How Science Is Applied in Technology

Unlike basic sciences, scientific research in advanced technologies aims to explain, predict, and (mathematically) describe not phenomena in nature, but phenomena in technological artefacts, thereby producing knowledge that is utilized in technological design. This article first explains why the covering‐law view of applying science is inadequate for characterizing this research practice. Instead, the covering‐law approach and causal explanation are integrated in this practice. Ludwig Prandtl’s approach to concrete fluid flows is used as an example of scientific research in the engineering sciences. A methodology of distinguishing between regions in space and/or phases in time that show distinct physical behaviours is specific to this research practice. Accordingly, two types of models specific to the engineering sciences are introduced. The diagrammatic model represents the causal explanation of physical behaviour in distinct spatial regions or time phases; the nomo‐mathematical model represents the phenomenon in terms of a set of mathematically formulated laws.     

Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness

This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of consciousness.     

Grounding, scientific explanation, and Humean laws

It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered.     

Economics and technological change: An evolutionary epistemological inquiry

The failure of neoclassical economic theories to explain the nature and significance of the phenomenon of technological change is critically looked at in this article. Although there are numerous excellent works in the literature on technological change that criticize the inadequacy of neoclassical economists’ approach to this phenomenon, my objective, however, is to open a new discourse on technological change by emphasizing the epistemological significance of technology. It is argued that the concept of technology as essentially a process of knowledge created for doing things and solving problems, and technological change as essentially a process of knowledge change occurring within the contexts of the political economic and social constructivist frameworks that inform the dynamics of this essentially qualitative process can address this failure. Empirically based analytical methodologies may be able to measure the impact of technological change, an evolutionary epistemology of technological change may be better equipped to understand and explain this phenomenon. He has previously taught at Illinois Institute of Technology and Virginia Tech. An earlier version of this paper was presented in a seminar to the Industrial Policy Management Group at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad on November 2, 1992. Thanks are due to Steve Fuller for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Some dubious premises in research and theory on racial differences. Scientific, social, and ethical issues

The scientific premises for looking for statistical differences between groups designated as races (on somewhat arbitrary grounds) are questionable. The explanation of such differences in strictly biological-evolutionary terms is even more dubious. Studies of temperament, basic personality traits, disorders (such as antisocial personality), and specific genetic markers show that there is much more variation within groups designated as races than between such groups. Investigators and theoreticians interpreting such differences on the basis of limited sampling within the three broad racial groups should be careful to avoid selectivity and misrepresentation of data that serve racist ideology, and should be cautious about presenting their theories to the public through inappropriate media forums.     

Energy Constraints

Building on research in anthropology and philosophy, one can make a distinction between type I and type II energy ethics as a framework for advancing public debate about energy. Type I holds energy production and use as a fundamental good and is grounded in the assumption that increases in energy production and consumption result in increases in human wellbeing. Conversely, type II questions the linear relationship between energy production and progress by examining questions of equity and human happiness. The type I versus type II framework helps to advance public debates about energy that address broad questions of profitability, regulation, and the environment, and in the process poses fundamental questions about the reverence for energy growth in advanced technological societies.     

Sherlock holmes ‐ Philosopher detective

Although prima facie no more than a successful private detective, Sherlock Holmes is a classic exponent of scientific method and has laid down several fundamental rules of scientific discovery and truth‐detection. While he rediscovered and modified well‐known principles of induction, analysis and synthesis, and decision theory, he also made significant contributions to patterns of explanation, and with his “principle of exclusion” was an ingenious innovator. This latter cornerstone of Holmes's methodology led him to an interesting modal theory of the “improbable possible” as a competitor to the famous doctrine of the “impossible probable” put forward by Aristotle in de Arte Poetica. Holmes's scientific discipline was seasoned by warmth, understanding, and boldness.     

Economics and technological change: An evolutionary epistemological inquiry

The failure of neoclassical economic theories to explain the nature and significance of the phenomenon of technological change is critically looked at in this article. Although there are numerous excellent works in the literature on technologicial change that criticize the inadequacy of neoclassical economists’ approach to this phenomenon, my objective, however, is to open a new discourse on technological change by emphasizing the epistemological significance of technology. It is argued that the concept of technology as essentially a process of knowledge created for doing things and solving problems, and technological change as essentially a process of knowledge change occurring within the contexts of the political economic and social constructivist frameworks that inform the dynamics of this essentially qualitative process can address this failure. Empirically based analytical methodologies may be able to measure the impact of technological change, an evolutionary epistemology of technological change may be better equipped to understand and explain this phenomenon. Reprinted from Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal of Knowledge Transfer and Utilization, Spring 1994, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 79–91. He has previously taught at Illinois Institute of Technology and Virginia Tech.     

Frankensteins and cyborgs: visions of the global future in an age of technology

This paper draws attention to the role of representation in the depiction of scientific and technological innovation as a means of understanding the narratives that circulate concerning the shape of things to come. It considers how metaphors play an important part in the conduct of scientific explanation, and how they do more than describe the world in helping also to shape expectations, normalise particular choices, establish priorities and create needs. In surveying the range of metaphorical responses to the digital and biotechnological age, we will see how technologies are regarded both as 'endangerment' and 'promise.' What we believe 'technology' is doing to 'us' reflects important implicit philosophies of technology and its relationship to human agency and political choice; yet we also need to be alert to the assumptions about 'human nature' itself which inform such reactions. The paper argues that embedded in the various representations implicit in the new technologies are crucial issues of identity, community and justice: what it means to be (post)human, who is (and who is not) entitled to the rewards of technological advancement, what priorities (and whose interests) will inform the shape of global humanity into the next century.     

Apocalypse soon? Dire messages reduce belief in global warming by contradicting just-world beliefs

Though scientific evidence for the existence of global warming continues to mount, in the United States and other countries belief in global warming has stagnated or even decreased in recent years. One possible explanation for this pattern is that information about the potentially dire consequences of global warming threatens deeply held beliefs that the world is just, orderly, and stable. Individuals overcome this threat by denying or discounting the existence of global warming, and this process ultimately results in decreased willingness to counteract climate change. Two experiments provide support for this explanation of the dynamics of belief in global warming, suggesting that less dire messaging could be more effective for promoting public understanding of climate-change research.     

Haugeland's Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Normativity

Abstract: John Haugeland's distinctive approach to Heidegger's ontology rests on taking scientific explanation to be a paradigmatic case of understanding the being of entities. I argue that this paradigm, and the more general account that Haugeland develops from it, misses a crucial component of Heidegger's picture: the dynamic character of being. While this dimension of being first comes to the fore after Being and Time, it should have been present all along. Its absence grounds Heidegger's persistent confusion about whether world is an entity, as well as problems that both Haugeland's Heidegger and Heidegger's Plato run into with the ontological difference. Retrieving the dynamic character of being reveals the proper object of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as well as a distinctive feature of his metaphysics of normativity, which is all but impossible to see if we grasp Heidegger's account through the special case of scientific explanation—at least as usually understood.     

Why do High IQ Societies Differ in Intellectual Achievement? The Role of Schizophrenia and Left-Handedness in Per Capita Scientific Publications and Nobel Prizes

Previous research has attempted to understand why countries with relatively favorable conditions and high estimated average IQs (such as Finland and Japan) have a relatively low per capita number of scientific Nobel prizes. In the present study, we examine whether there is a relationship between national schizophrenia and left-handedness prevalence, on the one hand, and per capita scientific and literary achievement, on the other hand, in countries with IQ estimates of at least 90. We found that per capita science and literature Nobel prizes and scientific publications are strongly negatively associated with schizophrenia and strongly positively correlated with left-handedness. There also was a very pronounced negative correlation between schizophrenia rate and left-handedness rate. These results suggest that genius can be regarded as a combination of very high IQ, aspects of high-functioning autism (specifically low empathy) plus relatively low impulse control, consistent with observations of intellectually outstanding individuals, and the fact that schizophrenia appears to constitute the opposite pole of these aspects of autism spectrum. We posit differences in androgen levels as a possible underlying explanation for these findings.     

Contrast,inference and scientific realism

The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from the phenomena’.     

Science undergraduates’ and graduates’ epistemologies of science: the notion of interpretive frameworks

First-year science (biology, chemistry, physics) undergraduates’ and advanced graduate students’ understanding of the scientific research process was assessed using two clinical interviews: the “Nature of Science Interview” (International Journal of Science Education 11 (1989) 514; Cognition and Instruction 18 (2000) 349) and the “Nature Nurture Interview” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, 1992) which offered a context (a fictitious conflict of a nature and a nurture theorist about the causes of nervousness in dogs). The participants’ answers were then subjected to a categorical analysis using a coding scheme that progresses from an undifferentiated understanding of science as action (Level 1) to an understanding of science as an iterative process of theory formation, testing, and revision with increasing depth of explanation (Level 5). Results indicate that neither group had a clear understanding of the necessity of framework theories for the scientific research process. While no clear developmental progression was found, differences between students majoring in different fields emerged.     

A REPLY TO ANNE KULL,EDUARDO CRUZ,AND MICHAEL DeLASHMUTT

In my reply to the essays by Anne Kull, Eduardo Cruz, and Michael DeLashmutt, I turn first to Cruz's charge that my use of “the sacred” is at odds with a growing religious studies mainstream that understands religion in secular terms. I suggest that this latter approach has its own problems, deriving partly from its neglect of the political, constructed nature of the category of “religion.” Second, in relation to Cruz's suggestion that my lack of attention to explanation compromises my claim to be social scientific, I defend a broader understanding of the human sciences and explore the relationships between understanding, critique, and history, and between sociology and theology. Third, reflecting on DeLashmutt's suggestion that I neglect the way that technical invention provides a glimpse of divine creativity, and the myth making that goes on around technology in vehicles such as science fiction, I argue that such issues have to be approached in a radically historical way. I conclude by identifying three challenges: to explore more deeply how technological objects form part of human being‐in‐the‐world, to show how my approach might offer practical resources for assessing technological and environmental developments, and to expand my analysis to include non‐Western religious traditions.     

Jacques Loeb, B. F. Skinner, and the legacy of prediction and control

The biologist Jacques Loeb is an important figure in the history of behavior analysis. Between 1890 and 1915, Loeb championed an approach to experimental biology that would later exert substantial influence on the work of B. F. Skinner and behavior analysis. This paper examines some of these sources of influence, with a particular emphasis on Loeb's firm commitment to prediction and control as fundamental goals of an experimental life science, and how these goals were extended and broadened by Skinner. Both Loeb and Skinner adopted a pragmatic approach to science that put practical control of their subject matter above formal theory testing, both based their research programs on analyses of reproducible units involving the intact organism, and both strongly endorsed technological applications of basic laboratory science. For Loeb, but especially for Skinner, control came to mean something more than mere experimental or technological control for its own sake; it became synonomous with scientific understanding. This view follows from (a) the successful working model of science Loeb and Skinner inherited from Ernst Mach, in which science is viewed as human social activity, and effective practical action is taken as the basis of scientific knowledge, and (b) Skinner's analysis of scientific activity, situated in the world of direct experience and related to practices arranged by scientific verbal communities. From this perspective, prediction and control are human acts that arise from and are maintained by social circumstances in which such acts meet with effective consequences.     

Human tool-making capacities reflect increased information-processing capacities: continuity resides in the eyes of the beholder

Chimpanzee/human technological differences are vast, reflect multiple interacting behavioral processes, and may result from the increased information-processing and hierarchical mental constructional capacities of the human brain. Therefore, advanced social, technical, and communicative capacities probably evolved together in concert with increasing brain size. Interpretations of these evolutionary and species differences as continuities or discontinuities reflect differing scientific perspectives.