社会性线索对内隐和外显元认知监控的影响

本研究以词图匹配材料为学习材料,以“大多数人选择的情况”为社会性线索,通过分析行为表现和眼动指标,探讨了社会性线索对内隐和外显元认知监控的影响。结果显示：（1）第一次信心判断时,外显信心判断显著高估,内隐信心判断较为准确。第二次信心判断时,在线索一致条件下,外显信心判断等级显著高于内隐信心判断。（2）在提供社会性线索阶段和第二次再认阶段,与线索一致条件相比,线索不一致条件下被提示项的注视时间更短,而未提示项的注视时间更长,且个体改变选择的次数显著增多。结果表明：内隐和外显元认知监测存在分离,内隐监测的准确性更高,外显监测受社会性线索的影响更大;而内隐和外显的元认知控制受社会性线索的影响趋同。     

基于人脸记忆新任务的元认知监测准确性研究

元认知监测关注个体对自身认知活动的监控,是重要的高级认知过程。学习判断(judgments of learning)是元认知监测的一种重要形式。该研究同时采用人脸-姓氏记忆新任务与经典词对记忆任务,比较学习判断的准确性在两者中的差异。结果发现:人脸-姓氏记忆的学习判断准确性在相对准确性、绝对准确性和总体判断准确性上均显著高于词对记忆。结果表明:当任务本身的社会适应意义更强时,个体对认知水平的监测更加准确,提示元认知监测技能不仅受到个体自身学习和发展的影响,还可能与人类的长期进化过程有关。     

知觉线索对元记忆监控的影响

近年来, 越来越多的证据表明知觉线索影响个体的高级认知--元记忆。元记忆指个体对自己学习和记忆活动的认知, 其核心成分是监测和控制。研究发现, 多种知觉线索(如字体大小、音量、文本清晰度、重量、亮度等)影响个体的元记忆监测(如学习判断和自信心评定)及控制(如学习时间分配)。这种影响可能是加工流畅性所致, 也可能基于人们的信念产生。未来研究有必要进一步探究知觉线索影响元记忆监控的条件, 并厘清加工流畅性和信念的具体作用。     

元认知监控的机制:认知灵活性的调节作用

元认知监控作为元认知的核心成分,是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,以MasterMind游戏任务为载体,从执行功能中认知灵活性的角度,探讨了元认知监控的内部机制。结果发现:元认知监测对元认知控制的作用受到认知灵活性的调节作用。对于高认知灵活性的学生,元认知监测水平越高,元认知控制越好;对于低认知灵活性的学生,元认知监测水平的高低不会引起元认知控制水平的显著变化。研究结果表明,高认知灵活性的学生能根据元认知监测进行有效元认知控制,而低认知灵活性的学生其元认知监测水平的提高没有影响元认知控制。结合元认知监控与执行功能进行了讨论。     

面孔吸引力对面孔学习程度判断的影响

实验考察面孔吸引力对面孔学习过程中的元认知监测准确性的影响。采用经典面孔再认范式,高、中、低吸引力面孔作为学习材料,学习判断(JOLs)作为元认知监测指标。结果发现:(1)低吸引力面孔的学习判断高于中、高吸引力面孔;(2)低吸引力面孔的元认知监测准确性低于高、中吸引力面孔;(3)个体对不同吸引力面孔的学习程度判断均存在过度自信现象。结论:个体对面孔再认的元认知监测会受到面孔吸引力的影响。     

儿童、青年与老年人在知觉和高阶元认知监控上的年龄差异

元认知是以监测和控制为核心的动态调节活动。本研究以9岁儿童、年轻人和老年人为研究对象，分别采用选点任务和词对学习任务，在知觉元认知和高阶元认知层次考察元认知监测和控制及其关系随年龄变化的特点。结果显示：(1)儿童的知觉元认知和高阶元认知监控能力大都低于年轻人；(2)老年人的知觉元认知能力与年轻人相似，但高阶元认知能力则低于年轻人；(3)老年人和年轻人一样能够在记忆监测中利用控制线索，而9岁儿童尚未表现出这种能力。本研究从发展的角度，支持了知觉元认知与高阶元认知能力具有领域特殊性的理论假设，并对监测和控制的关系发展进行了讨论。     

学习判断与学习时间分配的关系

学习判断与学习时间分配的关系是元认知领域的重要问题, 对学习判断的研究在于使个体了解自己的学习和记忆活动, 从而有效控制学习过程, 合理分配学习时间, 这是元记忆监测影响控制的典型例子。近来有研究者提出学习时间分配不仅表现控制功能, 而且还表现监测功能。于是围绕学习时间的双重功能, 他们提出了元记忆监测与控制至少存在两种关系模型—— MC(监测影响控制)模型和CM(控制影响监测)模型, 后来又提出了两模型相互协同作用的合并动态模型—— 连续波浪型模式和同时发生模型。未来的研究应在继续验证MC模型和完善CM模型的基础上, 尝试检验两模型的合并动态模型。     

有效测量元认知监控的新方法：Mastermind任务分析

元认知监控是元认知的核心成分,而且是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,对经典的Mastermind游戏任务加以改编,结合访谈分析,探讨了适合考察元认知监控的任务难度和有效的元认知监控指标。研究结果发现：（1）对于大学生来说,在游戏4（要求从六种颜色中选出四种正确的颜色,且排列位置也要正确）中当知觉难度最大且又可以经过努力选择策略、根据反馈进行有效选择时,才会在最大程度上激发元认知监控,使得游戏成绩提高;（2）“监测时间”是元认知监测的有效测量指标,而“违背反馈次数”是元认知控制的有效测量指标。     

重量对元认知监控的无意识影响

采用结构知识归因的方法,以学习判断和项目优先选择作为元认知监测和控制的指标,考察重量对元认知监控的影响是否是无意识的。被试学习粘贴在不同重量纸盒上的词对,进行学习判断(实验1)或项目选择(实验2),并报告其判断或选择的依据。结果:(1)重量影响学习判断和项目优先选择,相对于轻纸盒,被试给予重纸盒上的词对更高的JOL并优先选择重纸盒上的词对进行学习;(2)重量对学习判断的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测的情况下,重量对项目优先选择的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测和直觉的情况下。上述结果支持了元认知的具身性,并提示重量对元认知监控的影响可能是无意识的。     

学习判断的研究综述

学习判断是个体对正在学或刚学过的材料的学习程度的判断,它是元认知监控的重要形式。本文从学习判断相关概念、学习判断的影响因素及主要研究范式等三方面进行回顾,对其进行评价,有助于研究者更加深入、精确地研究学习判断以及其他元认知判断问题。     

The effects of intergroup discrimination and social values on level of self-esteem in the minimal group paradigm

The proposition that individuals engage in intergroup discrimination to increase or maintain positive social identity and a high level of self-esteem has received some empirical support. An attempt was made to extend prior findings by evaluating whether intergroup allocation behaviour consistent with subjects' social values would lead to higher self-esteem than inconsistent allocation behaviour. More specifically, it was predicted that competitive subjects' self-esteem will be higher following discriminatory choices than fair choices and prosocial subjects' self-esteem will be higher following fair choices than discriminatory choices. It was also predicted that after subjects were constrained to make discriminatory choices, competitors' self-esteem would be higher than prosocials' self-esteem and after subjects were constrained to make fair choices, prosocials' self-esteem would be higher than competitors' self-esteem. Experiment I supported the first of these predictions when a measure of personal self-esteem was used as a dependent variable. Experiment 2 attempted to extend the generality of the findings of Experiment 1 by defining and measuring self-esteem in collective terms. The expected prior pattern of results did not occur again. Constraining subjects to make discriminatory choices increased their collective self-esteem regardless of their social values.     

Orienting and maintenance of gaze to facial expressions in social anxiety

In 2 experiments, the authors tested predictions from cognitive models of social anxiety regarding attentional biases for social and nonsocial cues by monitoring eye movements to pictures of faces and objects in high social anxiety (HSA) and low social anxiety (LSA) individuals. Under no-stress conditions (Experiment 1), HSA individuals initially directed their gaze toward neutral faces, relative to objects, more often than did LSA participants. However, under social-evaluative stress (Experiment 2), HSA individuals showed reduced biases in initial orienting and maintenance of gaze on faces (cf. objects) compared with the LSA group. HSA individuals were also relatively quicker to look at emotional faces than neutral faces but looked at emotional faces for less time, compared with LSA individuals, consistent with a vigilant-avoidant pattern of bias.     

Perceiving emotions: Cueing social categorization processes and attentional control through facial expressions

Individuals spontaneously categorise other people on the basis of their gender, ethnicity and age. But what about the emotions they express? In two studies we tested the hypothesis that facial expressions are similar to other social categories in that they can function as contextual cues to control attention. In Experiment 1 we associated expressions of anger and happiness with specific proportions of congruent/incongruent flanker trials. We also created consistent and inconsistent category members within each of these two general contexts. The results demonstrated that participants exhibited a larger congruency effect when presented with faces in the emotional group associated with a high proportion of congruent trials. Notably, this effect transferred to inconsistent members of the group. In Experiment 2 we replicated the effects with faces depicting true and false smiles. Together these findings provide consistent evidence that individuals spontaneously utilise emotions to categorise others and that such categories determine the allocation of attentional control.     

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments

People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. Across 4 studies, the authors found that participants scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and ability. Although their test scores put them in the 12th percentile, they estimated themselves to be in the 62nd. Several analyses linked this miscalibration to deficits in metacognitive skill, or the capacity to distinguish accuracy from error. Paradoxically, improving the skills of participants, and thus increasing their metacognitive competence, helped them recognize the limitations of their abilities.     

Laying it on thin: analogical cue frequency in the manipulation of choice

Persuasive analogies consist of linguistic cues that invite audiences to represent a problem in terms of an analog and to make choices compatible with this manipulated representation. The authors explore how the frequency of linguistic cues moderates analogical bias in choice behavior. Participants read versions of a managerial decision scenario differing in the number of sports (e.g., game plan) or family (e.g., parent company) idioms used to describe situational attributes and then chose between analogically consistent and inconsistent response options. Analogies consisting of an intermediate number of cues elicited higher rates of analogically consistent responding than those of higher and lower cue frequency. When explaining their responses, participants referred to the sports or family analogies most often to rationalize rejecting the analogically consistent response option after reading high cue frequency versions. These findings indicate that there are lower and upper boundaries to a persuasive analogy's optimal cue frequency.     

In the Eyes of Others: Monitoring for Relational Value Cues

It was hypothesized that monitoring the social environment for relational value (RV) cues both consumes and depletes self‐regulatory resources. Consistent with predictions, the results suggest that regulatory resources are depleted when people monitor for relational cues (Experiments 1 and 2), that the capacity to monitor for complex (vs. simple) forms of relational cues is negatively impacted by prior depletion of the self’s resources (Experiment 3), and that insofar as the self’s resources are depleted by recent acts of self‐regulation, people are less effective at monitoring for relational cues (Experiment 4). These findings suggest an integrative relationship between regulatory resources and people’s capacity to accurately monitor the social environment for cues that communicate their RV.     

Remembering and knowing personality traits: figure/ground asymmetries in person-related retrieval experience

In two experiments, the effect of category salience on retrieval experience was investigated. In Experiment 1, participants rated typicality or concreteness of personality traits that differed in stereotype reference (i.e., consistent, inconsistent, and neutral in relation to the age stereotype). More remember judgments were given for consistent and inconsistent traits in contrast to neutral traits, thereby indicating a figure/ground asymmetry. In Experiment 2, neutral traits were excluded and a classical figure/ground phenomenon was demonstrated for the retrieval experience of traits (i.e., reversibility of an ambiguous figure after typicality and untypicality ratings). Altogether, the results suggest that metacognitive trait representations depend on principles of figure/ground asymmetries rather than on functional principles of social information processing.