Does Putnam's Argument Beg the Question against the Skeptic? Bad News for Radical Skepticism

The most convincing – and shortest – version of Putnam's argument against thepossibility of our eternal envattment is due toCrispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of themisunderstandings that have been elicited byPutnam's original presentation of the argumentin Reason, Truth and History (1981).But it is still open to the charge ofquestion-begging. True enough, the premisses ofthe argument (disquotation and externalism) canbe formulated and defended without presupposingexternal objects whose existence appearsdoubtful in the light of the very skepticalscenario which Putnam wants to repudiate.However, the argument is only valid if we add anextra premiss as to the existence of some external objects. In order to avoidcircularity, we should run the argument withexternal objects which must exist even if we arebrains in a vat, e.g. with computers rather thanwith trees. As long as the skeptic is engaged ina discussion of the brain-in-a-vat scenario, sheshould neither deny the existence of computersnor the existence of causal relations; for ifshe does, she is in fact denying that we arebrains in a vat.     

Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason

Hume's farmer's dilemma is usually construed as demonstrating the failure of Humeanism in practical reason and as providing an argument in favor of externalism or the theory of resolute choice. But thedilemma arises only when Humeanism is combined with the assumptionthat direct and intentional control of our desires – desiring atwill – is impossible. And such an assumption, albeit widely accepted,has little in its support. Once we reject that assumption we can describe a solution to the dilemma within the bounds of Humeanism. Moreover, wefind in this new solution as argument for the idea of desiring at will.     

Observer-Relative Chances In Anthropic Reasoning?

John Leslie presents a thought experiment to show that chances are sometimes observer-relative in a paradoxical way. The pivotal assumption in his argument – a version of the weak anthropic principle – is the same as the one used to get the disturbing Doomsday argument off the ground. I show that Leslie's thought experiment trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a paradoxical way. The result can be generalized: At least for a very wide range of cases, the weak anthropic principle does not giverise to paradoxical observer-relative chances. This finding could be taken to give new indirect support to the doomsday argument.     

Popper and Synthetic judgements A Priori

Summary  Popper uses the “Humean challenge” as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper’s problem of induction), and (b) the “Popperean” doubt whether – presupposing that there are laws of nature – the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper’s alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if Popper’s solution of the Humean challenge is re-interpreted as being close to Kant’s it makes sense. Even though Popper explicitly rejects Kant’s synthetic judgements a priori, it is claimed here that this is so because he misinterprets Kant’s argument. If he had understood Kant correctly he should have been a modern “Kantianer”!     

Constant colors in the head

I defend a version of color subjectivism — that colors are sortals for certain neural events — by arguing against a sophisticated form of color objectivism and by showing how a subjectivist can legitimately explain the phenomenal fact that colors seem to be properties of external objects.I am very grateful to C. L. Hardin and Mohan Matthen for reading early drafts of this paper — in Hardin's case, two drafts. They both helped me to become clearer about the issues and improved the argument considerably. I am grateful to Ran Lahav and Paul Pietroski for incisive comments on more recent drafts, and to others for comments made in discussion.     

Aristotle's Endoxa and Plausible Argumentation

Aristotle's conception and use of ta endoxa are key points to our understanding of Aristotelian dialectic. But, nowadays, they are not of historical or hermeneutic importance alone, as, in Aristotle's treatment of endoxa, we still see a relevant contribution to the modern study of argumentation. I propose here an interpretation of endoxa to that effect: namely, as plausible propositions. This version is not only defensible in the Aristotelian context, it may also shed new light on some of his assumptions and methodological shortcomings – e.g. concerning the 'plausible/implausible' pair –; finally, it will even enable us to show certain basic hints and guidelines, advanced by Aristotle's study of endoxa, which still serve nowadays to orientate our studies of argumentation from the angle of a theory of plausible argument currently under construction. These hints and guidelines suggest a pragmatic, gradual and comparative discursive concept of plausibility, and point, in particular, towards the reasonable dealing with, and weighing up of, differences of opinion within this frame of reference.     

Inverting Intentional Content

Critics of wide functionalism havetraditionally sought to attack the theory byexposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Widefunctionalist theories of intentionalcontent, however, were spared philosophicalscrutiny. I propose that wide functionalistaccounts of the intentional content are equallysusceptible to attack. I will attempt todemonstrate this by enlisting thefunctionalist's old foe from the qualia wars –the inverted spectrum hypothesis – in a newway. If the argument is sound, not only will Ihave shown that the inverted spectrumhypothesis may have more use than philosophicalliterature recognizes, I will have also exposeda weakness in a dominant philosophical theory:the wide functionalist theory of intentionalcontent.     

Atoms vs. Extended Simples: Towards a Dispositionalist Reconciliation

There are four main theories concerning the ultimate constitution of matter: atomism version 1 (matter has as fundamental constituents unextended point-particles), atomism version 2 (matter has as fundamental constituents extended but indivisible particles), the theory of gunk (on which every material object is composed of actual proper parts that are themselves material objects composed of actual proper parts that are themselves material objects…etc. ad infinitum), and the theory of extended simples (matter bottoms out in objects that are spatially extended and divisible but lacking in actual proper parts). These four theories are usually seen as diametrically opposed. Here I take a stab at ecumenism, and argue that atomism version 1 and the theory of extended simples can be reconciled and rendered compatible by reference to the reality of dispositions.     

Against zero-dimensional material objects (and other bare particulars)

A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist??s Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject spatiotemporally located zero-dimensional property instances. Finally, it is argued that since she must accept such instances if she accepts zero-dimensional material object bundles, she ought to avoid the latter. This leaves bare particular theory as the default view of zero-dimensional material objects. The argument for the second premise invokes the thesis that the exemplification of at least one sparse property is a prerequisite for the existence of any particular. It is argued from Humean considerations that bare particulars fail this prerequisite.     

Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses

Pascals wager is expounded as a paradigm case of a practical,decision-theoretical argument for acting as if a proposition is true when wehave no theoretical reasons to accept or reject it (1.1.–1.2.). Thoughthe paradigm is fallacious in various respects there are valid and adequatearguments for acting as if certain propositions are true: that theoreticalentities exist, that there are material perceptual objects, that the worldis uniform across time (1.3). After this analysis of examples the authorsgeneral approach for developing criteria for the validity and adequacy oftypes of argument (2.1.) is applied: Having discussed some problems(2.2.–2.3.), a general epistemic principle for such pascal argumentsis developed, which characterizes their premisses and, if introduced as anadditional premiss, can make them deductively valid (2.4).     

The Knowledge Argument, Abilities, And Metalinguistic Beliefs

In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical – or, put generally: an objectively scientific – perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated the epistemological challenge behind the case of Mary especially clearly. I take her formulation of the problem as a starting-point and present a solution which is based solely on the concepts of capability and of metalinguistic beliefs. References to epiphenomenal facts, phenomenal knowledge etc. will be avoided completely. I specify my proposal against the backdrop of Burge's critical reflections about metalinguistic reinterpretation of expressions of belief and the externalist thesis held by Burge, Putnam and others that meanings and mental states are dependent upon the environment. My solution is then compared with Lewis' and Nemirow's ability objection. Finally I argue that the much discussed ``knowing what it is like' has in its ordinary meaning nothing much to do with `phenomenal knowledge' or knowledge of `epiphenomenal' facts.     

The SameP-Relation as a Response to Critics of Baker's Theory of Constitution

According to the so-called “standard account” regarding the problem of material constitution, a statue and a lump of clay that makes it up are not identical. The usual objection is that this view yields many objects in the same place at the same time. Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution is a recent and sophisticated version of the standard account. She argues that the aforementioned objection can be answered by defining a relation of being the same P as (sameP). In this paper I shall examine consequences of her response and show that sameP has wrong formal properties, as a result of which this solution cannot be accepted.     

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

Peter Singer’S Argument for Utilitarianism

The paper begins by situating Singer within the British meta-ethical tradition. It sets out the main steps in his argument for utilitarianism as the ‘default setting’ of ethical thought. It argues that Singer’s argument depends on a hierarchy of reasons, such that the ethical viewpoint is understood to be an adaptation – an extension – of a fundamental self-interest. It concludes that the argument fails because it is impossible to get from this starting-point in self-interest to his conception of the ethical point of view. The fundamental problem is its mixing the immiscible: the Humean subordination of reason to interest with the Kantian conception of reason as universal and authoritative.     

A platonist epistemology

A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical objects by simply explaininghow they can do this. My argument is based upon the adoption of a particular version of platonism — full-blooded platonism — which asserts that any mathematical object which possiblycould exist actuallydoes exist.I would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper: Arnold Koslow, Hartry Field, Jerrold Katz, Michael Resnik, Elliott Mendelson, Charles Landesman, Stephen Schiffer, Adam Vinueza, David Pitt, Jody Azzouni, David MacCallum, Colin McLarty, Tom Slaughter, Henry Mendell, Penelope Maddy, Michael Liston, Ricardo Gomez, Seth Crook, Stuart Cornwell, and various people at the University of Colorado, Boulder, where I read this paper in February, 1994. Much of the research for this paper was carried out under a City University of New York Dissertation Fellowship; I am grateful for this.     

Memory for object locations: Priority effect and sex differences in associative spatial learning

This paper reports two experiments conducted to examine priority effects and sex differences in object location memory. A new task of paired position-learning was designed, based on the A–B A–C paradigm, which was used in paired word learning. There were three different paired position-learning conditions: (1) positions of several different objects (B-objects and C-objects) around referent objects (A-objects) were learned in the A–B A–C position-learning condition, (2) positions of several different objects with no referent objects were learned in the 0–B 0–C position-learning condition, and (3) positions of identical objects (stars) with no referent objects were learned in the 0-star 0-star position-only condition. The results revealed a significant priority effect on performance in the A–B A–C and the 0–B 0–C position-learning conditions but not in the 0-star 0-star position-only condition. Contradictory results were obtained with respect to the sex variable: a female superiority effect on paired position learning was significant in Experiment 1, but this effect was not replicated in Experiment 2. In addition, an articulatory suppression task used in Experiment 2 had a significant effect on recall of different object positions but no effect on recall of identical object positions. This suggested that verbal encoding was not necessary for learning of positions of identical objects.     

Rational Comprehension of Arguments in Theoretical Texts: A Program for an Argumentative-Linguistic Approach

A method of linguistically-oriented reasoning comprehension is proposed. It is based on semiological principles of text comprehension. Both content and form are essential for comprehending argumentative texts. A text recipient is viewed as a rational judge trying to detect all the components of the argument he/she considers and thus to see if the argument is consistent. Elementary and higher level argumentative units of the text are discovered by applying a modified S. Toulmin's model of argumentative functions. Validity and correctness of arguments are established by means of a new – linguistic – interpretation of traditional syllogistic.     

Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity

Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declaredistinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is notjust an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims,seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their wordssecure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to beidentical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resultinginterpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things cannever be identical – that allows us to understand the real point ofsuch statements. This view also offers a new solution to Fege's puzzleof the informativeness of identity statements.     

In Favor of Being Only Humean

The twin conceptions of (1) natural law as causal structure and (2) explanation as passage from phenomenon to cause, are two sides of a certain philosophical coin, to which I shall offer an alternative – Humean – currency. The Humean alternative yokes together a version of the regularity conception of law and a conception of explanation as passage from one regularity, to another which has it as an instance but of which it is not itself an instance. I will show that the regularity conception of law is the basis of a distinguished branch of physical mechanics; thus the Humean conception of law, like its better-loved rival, enjoys the support of a venerated tradition in mechanical theory – in fact, that strand which culminates in quantum theory. I shall also offer an account of explanatory asymmetry, a natural companion to the Humean conception of explanation as passage from one regularity to another of greater scope, as an alternative to van Fraassen's unsatisfactory account. My account of asymmetry is just as free of reliance on context as it is free of reliance on cause. I shall thus proclaim that explanatory asymmetry is at once a reality deserving of philosophical treatment – one not to be given over to the care of psychology or linguistics – and at the same time susceptible of an account worthy of Hume.