Cognitive extension,enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking

This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that conscious thoughts are related to one another. I argue that these considerations are necessary for understanding why forms of cognitive extension may diminish our cognitive lives in different ways. This does not lead to a categorical rejection of cognitive enhancement as unethical or bad for human flourishing, but does warrant a conservative approach to the design and implementation of cognitive artifacts.     

Task inhibition,conflict, and the n-2 repetition cost: A combined computational and empirical approach

Task inhibition (also known as backward inhibition) is an hypothesised form of cognitive inhibition evident in multi-task situations, with the role of facilitating switching between multiple, competing tasks. This article presents a novel cognitive computational model of a backward inhibition mechanism. By combining aspects of previous cognitive models in task switching and conflict monitoring, the model instantiates the theoretical proposal that backward inhibition is the direct result of conflict between multiple task representations. In a first simulation, we demonstrate that the model produces two effects widely observed in the empirical literature, specifically, reaction time costs for both (n-1) task switches and n-2 task repeats. Through a systematic search of parameter space, we demonstrate that these effects are a general property of the model’s theoretical content, and not specific parameter settings. We further demonstrate that the model captures previously reported empirical effects of inter-trial interval on n-2 switch costs. A final simulation extends the paradigm of switching between tasks of asymmetric difficulty to three tasks, and generates novel predictions for n-2 repetition costs. Specifically, the model predicts that n-2 repetition costs associated with hard-easy-hard alternations are greater than for easy-hard-easy alternations. Finally, we report two behavioural experiments testing this hypothesis, with results consistent with the model predictions.     

Cognitive extension: the parity argument,functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive

During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues and their interconnections. Section 1 provides a brief introduction. Section 2 argues that some of the most prominent objections against the appeal to parity considerations fail. Section 3 shows that such considerations are nevertheless unsuitable as an argument for cognitive extension. First, the actual argumentative burden is carried by an underlying commitment to functionalism, not by the parity considerations themselves. Second, in the absence of an independently motivated mark of the cognitive, the argument based on parity considerations does not get off the ground, but given such a mark, it is superfluous. Section 4 argues that a similar dilemma arises for the attempt to defend cognitive extension by a general appeal to functionalism. Unless it can be independently settled what it is for a process to be cognitive, functionalism itself will be undermined by the possibility of cognitive extension. Like parity considerations, functionalism is thus either unable to support cognitive extension or superfluous. Hence, nothing short of the specification of an appropriate mark of the cognitive that can be fulfilled not only by intracranial but also by extended processes will do as an argument for cognitive extension.     

Salience of initial attitude,magnitude of incentive,and attitude change in a forced compliance paradigm

To examine the application of interpersonal simulation findings to cognitive dissonance and incentive theories of attitude change in the forced compliance paradigm, 60 Ss were paid 50 cents or $2.50 to write counterattitudinal essays with salient or nonsalient initial attitudes. Findings showed that the larger incentive yielded greater change for salient pretest attitudes but that the smaller incentive led to more change of nonsalient pretest attitudes. Measures of error in attitude recall and a correlational analysis between pretest, posttest, and recalled attitudes were also consistent with Bem's (1967) hypothesis of isomorphism between the attributions of Ss and observers. It is proposed that remaining simulation data reported in the cognitive dissonance/self-perception controversy may identify additional parameters of attitude changes in forced compliance experiments.     

Tobacco use, alcohol dependence, and cognitive performance

Chronic alcohol abuse has long been associated with a mild, generalized pattern of cognitive decrements. However, it is important to note that problem drinking rarely occurs in isolation from abuse of other drugs. For people dependent upon alcohol, tobacco is one of the mostly commonly coabused substances. Recent research suggests that individuals with alcohol dependency may gravitate toward tobacco use, in part, because of the positive effects of nicotine on aspects of cognitive performance that may be compromised as a consequence of chronic alcohol misuse. In this article, the author focuses on the effects of nicotine on behavioral and electrophysiological indexes of cognitive performance, and the impact of these effects on alcohol-related cognitive decrements. The author discusses implications of these findings in the context of treatment and recovery of people with alcoholism.     

Active learning: effects of core training design elements on self-regulatory processes, learning, and adaptability

This article describes a comprehensive examination of the cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes underlying active learning approaches; their effects on learning and transfer; and the core training design elements (exploration, training frame, emotion control) and individual differences (cognitive ability, trait goal orientation, trait anxiety) that shape these processes. Participants (N = 350) were trained to operate a complex, computer-based simulation. Exploratory learning and error-encouragement framing had a positive effect on adaptive transfer performance and interacted with cognitive ability and dispositional goal orientation to influence trainees' metacognition and state goal orientation. Trainees who received the emotion-control strategy had lower levels of state anxiety. Implications for development of an integrated theory of active learning, learner-centered design, and research extensions are discussed.     

Computation, reduction, and teleology of consciousness

This paper aims to explore mechanistic and teleological explanations of consciousness. In terms of mechanistic explanations, it critiques various existing views, especially those embodied by existing computational cognitive models. In this regard, the paper argues in favor of the explanation based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation (as formulated in the connectionist literature), which reduces the phenomenological difference to a mechanistic difference. Furthermore, to establish a teleological explanation of consciousness, the paper discusses the issue of the functional role of consciousness on the basis of the aforementioned mechanistic explanation. A proposal based on synergistic interaction between the conscious and the unconscious is advanced that encompasses various existing views concerning the functional role of consciousness. This two-step deepening explanation has some empirical support, in the form of a cognitive model and various cognitive data that it captures.     

ADAPTABILITY TO CHANGING TASK CONTEXTS: EFFECTS OF GENERAL COGNITIVE ABILITY, CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, AND OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE

We examined the extent to which cognitive ability, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience predict decision-making performance prior to and after unforeseen changes in the task context. Seventy-three undergraduates made decisions on a series of 75 problems during a 3-hour computerized simulation. Unbeknownst to participants, the rules used in determining correct decisions changed after problems 25 and 50. Effects of the individual differences on decision-making performance became significantly stronger after the changes. Only cognitive ability explained variance in prechange performance. Individuals with higher cognitive ability made better decisions. After the change, the cognitive ability effect increased and the effects of Conscientiousness and Openness became statistically significant. As expected, those with high Openness made better decisions. Unexpectedly, those with low Conscientiousness made better decisions. Subsequent analyses revealed that this surprising effect for Conscientiousness was due to the traits reflecting dependability (i.e., order, dutiful-ness, deliberation) rather than volition (i.e., competence, achievement striving, self-discipline).     

Gesturing during mental problem solving reduces eye movements,especially for individuals with lower visual working memory capacity

Non-communicative hand gestures have been found to benefit problem-solving performance. These gestures seem to compensate for limited internal cognitive capacities, such as visual working memory capacity. Yet, it is not clear how gestures might perform this cognitive function. One hypothesis is that gesturing is a means to spatially index mental simulations, thereby reducing the need for visually projecting the mental simulation onto the visual presentation of the task. If that hypothesis is correct, less eye movements should be made when participants gesture during problem solving than when they do not gesture. We therefore used mobile eye tracking to investigate the effect of co-thought gesturing and visual working memory capacity on eye movements during mental solving of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Results revealed that gesturing indeed reduced the number of eye movements (lower saccade counts), especially for participants with a relatively lower visual working memory capacity. Subsequent problem-solving performance was not affected by having (not) gestured during the mental solving phase. The current findings suggest that our understanding of gestures in problem solving could be improved by taking into account eye movements during gesturing.     

Shared cognitive processes underlying past and future thinking: the impact of imagery and concurrent task demands on event specificity

Recent literature has argued that whereas remembering the past and imagining the future make use of shared cognitive substrates, simulating future events places heavier demands on executive resources. These propositions were explored in 3 experiments comparing the impact of imagery and concurrent task demands on speed and accuracy of past event retrieval and future event simulation. Results provide support for the suggestion that both past and future episodes can be constructed through 2 mechanisms: a noneffortful "direct" pathway and a controlled, effortful "generative" pathway. However, limited evidence emerged for the suggestion that simulating of future, compared with retrieving past, episodes places heavier demands on executive resources; only under certain conditions did it emerge as a more error prone and lengthier process. The findings are discussed in terms of how retrieval and simulation make use of the same cognitive substrates in subtly different ways.     

Initiating the formalization of theories of cognitive aging

Although the relevant knowledge base is still impoverished, the time may be appropriate to attempt to develop and investigate formal models of cognitive aging that incorporate explicit mechanisms to account for age differences frequently observed in measures of cognitive functioning. An initial model based on an associative network metaphor is described, in which age declines in fluid or process aspects of cognition are attributed to a reduction in either the number of simultaneously active nodes, the maximum allowable activation, or the rate of propagating activation between nodes. Results from a computer simulation are consistent at a first level of approximation with many cognitive aging phenomena, and the model is shown to provide a plausible account of age differences in an area that has previously resisted explanation. Although this particular model is only one of many that could be formulated at the present time, it is argued that more rapid progress in theoretical understanding of cognitive aging phenomena will be achieved by attempting to specify one's assumptions and hypotheses in a formal and explicit manner.     

Repressive Coping,Emotional Adjustment,and Cognition in People Who Have Lost Loved Ones to Suicide

Research indicates that a repressive coping style is psychologically protective against the stress of trauma, yet it is unclear whether this finding generalizes to suicide bereavement. Thus, we assessed cognitive ability and mental health among individuals who lost a loved one to suicide. The results indicate that repressive coping may be associated with greater emotional health during suicide bereavement. Interestingly, “repressors” also had lower scores on both cognitive tasks compared to “nonrepressors,” but it is unclear whether their more recent loss accounts for this difference. These results are based on cross‐sectional data, and should be interpreted with caution.     

The neural substrate for dreaming: is it a subsystem of the default network?

Building on the content, developmental, and neurological evidence that there are numerous parallels between waking cognition and dreaming, this article argues that the likely neural substrate that supports dreaming, which was discovered through converging lesion and neuroimaging studies, may be a subsystem of the waking default network, which is active during mind wandering, daydreaming, and simulation. Support for this hypothesis would strengthen the case for a more general neurocognitive theory of dreaming that starts with established findings and concepts derived from studies of waking cognition and neurocognition. If this theory is correct, then dreaming may be the quintessential cognitive simulation because it is often highly complex, often includes a vivid sensory environment, unfolds over a duration of a few minutes to a half hour, and is usually experienced as real while it is happening.     

Rhythms of the body,rhythms of the brain: Respiration,neural oscillations,and embodied cognition

In spite of its importance as a life-defining rhythmic movement and its constant rhythmic contraction and relaxation of the body, respiration has not received attention in Embodied Cognition (EC) literature. Our paper aims to show that (1) respiration exerts significant and unexpected influence on cognitive processes, and (2) it does so by modulating neural synchronization that underlies specific cognitive processes. Then, (3) we suggest that the particular example of respiration may function as a model for a general mechanism through which the body influences cognitive functioning. Finally, (4) we work out the implications for EC, draw a parallel to the role of gesture, and argue that respiration sometimes plays a double, pragmatic and epistemic, role, which reduces the cognitive load. In such cases, consistent with EC, the overall cognitive activity includes a loop-like interaction between neural and non-neural elements.     

Cognitive Tests,Constructs, and Content Validity: A commentary on Schmidt ()

This commentary discusses a number of issues that build on Schmidt's (International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 20, 1‐13 (2012)) perspective on content validity and cognitive tests. First, it elaborates on the relationship between the treatment of content validity in various professional standards and government guidelines. Second, it offers a differing perspective on the definition of ‘construct’ than that taken by Schmidt. Third, it elaborates on the settings in which content validity can and cannot be used to support the use of a given test in the cognitive ability domain.     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE AND THEISTIC EVOLUTION: INTERSUBJECTIVITY,LOVE, AND THE SOCIAL SPHERE

After providing a brief overview of social neuroscience in the context of strong embodiment and the cognitive sciences, this paper addresses how perspectives from the field may inform how theological anthropology approaches the origins of human persons‐in‐community. An overview of the Social Brain Hypothesis and of simulation theory reveals a simultaneous potential for receptive/projective processes to facilitate social engagement and the need for intentional spontaneity in the form of a spiritual formation that moves beyond simulation to empathy and love. Finally, elements of a virtue science that draws on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's relational imago Dei are shown to be helpful in framing and motivating theological approaches to human origins.     

Context, not conflict, drives cognitive control

Theories of cognitive control generally assume that perceived conflict acts as a signal to engage inhibitory mechanisms that suppress subsequent conflicting information. Crucially, an absence of conflict is not regarded as being a relevant signal for cognitive control. Using a cueing, a priming, and a Simon task, we provide evidence that conflict does not have this unique signal status: Encountering a conflict does not lead to behavioral adjustments on subsequent conflict trials, whereas encountering a nonconflict trial does lead to behavioral adjustments on subsequent nonconflict trials. We propose that this apparent role-reversal can be explained by a mechanism that responds to both the presence and the absence of conflict, down-regulating the visuomotor system following conflict, and up-regulating it following nonconflict.     

Cognitive failures,dysfunctional attitudes,and symptomatology: A longitudinal study

Abstract

A longitudinal study is presented in which a group of mature students were assessed at four months apart for their symptom levels, the occurrence of life events, and two putative cognitive vulnerability measures of dysfunctional attitudes, and of a proneness to cognitive failures. The results showed that although both the Time 1 cognitive measures were significantly correlated with symptom levels four months later, only the effect for cognitive failures remained significant when the initial symptom levels were taken into consideration. Speculations are presented about the possible nature of this vulnerability, and it is concluded that future studies of cognitive vulnerability should not limit themselves to self-reported negative thoughts or attitudes.