共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Stephen Hetherington 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):303-310
It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.
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Stephen HetheringtonEmail: |
2.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):137-147
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views
on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith
focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and
how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
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Ernest SosaEmail: |
3.
Timo Kajamies 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):525-534
In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests
on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic
assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress
problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in
fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit
of paramount epistemic values.
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Timo KajamiesEmail: |
4.
Douglas Walton 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):355-376
In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.
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Douglas WaltonEmail: |
5.
Albert Casullo 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):77-90
There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is
the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge.
There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose
any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some general
theory of knowledge or justification (call it the background theory). Those who embrace a theory-laden analysis incur a special burden: they must separate the features of their analysis that
are constitutive of the a priori from those that are constitutive of the background theory. My goal is to illustrate how the
failure to separate these features leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature of a priori knowledge.
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Albert CasulloEmail: |
6.
A major virtue of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation is its commitment to reasonableness and rationality as central
criteria of argumentative quality. However, the account of these key notions offered by the originators of this theory, Frans
van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, seems to us problematic in several respects. In what follows we criticize that account and
suggest an alternative, offered elsewhere, that seems to us to be both independently preferable and more in keeping with the
epistemic approach to arguments and argumentation we favor.
相似文献
John BiroEmail: |
7.
M. Oreste Fiocco 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):387-399
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance
to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions
are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality.
Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light
of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two
problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either
problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion
of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.
相似文献
M. Oreste FioccoEmail: |
8.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):5-15
Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level
if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt
belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed
for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does
belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes
levels of performance norrmativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where
the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge
that ascends above the animal level.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |
9.
Hilary Kornblith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):127-136
Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece
of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology. This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
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Hilary KornblithEmail: |
10.
Walter Hopp 《Husserl Studies》2009,25(1):1-14
If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification.
However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It
is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims
that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility,
and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible phenomenologists does not undermine Husserl’s claims concerning the
epistemic value of phenomenological inquiry. I will also defend my account against both internalist and externalist objections.
相似文献
Walter HoppEmail: |
11.
Ira Newman 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):43-54
Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived
from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits
of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of
a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already
accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the
form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional
literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect.
And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point.
相似文献
Ira NewmanEmail: |
12.
Holger Andreas 《Axiomathes》2008,18(3):379-394
The concept of measurement is fundamental to a whole range of different disciplines, including not only the natural and engineering
sciences, but also laboratory medicine and certain branches of the social sciences. This being the case, the concept of measurement
has a particular relevance to the development of top-level ontologies in the area of knowledge engineering. For this reason,
the present paper is concerned with ontological aspects of measurement. We are searching for a list of concepts that are apt
to characterize measurement methods in a general manner. To establish such means of characterization, we will primarily deal
with the semantics of measurement values.
相似文献
Holger AndreasEmail: |
13.
Garry Young 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):341-360
Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic
distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge
intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting
a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished
from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the
criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not
only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument
for exhaustive epistemic reduction.
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Garry YoungEmail: |
14.
Facet-like Structures in Computer Science 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Uta Priss 《Axiomathes》2008,18(2):243-255
This paper discusses how facet-like structures occur as a commonplace feature in a variety of computer science disciplines
as a means for structuring class hierarchies. The paper then focuses on a mathematical model for facets (and class hierarchies
in general), called formal concept analysis, and discusses graphical representations of faceted systems based on this model.
相似文献
Uta PrissEmail: |
15.
The epistemic regress problem 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Andrew D. Cling 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):401-421
The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes
only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some
proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support
by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all
require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that is arbitrary from the believer’s own point of view.
相似文献
Andrew D. ClingEmail: |
16.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
17.
Mikkel Gerken 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):87-96
There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or
anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However,
Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge
and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility
is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are
promising responses available to the compatibilists.
相似文献
Mikkel GerkenEmail: |
18.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
19.
Michael Veber 《Sophia》2007,46(2):177-187
Recent studies provide some support for the idea that prayer has curative powers. It is argued that even if prayers are effective
in these kinds of cases it cannot be because God is answering them. While many have challenged theological explanations for
the efficacy of prayer on epistemic grounds, the argument presented here concludes that the theological explanation conflicts
with the standard conception of God. In particular, if God answers prayers in these kinds of cases then God is immoral.
相似文献
Michael VeberEmail: |
20.
Jean-Michel Saury 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(2):245-260
Negation is a fundamental component of communication (no-answers), cognition (logical negation), perception (different color),
attitude (dislike), emotion (hatred), and volition (disagreement). Its many uses make it difficult to provide an integrated
definition of the concept. The aim of this paper is to show that an integrated definition of the concept can be arrived at
by means of a phenomenological method structuring it into three general essences labelled lack, otherness and obstruction.
相似文献
Jean-Michel SauryEmail: |