Predicting the Vote: Implicit Attitudes as Predictors of the Future Behavior of Decided and Undecided Voters

Two studies assessed the predictive validity of implicit political attitudes in relation to voting behavior. In Study 1 , we demonstrated the validity of the adopted measure (i.e., the IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998 ) with a sample of voters who clearly sided with one of the opposing parties. In Study 2 , implicit political preferences were measured in a sample of undecided voters one month before the election, and actual voting behavior was assessed immediately after the election. Results demonstrated that implicit political attitudes were good predictors of future voting behaviors. These findings support the hypothesis of the presence of embryonic attitudes even in the case of those voters who at the explicit and conscious level deny any preference for one of the two opposing candidates.     

Israeli Students' Perspectives Concerning Determinants of Intelligence

Abstract

Students' attitudes toward the nature versus nurture controversy pertaining to a variety of critical phenomena in the intelligence domain were assessed. A student inventory was constructed, pretested, and group administered to 269 students in various academic institutions in northern Israel, and comparisons were made between various sex, social, and ethnic groups. The majority of the students maintained that environment is the main factor influencing both personality and intelligence. Environment and an Environment x Heredity interaction were the most popular categories used to explain various generalizations about differences in ability, particularly among lower-class students. Students of Western origin were more inclined to adopt an environmental perspective on differences in IQ than were their Eastern counterparts. No sex differences were observed.     

When the best appears to be saved for last: Serial position effects on choice

Decision‐makers often evaluate options sequentially due to constraints on attention, timing, or physical location of the options. Choosing the best option will therefore often depend on people's memories of the options. Because imperfect recall introduces uncertainty in earlier options, judgments of those options should regress toward the category mean as memory decays over time. Relatively desirable options will therefore tend to seem less desirable with time, and relatively undesirable options will tend to seem less undesirable with time. We therefore predicted that people will tend to select the first option in a set when choosing between generally undesirable options, and will tend to select the last when choosing between generally desirable options. We demonstrate these serial position effects in choices among paintings, American Idol audition clips, jellybeans, and female faces, provide evidence of its underlying mechanism, and explain how these findings build on existing accounts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Embracing Chance Tactically: A Different Perspective on Risk Taking

Although they value certainty, people are willing to take risks to avoid losses. Consequently, they are risk‐seeking in the domain of losses but risk‐avoidant in the domain of gains. This behavior, frequently demonstrated in framing experiments, is traditionally explained in terms of prospect theory. We suggest a different account whereby involving chance in one's decisions may serve a strategic impression‐formation function. In the domain of losses actors may embrace chance to distance themselves from the outcomes and deflect possible blame. Given potential gains, however, actors may avoid uncertainty to enhance their association with valued outcomes. We test this idea by manipulating the level of actors' personal responsibility for the decision outcomes. The results of four studies consistently showed that when personal responsibility is high, the original framing effect is replicated (i.e., greater risk‐taking when choices are framed in terms of losses rather than gains). However, when because of assigned role or decision circumstances, actors experience low personal responsibility for the outcomes, and the classic framing effect is eliminated. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

内隐多效性选择的ERP证据

采用事件相关电位技术,考察内隐多效性选择及其神经机制。被试的任务是认真观看配对的纯色图片刺激,并进行分类按键反应。实验结果发现,在P2上,积极启动刺激比对照刺激激发了更大的P2波幅; 对比对照刺激,积极启动刺激在左脑、大脑中部和后脑诱发了更大的P2波幅,其中右脑的效应最大。在N2上,积极启动刺激比对照刺激激发了更小的N2波幅; 对比对照刺激,积极启动刺激在左脑、大脑中部和后脑诱发了更小的N2波幅,其中右脑的效应最大。在P3上,积极启动刺激比对照刺激激发了更大的P3波幅; 对比对照刺激,积极启动刺激在左脑、大脑中部和后脑诱发了更大的P3波幅,其中右脑的效应最大。研究结果表明当外显目标与内隐目标同时被呈现时,被试趋向于做多效性选择,这可能表明无意识信息加工具有相当大的权重。且右后部脑区可能是加工多效性刺激的核心和关键区域,P3成分可能反应了内隐多效性选择的精细加工过程,能够作为内隐多效性选择的有效的ERPs指标。     

“时间贫穷”对跨期决策和前瞻行为的影响及其认知机制

紧张的社会节奏使人们感觉时间正在变少,从而产生时间匮乏的心理感知和思维模式,这一现象概括为"时间贫穷"。"时间贫穷"会对个体认知判断、情绪和行为控制力产生重要影响。通过行为科学和认知神经科学相结合的研究方法,从行为反应-心理机制-神经机制三个层面研究时间贫穷对跨期决策和前瞻行为的影响。研究分为3个部分:(1)时间贫穷对个体认知判断、情绪和行为控制力的影响;(2)时间贫穷对跨期决策的影响;(3)组织中时间贫穷对前瞻行为的影响。通过系列研究,拟解决3个关键问题:(1)时间贫穷如何影响人们的认知判断,导致非理性决策行为?(2)时间贫穷影响认知判断和跨期决策的神经机制究竟是什么?(3)时间贫穷对管理决策带来哪些挑战?对这些问题的深入探讨,不仅对行为决策理论的发展有重要贡献;而且对组织如何进行有效的管理制度设计,避免个体和组织陷入"时间贫穷陷阱",同样有很强的实践意义。     

“All‐or‐None” Versus “Most‐or‐Some” Options in Risky Choice: Effects of Domain and Handedness

Two methodological variants of Kahneman and Tversky's Asian disease scenario were investigated. One variant involved replacing the “all‐or‐none” outcome scenarios of the risky choice with “most‐or‐some” scenario outcomes, and the second variant involved replacing the negative domain of lives lost with a positive domain of jobs created. In addition, the effects of strength of handedness, a variable related to individual differences in risk perception, were examined. Results indicated that standard framing effects were obtained across both domains, with a decrease in risky choice under the gain domain. Scenario type also interacted with handedness, such that the all‐or‐none scenario yielded framing effects for consistent (strong)‐handers only, whereas the most‐or‐some scenario yielded framing effects for inconsistent (mixed)‐handers only (consistent‐handers are those who use the same hand exclusively for almost all activities). These results demonstrate that framing effects are strongly influenced by the presence versus absence of extreme/absolute outcomes and that individuals (in this case, decision makers with varying degrees of handedness strength) are differentially sensitive to different pieces of information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Temporal Discounting Mechanisms of Future‐oriented Coping: Evidence from Delay Discounting and Task Prioritization Paradigms

Four studies were conducted to examine the relationship between future‐oriented coping and temporal discounting under different situational conditions. In Study 1, 138 participants were primed with either stressful or neutral stimuli, followed by a delay‐discounting task. In Study 2, 118 participants were primed with either stressful or neutral stimuli, followed by a task‐prioritization activity. The results of both studies indicated that future‐oriented coping had a significant negative association with temporal discounting or the number of rational choices in the neutral‐priming condition, but the relationship was not significant in the stress‐priming condition. In Study 3, qualitative data revealed that the major reason for shifting choices from larger but later payoffs to smaller but sooner rewards in a stressful condition was to reduce the stressful mood, create a positive mood, and promote a sense of accomplishment. This explanation was corroborated by Study 4, in which one group was allowed to choose an immediate payoff and the other group was blocked from choosing that immediate payoff. We confirmed that post‐test anxiety was significantly lower in the immediate payoff group compared with the delayed‐payoff group in proactive and preventive coping, using pre‐test anxiety as a covariate. Preventive coping helped to reduce anxiety levels in a stressful condition only when there was a choice to obtain an immediate payoff. These findings underscore the relationship between future‐oriented coping and temporal discounting, as well as the flexibility of discounting in the face of stress. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Order effects and memory for evidence in individual versus group decision making in auditing

Sequential processing of evidence may lead to recency effect, a potential bias in judgment. The present research seeks to extend the literature on recency effects by assessing the potential moderating influence of team work: whether group decision making moderates the severity of recency effects predicted by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), and whether group processing influences the accuracy of, and confidence in memory for evidence. Experienced auditors from a Big‐6 accounting firm made audit judgments, either individually or as groups. They were randomly assigned to one of two levels of evidence presentation order. After performing the judgment task, participants completed two evidence recognition tests. Consistent with prior findings, recency effects on judgments were observed, but only for individuals. Group judgments or audit reports were not affected by recency. Order effects, however, did not translate into different choices of audit reports, and did not persist in memories of either individuals or groups. As expected, group memory was more accurate than individual memory and groups were more confident than individuals. Overall, confidence in accurate memories was greater than in inaccurate ones. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

内隐职业性别刻板印象、信息完整性对大学生职业决策过程的影响

采用内隐联想测验对150名大学生进行分组,选出高、低职业性别刻板印象组被试共74名（各37名）,运用信息板技术深入考察内隐职业性别刻板印象、信息完整性对个体职业决策过程的具体影响。结果表明：（1）内隐职业性别刻板印象显著影响个体职业决策的决策时间、探索深度以及探索模式;（2）信息完整性对个体职业决策的信息探索深度、探索模式以及决策满意度有显著影响,且高内隐职业性别刻板印象个体的决策满意度随信息完整性的减少而降低;（3）高内隐职业性别刻板印象的个体在信息不完整的情况下会倾向于进行更深入的信息探索。     

内隐自尊和风险偏好对大学生职业决策的影响

为研究影响大学生职业决策的影响因素和决策有效性,实验一、二分别从决策者心理特征（内隐自尊与风险偏好）和职业方案特征（框架效应与风险水平）入手,考察二者对大学生职业决策行为的影响。结果发现：内隐自尊和风险偏好的高低显著影响大学生择业倾向性;大学生对风险水平不同的职业方案的选择倾向由低到高依次为冒险、折中、保守方案;职业决策存在明显的框架效应。研究表明,大多数大学生倾向于选择保守的职业方案;高风险偏好的大学生倾向于选择冒险的职业方案;高内隐自尊大学生倾向于主动择业;积极表述的职业方案更受大学生所青睐。     

The Influence of Physical Elevation in Buildings on Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Pilot and Four Field Studies

Little empirical research has been reported on the role of spatial positioning inside buildings on consumer behavior. Based on embodied cognition literature, we propose that elevation from street level influences risk preferences. In a pilot study and four field studies involving financial decisions with both hypothetical and real payoffs, we find evidence that high physical elevation increases risk‐seeking tendencies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that elevation leads to riskier behavior by increasing sensitivity to power. Finally, we establish a boundary condition for the impact of elevation on risk preferences by demonstrating that the effect attenuates when accessibility of physical elevation is low. These findings show that a subtle environmental parameter—physical elevation from street level—can influence human psychological states and consequently affect decisions.     

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives From Brain and Behavioral Science

ABSTRACT— Trying to understand why adolescents and young adults take more risks than younger or older individuals do has challenged psychologists for decades. Adolescents' inclination to engage in risky behavior does not appear to be due to irrationality, delusions of invulnerability, or ignorance. This paper presents a perspective on adolescent risk taking grounded in developmental neuroscience. According to this view, the temporal gap between puberty, which impels adolescents toward thrill seeking, and the slow maturation of the cognitive-control system, which regulates these impulses, makes adolescence a time of heightened vulnerability for risky behavior. This view of adolescent risk taking helps to explain why educational interventions designed to change adolescents' knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes have been largely ineffective, and suggests that changing the contexts in which risky behavior occurs may be more successful than changing the way adolescents think about risk.     

Risk preferences in young children: early evidence of individual differences in reaction to potential gains and losses

New methods were developed for studying risky decision making in children as young as age five. Each child was given a block of ‘gain’ trials, for example, a choice between a sure gain of one prize and a 50:50 chance of gaining either two prizes or no prize, and a block of ‘loss’ trials, for example, a choice between a sure loss of one prize and a 50:50 chance of losing either two prizes or no prize. We were thus able to compare risky choice for gains and losses at the level of the individual child. In each of two experiments a variety of individual difference variables were measured, including in Experiment 2, the child's parent's scores on the same task. Across experiments, the preponderance of choices was of the risky option. However, most children and adults made more risky choices in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. Predictors of individual differences in children included shyness, impulsivity, and the risk taking of the child's parent. We suggest that methods are now in place to encourage further studies of decision processes in young children. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling the Impact of Control on the Attractiveness of Risk in a Prospect Theory Framework

Many decisions involve a degree of personal control over event outcomes, which is exerted through one's knowledge or skill. In three experiments we investigated differences in decision making between prospects based on a) the outcome of random events and b) the outcome of events characterized by control. In Experiment 1, participants estimated certainty equivalents (CEs) for bets based on either random events or the correctness of their answers to U.S. state population questions across the probability spectrum. In Experiment 2, participants estimated CEs for bets based on random events, answers to U.S. state population questions, or answers to questions about 2007 NCAA football game results. Experiment 3 extended the same procedure as Experiment 1 using a within-subjects design. We modeled data from all experiments in a prospect theory framework to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. Participants weighted the probabilities associated with bets characterized by control so as to reflect greater risk attractiveness relative to bets based on random events, as evidenced by more elevated weighting functions under conditions of control. This research elucidates possible cognitive mechanisms behind increased risk taking for decisions characterized by control, and implications for various literatures are discussed.     

Risk strategy under task complexity: a multivariate analysis of behaviour in a naturalistic setting

This study complements the existing literature on decision-making processes and outcomes in complex settings by exploring the impact of different types of complexity on risk strategies in a naturalistic setting. The study analyses a large sample of decisions made by individuals in UK offcourse betting markets, a fertile environment for observing both a variety of risk strategies and a range of task complexities. Specifically, the investigation focuses on the comparative impacts of complexity defined in terms, respectively, of alternatives and attributes. The results suggest that the risk strategy employed is affected by task complexity. Complexity does not affect the size of risk accepted but alternative- and attribute-based complexity together influence the propensity to accept greater degrees of risk. In addition, the effect of attribute-based complexity on risk taking appears to be modified by the use of risk-hedging strategies. The results are observed to corroborate some earlier work on decision process and outcome; where differences with earlier findings are identified, some possible explanations are offered. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

内隐绩效模型对管理决策的影响作用研究

本文在以往绩效模型和内隐绩效模型的研究基础上,运用实验模拟方法,研究了内隐绩效模型对管理决策的影响作用,结果发现：在不同决策任务条件下,内隐绩效模型存在显著差异．并随着决策任务变化而变化;内隐绩效模型影响决策者的决策偏差,周边绩效一定程度上对任务绩效起补偿作用。