Categorical perception of tonal intervais: Musicians can’t tellsharp fromflat

Six musicians with relative pitch judged 13 tonal intervals in a magnitude estimation task. Stimuli were spaced in .2-semitone increments over a range of three standard musical categories (fourth, tritone, fifth,). The judged magnitude of the intervals did not increase regularly with stimulus magnitude. Rather, the psychophysical functions showed three discrete steps cor-responding to the musically defined intervals. Although all six subjects had identified in-tune intervals with >95% accuracy, all were very poor at differentiating within a musical category— they could not reliably tell “sharp” from “flat.” After the experiment, they judged 63% of the stimuli to be “in tune,” but in fact only 23% were musically accurate. In a subsequent labeling task, subjects produced identification functions with sharply defined boundaries between each of the three musical categories. Our results parallel those associated with the identification and scaling of speech sounds, and we interpret them as evidence for categorical perception of music.     

What is in a view? The role of featural information in the recognition of unfamiliar faces across viewpoint transformation

In recognising a face the visual system shows a remarkable ability in overcoming changes in viewpoint. However, the mechanisms involved in solving this complex computational problem, particularly in terms of information processing, have not been clearly defined. Considerable evidence indicates that face recognition involves both featural and configural processing. In this study we examined the contribution of featural information across viewpoint change. Participants were familiarised with unknown faces and were later tested for recognition in complete or part-face format, across changes in view. A striking effect of viewpoint resulting in a reduction in profile recognition compared with the three-quarter and frontal views was found. However, a complete-face over part-face advantage independent of transformation was demonstrated across all views. A hierarchy of feature salience was also demonstrated. Findings are discussed in terms of the problem of object constancy as it applies to faces.     

What’s in God’s name: literary forerunners and philosophical allies of the imjaslavie debate

The aim of this paper is to explore the interaction between a tradition that belongs originally to the realm of orthodox contemplative monasticism (i.e., hesychasm) and nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian intellectuals. In the first part, this paper will explore how hesychasm gradually penetrated nineteenth-century secular culture; a special focus will be on the hermitage of Optina Pustyn?? and its renowned elders, as well as their appeal to members of the Optina-intelligentsia, especially F?dor Dostoevskij. Then, attention will shift to the imjaslavie controversy at the beginning of the twentieth century, which flared up initially as a dispute between Athonite monks and reached a sad culmination in 1912?C1913 with a manu militari intervention by troops of the Russian Holy Synod. However, the debate was taken up by some prominent intellectuals of the Russian religious renaissance, such as Pavel Florenskij, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and Sergej Bulgakov, who explicitly sided with the imjaslavcy (??Glorifiers of the Name??) and actively stepped into the debate.     

What is Enshrined in Morality? Understanding the Grounds for Nietzsche’s Critique

Abstract

It is a truism that Nietzsche is a critic of morality. But what does Nietzsche have against this institution of morality? I consider the prominent interpretation of Brian Leiter’s that Nietzsche takes morality to task for its bad effects in hampering the flourishing of great individuals and cultures. There are good reasons, I argue, to resist this reading as the best, and certainly as the exclusive, account of the grounds for Nietzsche’s criticism of morality. I go on to propose an alternative construal that sees Nietzsche as objecting to the expressive character of moral values themselves (an under-explored notion in anglophone ethics and social philosophy that I seek to elucidate in the paper). My project, in the first instance, is the exegetical one of understanding what is going on in Nietzsche’s texts when he criticizes morality. Nonetheless, there are important philosophical lessons to be learned here from Nietzsche’s work, if not necessarily about the actual failings of morality itself, then about the kinds of ethical and ideological objections that philosophers and cultural critics can sensibly raise. One of the central styles of critique that we see in Nietzsche’s work, exemplified especially in his criticism of morality, involves interpreting social and cultural phenomena, as one might interpret texts or works of art, with an eye toward extracting the meaning or significance they have in light of the ideals they enshrine, and then attacking them, on broadly ethical grounds, on account of this. It thereby creates the space for criticizing institutions not just for what pernicious effects they have, but for the intrinsically objectionable character of what they express.     

Holistic processing in mother’s face perception for infants

In this study, we created composite faces using mothers’ faces to examine holistic face processing in infants aged 5–8 months. The composite-face effect occurred only in infants aged 7–8 months, suggesting that infants older than 7 months are able to process familiar faces holistically.     

What’s in a name, what’s in a place? The role of verbal labels in distinct cognitive tasks

The effects of congruent and incongruent labelling on two simple cognitive tasks, sequence learning and place learning, were investigated. The results of both studies indicate the greater cognitive importance of information derived from the object compared to information derived from the verbal label.     

What’s up in mental rotation?

We report two experiments on the influence of head tilt on mental rotation. In Experiment I, subjects decided whether dot patterns were or were not repeated about a line. Their reaction times (RTs) were consistent with the interpretation that they mentally rotated the patterns so that the line was subjectively vertical before making their decisions. When the subjects tilted their heads, the RT functions shifted in the direction of the tilt, indicating that the subjective vertical lay closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical. In Experiment II, subjects decided whether singly presented alphanumeric characters in various orientations were standard or backward (mirror-reversed). Again, analysis of their RTs suggested mental rotation to the standard upright, but the function was unaffected by head tilt; in this case, the subjects operated in subjective gravitational rather than retinal coordinates. The choice of retinal or gravitational coordinates may depend on whether the stimuli are interpreted egocentrically or as part of the external world.     

Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: What’s the Question?

Alvin Plantingas Warranted Christian Belief is without questionone of the central texts of the Reformed epistemology movement. Critiques of Plantingas defence have been both multiple and varied. As varied as these responses are, however, it is my contention that many of them amount to the same thing. It is the purpose of this paper to offer an overview of the main lines of attack that have been directed as Plantingas project, and thereafter to show how many, if not most, of these objections can be understood as versions or aspects of the same criticism, what I call the Inadequacy Thesis.     

What can law do for the development of bio-economy?

Bio-technology has become a new impeller to the development of the world economy since the 1970's. The development of bio-economy has two sides for mankind which calls for intervention by law. During the legislation of bioeconomy, some special principles should be esteemed and observed by legislators. It is necessary for the healthy development of bio-economy.     

What are the prospects for a higher-order stimulus theory of perception?

Abstract.— Gibson has advocated a pure higher-order stimulus theory of perception. Johansson has agreed that the stimuli for perception are higher order variables of stimulation. However, unlike Gibson, Johansson assigns an important role to decoding principles in determining perception. Evidence is reviewed to show that percept-percept relations are involved in perception. On this ground it was argued that the prospects for a successful pure-stimulus theory are poor and that Johansson's views should be elaborated to include various types of decoding principles.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

What’s the matter with Huck Finn?

This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What explains why akratic agents are always either theoretically or practically irrational? I suggest that this is true because an agent’s total evidence determines both the beliefs and the intentions it is rational for her to have. Moreover, an agent’s evidence does so in a way such that it is never rational for the agent to at once believe that she ought to Φ and lack the intention to Φ.     

What’s in a Purse? Maybe a Woman’s Reputation

Does a woman’s reputation suffer when others discover condoms in her possession? Fifty-two male and female predominantly white undergraduates from a small, private, Catholic university in the northeast USA examined the contents of a purse to formulate an impression of its owner. Unflattering inferences were drawn about the character of the target when her purse contained condoms. A follow-up study with 55 comparable participants confirmed that these inferences were indeed uncomplimentary. The results are discussed in terms of the multi-dimensional price women pay when assuming responsibility for their sexual health.     

What is nonconceptualism in Kant’s philosophy?

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content.     

The influence of verbal labeling on the perception of odors: evidence for olfactory illusions?

Using the definition that an illusion is observed when a stimulus is invariant but context alters its perception, we examined whether verbal context could produce olfactory illusions. To test this effect, we chose five odors with minimally fixed sources and that could be interpreted with various hedonic connotations. The odors were violet leaf, patchouli, pine oil, menthol, and a 1:1 mixture of isovaleric and butyric acids. Subjects individually sniffed each odor at two different sessions separated by one week. At each session an odor was given a different verbal label (either positive or negative) and subjects rated the odors on several hedonic scales and provided perceptual and interpretative responses to them. Results showed that the perception of an odor could be significantly influenced by the label provided for it. We propose that the cases where verbal labels inverted odor perception are the first empirical demonstrations of olfactory illusions.     

What is Original in Merleau-Ponty’s View of the Phenomenological Reduction?

Despite the recent increase of interest in the work of Merleau-Ponty there is still a persistent tendency to overlook the uniqueness of the philosophical position he advances in Phenomenology of Perception. In this article I present a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomenological reduction that explains how it is original. I do this by contrasting his presentation of the reduction with that of the early Husserl, highlighting how his emphasis on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’ leads him to reject Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as a ‘philosophical science,’ and the Kantian language in which the this account is framed. I go on to critically discuss the interpretations of the reduction advanced by Stephen Priest and Joel Smith as examples of readings that fail to fully grasp Merleau-Ponty’s account of the ‘natural attitude’ as resting on the inherent objectivizing structure that is built into perception itself. The way that these authors misinterpret Merleau-Ponty helps to make maximally clear the profound philosophical significance that he places on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’.