共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Dan Mcarthur 《Synthese》2006,151(2):233-255
In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the
laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that
fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply
in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental
physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing
a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account
of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable.
I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such
as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the
EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether
abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses. 相似文献
2.
Arndt Büssing Julia Fischer Thomas Ostermann Peter F. Matthiessen 《Applied research in quality of life》2009,4(1):77-90
Within the context of coping, we analyze whether Reliance on God’s Help, as a measure of intrinsic religiosity, is associated specifically with SF-12’s health-related quality of life. Data of 5,248
individuals (63.1 ± 10.6 years; 14% chronic diseases, 16% cancer, 8% had experienced acute diseases, and 62% healthy elderly
as a control group) were enrolled. Although about half of the individuals had a strong belief that God will help and prayed
to become healthy again, Reliance on God’s Help was not generally associated with better physical or mental health-related quality of life. Just in distinct subgroups we
found some marginal associations. Regression analyses confirmed that physical or mental health were not among the predictors
of Reliance on God’s Help. Nevertheless, intrinsic religiosity was utilized by several individuals, particularly by patients with higher age and cancer.
It should be regarded as a resource to cope (meaning-focused coping) rather than an independent contributor to health-related
quality of life. 相似文献
3.
Jaysankar L. Shaw 《Sophia》2011,50(3):481-497
This paper explains some of the uses of the word ‘freedom’ in Western as well as in Indian philosophy. Regarding the psychological
concept of freedom or free will, this paper focuses on the distinction between fatalism, determinism, types of compatibilism,
and libertarianism. Indian philosophers, by and large, are compatibilists, although some minor systems, such as Śākta Āgama,
favor a type of libertarianism. From the Indian perspective the form of life of human beings has also been mentioned in the
discussion of free will. Regarding metaphysical freedom, I discuss the views of the Bhagavad Gītā and Swami Vivekananda in
Sect. III. K.C. Bhattacharyya, a neo-Advaita Vedāntin, has discussed degrees of freedom of the subject at several levels.
According to him, spiritual progress lies in the progressive realization of the freedom of the subject. I compare his view
with the classical Advaita concept of freedom. I have also addressed the question of whether freedom from suffering can be
realized at social and global levels. In this context I have mentioned some of the interpretations of the great saying ‘I
am Brahman,’ and how freedom can be realized at the global level by using the Advaita concept of ‘oneness.’ 相似文献
4.
Mary Healy 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(3):229-240
This paper seeks to examine the plausibility of the concept of ‘Civic Friendship’ as a philosophical model for a conceptualisation
of ‘belonging’. Such a concept, would hold enormous interest for educators in enabling the identification of particular virtues,
attitudes and values that would need to be taught and nurtured to enable the civic relationship to be passed on from generation
to generation. I consider both of the standard arguments for civic friendship: that it can be understood within the Aristotelian
typology as either a form of utility friendship or as a form of virtue friendship. I argue that civic friendship may not be
the most appropriate model and that attempts to resolve the problems through looking on it as a political metaphor leave it
unable to fulfil the function for which it was originally designed in Ancient Greece. Finally, I emphasize the need to carefully
consider which particular metaphors we choose for civic relationships and how we subsequently use them. 相似文献
5.
John Bishop 《Sophia》2009,48(4):419-433
Theistic religious believers should be concerned that the God they worship is not an idol. Conceptions of God thus need to
be judged according to criteria of religious adequacy that are implicit in the ‘God-role’—that is, the way the concept of
God properly functions in the conceptual economy and form of life of theistic believers. I argue that the conception of God
as ‘omniGod’—an immaterial personal creator with the omni-properties—may reasonably be judged inadequate, at any rate from
the perspective of a relationship ethics based on the Christian revelation that God is Love. I go on to suggest that a conception
of God as the power of love within the natural universe might prove more adequate, with God’s role as creator understood in
terms of final rather than efficient causation. 相似文献
6.
Elaine Landry 《Synthese》2007,158(1):1-17
Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models,
formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure
of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s
appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be
so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single
unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types
of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent
semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using
the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this
concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French,
2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s
(1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for
both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate
kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models.
I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos,
Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial
suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful 相似文献
7.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
8.
9.
Philip Ball 《Nanoethics》2010,4(2):129-132
“Van den Belt recently examined the notion that synthetic biology and the creation of ‘artificial’ organisms are examples
of scientists ‘playing God’. Here I respond to some of the issues he raises, including some of his comments on my previous
discussions of the value of the term ‘life’ as a scientific concept.” 相似文献
10.
Keith Breen 《Res Publica》2007,13(4):381-414
This article argues that productive work represents a mode of human flourishing unfortunately neglected in much current political
theorizing. Focusing on Habermasian critical theory, I contend that Habermas’s dualist theory of society, with its underpinning
distinction between communicative and instrumental reason, excludes work and the economy from ethical reflection. To avoid
this uncritical turn, we need a concept of work that retains a core emancipatory referent. This, I claim, is provided by Alasdair
MacIntyre’s notion of ‹practice’. The notion of ‹practice’ is␣significant in suggesting an alternative conception of human
productivity that is neither purely instrumental nor purely communicative, but rather both simultaneously: a form of activity
which issues in material products and yet presumes a community of workers engaged in intersubjective self-transformation.
However, we can endorse MacIntyre’s notion of ‹practice’ only if we reject his totalizing anti-modernism and insist on the
emancipatory potentialities of modern institutions. 相似文献
11.
12.
Eberhard Herrmann 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):63-73
The starting-point is the distinction between concept and conception. Our conceptions of gold, for instance, are the different
understandings we get when we hear the word ‘gold’ whereas the concept of gold consists in the scientific determination of
what gold is. It depends on the context whether it is more reasonable to claim a concept or to look for fitting conceptions.
By arguing against metaphysical realism and for non-metaphysical realism, I will elaborate on some philosophical reasons for
dealing with conceptions instead of concepts of God, and secondly, I will discuss how such conceptions should be critically
assessed.
This article is an amended and enlarged version of a paper delivered at the conference on The Concept of God, arranged by
the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion in Oxford, Great Britain, September 11–13, 2007. 相似文献
13.
Richard Menary 《Topoi》2009,28(1):31-43
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore,
be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all
mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that
makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality,
I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics
is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence
that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to
develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational
principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction.
Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and
representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in
action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
相似文献
Richard MenaryEmail: |
14.
Brendan O’Sullivan 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):531-544
In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments
that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property
dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist
is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property
dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin
mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance
and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to
save.
相似文献
Brendan O’SullivanEmail: |
15.
Ausonio Marras 《Synthese》2006,151(3):561-569
In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists. 相似文献
16.
Michael E. Levin 《Synthese》2007,155(1):35-64
It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke’s famous version of Wittgenstein’s meaning skepticism is precisely the one
that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental
states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein’s notorious idea that all proofs “create concepts.”
Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date[.] – Saul Kripke相似文献
17.
Nikk Effingham 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(2):225-240
This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal
part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from
Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this,
we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics,
we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set. 相似文献
18.
E. J. Lowe 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(1):5-23
Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their
own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of
disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms
of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is
proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous
system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological
character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological
level. 相似文献
19.
Lisa M. Hooper Mark Richardson Linda L. Knol Nyshetia White-Chapman Lixin Qu Natalie J. Hannah 《Contemporary Family Therapy》2010,32(3):320-334
In this pilot study, we examined the relationship between health factors, sociodemographic factors, and body mass index (BMI)
across two generations (n = 41 parent-child pairs). Generation 1 study variables included parent- and family-focused characteristics and health variables,
the Generation 2 variables included child demographic factors, and the outcome variable was youths’ physical health (operationalized
as BMI). Regression models revealed that Generation 1 variables, taken together, accounted for 26% of the variance in youth
BMI. However, only the parent’s mental health symptoms (i.e., depression symptoms) made a unique contribution to the variance
in youth BMI. Logistic regression analysis revealed that the youths’ race and age—but no other demographic factor—were significantly
related to youth BMI-for-age. Our findings suggest that youth race, age, and parent mental health are each associated with
youth physical health (i.e., BMI), confirming previous study findings that parental factors and demographic factors should
be considered when exploring youth health outcomes. 相似文献
20.
Justin T. Tiehen 《Synthese》2011,182(3):375-391
In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible
to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can
be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their
physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation
which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This,
I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts. 相似文献