Holonomic brain theory in imaging and object perception

Image processing in the visual system is described utilizing some basic neurophysiological data. We propose that both sensory and cognitive operations address features already conjoined in critical receptive fields. As both sensory perception and further processing stages are critically dependent upon movement, the theory emphasizes sensory-motor reciprocity in imaging and in object perception.     

A theory of visual interpolation in object perception

We describe a new theory explaining the perception of partly occluded objects and illusory figures, from both static and kinematic information, in a unified framework. Three ideas guide our approach. First, perception of partly occluded objects, perception of illusory figures, and some other object perception phenomena derive from a single boundary interpolation process. These phenomena differ only in respects that are not part of the unit formation process, such as the depth placement of units formed. Second, unit formation from static and kinematic information can be treated in the same general framework. Third, spatial and spatiotemporal discontinuities in the boundaries of optically projected areas are fundamental to the unit formation process. Consistent with these ideas, we develop a detailed theory of unit formation that accounts for most cases of boundary perception in the absence of local physical specification. According to this theory, discontinuities in the first derivative of projected edges are initiating conditions for unit formation. A formal notion of relatability is defined, specifying which physically given edges leading into discontinuities can be connected to others by interpolated edges. Intuitively, relatability requires that two edges be connectable by a smooth, monotonic curve. The roots of the discontinuity and relatability notions in ecological constraints on object perception are discussed. Finally, we elaborate our approach by discussing related issues, some new phenomena, connections to other approaches, and issues for future research.     

A theory of dynamic occluded and illusory object perception

Humans see whole objects from input fragmented in space and time, yet spatiotemporal object perception is poorly understood. The authors propose the theory of spatiotemporal relatability (STR), which describes the visual information and processes that allow visible fragments revealed at different times and places, due to motion and occlusion, to be assembled into unitary perceived objects. They present a formalization of STR that specifies spatial and temporal relations for object formation. Predictions from the theory regarding conditions that lead to unit formation were tested and confirmed in experiments with dynamic and static, occluded and illusory objects. Moreover, the results support the identity hypothesis of a common process for amodal and modal contour interpolation and provide new evidence regarding the relative efficiency of static and dynamic object formation. STR postulates a mental representation, the dynamic visual icon, that briefly maintains shapes and updates positions of occluded fragments to connect them with visible regions. The theory offers a unified account of interpolation processes for static, dynamic, occluded, and illusory objects.     

Separating processes in object perception

In this article, I consider research by Needham and colleagues examining the role of object knowledge on infant's segregation of scenes into objects. I suggest that research in this area would benefit from closer connections to computational, psychophysical, and neurophysiological research on adult perceptual segmentation and grouping. I sketch a framework for understanding the components of object perception and apply it to the paradigm and displays used by Needham. This analysis suggests two ideas. First, it would be valuable to demonstrate the role of object knowledge in cases that are less impoverished in terms of perceptual information for segregation and more typical of object arrangements in ordinary scenes. Second, some method is needed to distinguish whether infants' object knowledge affects perceptual organization of new scenes or produces specific beliefs, inferences, or expectations about particular objects and scenes. As a specific example of the benefits of connecting developmental and adult research, some recent research in adult perception is described. The research indicates that in adult object segregation, two types of processes may be distinguished: basic perceptual processes of object segregation and more cognitive processes involving recognition. I suggest that Needham's research may be revealing the developmental origins of the latter processes.     

Scene consistency in object and background perception

Does knowledge about which objects and settings tend to co-occur affect how people interpret an image? The effects of consistency on perception were investigated using manipulated photographs containing a foreground object that was either semantically consistent or inconsistent with its setting. In four experiments, participants reported the foreground object, the setting, or both after seeing each picture for 80 ms followed by a mask. In Experiment 1, objects were identified more accurately in a consistent than an inconsistent setting. In Experiment 2, backgrounds were identified more accurately when they contained a consistent rather than an inconsistent foreground object. In Experiment 3, objects were presented without backgrounds and backgrounds without objects; comparison with the other experiments indicated that objects were identified better in isolation than when presented with a background, but there was no difference in accuracy for backgrounds whether they appeared with a foreground object or not. Finally, in Experiment 4, consistency effects remained when both objects and backgrounds were reported. Semantic consistency information is available when a scene is glimpsed briefly and affects both object and background perception. Objects and their settings are processed interactively and not in isolation.     

Object perception and object naming in early development

Among our most fundamental capacities are those that allow us to perceive, categorize and name objects. Recently, controversy has surrounded the question of how young children learn names for objects, in particular, the relative roles of perception and higher-level world knowledge. It is well known that adults depend strongly on conceptual knowledge in a variety of categorization tasks, including object naming. We argue, however, that perception may play a special role in early object naming and, in particular, that certain kinds of world knowledge known to guide adult naming may come to guide naming only rather late in development. Building early mechanisms of naming on a perceptual foundation that may be encapsulated, and thus shut off from more reflective processes, may explain in part why young children can easily and rapidly learn names for things from the adults around them, despite the fact that adults and children may possess very different conceptual organizations.     

Implicit semantic perception in object substitution masking

Decades of research on visual perception has uncovered many phenomena, such as binocular rivalry, backward masking, and the attentional blink, that reflect ‘failures of consciousness’. Although stimuli do not reach awareness in these paradigms, there is evidence that they nevertheless undergo semantic processing. Object substitution masking (OSM), however, appears to be the exception to this rule. In OSM, a temporally-trailing four-dot mask interferes with target perception, even though it has different contours from and does not spatially overlap with the target. Previous research suggests that OSM has an early locus, blocking the extraction of semantic information. Here, we refute this claim, showing implicit semantic perception in OSM using a target-mask priming paradigm. We conclude that semantic information suppressed via OSM can nevertheless guide behavior.     

Motion and edge sensitivity in perception of object unity

Although much evidence indicates that young infants perceive unitary objects by analyzing patterns of motion, infants' abilities to perceive object unity by analyzing Gestalt properties and by integrating distinct views of an object over time are in dispute. To address these controversies, four experiments investigated adults' and infants' perception of the unity of a center-occluded, moving rod with misaligned visible edges. Both alignment information and depth information affected adults' and infants' perception of object unity in similar ways, and infants perceived object unity by integrating information about object features over time. However, infants perceived a moving, misaligned, three-dimensional object as indeterminate in its connectedness, whereas adults perceived it as connected behind the occluder. These findings indicate that the effectiveness of common motion in specifying unified surfaces across an occluder is reduced by misalignment of edges. Alignment information enhances perception of object unity either by serving directly as information for unity or by optimizing the detectability of motion-carried information for unity. In addition, young infants are able to retain information about edge orientation over short intervals in determining connectedness via a process of spatiotemporal integration.     

Dynamic object perception by pigeons.

Three experiments examined pigeon discrimination of computer-generated three-dimensional (3-D) projections of cube and pyramid objects. Four pigeons were tested using a go/no-go procedure involving static and dynamically rotating presentations of these stimuli. Transfer tests with different types of rotational and featural transformations suggested the pigeons may have used a 3-D representation of the objects as their primary means of performing the discrimination. The comparative implications for object and motion perception in animals are considered.     

Perirhinal cortical contributions to object perception

The traditional theory of the medial temporal lobe (MTL) memory system asserts that the primate MTL (hippocampus, perirhinal, entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices) is exclusively involved in consolidating declarative memories. However, several recent reports have directly challenged this dogma by arguing that MTL structures also contribute to perception. Controversy remains as many of the behavioural tasks used have confounded memory with perception. We review the evidence here and highlight new studies in humans and macaques that indicate a perceptual role for MTL in the absence of such confounds. We argue that the challenge to MTL memory system theory is substantiated and that the implications are considerable, namely that most psychologists and neuroscientists have held a fundamentally flawed view of how memory is implemented in the brain.     

Feature confirmation in object perception: Feature integration theory 26 years on from the Treisman Bartlett lecture

The Treisman Bartlett lecture, reported in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology in 1988, provided a major overview of the feature integration theory of attention. This has continued to be a dominant account of human visual attention to this day. The current paper provides a summary of the work reported in the lecture and an update on critical aspects of the theory as applied to visual object perception. The paper highlights the emergence of findings that pose significant challenges to the theory and which suggest that revisions are required that allow for (a) several rather than a single form of feature integration, (b) some forms of feature integration to operate preattentively, (c) stored knowledge about single objects and interactions between objects to modulate perceptual integration, (d) the application of feature-based inhibition to object files where visual features are specified, which generates feature-based spreading suppression and scene segmentation, and (e) a role for attention in feature confirmation rather than feature integration in visual selection. A feature confirmation account of attention in object perception is outlined.     

The relationship between object files and conscious perception

Object files (OFs) are hypothesized mid-level representations which mediate our conscious perception of persisting objects-e.g. telling us 'which went where'. Despite the appeal of the OF framework, not previous research has directly explored whether OFs do indeed correspond to conscious percepts. Here we present at least one case wherein conscious percepts of 'which went where' in dynamic ambiguous displays diverge from the analogous correspondence computed by the OF system. Observers viewed a 'bouncing/streaming' display in which two identical objects moved such that they could have either bounced off or streamed past each other. We measured two dependent variables: (1) an explicit report of perceived bouncing or streaming; and (2) an implicit 'object-specific preview benefit' (OSPB), wherein a 'preview' of information on a specific object speeds the recognition of that information at a later point when it appears again on the same object (compared to when it reappears on a different object), beyond display-wide priming. When the displays were manipulated such that observers had a strong bias to perceive streaming (on over 95% of the trials), there was nevertheless a strong OSPB in the opposite direction-such that the object files appeared to have 'bounced' even though the percept 'streamed'. Given that OSPBs have been taken as a hallmark of the operation of object files, the five experiments reported here suggest that in at least some specialized (and perhaps ecologically invalid) cases, conscious percepts of 'which went where' in dynamic ambiguous displays can diverge from the mapping computed by the object-file system.     

Emergent features, attention, and object perception

The perceptual processing of arrows and triangles and of their component angles and lines was explored in a number of different tasks. The results suggest that some analysis of shapes into simpler parts occurs preattentively, because these parts can recombine to form illusory conjunctions when attention is divided. The presence of "emergent features," such as closure or arrow junctions, was inferred from predicted correlations in the pattern of performance across tasks and across individual subjects. Thus triangles (for most subjects) and arrows (for some subjects) behave as if they had a perceptual feature that is absent from their parts and that mediates parallel detection in search and easy texture segregation. For some subjects, circles could apparently supply the additional feature (presumably closure) required to form illusory triangles from their component lines, whereas for other subjects circles had no effect. The fact that triangle lines can form illusory conjunctions with another shape makes it unlikely that triangles are perceived holistically and strengthens the interpretation that relies on emergent features.