A lost horizon: the experience of an other and school bullying

To date, research on bullying has largely employed empirical methodologies, including quantitative and qualitative approaches. Through this research we have come to understand bullying as both a dyadic and peer group phenomenon, primarily situated in the heads (thinking) of those involved, or in a lack of skill or expertise, or in the delinquency of a bully who needs to be reformed. This research has largely directed its strategies toward problem students using individual and peer group approaches. And yet school bullying continues to be a crucial educational issue affecting millions of students each year. In this project I introduce a missing philosophical perspective. Analyzing the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer I am led to conclude that typical anti-bullying strategies at times simply train bullies to be better at bullying (i.e., learning to bully more covertly, more expertly so as to inflict the same devastation without adult detection). Gadamer invites us to think about bullying in new ways. While certainly involving the thinking and skills of the bully and the victim, Gadamer contends that bullying does not fundamentally result from a problem within the participants, but is fostered by certain spaces between them; terrains that cultivate specific experiences of an "other". Generally, this project stems from an interest in the ways that domination develops in this "space between". Specifically in this paper I ask: What is the nature of "hermeneutic" experience as conceptualized by Gadamer? What kinds of experiences of an other does bullying exemplify? What kinds of experience of an other do non-bullying relations exemplify and what kinds of relational spaces foster such experience? This paper opens up significant new territory for anti-bullying work, expanding our focus to include the space between students which fosters certain inter-personal experiences - experiences situated in domination and stymied growth or, alternatively, experiences of reciprocity which open the possibility of human growth and transformation.     

Remembering and Remembering to Forget

To navigate our lives we all need to find ways both to remember and sometimes to forget aspects of our experiences that threaten us or cause us anxiety. Often patients need help in developing a capacity to hold in some dialectical tension, both remembering and forgetting. Some people are so frightened by the harsher realities of their lives that they turn to us to take on the remembering side of this dialectic, and, sometimes, to take on the forgetting side. Part of the work of their therapy is to help them develop the capacity to do more of both for themselves. Other patients come better prepared to take on this challenge and use us to witness and support their own efforts. This paper considers how patients use their hours with us to remember and to forget and ways in which psychoanalysts might participate in this undertaking.     

Prenatal cocaine exposure and neurobehavioral development: How subjects lost to follow-up bias study results

Ninety-four prenatally cocaine-exposed and 50 non-cocaine-exposed infants were enrolled at birth and seen at 3,6, and 12 months. Applying a recently developed model (Cicchetti&Nelson, 1994) produced four independent groups: those infants assessed at birth only (n=61), those returning for at least one (n=29) or two (n=15) assessments after birth, and those returning for all three (n=35). Among those infants having all follow-up assessments, cocaine-exposed infants showed significantly lower psychomotor performance on the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID) than did non-exposed infants. Results approached statistical significance for mental development. Except for birthweight (cocaine-exposed infants weighed significantly less), none of a wide range of maternal, perinatal, or neurobehavioral demographic variables biased study results or the generalization of findings to the total sample from those who returned for all visits.     

Celebrity and Political Psychology: Remembering Lennon

This article is a contribution toward the task of constructing a distinctive political psychology and social theory of celebrity. The article begins by noting some recent approaches to the analysis of mass communications in political theory, and moves to consider what these theories mean for the conceptual analysis of celebrity. A substantive example of the political construction of celebrity is given in a case study of the ex-Beatle, John Lennon—specifically, the social drama surrounding his death in 1980. A number of issues, ranging from the denial of death in modernity to the multiplex modes of cultural remembering, are discussed as they relate to celebrity.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

Computer games: Paradigms of opportunity

Computer games offer unique opportunities to apply unobtrusive constraints to action that permit meaningful analysis without destroying the integrity of the game itself. To a much greater extent than most traditional laboratory tasks, computer games represent holistic, meaningful, and natural human activity. Considerable concern about the appropriate analysis and interpretation of results, however, remains. One strategy that addresses these concerns involves the adoption of separate but convergent analytic perspectives. This article suggests that three such perspectives (viz., the objective, the subjective, and the empirical) can be combined to provide the necessary logical leverage to allow meaningful research. Alternative analyses of data collected from the playing of a particular arcade-type computer game are used to illustrate this point.     

Unification and Revolution: A Paradigm for Paradigms

Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent implicit assumption concerning unity. To put it in Kuhnian terms, underlying unity is a paradigm for paradigms. We need a conception of science which represents problematic assumptions concerning the physical comprehensibility and knowability of the universe in the form of a hierarchy, these assumptions becoming less and less substantial and more and more such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. This hierarchical conception of science has important Kuhnian features, but also differs dramatically from the view Kuhn expounds in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In this paper, I compare and contrast these two views in a much more detailed way than has been done hitherto. I show how the hierarchical view can be construed to emerge from Kuhn’s view as it is modified to overcome objections. I argue that the hierarchical conception of science is to be preferred to Kuhn’s view.     

Relational Remembering and Oppression

This paper begins by discussing Sue Campbell's account of memory as she first developed it in Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars and applied it to the context of the false memory debates. In more recent work, Campbell was working on expanding her account of relational remembering from an analysis of personal rememberings to activities of public rememberings in contexts of historic harms and, specifically, harms to Aboriginals and their communities in Canada. The goal of this paper is to draw out the moral and political implications of Campbell's account of relational remembering and thereby to extend its reach and application. As applied to Aboriginal communities, Campbell's account of relational remembering confirms but also explains the important role that Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IRS TRC) is poised to play. It holds this promise and potential, however, only if all Canadians, Aboriginal and non‐Aboriginal, engage in a process of remembering that is relational and has the goal of building and rebuilding relationships. The paper ends by drawing attention to what relational remembering can teach us about oppression more generally.