Who or what is the preembryo?

...The moral status -- and specifically the controversial issue of personhood -- is related to attainment of developmental individuality...This contrasts with the view that holds that personhood occurs earlier, at the point of genetic uniqueness. I believe that an embryo that has developed to the point where it can be one individual and one individual only, differs in moral status from a preembryo that has not, even if in many cases we may choose to treat them similarly...In view of the conviction that the preembryo is not yet a person and that its statistical potential for becoming such is small, it is not clear that nontherapeutic experiments can be excluded in principle. However, because the preembryo does have intrinsic potential...the preembryo should be treated as a person...Any exceptions from the prima facie duty to treat the preembryo as a person should be based on criteria established at the national level....     

Stereotypes of singles: are singles what we think?

Four studies examined the accuracy of the single stereotype by comparing perceptions of single and partnered targets with self‐ratings and ratings by others of single and partnered participants. Results revealed that single targets were evaluated more negatively than partnered targets in terms of a wide range of personality characteristics, overall well‐being, and satisfaction with relationships status. These findings were very robust and not qualified by target sex, participant sex, and participant relationship status. In contrast, self‐ratings of single and partnered participants were remarkably similar for all personality characteristics as well as overall well‐being, which was corroborated by ratings of participants by others. However, partnered participants were indeed more satisfied with their relationship status than single participants. When all is considered, the single stereotype is largely inaccurate. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neuromotor profiles: what are they and what can we learn from them?

Eye movements, alternating movements, rapid pointing movements, and various tremors were measured on patients with Parkinson's disease (n = 21), on Cree subjects exposed to methylmercury (n = 36), and on healthy control subjects (n = 30). Neuromotor profiles were created according to thirty characteristics extracted from test results of four subgroups matched for age and composed of six subjects each. Z scores were calculated with respect to the mean and standard deviation of the control group for each of the 30 characteristics. The subgroup with the lower methylmercury blood level had larger z scores than the control subgroup and with a few positive values above one standard deviation. The subgroup with the higher methylmercury blood level had several z scores above two standard deviations. Interestingly, the abnormal values for the subgroup with Parkinson's disease were mostly limited to static tremor recorded with no visual feedback and reached up to 5 standard deviations. These results indicate that neuromotor profiles can be used to summarize information extracted from different neuromotor tests and to differentiate neurological conditions.     

What are we doing to the earth's climate and what are we going to do about it?

Climatic considerations are critical if our planet is to survive. The environment, and in particular the atmosphere, is particularly sensitive to man. The time has come to act in favor of that which gives us life. This is why, in a field which knows no boundaries, only an international strategy can be effective.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

Who published what about whom?

Each study (n = 1,170) in the Journal of Personality Assessment and its predecessor (1968 through 1982) was reviewed to determine the affiliation of authors, personality measures commonly used, type of study methodologies employed, and characteristics of subjects studied. Generally, there were no large trends or shifts in any of these across the 15-year survey period. The Rorschach continues to be a common subject for study, as does the MMPI; authors have typically been from academic rather than applied settings; validity and normative studies have been most common; and the most frequently used subjects have been college students. Objective tests have increased in frequency in JPA articles, while projectives, except for the Rorschach, have declined; and the majority of research subjects have been drawn from nonpathological populations. Implications for editorial policies and reader interest are discussed.     

Psychological universals: what are they and how can we know?

Psychological universals, or core mental attributes shared by humans everywhere, are a foundational postulate of psychology, yet explicit analysis of how to identify such universals is lacking. This article offers a conceptual and methodological framework to guide the investigation of genuine universals through empirical analysis of psychological patterns across cultures. Issues of cross-cultural generalizability of psychological processes and 3 cross-cultural research strategies to probe universals are considered. Four distinct levels of hierarchically organized universals are possible: From strongest to weakest claims for universality, they are accessibility universals, functional universals, existential universals, and nonuniversals. Finally, universals are examined in relation to the questions of levels of analysis, evolutionary explanations of psychological processes, and management of cross-cultural relations.     

Relations between implicit measures of prejudice:what are we measuring?

Some recent findings suggest that different implicit measures of prejudice assess the same underlying construct, but other work suggests that they may not. In this experiment, White participants completed a version of a priming measure of racial attitudes that either encouraged categorization of the face primes in terms of race or did not encourage such categorization, and then completed the Implicit Association Test. Correspondence between the two measures was found only when categorization by race was required on the priming measure. Moreover, participants appeared more prejudiced when they were led to construe individuals in terms of race than when they were not so encouraged. The discussion focuses on the potential for dissociations between evaluations of a category and evaluations of members of the category.     

Organ donation terminology: are we communicating life or death?

The continued functioning of organ transplantation depends on obtaining the permission of the next of kin. This communication process between medical or transplant professionals and a donor family hinges heavily on the understanding of certain critical terms like brain dead, life support, and transplantation. Communication issues in obtaining organ donation consent were examined, with particular focus on what are literally life-and-death decisions. Using an experimental simulation methodology, data are offered in support of the claim that much miscommunication occurs in such situations. Directions for improving such communication by allaying latent fears and more carefully defining crucial terminology are offered.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

Who are the Mentally Handicapped?

ABSTRACT In this paper we compare philosophical and contemporary psychological approaches to mental handicap. Careful comparison between the disciplines reveals major differences and indicates that much further work is needed which would be fruitful for both sides.
The two disciplines concentrate on different questions: philosophy tends to look chiefly at mental handicap in relation to issues of personhood and is not very clear about what mental handicap is; psychology on the other hand is much more specific about mental handicap, but shows little concern with critically examining value issues. Our main intention is to explore the different ways in which mental handicap is defined and seen as a class.
We conclude that class definition embodies a significant normative component and a large element of social construction. To ignore this and attempt to make normative judgements on the basis of class membership is thus highly problematic. Since within philosophy, these normative issues are often discussed in terms of personhood, this category is also critically examined and the conclusion is reached that it too has normative and social components which can lead to ethically dubious judgements being made about 'the mentally handicapped'.     

The paradox of happiness: Why are we not doing what we know makes us happy?

Achieving and maintaining happiness can be difficult, especially when people are not engaging in the activities they know facilitate it. ‘Flow’ activities require clear rules, challenge, a high investment of energy, and have been shown to promote long-term happiness better than low investment, passive activities. Do people know this? In two studies, we found that, despite recognizing that flow activities are more likely to facilitate happiness, people nevertheless participated in passive leisure significantly more often in a typical week. Participants rated passive activities as being significantly more enjoyable, requiring less effort, and being less daunting to get started than flow activities. Participants’ engagement in flow activities was significantly predicted by how enjoyable the activities were perceived to be, whereas how daunting those activities were rated predicted non-engagement. Passive activity engagement was only significantly predicted by enjoyment. Suggestions for enabling people to rise above the barriers to flow activities are offered.     

Are we free to imagine what we choose?

It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what we choose. This paper explores a thesis—what we call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides a way of making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According to intentionalism, the contents of your imaginings are simply determined by whatever contents you intend to imagine. Thus, for example, when you visualize a building and intend it to be of King’s College rather than a replica of the college you have imagined the former rather than the latter because you intended to imagine King’s College. This is so even if the visual image you conjure up equally resembles either. This paper proposes two kinds of counterexamples to intentionalism and discusses their significance. In particular, it sketches a positive account of how many sensory imaginings get to be about what they are about, which explains how the causal history of our mental imagery can prevent us from succeeding in imagining what we intended.