The Moral Judgments of Chinese Students

Abstract

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was translated into Chinese and administered to 84 male and 84 female Chinese subjects in Hong Kong. No significant sex differences in all of the stage scores derived from DIT ratings and rankings were found. In addition, the Pearson correlation matrix of Stage 2 through 6 scores for the females but not for the males approximated a simplex-like pattern. The unrotated factor loadings of the Principal Components Analysis for the female subjects provided clear support to the claim of an ordered sequence of Kohlberg's stages measured by the DIT. The factor loadings on the higher stages (4, 5, and 6), however, were less discriminating and consistent in the male factor pattern.     

Moral Motivation Based on Multiple Developmental Structures: An Exploration of Cognitive and Emotional Dynamics

Intrapersonal variability and multiplicity in the complexity of moral motivation were examined from Dynamic Systems and Self-Determination Theory perspectives. L. Kohlberg's (1969) stages of moral development are reconceptualized as soft-assembled and dynamically transformable process structures of motivation that may operate simultaneously within person in different degrees. Moral motivation is conceptualized as the real-time process of self-organization of cognitive and emotional dynamics out of which moral judgment and action emerge. A detailed inquiry into intrapersonal variation in moral motivation is carried out based on the differential operation of multiple motivational structures. A total of 74 high school students and 97 college students participated in the study by completing a new questionnaire, involving 3 different hypothetical moral judgments. As hypothesized, findings revealed significant multiplicity in the within-person operation of developmental stage structures, and intrapersonal variability in the degrees to which stages were used. Developmental patterns were found in terms of different distributions of multiple stages between high school and college samples, as well as the association between age and overall motivation scores. Differential relations of specific emotions to moral motivation revealed and confirmed the value of differentiating multiple emotions. Implications of the present theoretical perspective and the findings for understanding the complexity of moral judgment and motivation are discussed.     

A cross-cultural validation of stage development: A Rasch re-analysis of longitudinal socio-moral reasoning data

Kohlberg's characterization of moral development as displaying an invariant hierarchical order of structurally consistent stages is losing ground. However, by applying Rasch analysis, Dawson recently gave new interpretation and support to his characterization of stage development. Using Rasch models, we replicated and strengthened her findings in a re-analysis of three sets of longitudinal socio-moral reasoning data collected in Iceland. A new application of Rasch analysis provided support for upward development. Our results supported Kohlberg's characterization of stage development and the cross-cultural stability of Dawson's findings that were exclusively based on US samples. We conclude that proposals to replace Kohlberg's characterization of moral development are premature.     

Moral Judgment Research and the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education

Describing Kohlberg's interview test and his own Defining Issues Test (DIT), Rest assures us that we now have usable, reliable ways of assessing an individual's moral judgment development level. There is evidence for accepting a developmental sequence in moral judgment, from low stage thinking to higher stage thinking. Rest reviews the evidence for three aspects of morality as part of the cognitive domain, although numerous other factors beyond moral judgment influence concrete behavior. The author offers impressions about educational interventions. Moral judgment theory is considered the current best choice for “theoretical richness, practical implications, validated findings.”     

THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL JUDGMENT DEVELOPMENT

Kohlberg's theory of moral development is extended and revised. The Chinese perspectives on moral development are integrated into the present 6-stage model. The last three stages are: (4) Golden mean orientation and social system; (5) Majority rights and individual rights, and (6) Universal ethical principles of natural harmony. The first three stages are hypothesized to be cultural universal but the last three stages are supposed to have a cultural component. For each of the Stages 4, 5 and 6, a general structure is constructed and then a Chinese sub-structure and a Western sub-structure are derived from their corresponding general structure. Confucian and Taoistic philosophies are employed to elaborate some of the characteristics of the Chinese sub-structures.     

KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF VALIDATION STUDIES WITH THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST

This paper evaluates studies that have used the Defining Issues Test for validating Kohlberg's theory of moral stage development. Although this test was introduced to overcome inadequacies with Kohlberg's procedure, it too encounters serious methodological and conceptual difficulties. Its limitations include truncation of the stages and age range assessed. The validation studies, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, have used a correlational design and confounded age with other variables. Threats to internal and external validity obviate support claimed for Kohlberg; moral reasoning thus measured seems a function of education, IQ, direct moral training, and cultural values rather than maturation. Nor is the stage model upheld by longitudinal data, which fail to reveal sequential stepwise change and belie occasional regression. Attempted redefinition of the stage concept to salvage these data has not rescued Kohlberg's proposal, which remains to be validated empirically.     

Developmental progress in ancient Greek ethics

Starting from a neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning, major moral-cognitive advancements are reconstructed from the historical development of ancient Greek ethical philosophy. Kohlberg's stage theory is basically retained and supplemented by a developmental logic which allows us to (re)construct moral stages from their respective predecessors. This logical or dynamical approach, however, yields a new stage taxonomy, which is significantly different from and more detailed than Kohlberg's. Applying the new approach to ancient Greek ethics nine distinct stages within the historical process can be made out and analysed. As far as the argument and the available historical evidence go, the real historical development appears to be well accommodated by the suggested theory.     

Variations in Level of Moral Judgment as a Function of Type of Dilemma and Moral Choice

This study compares the predictive power of two models of moral judgment: (a) Kohlberg's model, which predicts stage consistency across varying content, and (b) a model that predicts variations in stage as a function of complex interactions between people and social contexts. Forty university students were asked to make and justify choices on three moral dilemmas—a dilemma involving the sale of defective merchandise (selling dilemma) and two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test of moral judgment. Half the participants made hypothetical choices on the selling dilemma; the other half were offered a selfish incentive—money—for concealing the defects in the merchandise. In support of the interactional model, (a) participants scored lower on the selling dilemma than on Kohlberg's test, (b) the monetary incentive affected moral choices, (c) participants justified the choice to conceal defects in the merchandise with significantly lower stage moral judgments than they invoked in support of the decision to disclose its defects, and (d) participants who upheld the choice to disclose supported it with higher stage justifications than those who rejected it. Surprisingly, however, participants who stood to make money disclosed more about the defects in the article and charged less than participants who did not.     

What does principled versus conventional moral reasoning convey to others about the politics and psychology of the reasoner?

The well‐documented relationship between political orientation and moral reasoning has most often been interpreted in terms of the influence of level of moral development (cf. Kohlberg, 1984) upon an individual's political inclinations: those who have reached the conventional level (or stage 4) in Kohlberg's terms will as a result tend to favour the political right, whereas those who progress to the principled level (stage 5) shift their political preferences to the left. An alternative, ‘social communication’ view is that these different forms of moral reasoning are expressions of contrasting political identities, and differ in ideological content rather than developmental level. We compared the inferences that American and British students (n=211) drew about the political, moral and cognitive attributes of a target who, in response to moral dilemmas, used either stage 4A, stage 4B or stage 5 moral arguments as defined by Kohlberg. Perception of the target's political attributes varied consistently and significantly as a function of the target's moral reasoning, but there were no corresponding effects on perception of moral or cognitive attributes. The results are interpreted as supporting a social communication view of moral reasoning and its relation to political orientation, and at the same time questioning the claim that conventional (stage 4) and principled (stage 5) moral reasoning are distinct levels of socio‐cognitive development. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Stage Is a Stage Is a Stage: A Direct Comparison of Two Scoring Systems

L. Kohlberg (1969) argued that his moral stages captured a developmental sequence specific to the moral domain. To explore that contention, the author compared stage assignments obtained with the Standard Issue Scoring System (A. Colby & L. Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b) and those obtained with a generalized content-independent stage-scoring system called the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (T. L. Dawson, 2002a), on 637 moral judgment interviews (participants' ages ranged from 5 to 86 years). The correlation between stage scores produced with the 2 systems was .88. Although standard issue scoring and hierarchical complexity scoring often awarded different scores up to Kohlberg's Moral Stage 2/3, from his Moral Stage 3 onward, scores awarded with the two systems predominantly agreed. The author explores the implications for developmental research.     

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach and the Practicing Counselor: An Opportunity for Counselors to Rethink Their Roles

At the present time, psychologists who describe the stages of human growth concur on the importance of cognitive elements, although they also recognize the affective and social components of development. Kohlberg's thinking was influenced by the work of Dewey and Piaget, and has been confirmed by his longitudinal study of 50 Chicago boys and by numerous other researches throughout the world. In his conception, discussions of moral problems (dilemmas) are the basis for moral growth. Through them the less mature become aware of the perspectives of those who have reached a higher level of moral judgment. These ideas and practices have been applied with young people in The Cluster School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the ideas of justice for all and fairness have become the real themes of the school. The authors' challenge to counselors as consultants and facilitators is one of becoming deliberately involved in the value and moral growth of students. Allen E. Ivey reacts to this article by urging a value-centered advocacy model for counselors.     

Change in values and moral reasoning during higher education

The aim of this study was to examine whether personal value priorities, measured by Schwartz et al.'s method, change during higher education, whether moral reasoning measured by the DIT develops and whether values predict gain in moral development. Moreover, we explored the simultaneous changes in value priorities and moral reasoning. Our sample consisted of 132 students from a university of applied sciences who filled out the value measure and the DIT both at the beginning and at the end of their studies. The results revealed that universalism and security values became more important whereas achievement decreased in importance during the three-year period. We also found significant gain in moral development and that universalism and hedonism values predicted this gain significantly. Significant correlated change was found between moral reasoning and stimulation, conformity and security values. The meaning of the results is discussed in terms of the theories of Schwartz and Kohlberg.     

Early Adolescents' Values About Their Pets

The essays of adolescent boys and girls (N = 354) explaining their decisions to save a pet in the event of a fire were examined by content analysis for the adolescents' underlying value orientations. Hedonistic utility, a moral value characteristic of the second of Kohlberg's (1976) moral development stages, was the primary value underlying adolescents' choices.     

Limits of morality: A sociological approach to higher moral stages

Grounded in the wider framework of Kohlberg's (1984) stage theory of moral development and Habermas' (1981; Habermas &; Luhmann, 1971) theory of discourse, this article addresses the question: Is a moral stage 6 society possible? Toward answering this question, a sociological approach to moral stage 6 is employed that complements the usual psychological approach to moral development. The article posits that a moral stage 6 society is impossible. Therefore, lower-stage institutions cannot be abolished; they have to be controlled and supervised. This calls for a new and structurally different type of discourse, the metadiscourse. The article postulates that such metadiscourse has the property of moral stage 7 according to the general stage model (Commons &; Richards, 1984a, 1984b). Finally, several strategies for controlling lower-stage institutions are considered, with bureaucracy serving as example of a lower-stage institution.     

Moral Reasoning and Rhetoric: The Acceptability of Arguments About AIDS-Related Dilemmas1

The disease AIDS has given rise to a host of social dilemmas. Here we explore the rhetoric that affects people's reasoning about actions taken in the face of such dilemmas. We presented a group of 514 undergraduates with vignettes depicting dilemmas having to do with the distribution of sexually explicit educational material to high school students and with the forced HIV blood testing of factory workers. Subjects rated the acceptability of arguments for and against courses of action taken by persons in the vignettes. The arguments embodied concerns typical of moral reasoning at each of Kohlberg's six stages. We found that the acceptability of stage-typical moral arguments about AIDS-related dilemmas depends on both the dilemma at hand and the course of action being argued for. We argue that knowledge of how people respond to different kinds of moral arguments concerning AIDS-related dilemmas is valuable for informing efforts to advocate humane and lifesaving policies to particular audiences.     

Antecedent Variables for Sociomoral Reasoning Development: Evidence from Two Cultural Settings

This study examined the developmental pattern of sociomoral reasoning in two different cultural settings, focusing on factors assumed to influence the course of growth in this particular domain. The specific hypotheses tested concerned the relationships between operational thinking within Piaget's theory and Kohlberg's conceptualization of sociomoral judgement development. Secondary school and university students from Greece and Nigeria aged 15 to 22 years (N = 281) participated in the study. Results indicated that (1) the developmental sequence was similar in the two differing cultural environments, (2) stage endorsement differed significantly in the two samples, and (3) the necessary-but-not-sufficient hypothesis was confirmed in both groups. The possible explanations of the findings are discussed in connection with the basic assumptions of the structural-developmental approach to socio-cognitive growth.     

Sexual experience, sex guilt, and sexual moral reasoning

Two studies are described in which the relations between sexual experience, sex guilt, and sexual moral reasoning were examined. Subjects were asked to articulate their opinions on each of six sexual activities, and then choose one of six statements (corresponding to Kohlberg's six stages of reasoning) that most clearly reflected why they had, or had not, engaged in three of those activities. An analysis of the moral reasoning present in each of the six articulated responses indicated that level of reasoning was inversely related to sex guilt. Analysis of the preference data indicated that subjects endorsed reasoning (statements) at a higher stage than they had articulated, and that this “gap” between articulation and preference was much greater for less experienced subjects. Results are discussed in terms of the utility of using situation-specific moral dilemmas when assessing moral reasoning, and in terms of the possible role that lack of sexual experience plays in inhibiting sexual moral development.     

Value systems among adolescents: Novel method for assessing level of ego‐development

Children's value systems develop through youth and influence attitudes and actions. But there is a lack of appropriate measures for children and adolescents. The objective of this study was to construct and validate a questionnaire that reveals distinct value systems among adolescents, and to evaluate the identified value systems’ relationship to degree of ego‐development and moral development. A quantitative study in a Swedish School with ages 12 through 16 (grades 6 to 9) was performed (N = 204). A set of pattern recognition statistical analyses has been used to identify different profiles of values systems and demonstrate that these systems can be arranged in a hierarchical order similar to other development. Results revealed three value systems in this sample. The identified value systems reflect different degrees of moral and ego‐development among children in the study. Three distinct value systems were identified: the first (n = 9) and the second value systems (n = 35) correspond to pre‐conventional stages, and the third value system (n = 155) corresponds to early conventional stages of ego development. Ego development scoring of test statements to assess stages. The value system was significantly related to moral development in the personal interest and the maintaining norms schemas of the Defining Issues Test (DIT). However, many students did not complete the entire DIT, so those results should be looked at with caution. It appears that this new test (Test for Adolescent Value Systems – TAVS) does relate to an established ego development rating scale.     

Possible Environmental Causes of Stages in Moral Reasoning

Both children (6-, 10-, and 14-year-olds) and their mothers were interviewed. The children's responses to moral dilemmas were classified into Kohlberg's three main categories—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. The mothers were presented with a variety of hypothetical situations—e.g., they had just found out that their child had stolen something, and were asked to tell what they would say or do to their child in each situation. The mothers' hypothetical responses to such situations were divided into either the preconventional, conventional, or postconventional category depending on the level or moral reasoning such responses would imply to their children. The results indicated that as the age of the children increased, both the level of moral reasoning used by the children and the level of moral reasoning implied by the mothers' treatment of the children increased. Even with age partialed out, there was a significant positive relationship between the mothers' implied level of moral reasoning and the children's level of moral reasoning. Thus, although causality cannot be established, the results indicate that there is at least the possibility that environmental changes—i.e., changes in the way the mother treats the child—may be responsible for the appearance of stages in the child's development of moral reasoning.