)对于利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向接受,亲社会者并不比亲自我者体验到更强的内疚情绪;对于不利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向拒绝,且产生较强的不公平感及气愤情绪。     

社会价值取向对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制

以往关于为自己和代他人决策的冒险行为研究结果不一致, 这可能是因为以往的研究没有考虑决策情境和决策者人际特质等因素对于决策行为的影响。社会价值取向(social value orientation, SVO)是一种典型的人际特质, 是个体在对自我和他人资源分配时所表现出的社会偏好, 通常分为亲社会者和亲自我者。为探究SVO对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制, 采用为自己和陌生人分别完成多轮混合赌博游戏的任务。结果发现亲自我比亲社会者代他人决策更冒险。用模型量化的损失厌恶和对潜在损失的敏感度部分中介了自我-他人风险决策差异, 但只有对他人潜在损失的敏感度部分中介自我-他人决策的SVO效应。说明SVO会影响自我-他人风险决策, 且该效应可以通过对他人利益的关心程度起作用, 所以在自我-他人风险决策的研究中应将SVO这一决策者的人际特质因素考虑在内。     

The consequences of mimicry for prosocials and proselfs: Effects of social value orientation on the mimicry–liking link

People often mimic each other's behaviors. As a consequence, they share each other's emotional and cognitive states, which facilitates liking. Mimicry, however, does not always affect liking. In two studies, we investigate whether the mimicry–liking link is influenced by people's social value orientations. More specifically, we examine whether prosocials and proselfs are differently affected when being mimicked or not. Prosocials and proselfs indicated their liking for the interaction partner after being or not being mimicked in a face‐to‐face interaction. The results of two studies showed that prosocials rated the interaction partner as less likeable when they were not mimicked than when they were mimicked. Proselfs, however, were not affected by mimicry. These results show that people's social motives play a role in whether or not the effects of mimicry on liking occur: Proselfs are less sensitive to the mimicry acts of others. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The double meaning of a single act: influences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour

The present research examines how a single behaviour that is informative of both the morality and intelligence of a person influences impressions, degree of cooperative behaviour expected from that person, and degree of cooperative behaviour displayed toward that person in a mixed‐motive interdependence situation (i.e., a social dilemma). Furthermore, it is investigated how individual differences in social value orientation influence these processes. Participants were provided with behavioural information that could be construed in terms of both morality (high/low) and intelligence (high/low). Consistent with the morality‐importance hypothesis, participants assigned greater weight to morality than to intelligence aspects of the information. Congruent with the social value orientation hypothesis (i) only proselfs and not prosocials expected more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others, and (ii) prosocials attended more strongly to morality aspects than proselfs in deciding on own cooperation. Finally, consistent with the relative benefit hypothesis, people overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display, and this tendency was especially pronounced with others described by moral/unintelligent behaviour, and for people with a proself value orientation. The authors discuss a model describing influences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Social Dilemma Analysis of Commuting Preferences: The Roles of Social Value Orientation and Trust1

The current research advances a social dilemma analysis of commuting, examining the roles of preexisting personality differences in social value orientation (i.e., prosocial vs. proself orientation) and trust (i.e., a general belief in the honesty and cooperative intentions of others) in determining preferences for collectively desirable commuting options: preferences for commuting by public transportation (Study 1) and carpooling (Study 2). Consistent with predictions, both studies revealed that, relative to p of prosocials, preferences of proselfs were more strongly associated with beliefs about the relative efficiency of cars (i.e., an outcome affecting personal well-being). Also, greater preferences for collectively desirable actions were observed among prosocials with high trust—relative to prosocials with low trust and proselfs with high or low trust—providing support for the claim that 2 conditions (i.e., prosocial goals and trust in others) must be met to obtain collectively desirable commuting preferences.     

Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

What other's disappointment may do to selfish people: emotion and social value orientation in a negotiation context

The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientation moderate responses to other's expressions of disappointment in negotiation. The literature suggested competing hypotheses: First, prosocials are more responsive to other's disappointment because they have a greater concern for other; second, proselfs are more responsive because they see other's disappointment as a threat to their own outcomes. Results of a computer-mediated negotiation in which a simulated opponent expressed disappointment, no emotion, or anger supported the second prediction: Proselfs conceded more to a disappointed opponent than to a neutral or angry one, whereas prosocials were unaffected by the other's emotion. This effect was mediated by participants' motivation to satisfy the other's needs, which disappointment triggered more strongly in proselfs than in prosocials. Implications for theorizing on emotion, social value orientation, and negotiation are discussed.     

Mother Teresa versus Ebenezer Scrooge: mortality salience leads proselfs to endorse self-transcendent values (unless proselfs are reassured)

Recently, Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski demonstrated that mortality salience (MS) increased contributions to (an ingroup) charity (i.e., the Scrooge effect). The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientations would moderate the Scrooge effect. In line with an Ebenezer shift hypothesis, proselfs were less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values in a dental pain control condition but were indistinguishable from prosocials in an MS condition as proselfs increased endorsement of self-transcendent values under MS (Experiments 1 and 2a). However, when participants gave their impressions of an unfavorable prosocial or a favorable proself prior to the MS manipulation, proselfs were again less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values (Experiments 2a and 2b), suggesting that proselfs are unlikely to transform into prosocials under conditions of MS when given reasons to disidentify with prosocial values or identify with proself values.     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

Cooperating If One's Goals Are Collective‐Based: Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal Transformation1

Prior studies of the effect of group identification on cooperation in social dilemmas have advanced 2 competing accounts: the goal‐transformation hypothesis, which holds that identification makes personal and collective goals interchangeable; and the goal‐amplification hypothesis, which states that identification induces positive expectations about others’ cooperative behavior. However, prior studies have neglected to assess the process measures necessary to pit the one account against the other. The present study showed that the effect of identification was moderated by participants’ social value orientation. Identification influenced proselfs’ cooperation more than prosocials’ cooperation. Mediational analyses further showed that the effect of our identification manipulation was mediated by participants’ sense of collective self, and not by their expectations.     

社会价值取向对自我社会奖赏加工的影响——来自ERPs的证据

社会价值取向(Social Value Orientation, SVO)是相互依存情境下人们对自己和他人分配结果的一种稳定的社会偏好, 按SVO不同可以将个体分为“亲社会取向”和“亲自我取向”个体。已有研究表明SVO影响个体对涉及自我金钱奖赏的结果评价加工, 而它如何影响自我社会奖赏加工过程尚不明确。本研究让亲社会取向和亲自我取向被试完成涉及自我社会奖赏(包含社会接纳和自我成就感)的猜牌建议给予任务, 同时记录其加工他人对建议的反馈(接受vs.拒绝)和他人最终结果(收益vs.损失)时诱发的脑电成分。结果发现, 在建议反馈加工阶段, 相比亲自我取向个体, 亲社会取向个体在反馈相关负波(FRN)波幅(峰-峰值)和P3平均波幅上, 建议被对方接受和被对方拒绝所诱发的波幅差异均显著; 在他人最终结果加工阶段, 建议被对方拒绝后, 对于亲社会取向个体, 对方损失诱发的反馈相关负FRN波幅比对方收益诱发的波幅更负, 而对方损失诱发的P3波幅小于对方收益诱发的波幅; 对于亲自我取向个体, 对方损失与收益诱发的FRN波幅无差异, 对方损失诱发的P3波幅显著大于对方收益诱发的波幅。这些结果表明社会价值取向调节个体对自我社会奖赏的加工。     

True versus strategic fairness in a common resource dilemma: Evidence from the dual‐process perspective

Common resource dilemmas involve collectively coordinating individual choices to promote group efficiency. Equal division represents one of the most important coordination rules. Previous research suggests that individuals follow the equality rule for different reasons. Some individuals behave cooperatively out of their concern for other's welfare, whereas some individuals cooperate strategically to enhance personal gains. Building on the dual‐process perspective, the authors aim to differentiate strategic fairness from true fairness in solving a resource dilemma. In four experiments, the effect of cognitive processing manipulations on individual harvesting behavior in a one‐shot resource dilemma was tested against participants with different social values. Results consistently showed that prosocials, who value joint outcome and equality, requested significantly less money than did proselfs, who value personal gain. More importantly, prosocials in the intuition and deliberation conditions request similar amounts, whereas proselfs in the intuition condition request more money than those in the deliberation condition. The results were further validated by a follow‐up meta‐analysis based on the four experiments. The implications of the dual‐process perspective for social coordination research are discussed.     

Effects of social value orientations on fairness judgments

The authors assessed the impact that social value orientations--prosocial (i.e., concerned about outcomes for both oneself and others) versus proself (i.e., concerned about one's own outcome only)--had on fairness judgments in a non-negotiation setting. The results indicated that prosocials generally formed fairness judgments in a manner suggested by equity theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw an equal outcome as fairer than a favorable or unfavorable outcome. The fairness determinations of proselfs, however, tended to follow the tenets of self-interest theory: Given the same input as a comparison other, they saw a favorable outcome as fairer than an unfavorable outcome. Contrary to self-interest theory, proselfs did not find a favorable outcome fairer than an equal outcome. These findings indicate that social value orientations differentially affect the evaluation of outcome information in the formation of fairness judgments.     

Reactions to group success and failure as a function of identification level: a test of the goal-transformation hypothesis in social dilemmas

This study examined the combined effects of identification level, social value orientation, and feedback on contributions in a public goods dilemma. Previous research has shown that strengthening group identity promotes cooperation. One explanation for this finding is that a strong group identity transforms people's motives from the personal to the collective level (the goal transformation hypothesis). Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in studies showing that a strong sense of group identity influences proselfs, relative to prosocials, to make larger contributions. In this experiment, we demonstrated that these findings are restricted to situations in which no feedback about a group's performance is provided. When performance feedback is provided, a strong group identity cancels the effects of individual differences in social value orientations. In particular, when a group fails, contributions increase if group identity is salient, but decrease if personal identity is salient, regardless of a person's social value orientation. But when a group succeeds, no differences between group and personal identity are found. These results are discussed in terms of the goal transformation hypothesis.     

Spill‐over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas

This research investigates the role of intermittent monetary costs in restraining individuals from defection in social dilemmas. In Experiment 1, 104 car owners made fictitious choices between a slow and a fast travel mode in the context of a continuous social dilemma. There were four different conditions of monetary costs for choosing the fast mode (defection): no cost, low cost, high cost to self, or high cost to others. Participants defected most when there was no cost and least when they themselves were charged a high cost. A spill‐over effect was obtained such that when others were charged a high cost to defect, defection rates were lower than under no cost. Experiment 2 used 36 undergraduates as participants in an iterated decision task with real groups. The results replicated the major results of Experiment 1. Furthermore, whereas prosocials were strongly affected by intermittent costs for defection (i.e. showed large spill‐over effects), proselfs seemed to be unaffected. Possible explanations of this interaction effect between social value orientation and intermittent punishment for defection are provided. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

All is well that ends well,at least for proselfs: emotional reactions to equality violation as a function of social value orientation

In step‐level public good dilemmas the equality rule serves as an important distribution rule to tacitly coordinate group members' decisions. In two studies, we examined the motives that may underlie the use of the equality rule. More specifically, we examined whether people use the equality rule out of fairness concerns or out of efficiency concerns. For this purpose, we assessed people's emotional reactions toward a violator of the equality rule when the group succeeded vs. failed, as a function of social value orientation. The results of both experiments showed that proselfs' emotional reactions towards a violator were a function of the success or the failure of the group, whereas prosocials' emotional reactions did not vary as a function of the outcome feedback. These results suggest that prosocials prefer the equality rule out of fairness concerns whereas for proselfs efficiency concerns dominate. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self-activation is a two-edged sword: The effects of I primes on cooperation

Two studies examined the influence of I primes on cooperative behavior. Two contrasting hypotheses were tested, using prosocial allocations (Experiment 1) and behavior in a give-some dilemma (Experiment 2) as dependent variables and assessing subjects’ social value orientation. The self-activation hypothesis (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) predicts that social value orientation influences behavior to a stronger degree when activated. That is, proselfs should behave less cooperatively, whereas prosocials should behave even more cooperatively in an I prime condition. The independent self-construal hypothesis (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999) predicts a stronger concern for one’s own outcome and less cooperative behavior for individuals with an activated independent self-construal. In both studies an interaction between priming and social value orientation occurred, supporting the self-activation hypothesis. Implications for the importance of social cognitive processes underlying cooperative behavior, as well as, implications for research on independent vs interdependent self-construals are discussed.