The Structure of Predication

The paper discusses the structure of non-verbal predication, with particular reference to the role of the copula. Differently from the main tenets of contemporary logico-philosophical and linguistic theories, a model of predication is proposed where the verbal component (specifically, tense information) is regarded as central in establishing the syntactic and semantic relation between a predicate and its subject. It is thus possible to recover some of the insights of the pre-Fregean analysis of predication. The proposed solution has a number of significant consequences for the structure to be assigned to non-verbal predication, in particular for the semantics of small clause constituents, where the predication is established without the copula.     

Pastoral care of the severely emotionally distressed: An overview of potential pastoral roles in the clinical setting

Evidence suggests that more people wanting help for emotional problems go to the clergy than to any other professional group. Many of these distressed persons manifest psychotic symptoms; yet little attention has been given to pastors' opportunity and responsibility in aiding persons suffering from psychoses. A model of pastoral care of the severely emotionally distressed is presented by describing five potential pastoral roles: availability, assessment (present episode and past history, mental status, specific symptoms), synthesis (hierarchy of probabilities), treatment (linkage, primary care [in collaboration], primary care [alone], support), and follow-up. Clinical vignettes illustrate these various roles.     

Predication and the Frege–Geach problem

Several philosophers have recently appealed to predication in developing their theories of cognitive representation and propositions. One central point of difference between them is whether they take predication to be forceful or neutral and whether they take the most basic cognitive representational act to be judging or entertaining. Both views are supported by powerful reasons and both face problems. Many think that predication must be forceful if it is to explain representation. However, the standard ways of of implementing the idea give rise to the Frege–Geach problem. Others think that predication must be neutral, if we’re to avoid the Frege–Geach problem. However, it looks like nothing neutral can explain representation. My aim in this paper is to present a third view, one which respects the powerful reasons while avoiding the problems. On this view predication is forceful and can thus explain representation, but the idea is implemented in a novel way, avoiding the Frege–Geach problem. The key is to make sense of the notion of grasping a proposition as an objectual act, where the object is a proposition.

     

Waiting for the bus: when base-rates refuse to be neglected

The paper reports the results from 16 versions of a simple probability estimation task, where probability estimates derived from base-rate information have to be modified by case knowledge. In the bus problem [adapted from Falk, R., Lipson, A., & Konold, C. (1994). The ups and downs of the hope function in a fruitless search. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 353-377). Chichester, UK: Wiley], a passenger waits for a bus that departs before schedule in 10% of the cases, and is more than 10 min delayed in another 10%. What are Fred's chances of catching the bus on a day when he arrives on time and waits for 10 min? Most respondents think his probability is 10%, or 90%, instead of 50%, which is the correct answer. The experiments demonstrate the difficulties people have in replacing the original three-category 1/8/1 partitioning with a normalized, binary partitioning, where the middle category is discarded. In contrast with typical studies of "base-rate neglect", or under-weighing of base-rates, this task demonstrates a reversed base-rate fallacy, where frequentistic information is overextended and case information ignored. Possible explanations for this robust phenomenon are briefly discussed.     

Anticipatory coarticulation in aphasia: acoustic and perceptual data

Two experiments investigated speech motor planning in aphasia by contrasting the degree of labial and lingual anticipatory coarticulation evident in normal subjects' speech with that found in the speech of aphasic subjects. In the first experiment, Linear Predictive Coding (LPC) analyses were conducted for the initial consonants of CV [si su ti tu ki ku] and CCV [sti stu ski sku] productions by 6 normal and 10 aphasic (5 anterior, 5 posterior) subjects. For normal subjects' productions, reliable coarticulatory shift was found for almost all measurements, indicating that acoustic correlates for anticipatory coarticulation obtain for [s], [t], and [k] in a prevocalic environment, as well as when [s] is the initial consonant of a CCV syllable. The data for the aphasic subjects were statistically indistinguishable from those of the normal subject group, and there were no differences noted as a function of aphasia type. In the second experiment, a subset of the consonantal stimuli produced by the normal and aphasic subjects was presented to a group of 10 naive listeners for a vowel identification task. Listeners were able to identify the productions of all subjects at a level well above chance. In addition, small but statistically significant Group differences were observed, with the [sV], [skV], and [tV] productions by anterior aphasics showing significantly lower perceptual scores than those of normal subjects.     

Graded modalities. III (the completeness and compactness of S40)

We go on along the trend of [2] and [1], giving an axiomatization of S4 ⁰ and proving its completeness and compactness with respect to the usual reflexive and transitive Kripke models. To reach this results, we use techniques from [1], with suitable adaptations to our specific case.The present work was carried out while the author had a grant of the Foundation U. Bordoni.     

Predication and cognitive context: Between minimalism and contextualism

In this paper, we suggest a strategy for modelling cognitive context within a truth‐conditional semantics, using Asher's model of predication. This allows us to introduce the notion of type presupposition intended as a lexical constraint to the composition of the truth‐conditional content. More specifically, we suggest that this model of predication produces a notion of truth‐conditional meaning where the cognitive context fixes a set of lexical restrictions and forced modifications. We conclude that this model might offer an intermediate position between Minimalism and Contextualism: an account that provides intuitive truth conditions within a formal semantic theory.     

Diversification: Counselors' Investment in Humanity—A Student's Opinion

The author argues that diversification can be the basis of the counseling profession's investment in humanity, attempts to inspire a united stance within the profession, and maintains that counseling professionals have a responsibility to share their knowledge of and respect for embracing all people. These statements attempt to capture the perspective of one aspiring to join the ranks of many dedicated and inspiring counseling professionals. Open your eyes and look for some [person], or some work for the sake of [all people], which needs a little time, a little friendship, a little [empathy], a little sociability, a little human toil. … It is needed in every nook and corner; therefore, search and see if there is not some place where you may invest your humanity, —Albert Schweitzer (As cited in Canfield, Hansen, McCarty, & McCarty, 1997, p. 267)     

On Speaking Thus: the Semantics of Indirect Discourse

Indexical predication is possible as well as the more familiar indexical reference. 'My curtains are coloured thus' describes my curtains. The indexical predicate expression it contains ('coloured thus') stands to possible non-indexical replacements ('red') as a referring indexical ('he') does to possible non-indexical replacements ('Tom'), in that it calls upon the context of utterance to fix its semantic contribution to the whole. Indexical predication is the natural resource to call upon in talk about skilful human performances, where we exhibit considerable know-how but little explicit know-that. Speech is among such performances. Both direct and indirect speech reports may be illuminated by seeing them in the light of this thought. A corollary of the approach is that the prospects of providing a formal semantic treatment of indirect speech do not look good.     

Cut elimination for a logic with induction and co-induction

Proof search has been used to specify a wide range of computation systems. In order to build a framework for reasoning about such specifications, we make use of a sequent calculus involving induction and co-induction. These proof principles are based on a proof-theoretic (rather than set-theoretic) notion of definition (Hallnäs, 1991 [18], Eriksson, 1991 [11], Schroeder-Heister, 1993 [38], McDowell and Miller, 2000 [22]). Definitions are akin to logic programs, where the left and right rules for defined atoms allow one to view theories as “closed” or defining fixed points. The use of definitions and free equality makes it possible to reason intensionally about syntax. We add in a consistent way rules for pre- and post-fixed points, thus allowing the user to reason inductively and co-inductively about properties of computational system making full use of higher-order abstract syntax. Consistency is guaranteed via cut-elimination, where we give a direct cut-elimination procedure in the presence of general inductive and co-inductive definitions via the parametric reducibility technique.     

Iterative Probability Kinematics

Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and that every Popper function is representable in terms of the standard real values of some infinitesimal measure.Our main goal in this article is to study the constraints on (qualitative and probabilistic) change imposed by an extended version of McGee's result. We focus on an extension capable of allowing for iterated changes of view. Such extension, we argue, seems to be needed in almost all considered applications. Since most of the available axiomatizations stipulate (definitionally) important constraints on iterated change, we propose a non-question-begging framework, Iterative Probability Systems (IPS) and we show that every Popper function can be regarded as a Bayesian IPS. A generalized version of McGee's result is then proved and several of its consequences considered. In particular we note that our proof requires the imposition of Cumulativity, i.e. the principle that a proposition that is accepted at any stage of an iterative process of acceptance will continue to be accepted at any later stage. The plausibility and range of applicability of Cumulativity is then studied. In particular we appeal to a method for defining belief from conditional probability (first proposed in [42] and then slightly modified in [6] and [3]) in order to characterize the notion of qualitative change induced by Cumulative models of probability kinematics. The resulting cumulative notion is then compared with existing axiomatizations of belief change and probabilistic supposition. We also consider applications in the probabilistic accounts of conditionals [1] and [30].     

Children Change Their Answers in Response to Neutral Follow-Up Questions by a Knowledgeable Asker

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator's intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent–child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children's reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.     

Effects of variations in local reinforcement rate on local response rate in variable interval schedules

Rats trained to lever press for sucrose were exposed to variable-interval schedules in which (i) the probability of reinforcement in each unit of time was a constant, (ii) the probability was high in the first ten seconds after reinforcement and low thereafter, (iii) the probability was low for ten seconds and high thereafter, (iv) the probability increased with time since reinforcement, or (v) the probability was initially zero and then increased with time since reinforcement. All schedules generated similar overall reinforcement rates. A peak in local response rate occurred several seconds after reinforcement under those schedules where reinforcement rate at this time was moderate or high ([i], [ii], and [iv]). Later in the inter-reinforcement interval, local response rate was roughly constant under those schedules with a constant local reinforcement rate ([i], [ii], and [iii]), but increased steadily when local reinforcement rate increased with time since reinforcement ([iv] and [v]). Postreinforcement pauses occurred on all schedules, but were much longer when local reinforcement rate was very low in the ten seconds after reinforcement ([iii]). The interresponse time distribution was highly correlated with the distribution of reinforced interresponse times, and the distribution of postreinforcement pauses was highly correlated with the distribution of reinforced postreinforcement pauses on some schedules. However, there was no direct evidence that these correlations resulted from selective reinforcement of classes of interresponse times and pauses.     

Age of onset of child maltreatment predicts long-term mental health outcomes

The authors tested the hypothesis that children who are maltreated earlier in life are at greater risk for poor psychological functioning in adulthood than those maltreated later in life. Age of onset of maltreatment was assessed with 3 classifications: (a) continuous (ages 0-11 years); (b) dichotomous (early [ages 0-5 years] vs. later [ages 6-11 years]); and (c) developmental (infancy [ages 0-2 years], preschool [ages 3-5 years], early school age [ages 6-8 years], and school age [ages 9-11 years]). Individuals with documented cases of physical and sexual abuse and neglect prior to age 12 (N=496) were followed up and assessed in adulthood. Results indicated that an earlier onset of maltreatment, measured dichotomously and developmentally, predicted more symptoms of anxiety and depression in adulthood, while controlling for gender, race, current age, and other abuse reports. Later onset of maltreatment, measured continuously or developmentally, was predictive of more behavioral problems in adulthood. Implications for the assessment of maltreated children, the prevention of adult psychopathology, and the classification of age of maltreatment onset are discussed.     

Eine Auch Sich Selbst Missverstehende Kritik: Über das Reflexionsdefizit Formaler Explikationen

The criticism formulated by L. B. Puntel concerning the theory of dialectic proposed by the author is rejected. Puntel's attempt at explicating predication by means of (second order) predicate logic fails: It misjudges predication being already presupposed for the possibility of predicate logic, thus belonging to the transcendental conditions of formal predicate logic, so that predication itself cannot be further explicated by means of such logic. What is in fact criticized by Puntel is something like an artefact of formalization. The unreflected application of formal logic here generates problems instead of solving them.     

Predication in Conceptual Realism

Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are “object”-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. Through a second nominalization of the common names that are part of conceptual realism’s theory of reference (via quantifier phrases), the theory also accounts for both plural reference and predication and mass noun reference and predication. Finally, a separate nexus of predication based on natural kinds and the natural properties and relations nomologically related to those natural kinds, is also an integral part of the framework of conceptual realism.     

On Finite Models of the Lambek Calculus

We study a class of finite models for the Lambek Calculus with additive conjunction and with and without empty antecedents. The class of models enables us to prove the finite model property for each of the above systems, and for some axiomatic extensions of them. This work strengthens the results of [3] where only product-free fragments of these systems are considered. A characteristic feature of this approach is that we do not rely on cut elimination in opposition to e.g. [5], [9].