Introduction to the special issue on comparative cognition

Prior research has shown that nonhumans show an extreme preference for variable‐ over fixed‐delays to reinforcement. This well‐established preference for variability occurs because a reinforcer's strength or “value” decreases according to a curvilinear function as its delay increases. The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate whether this preference for variability occurs with human participants making hypothetical choices. In three experiments, participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk made choices between variable and fixed monetary rewards. In a variable‐delay procedure, participants repeatedly chose between a reward delivered either immediately or after a delay (with equal probability) and a reward after a fixed delay (Experiments 1 and 2). In a double‐reward procedure, participants made choices between an alternative consisting of two rewards, one delivered immediately and one after a delay, and a second alternative consisting of a single reward delivered after a delay (Experiments 1 and 3). Finally, all participants completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Although we observed both curvilinear discounting and magnitude effects in the standard discounting task, we found no consistent evidence of a preference for variability—as predicted by two prominent models of curvilinear discounting (i.e., a simple hyperbola and a hyperboloid)—in our variable‐delay and double‐reward procedures. This failure to observe a preference for variability may be attributed to the hypothetical, rule‐governed nature of choices in the present study. In such contexts, participants may adopt relatively simple strategies for making more complex choices.     

Affect Is Greater Than,Not Equal to,Condition: Condition and Person Effects in Affective Priming Paradigms

Affective primes may impact ensuing behavior through condition and person effects. However, previous research has not experimentally disentangled these two sources of influence in affective priming paradigms. In the current research, we simultaneously examine the influence of condition factors, in terms of prime valence, and person factors, in terms of affect reactivity and personality. In both studies, undergraduate participants (total N = 174) were primed with either positive or negative affective stimuli (words, Study 1; pictures, Study 2) prior to judging the likability of a neutral target (Arabic characters, Study 1; inkblots, Study 2). Although we did observe between‐condition differences for positive and negative primes, person‐level effects were more consistent predictors of target ratings. Affect reactivity (affect Time 2, controlling Time 1) to the primes predicted evaluative judgments, even in the absence of condition effects. In addition, the personality traits of Neuroticism (Study 1) and behavioral inhibition system sensitivity (Study 2) predicted evaluative judgments of neutral targets following negative affective primes. With effects for condition, affect reactivity, and personality, our results suggest that affective primes influence ensuing behaviors through both informational and affective means. Research using affective priming methodologies should take into account both condition and person‐level effects.     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Age‐related differences in delay discounting: Immediate reward,reward magnitude,and social influence

Delay discounting refers to the tendency of individuals to subjectively devalue rewards that are to be received in the future, with high rates of delay discounting being associated with a variety of maladaptive life outcomes (e.g., unhealthy dietary and exercise behaviors). The current study explored the psychological and social processes involved in adult age‐related differences in delay discounting of monetary rewards. Younger adults exhibited higher levels of delay discounting than older adults. This increased level of patience in older adults was found whether smaller‐sooner rewards were to be received immediately or in the future. However, there was an interaction with reward magnitude, whereby younger adults exhibited higher levels of delay discounting for smaller reward magnitudes but not larger reward magnitudes. Social influence on delay discounting was investigated by having participants complete three phases of the delay‐discounting task: an individual precollaboration phase, a collaboration phase in age‐group‐matched dyads, and an individual postcollaboration phase. A convergence effect was observed in that dyad members' postcollaboration choices were significantly more similar compared to their baseline choices during the precollaboration phase. Moreover, levels of convergence were comparable between younger and older adults, suggesting age invariance in social influence on delay discounting. The current results demonstrate a degree of malleability in delay discounting that extends into older adulthood, making interventions targeting the construct a promising avenue for future research.     

Mood and judgments based on sequential sampling

Different adaptive styles characterize cognition and behavior in different affective states. Whereas negative affect supports accommodation (i.e., stimulus‐driven bottom‐up processing), positive affect supports assimilation (i.e., self‐determined top‐down processing). Applying this well‐established rule to binary choices after self‐truncated information sampling, we predicted that positive mood should render choices less dependent on large samples than negative mood. Consequently, the potential primacy advantage underlying Wald's ( 1947 ) sequential testing (i.e., quick and correct decisions from the first few items in a sample) was exploited more efficiently when participants were in positive rather than negative mood. This efficient utilization of small samples in positive mood was obtained under the very conditions derived on a priori ground from a statistical model, namely, when a response criterion or threshold was high and when the true difference between choice options was relatively small. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Positive and Negative Affect and Issue Framing on Issue Interpretation and Risk Taking

Two studies examined the influence of transient affective states and issue framing onissue interpretationandrisk takingwithin the context of strategic decision making. In Study 1, participants in whom transient positive or negative affective states were induced by reading a short story showed systematic differences in issue interpretation and risk taking in a strategic decision making context. Compared to negative mood participants, those in a positive mood were more likely to interpret the strategic issue as an opportunity and displayed lower levels of risk taking. Study 2 replicated and extended these results by crossing affective states with threat and opportunity frames. Results showed that framing an issue (as a threat or an opportunity) had a stronger impact on issue interpretation among negative affect participants than among positive affect participants. Affective states also moderated the impact of issue framing on risk taking: the effect of framing on risk-taking was stronger under negative rather than positive affect. These results are interpreted via information-processing and motivational effects of affect on a decision maker.     

Manipulating affective state influences conditioned appetitive responses

Affective states influence how individuals process information and behave. Some theories predict emotional congruency effects (e.g. preferential processing of negative information in negative affective states). Emotional congruency should theoretically obstruct the learning of reward associations (appetitive learning) and their ability to guide behaviour under negative mood. Two studies tested the effects of the induction of a negative affective state on appetitive Pavlovian learning, in which neutral stimuli were associated with chocolate (Experiment 1) or alcohol (Experiment 2) rewards. In both experiments, participants showed enhanced approach tendencies towards predictors of reward after a negative relative to a positive performance feedback manipulation. This increase was related to a reduction in positive affect in Experiment 1 only. No effects of the manipulation on conditioned reward expectancies, craving, or consumption were observed. Overall, our findings support the idea of counter-regulation, rather than emotional congruency effects. Negative affective states might therefore serve as a vulnerability factor for addiction, through increasing conditioned approach tendencies.     

Rewards decrease risky decisions for adolescent drivers: Implications for crash prevention

Motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) are a major contributor to adolescent mortality. Adolescent drivers are more likely to make risky decisions in the presence of peers. However, rewards have also been shown to improve decision making in adolescence. Our goal was to determine if peer observation and reward effects on decision-making were dependent upon adolescent driving styles.Twenty-four healthy adolescents played a driving game in a 2 (no peer; peer) × 2 (no rewards; rewards) within-subjects experiment. Driving styles were measured by self-report.Rewards favoring safe choices reduced risky decision making, but this effect was especially robust for adolescents with driving styles that increase risk of MVCs (i.e., dangerous, fast, angry, or distracted styles). Findings suggest that rewards for safe driving can be an effective mechanism for reducing MVCs, especially for the most at-risk drivers, if they can be made appetizing to adolescents.     

Who’s bringing the donuts: The role of affective patterns in group decision making

Two studies examined how intragroup affective patterns influence groups’ pervasive tendency to ignore the unique expertise of their members. Using a hidden profile task, Study 1 provided evidence that groups with at least one member experiencing positive affect shared more unique information than groups composed entirely of members experiencing neutral affect. This occurred because group members experiencing positive affect were more likely to initiate unique information sharing, as well as information seeking. Study 2 built upon this base by showing that confidence mediates the relationship between positive affect and the initiation of unique information sharing. Additionally, Study 2 investigated the role of negative affect in group decision making and how negative and positive affect concurrently influence decision making when groups are composed of members experiencing each. The results are discussed in terms of the role affect plays in influencing group behavior and the resultant importance of investigating specific affective patterns.     

Unconscious reward cues increase invested effort,but do not change speed–accuracy tradeoffs

While both conscious and unconscious reward cues enhance effort to work on a task, previous research also suggests that conscious rewards may additionally affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs. Based on this idea, two experiments explored whether reward cues that are presented above (supraliminal) or below (subliminal) the threshold of conscious awareness affect such tradeoffs differently. In a speed–accuracy paradigm, participants had to solve an arithmetic problem to attain a supraliminally or subliminally presented high-value or low-value coin. Subliminal high (vs. low) rewards made participants more eager (i.e., faster, but equally accurate). In contrast, supraliminal high (vs. low) rewards caused participants to become more cautious (i.e., slower, but more accurate). However, the effects of supraliminal rewards mimicked those of subliminal rewards when the tendency to make speed–accuracy tradeoffs was reduced. These findings suggest that reward cues initially boost effort regardless of whether or not people are aware of them, but affect speed–accuracy tradeoffs only when the reward information is accessible to consciousness.     

Spontaneous versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior

This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can influence choices: a “lower order” route, where choices are influenced through automatic affective processes, and a “higher order” route, where choices are influenced through more controlled affective or consequence-related cognitive processes. Across three experiments the extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to identify conditions under which lower order affect, higher order affect, or higher order cognitions impact choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive affect but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit salad). Findings suggest that when the individual makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by lower order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by higher order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other situations, choices are driven by higher order consequence-related cognitions and the alternative that is superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.     

Positive mood effects on delay discounting

Delay discounting is the process by which the value of an expected reward decreases as the delay to obtaining that reward increases. Individuals with higher discounting rates tend to prefer smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Previous research has indicated that personality can influence an individual's discounting rates, with higher levels of Extraversion predicting a preference for immediate gratification. The current study examined how this relationship would be influenced by situational mood inductions. While main effects were observed for both Extraversion and cognitive ability in the prediction of discounting rates, a significant interaction was also observed between Extraversion and positive affect. Extraverted individuals were more likely to prefer an immediate reward when first put in a positive mood. Extraverts thus appear particularly sensitive to impulsive, incentive-reward-driven behavior by temperament and by situational factors heightening positive affect.     

适应性时间管理：死亡意识对时间知觉和跨期决策的影响

死亡意识是个体对自身死亡必然性的认识; 基于进化适应性的考量, 作者认为具有前瞻性的死亡意识作为人类特有的认知能力和个体生命史的终极坐标, 不仅可能引起恐惧感和防御反应, 更重要的是可以帮助人们做出适应性的时间管理。据此推论, 死亡意识的启动会加强人们对时间有限性的关注, 体验出更强的时间流逝感, 影响人们对时间的评估, 以及人们对不同时间点的成本与收益进行权衡而做出的跨期决策。本研究采用死亡凸显范式启动死亡意识, 通过两个实验探讨了死亡意识、时间知觉和跨期决策三者之间的关系。结果发现, 死亡意识启动使被试低估时间距离, 并表现出较低的跨期决策延迟折扣率, 从而在较小的即时获益与更大的延迟的获益之间更为偏好未来导向的选项。进一步的分析显示, 时间知觉在死亡意识和跨期决策延迟折扣率之间起到部分中介变量的作用。以上的研究结果初步揭示了死亡意识在时间管理上的适应性价值。     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Within-subject comparison of real and hypothetical money rewards in delay discounting

A within-subject design, using human participants, compared delay discounting functions for real and hypothetical money rewards. Both real and hypothetical rewards were studied across a range that included $10 to $250. For 5 of the 6 participants, no systematic difference in discount rate was observed in response to real and hypothetical choices, suggesting that hypothetical rewards may often serve as a valid proxy for real rewards in delay discounting research. By measuring discounting at an unprecedented range of real rewards, this study has also systematically replicated the robust finding in human delay discounting research that discount rates decrease with increasing magnitude of reward. A hyperbolic decay model described the data better than an exponential model.     

Intuition,affect, and personality: unconscious coherence judgments and self-regulation of negative affect

According to personality systems interaction theory, a negative mood was expected to reduce access to extended semantic networks and to reduce performance on intuitive judgments of coherence for participants who have an impaired ability to down-regulate negative affect (i.e., state-oriented participants). Consistent with expectations, state-oriented participants reporting higher levels of perseverating negative mood had a reduced discrimination between coherent and incoherent standard word triples (Study 1) and individually derived word triples describing persons (Study 2). Participants who are able to down-regulate negative affect (i.e., action-oriented participants) did not show this tendency. In addition, Study 2 revealed a dissociation between state orientation and Neuroticism that is discussed in terms of a functional difference between the two constructs.     

Development of affective decision making for self and other: evidence for the integration of first- and third-person perspectives

The role of perspective taking in affective decision making was studied in children at two ages (3 and 4 years) using a delay-of-gratification paradigm in which children chose between an immediate reward of lower value and a delayed reward of higher value. Half the children chose for themselves (self condition), and half chose for the experimenter (other condition). Three-year-olds chose delayed rewards in the other condition but made impulsive choices in the self condition. Compared with 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds performed better in the self condition and worse in the other condition. Results suggest that 3-year-olds took either a subjective, first-person perspective (for self) or an objective, third-person perspective (for other). Four-year-olds integrated these perspectives, considering a third-person perspective in the self condition and the experimenter's subjective perspective in the other condition (i.e., her desire for immediate gratification). This integration allowed reason to be tempered by emotion, and vice versa.     

Moving beyond categorization to understand affective influences on real world health decisions

This paper provides an overview of affect and health decision‐making research, with a focus on identifying gaps, opportunities, and challenges to guide future research. We begin by defining common categorical distinctions of affective processes that influence health decisions: integral (i.e., related to the decision) and incidental (i.e., normatively unrelated to the decision) influences, and current (experienced in the moment) and anticipated (“cognitive representations” of future affect) affect. We then summarize key discoveries within the most common categories of affective influences on health decision making: current integral affect, current incidental affect, and anticipated integral affect. Finally, we highlight research gaps, challenges, and opportunities for future directions for research aimed at translating affective and decision science theory to improve our understanding of, and ability to intervene upon, health decision making.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.