Development of the false-memory illusion

The counterintuitive developmental trend in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) illusion (that false-memory responses increase with age) was investigated in learning-disabled and nondisabled children from the 6- to 14-year-old age range. Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that because there are qualitative differences in how younger versus older children and disabled versus nondisabled children connect meaning information across the words on DRM lists, certain key effects that are observed in adult studies will be absent in young children and in learning-disabled children. Data on 6 such adult effects (list strength, recall inflation, delayed inflation, delayed stability, thematic intrusion, and true-false dissociation) were used to investigate this hypothesis, and the resulting data were consistent with prediction.     

Forward and backward blocking in human contingency judgement

Three experiments investigated whether a process akin to Kamin's (1969) blocking effect would occur with human contingency judgements in the context of a video game. Subjects were presented with sets of trials on each of which they could perform a particular action and observe whether the action produced a particular outcome in a situation in which there was an alternative potential cause of the outcome. In Experiment 1 it was found that prior observation of the relationship between the alternative cause and the outcome did indeed block or reduce learning about the subsequent action-outcome relationship. However, exposure to the relationship between the alternative cause and the outcome after observing the association between the action and the outcome also reduced judgements of the action-outcome contingency (backward blocking), a finding at variance with conditioning theory. In Experiment 2 it was found that, just as is the case with forward blocking, the degree of backward blocking depended on how good a predictor of the outcome the alternative cause was. Finally, in Experiment 3 it was shown that the backward blocking effect was not the result of greater forgetting about the action-outcome relationship in the experimental than in the control condition. These results cast doubt upon the applicability of contemporary theories of conditioning to human contingency judgement.     

Forward and backward second-order Pavlovian conditioning in honeybees

Second-order conditioning (SOC) is the association of a neutral stimulus with another stimulus that had previously been combined with an unconditioned stimulus (US). We used classical conditioning of the proboscis extension response (PER) in honeybees (Apis mellifera) with odors (CS) and sugar (US). Previous SOC experiments in bees were inconclusive, and, therefore, we attempted to demonstrate SOC in the following three experiments: (Experiment 1) After differential conditioning (pairing odor A with US and presenting odor B without US), the bees experienced two pairs of partially overlapping odors, either a new odor C followed by a previously reinforced odor A (C-A) or a new odor C followed by a previously nonreinforced odor B (C-B). (Experiment 2) After differential conditioning, bees were presented with C-A or A-C. (Experiment 3) Bees were first presented with C-A or A-C before differential conditioning and were tested with odor C. We observed: (Experiment 1) 40% of the bees showed PER to the C-A presentation, but only 20% showed PER to the C-B presentation. (Experiment 2) 40% of the bees showed PER to the C-A presentation, while only 20% showed PER to the reversed sequence A-C. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a previously reinforced odor can be a secondary reinforcer for excitatory SOC only with forward-pairing. (Experiment 3) PER toward C was lower (15%) in bees presented with A-C than with C-A (25%). This showed that backward SOC is not as effective as forward SOC. These results help to delineate different conditions that are critical for the phenomenon of SOC.     

Forward, backward and combined masking: Implications for an auditory integration period

Auditory temporal psychometric functions were obtained for forward masking, backward masking, and for combined forward and backward masking for the case of an impulsive signal in white noise. Temporal psychometric functions show a large interaction between forward masking and backward masking when evaluated against an independence model of performance. The results are not consistent with the concept of a sharp rectangular temporal integrating period (“moment”) to account for the interaction.     

Forward and backward recall: different response time patterns,same retrieval order

How do people retrieve information in forward and backward recall? To address this issue, we examined response times in directional recall as a function of serial position and list length. Participants memorized lists of four to six words and entered responses at the keyboard. Recall direction was postcued. Response times exhibited asymmetry in terms of direction. In forward recall, response times peaked at the first position, leveling off for subsequent positions. Response times were slower in backward recall than in forward recall and exhibited an inverse U-shaped function with an initial slowdown followed by a continuous speedup. These asymmetries have implications for theoretical models of retrieval in serial recall, including temporal-code, rule-based, and network models. The response time pattern suggests that forward recall proceeds in equal steps across positions, whereas backward recall involves repeated covert cycles of forward recall. Thus, retrieval in both directions involves a forward search.     

Forward and backward number translation requires conceptual mediation in both balanced and unbalanced bilinguals

It is much debated whether translation is semantically mediated or based on word-word associations at the lexical level. In 2 experiments with Dutch (L1)-French (L2) bilinguals, the authors showed that there is a semantic number magnitude effect in both forward and backward translation of number words: It takes longer to translate number words representing large quantities (e.g., acht, huit [eight]) than small quantities (e.g., twee, deux [two]). In a 3rd experiment, the authors replicated these effects with number words that had been acquired only just before the translation task. Finally, it was shown that the findings were not due to the restricted semantic context of the stimuli. These findings strongly suggest that translation processes can be semantically mediated in both directions, even at low levels of L2 proficiency.     

Recollection rejection: false-memory editing in children and adults

Mechanisms for editing false events out of memory reports have fundamental implications for theories of false memory and for best practice in applied domains in which false reports must be minimized (e.g., forensic psychological interviews, sworn testimony). A mechanism posited in fuzzy-trace theory, recollection rejection, is considered. A process analysis of false-memory editing is presented, which assumes that false-but-gist-consistent events (e.g., the word SOFA, when the word COUCH was experienced) sometimes cue the retrieval of verbatim traces of the corresponding true events (COUCH), generating mismatches that counteract the high familiarity of false-but-gist-consistent events. Empirical support comes from 2 qualitative phenomena: recollective suppression of semantic false memory and inverted-U relations between retrieval time and semantic false memory. Further support comes from 2 quantitative methodologies: conjoint recognition and receiver operating characteristics. The analysis also predicts a novel false-memory phenomenon (erroneous recollection rejection), in which true events are inappropriately edited out of memory reports.     

Perception,illusion, and hallucination

Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.     

Forward and backward blocking of causal judgment is enhanced by additivity of effect magnitude

When two causes for a given effect are simultaneously presented, it is natural to expect an effect of greater magnitude. However many laboratory tasks preclude such an additivity rule by imposing a ceiling on effect magnitude-for example, by using a binary outcome. Under these conditions, a compound of two causal cues cannot be distinguished from a compound of one causal cue and one noncausal cue. Two experiments tested the effect of additivity on cue competition. Significant but weak forward blocking and no backward blocking were observed in a conventional "allergy" causal judgment task. Explicit pretraining of magnitude additivity produced strong and significant forward and backward blocking. Additivity pretraining was found to be unnecessary for another cue competition effect, release from overshadowing, which does not logically depend on additivity. The results confirm that blocking is constrained when effect magnitude is constrained and provide support for an inferential account of cue competition.     

Agency, authorship, and illusion

Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will is an illusion. I examine the adequacy of his theory of apparent mental causation and whether, if accurate, it suggests that our experience of agency and authorship should be considered illusory. I examine various interpretations of this claim and raise problems for each interpretation. I also distinguish between the experiences of agency and authorship.     

Size illusion, distance illusion, and terrestrial passage: comment on reed

Two assumptions of Reed's (1984) terrestrial passage theory are questioned. First, Reed assumes that the moon's failure to increase in visual subtense while elevating is accounted for strictly by perceptual distancing. This allows a formal account of the moon distance illusion, but at the expense of a compelling explanation of the moon size illusion. Second, in order to explain the distance illusion, Reed assumes that all objects, regardless of their perceived altitude, are perceived to start from a common point at the horizon. Several alternative application of Reed's terrestrial-passage foundation to the actual illusions are suggested.     

Avoidance,induction, and the illusion of reinforcement

Environmental events that impact reproductive success may be called phylogenetically important events (PIEs). Some promote reproductive success, like mates and food; others threaten reproductive success, like predators and injury. Beneficial PIEs induce activities that enhance them, and detrimental PIEs induce activities that mitigate or avoid them. Free-operant avoidance relies on electric shock as a proxy for injury, a PIE. One theory takes avoidance behavior to be reinforced by its reducing shock rate. A more complete explanation is that avoidance both reduces shock rate and is induced by the PIEs it usually prevents. Shocks received act in concert with shock-rate reduction, in a feedback system. Four parametric data sets were analyzed to show that avoidance is induced by received shock rate according to power functions. Avoidance is not reinforced at all; avoidance is induced by its failures. Induction explains not only avoidance itself, but also phenomena unique to avoidance, like warmup and effects of unavoidable shock. Induction explains behavior more generally than reinforcement, because induction explains not only food-maintained operant and nonoperant behavior, but also shock-maintained behavior, including avoidance. Reinforcement fails to explain behavior when reinforcement is defined as strengthening by consequences. Induction erases the distinction between consequences and antecedents.     

Competition, superstition and the illusion of control

The effects of reinforcement schedule and competition on generating superstitious behaviors and beliefs were examined in 72 people. Superstition was induced by having participants respond to turn on a tone under a concurrent 2—lever Variable Interval (VI) Extinction (EXT) schedule. During the session, stimulus lights would occasionally be illuminated, although they did not signal any change in contingency. Attributing importance to the inactive lever, a pattern of switching between levers, or to the illumination of the lights were considered to be superstitious beliefs. Participants were either run alone or in pairs, and manipulation of the reinforcement schedule resulted in groups which were matched in probability of reinforcement, as well as in groups which were mismatched. Reinforcement schedule (VI 30” versus VI 60”) and competitive situation did not affect degree of superstitious belief, except when people were placed in a “winning” condition. However, Superstition was associated with participants’ belief in improved future performance and with participants’ perceived skill relative to their opponents. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between superstition, the illusion of control, and self-efficacy. Differences between experimentally-induced and commonly held superstitions are also discussed.     

Competition, superstition and the illusion of control

The effects of reinforcement schedule and competition on generating superstitious behaviors and beliefs were examined in 72 people. Superstition was induced by having participants respond to turn on a tone under a concurrent 2—lever Variable Interval (VI) Extinction (EXT) schedule. During the session, stimulus lights would occasionally be illuminated, although they did not signal any change in contingency. Attributing importance to the inactive lever, a pattern of switching between levers, or to the illumination of the lights were considered to be superstitious beliefs. Participants were either run alone or in pairs, and manipulation of the reinforcement schedule resulted in groups which were matched in probability of reinforcement, as well as in groups which were mismatched. Reinforcement schedule (VI 30” versus VI 60”) and competitive situation did not affect degree of superstitious belief, except when people were placed in a “winning” condition. However, Superstition was associated with participants’ belief in improved future performance and with participants’ perceived skill relative to their opponents. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between superstition, the illusion of control, and self-efficacy. Differences between experimentally-induced and commonly held superstitions are also discussed.