Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Taking a social psychological approach to metacognitive judgments, this study analyzed the difference in realism (validity) in confidence and frequency judgments (i.e., estimates of overall accuracy) between one's own and another person's answers to general knowledge questions. Experiment 1 showed that when judging their own answers, compared with another's answers, the participants exhibited higher overconfidence, better ability to discriminate correct from incorrect answers, lower accuracy, and lower confidence. However, the overconfidence effect could be attributable to the lowest level of confidence. Furthermore, when heeding additional information about another's answers the participants showed higher confidence and better discrimination ability. The overconfidence effect of Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2. However, the results of Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ability, confidence, and accuracy. Finally, in both experiments the participants gave lower frequency judgments of their own overall accuracy compared with their frequency judgments of another person's overall accuracy.     

Stability in the metamemory realism of eyewitness confidence judgments

The stability of eyewitness confidence judgments over time in regard to their reported memory and accuracy of these judgments is of interest in forensic contexts because witnesses are often interviewed many times. The present study investigated the stability of the confidence judgments of memory reports of a witnessed event and of the accuracy of these judgments over three occasions, each separated by 1 week. Three age groups were studied: younger children (8–9 years), older children (10–11 years), and adults (19–31 years). A total of 93 participants viewed a short film clip and were asked to answer directed two-alternative forced-choice questions about the film clip and to confidence judge each answer. Different questions about details in the film clip were used on each of the three test occasions. Confidence as such did not exhibit stability over time on an individual basis. However, the difference between confidence and proportion correct did exhibit stability across time, in terms of both over/underconfidence and calibration. With respect to age, the adults and older children exhibited more stability than the younger children for calibration. Furthermore, some support for instability was found with respect to the difference between the average confidence level for correct and incorrect answers (slope). Unexpectedly, however, the younger children’s slope was found to be more stable than the adults. Compared to the previous research, the present study’s use of more advanced statistical methods provides a more nuanced understanding of the stability of confidence judgments in the eyewitness reports of children and adults.     

The accuracy of meta-metacognitive judgments: regulating the realism of confidence

Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith's (Psychol Rev 103:490-517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer's correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.     

A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination

In a recent issue of this journal, Björkman, Juslin, and Winman (1993) presented a model of the calibration of subjective confidence judgments for sensory discrimination which they called “subjective distance theory.” They proposed that there was a robust underconfidence bias in such judgments, that the model predicted such a bias, and that two different models were needed for the calibration of subjective confidence for cognitive judgments and for sensory ones. This paper addresses issues they raised. It points out that they have not presented a new model, but rather a portion of a more general one, the “decision-variable partition model” originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (1980). This paper explores properties of the model and shows, contrary to Björkman, Juslin, and Winman’s hypotheses, that the model does not predict under-confidence, that the “hard-easy effect” can be observed with sensory discriminations, and that the model fits not only sensory, but also cognitive judgments.     

Moral realism and moral judgments

For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.     

Adult age differences in the realism of confidence judgments: overconfidence, format dependence, and cognitive predictors

Realistic confidence judgments are essential to everyday functioning, but few studies have addressed the issue of age differences in overconfidence. Therefore, the authors examined this issue with probability judgment and intuitive confidence intervals in a sample of 122 healthy adults (ages: 35-40, 55-60, 70-75 years). In line with predictions based on the na?ve sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), substantial format dependence was observed, with extreme overconfidence when confidence was expressed as an intuitive confidence interval but not when confidence was expressed as a probability judgment. Moreover, an age-related increase in overconfidence was selectively observed when confidence was expressed as intuitive confidence intervals. Structural equation modeling indicated that the age-related increases in overconfidence were mediated by a general cognitive ability factor that may reflect executive processes. Finally, the results indicated that part of the negative influence of increased age on general ability may be compensated for by an age-related increase in domain-relevant knowledge.     

Local and global judgments of confidence

Studies of calibration have shown that people's mean confidence in their answers (local confidence) tends to be greater than their overall estimate of the percentage of correct answers (global confidence). Moreover, whereas the former exhibits overconfidence, the latter often exhibits underconfidence. Three studies present evidence that global underconfidence reflects a failure to make an allowance for correct answers that are likely to result from mere guessing and can be eliminated by informing participants of the dubious normative status of estimates below 50% (i.e., chance). Previously reported discrepancies between global and local confidence, it is concluded, arise less from possible methodological artifacts in assessment of local confidence than from normatively inappropriate assessments of global confidence.     

Priors and payoffs in confidence judgments

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics - Priors and payoffs are known to affect perceptual decision-making, but little is understood about how they influence confidence judgments. For optimal...     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

Sources of confidence judgments in implicit cognition

Subjective reports of confidence are frequently used as a measure of awareness in a variety of fields, including artificial grammar learning. However, little is known about what information is used to make confidence judgments and whether there are any possible sources of information used to discriminate between items that are unrelated to confidence. The data reported here replicate an earlier experiment by Vokey and Brooks (1992) and show that grammaticality decisions are based on both the grammatical status of items and their similarity to study exemplars. The key finding is that confidence ratings made on a continuous scale (50%—100%) are closely related to grammaticality but are unrelated to all of the measures of similarity that were tested. By contrast, confidence ratings made on a binary scale (high vs. low) are related to both grammaticality and similarity. The data confirm an earlier finding (Tunney & Shanks, 2003) that binary confidence ratings are more sensitive to low levels of awareness than continuous ratings are and suggest that participants are conscious of all the information acquired in artificial grammar learning.     

Favourable and unfavourable conditions for children's confidence judgments

Two studies are presented in which favourable and unfavourable conditions for children's meta‐cognitive monitoring processes are examined. Previously reported findings have shown that especially children's uncertainty monitoring (in contrast to certainty monitoring) poses specific problems for children in their elementary school years. When interviewing children about an observed event, answerable and unanswerable questions in two question formats (unbiased and misleading) were used, and 8‐ and 10‐year‐old children as well as adults were asked to rate their confidence on a three‐point scale concerning each response. Results of Study 1 show that accuracy instructions and the option to answer with ‘I don't know’ inflate children's level of confidence because uncertain answers are withheld. Results of Study 2 revealed that children's difficulty with uncertainty monitoring may lie in a cognitive overload during the interview because immediate confidence judgments were less precise and less adequate compared with delayed confidence judgments. Participants' rating of their uncertainty after having erroneously provided an answer to an unanswerable question proved that children aged 8 years and older are able to experience and report levels of uncertainty but, as was shown for answerable questions, these emerging competencies are dependent on favourable task conditions.     

The calibration and resolution of confidence in perceptual judgments

Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontariot Canada Confidence rating based calibration and resolution indices were obtained in two experiments requiring perceptual comparisons and in a third with visual gap detection. Four important results were obtained. First, as in the general knowledge domain, subjects were underconfident when judgments were easy and overconfident when they were difficult. Second, paralleling the clear dependence of calibration on decisional difficulty, resolution decreased with increases in decision difficulty arising either from decreases in discriminability or from increasing demands for speed at the expense of accuracy. Third, providing trial-by-trial response feedback on difficult tasks improved resolution but had no effect on calibration. Fourth, subjects can accurately reportsubjective errors (i.e., trials in which they have indicated that they made an error) with their confidence ratings. It is also shown that the properties of decision time, conditionalized on confidence category, impose a rigorous set of constraints on theories of confidence calibration.     

Performance feedback improves the resolution of confidence judgments

A training experiment was carried out to examine whether feedback concerning the appropriateness of confidence judgments, given in terms of probability, improves calibration and resolution skills. Subjects participated in four separate sessions in which they responded to a series of general knowledge questions. Immediately before completing the questionnaires in Sessions 2, 3, and 4, half of the subjects were given detailed feedback concerning their confidence levels and accuracy rates. The remaining half were given no such feedback, and thus served as a control group. The resolution of confidence judgments improved across sessions to a greater extent for the group exposed to performance feedback than for the control group. Calibration of confidence judgments was uninfluenced by the performance feedback manipulation.     

Judging confidence influences decision processing in comparative judgments

Current theories of confidence in human judgment assume that confidence and the decision it is based on are inextricably tied to the same process (decisional locus theories) or that confidence processing begins only once the primary decision has been completed (postdecisional locus theories). In the absence of auxiliary assumptions, however, neither class of theory permits the judgment of confidence to affect primary decision processing. In the present study, we examined the effect of rendering confidence judgments on the properties of the decision process in a sensory discrimination task. An examination of the properties of the time taken to determine confidence (i.e., the time taken to render the judgment of confidence) revealed clear evidence of postdecisional confidence processing. Concomitantly, the requirement of confidence judgments was found to substantially increase decisional response times, suggesting that some confidence processing occurs during the primary decision process. We discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary models of confidence in human judgment.     

Task predictability and performance as determinants of confidence in multiple-cue judgments

Two experiments were performed in order to study judges' confidence in their judgments. Experiment I showed that judges' confidence is a direct function of the cue intercorrelation. r_ij in a pure judgmental task. When judges recieved feedback, the effect of r_ij on confidence was, as predicted, reduced. Confidence was, however, systematically related to neither R ²_c nor performance in the feedback condition. Experiment II was a further study of the effect of feedback on confidence. In addition, the hypothesis that the lack of relation between performance and confidence is due to judges' poor knowledge of how they actually perform in probabilistic inference tasks was tested. The experiment showed that differences among judges' confidence is a direct function of task predictability and that judges' confidence is related to how they believe that they perform rather than to how they actually perform. The theoretical as well as the practical importance of studies of confidence in probabilistic inference tasks was discussed.     

Optimistic bias and pessimistic realism in judgments of contingency with aversive or rewarding outcomes

A depressive personality influences judgments of contingency. This is called "depressive realism." The present experiment examined whether optimistic traits, as measured by various scales, are correlated with judgments of contingency. The valences of the target stimuli were aversive or rewarding (noise avoidance or gaining points). Analysis indicated that the optimistic subjects (as measured by explanatory style for negative events) tend to overestimate noncontingent events; however, optimism measured by other scales did not show such an effect. The findings are discussed in terms of a self-defensive attributional bias.     

Response competition effects insame-different judgments

An account ofsame-different discriminations that is based upon a continuous-flow model of visual information processing (C. W. Eriksen & Schultz, 1979) and response competition and inhibition between the responses by which the subject signifies his judgment is presented. We show that a response signifyingsame will on the average be executed faster due to less priming or incipient activation of the competing response,different. In the experiment, the subjects matched letters on the basis of physical identity. The degree of priming ofdifferent responses on same trials and ofsame responses ondifferent trials was manipulated by an extraneous noise letter placed in the display. Latency for judgments onsame trials increased as the feature overlap of noise and target letters decreased. Latencies were shorter ondifferent trials when the noise letter was dissimilar to either target letter than when the noise letter was the same as one of the targets. These results were consistent with the response-competition interpretation.     

Increased realism in eyewitness confidence judgements: the effect of dyadic collaboration

This study investigated to what extent, and under what circumstances, pair collaboration influences the realism in eyewitness confidence in event memory. The participants first saw a short film clip and then confidence rated their answers to questions on its content. A condition (the Individual–Pair condition) where individual effort preceded pair collaboration showed better calibration compared with a condition (the Simple Pair condition) where no individual effort took place. Furthermore, within the Individual–Pair condition, better calibration, and lower overconfidence, were found in the pair phase compared with the individual phase. The eyewitnesses in the Individual–Pair condition made more realistic judgements of the total number of questions answered correctly. In a control experiment no effect on realism in confidence was found when individuals performed the same task twice. The improved realism in the Individual–Pair condition may partly be explained in terms of the increased accuracy and lowered confidence found for such items where the pair members' had given different answers in the individual phase, and by a risky shift effect for such items where they had given the same answer. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's numerical skill and judgments of confidence in estimation

This study investigated how children's fluent use of a basic numerical skill is related to their perceptions of confidence on a task of quantitative estimation. One hundred four 10th graders (age 15.7 years) were categorized according to level of numerical fluency as assessed by timed tasks of counting in various nonunity increments. They then made estimates of large numbers of dots and rated how confident they were on each trial. The estimation task varied according to two within-subject factors of task difficulty. It was found that counting skill was related not only to accuracy in estimating, but also to the appropriateness of the children's confidence in their responses. Skillful children made judgments that corresponded with actual task difficulty. A derived calibration score corroborated ANOVA findings of the interaction of skill level and task difficulty on confidence ratings. It also revealed that while girls were less confident than boys, they were actually more realistic in their judgments. Findings are discussed in terms of (a) the effect of stimulus knowledge on awareness of task difficulty and (b) sex differences in achievement-related expectancies.