Internal representation of simple temporal patterns

In this study the imitation of several periodically repeating simple temporal patterns consisting of two or more intervals varying in their duration ratios has been investigated. The errors that subjects typically made in their imitations and the systematic changes that occurred during repeated imitations indicate that both musically trained and untrained subjects map temporal sequences onto an interval structure the nature of which is revealed by studying which patterns are correctly and which incorrectly reproduced. A "beat-based" model for the perception of temporal sequences is proposed. This model states that the first step in the processing of a temporal sequence consists of a segmentation of the sequence into equal intervals bordered by events. This interval is called the beat interval. How listeners select this beat interval is only partly understood. In a second step, intervals smaller than the beat interval are expressed as a subdivision of the beat interval in which they occur. The number of within-beat structures that can be represented in the model is, however, limited. Specifically, only beat intervals that are subdivided into either equal intervals or intervals in a 1:2 ratio fit within the model. The partially hierarchical model proposed, though in need of further elaborations, shows why the number of temporal patterns that can be correctly conceptualized is limited. The relation of the model to other models is discussed.     

Internal representation of visual texture as the basis for the judgment of similarity

The relationship between Fourier spectra of visual textures (represented both by the actual frequency components and by the response of four hypothetical channels selectively sensitive to spatial frequency) and the perceptual appearance of the textures was investigated. Thirty textures were synthesized by combining seven spatial frequencies whose amplitudes were randomly chosen and then scaled to give an overall contrast of .9. Similarity judgments were collected using both the method of triadic comparison (two subjects, 4,060 trials each) and the method of paired comparison (six subjects, 435 trials each). The similarity judgments were subjected to MDSCAL and INDSCAL dimensions were found to be optimally oriented in terms of spatial frequency information without rotation. The seven spatial frequency components accounted for 90.6% of the variance in the 3-D INDSCAL space, while the four channels accounted for 91.8% of the variance in the first two dimensions. The data further suggest that the four channels may interact in an opponent process manner. The results support the idea that the visual internal representation of stimuli is based on spatial frequency analysis rather than feature extraction.     

Internal number magnitude representation is not holistic,either

Over the last years, evidence has accumulated that the magnitude of two-digit numbers is not only represented as one holistic entity, but also decomposed for tens and units. Recently, Zhang and Wang (2005) suggested such separate processing may be due to the presence of external representations of numbers, whereas holistic processing became more likely when one of the to-be-compared numbers was already internalised. The latter conclusion essentially rested on unit-based null effects. However, Nuerk and Willmes (2005) argued that unfavourable stimulus selection may provoke such null effects and misleading conclusions. Therefore, we tested the conclusion of Zhang and Wang for internal standards with a modified stimulus set. We observed reliable unit-based effects in all conditions contradicting the holistic model. Thus, decomposed representations of tens and units can also be demonstrated for internal standards. We conclude that decomposed magnitude processing of multidigit numbers does not rely on external representations. Rather, even when two-digit numbers are internalised, the magnitudes of tens and units seem to be (also) represented separately.     

Epistemic representation, informativeness and the aim of faithful representation

In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information about its target system and argue that a vehicle’s capacity to provide specific information about its target system—its informativeness—is an essential feature of this kind of representation. I draw an analogy to our ordinary notion of interpretation to show that a user’s aim of faithfully representing the target system is necessary for securing this feature.     

Beyond the representation field

Abstract

This article outlines the importance of representation and several Freudian concepts such as Vorstellung, Trieb, and word and object representations. The author refers to the division of the analytical process into two main fields: the field of representation, and the field of the Real, which is characterized by impossibility. He then states that this field is the proper field of psychoanalysis. The author presents two clinical vignettes in an attempt to demonstrate the significance of the analytical act as a tool to deal with such extreme psychic situations.     

On the representation of error

Though he maintained a significant interest in theoretical aspects of measurement, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. was critical of the representational theory that in many ways has come to dominate discussions concerning the foundations of measurement. In particular, Kyburg (in Savage and Ehrlich (eds) Philosophical and foundational issues in measurement theory, 1992) asserts that the representational theory of measurement, as introduced in (Scott and Suppes, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 23:113?C128, 1958) and developed in (Krantz et?al., Foundations of measurment: additive and polynomial representations. Academic Press, 1971), cannot account for the measurement of error. The present work examines and responds to this charge.     

Extending the classical view of representation

Representation has always been a central part of models in cognitive science, but this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating the alternative approaches of perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the representational view and these four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing.     

Assessing the concreteness of relational representation

Research has shown that people's ability to transfer abstract relational knowledge across situations can be heavily influenced by the concrete objects that fill relational roles. This article provides evidence that the concreteness of the relations themselves also affects performance. In 3 experiments, participants viewed simple relational patterns of visual objects and then identified these same patterns under a variety of physical transformations. Results show that people have difficulty generalizing to novel concrete forms of abstract relations, even when objects are unchanged. This suggests that stimuli are initially represented as concrete relations by default. In the 2nd and 3rd experiments, the number of distinct concrete relations in the training set was increased to promote more abstract representation. Transfer improved for novel concrete relations but not for other transformations such as object substitution. Results indicate that instead of automatically learning abstract relations, people's relational representations preserve all properties that appear consistently in the learning environment, including concrete objects and concrete relations.     

Linda问题的表象-命题双表征解释视角探究

本文首先提出了Linda问题的表象-命题双表征这一新的解释视角。该视角认为,Linda问题基于表象表征和命题表征可以有两种不同的解读与表征方式;而不同的被试在Linda问题上可能分别采取了上述表征方式之一;但由于Linda问题的特殊性,大多数被试采用了表象表征;大多数被试的这一表征取向则可能是所谓谬误判断出现的原因。本文通过4项研究,让被试在基于表象表征设计的转述版本与基于命题表征设计的转述版间选择接近自身理解的版本;并考察了将Linda问题修改成更符合命题表征的数学化表达形式能否降低所谓谬误水平;还考察了增加促使被试运用命题表征的排序项"Linda是全人类中的一员"能否降低所谓谬误水平。结果显示,在转述版本选择上,大多数被试选择了基于表象表征设计的版本;而上文所指的两个修正版Linda问题则都降低了被试的所谓谬误水平。这些结果支持了本文所提的视角。     

Dialogue representation

We consider question-answer dialogues between participants who may disagree with each other. The main problems are: (a) How different speech-acts affect the information in the dialogue; and (b) How to represent what was said in a dialogue, so that we can summarize it even when it involves disagreements (i.e., inconsistencies).We use a fully-typed many-sorted language L with a possible-worlds semantics. L contains nominals representing short answers. The speech-acts are uniformly represented in a dialogue language DL by focus structures, consisting of a mood operator, a topic component and a focus component. Each stage of the dialogue is associated with a set of information functions (g-functions), which are partial functions taking a topic component (representing a question raised) to a set of propositions determined by the corresponding focus component (to the set of answers given to it).Asserting is answering a question and, hence, it causes a new g-function to be defined. Asking is an attempt to cause the hearer to define a new g-function satisfying certain conditions. A question asked requests a true and complete answer. A reaction answers a question if it satisfies some of the conditions of the question. Indirect questions are viewed as indirect answers.A dialogue representation consists of: commitment sets, each representing the commitments expressed by one participant; sets of questions under discussion associated with each stage of the dialogue, and the common ground, containing the g-functions and representing consistently what was said in the dialogue.Concepts of informativeness are naturally defined within the theory. Whether an utterance is informative depends on which question it answers and how the question was answered previously. These concepts yield that uttering mathematical and logical truths is as informative as uttering a contingency.     

Constraining the neural representation of the visual world

Understanding the perception of all but the most impoverished and artificial scenes presents a different and probably far greater challenge from understanding face recognition, reading, or identification (or even categorization) of single objects. Central issues in the interpretation of structured objects and scenes are reviewed, starting with fundamentals such as the meaning of seeing. A theoretical approach to this formidable task is outlined, motivated by some recent developments in neuroscience and neurophilosophy.     

Clauses and the semantic representation of words

When a sentence with more than one clause is processed, words of the first clause become less available for recall or recognition once the clause boundary has been passed. One common interpretation of this observation is that the representation of a given word shifts from a predominantly surface form (e.g., phonological or lexical) to a semantic form, after the clause boundary. Two experiments that test that interpretation are reported. In the first experiment, two-clause spoken sentences were followed by spoken word or picture probes. Pictures were intended to provide a fast semantic match to probed words, but a slow surface match. Although response times exhibited a robust main effect of the clause position of the probe, no interaction with probe type was found. Similar results were obtained in a second experiment that compared pictures with written word probes. The faster response to picture than to word probes in the second experiment indicates that subjects did not covertly name the picture, but made a semantic match (as intended). These observations suggest the following reinterpretation of earlier sentence memory experiments: Words in the most recent clause of a sentence are more available than words in an earlier clause because their semantic representations are more active, not because their surface representations are more active.     

Nature of the representation for picture-recognition memory

When distracting pictures are randomly selected from the same pool of pictures as the target pictures, performance with large numbers of pictures (1,000) is much poorer than has previously been reported. Further, performance drops quite substantially after 1 wk., a finding that differs from the conclusion that picture memory is relatively stable over time. Under conditions where the distractors were selected to reduce similarity between targets and distracting pictures, performance approximated levels previously reported in the literature. The results of the experiments seem to demand some type of categorization model of picture-recognition memory.