Are current theories of panic falsifiable?

The authors examine 6 theories of panic attacks as to whether empirical approaches are capable of falsifying them and their heuristic value. The authors conclude that the catastrophic cognitions theory is least falsifiable because of the elusive nature of thoughts but that it has greatly stimulated research and therapy. The vicious circle theory is falsifiable only if the frightening internal sensations are specified. The 3-alarms theory postulates an indeterminate classification of attacks. Hyperventilation theory has been falsified. The suffocation false alarm theory lacks biological parameters that unambiguously index dyspnea or its distinction between anticipatory and panic anxiety. Some correspondences postulated between clinical phenomena and brain areas by the neuroanatomical hypothesis may be falsifiable if panic does not depend on specific thoughts. All these theories have heuristic value, and their unfalsifiable aspects are capable of modification.     

Are natural languages universal?

Summary We began by distinguishing Tarskian and Fitchean notions of universality in such a way that the claim that no language is universal in the sense of Tarski is compatible with accepting Fitchean universality. Then we examined a proposal involving two truth concepts — one that fit the Fitchean notion and another that followed Tarski's views on truth — finding little advantage in such generosity. We attempted a reformulation of Herzberger's argument for the negative view — the view that no language is universal in Tarski's sense — but found it unsuccessful when the language of the argument's formulation was brought under consideration. A more persuasive argument for EI was found, free of the defect of the previous one. EI was then shown to have unsettling consequences, prompting us to inquire about avoiding it. We found this possible, noting that EI is itself a solution to the semantic paradoxes, to which there are alternatives that avoid the unwelcome aspects of EI. However, whether any such alternative is ultimately preferable to EI remains to be seen.Section 4 of this paper was presented at the 1973 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and I am particularly grateful to the paper's commentator, Stephen P. Stich, for his helpful comments. I have also profited from correspondence with Paul Teller, whose paper The Universality of Natural Languages and Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics: A Response to Herzberger (1971, ditto) presents a position similar in certain respects to mine.     

Are there universal human being skills?

The issue of what constitutes a skilled human being is fundamental to counselling and psychotherapy. Furthermore, multicultural counselling and therapy is based on the two primary assumptions of common humanity and cultural diversity. However, nowhere have I seen in the psychotherapy theory and the multicultural literature the issue addressed of whether there are universal human being skills that underlie and transcend cultural diversity. By 'universal human being skills' I mean skills that characterize the good or effective person regardless of the culture or country in which they live. Arguably the widespread possession of such human skills throughout the world is fundamental to creating happiness and avoiding suffering on a daily basis. Furthermore, the survival of the species depends on the existence of sufficient good or skilled human beings to protect the interests of future generations.     

Are early verbal communicative intentions universal? A preliminary investigation

This longitudinal study was conducted to provide preliminary information about the universality of early verbal communicative intentions. Three children whose native languages differ were videotaped in spontaneous mother-child interactions at 2-week intervals between MLU 1.0 and 2.0. The languages studied were American English, Danish, and Serbo-Croatian. Each child utterance was coded for the communicative intention expressed using a modified version of Dale's (1980) taxonomy. Findings indicate that all subjects used the full range of intentions. Overall, the intentions used most frequently were Naming and Attributes. Crosslinguistic similarities were also noted in patterns of intention usage as a function of increasing MLU. Results support the view that early verbal intentions are language-learning universals. However, no support was found for the universal-sequence hypothesis.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

Are social prediction errors universal? Predicting compliance with a direct request across cultures

Previous research conducted in the United States has demonstrated that help-seekers fail to appreciate the embarrassment and awkwardness (i.e., social costs) targets would experience by saying “no” to a request for help. Underestimation of such social costs leads help-seekers to underestimate the likelihood that others will comply with their requests. We hypothesized that this error would be attenuated in a collectivistic culture. We conducted a naturalistic help-seeking study in the U.S. and China and found that Chinese help-seekers were more accurate than American help-seekers at predicting compliance. A supplementary scenario study in which we measured individual differences in collectivistic and individualistic orientations within a single culture provided converging evidence for the association between collectivism and expectations of compliance. In both cases, the association between collectivism (culturally defined or measured) and predicted compliance was mediated by participants' ratings of the social costs of saying “no”.     

Dialectic – a universal for consciousness?

Dialectic is a word of many meanings but used here in the classical sense of the apposition of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis. The first, counterfactual phase is expressible symbolically by the symmetric difference $, “one or the other, but not both”. The second, synthesis phase is taken here to correspond to the complement ∼$, consisting of commonality and context within the universe of discourse. After a brief discussion of parallels between “events” in quantum theory and the dialectical pair ($, ∼$), it is argued that the latter is more fundamental for brain and mind. Consciousness is “carved at the joints” as comprising basic awareness (=not-unconscious), self-awareness, perception and cognition factored by attention, and emotion. The dialectical pair ($, ∼$) is then referred to Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, categories both mathematical and psychological, knowledge and learning, negotiation and dialogue, problem solving, affect and emotion, and brain structure and function. Coupling previous work by the author for the ($, ∼$) model with the present analysis, it is concluded that the dialectical pair provides a universal for consciousness parallel to its known universal property for the most general sorts of equivalences in mathematics.     

Dying: A universal human experience?

This paper explores the question, “Is there a universal psychological experience suffered by all dying persons?” a question to which the popular theory of Kübler-Ross presupposes an affirmative answer. Our answer takes three steps: first, a comparison between the Kübler-Ross model of dying and that of the late medievalBook of the Craft of Dying centered upon the five Kübler-Ross “stages”; second, a philosophical critique of the terms of this comparison; and third, a revised look at the alleged similarities between the two models, providing a deeper look at the moral and spiritual assumptions behind each.     

How do generic statements impact performance? Evidence for entity beliefs

Generic statements about the abilities of children's social groups (e.g. ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game’) negatively impact children's performance – even if the statements are favorable towards children's own social groups. We explored the mechanism by which generic language impairs children's performance. Across three studies, our findings suggest that generic statements influence children's performance by creating an entity belief (i.e. a belief that a fixed ability determines performance). Children who were exposed to a generic statement about their social group's ability performed worse than children in control conditions. This effect hurt children's performance even when the person who made the generic statement was no longer present and a new person not privy to the statement replaced them. However, when children heard a generic statement paired with an effort explanation (i.e. ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game because they try really hard when they draw’) they performed better than children who heard the generic statement with no explanation (i.e. just ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game’) and children who heard the generic statement paired with a trait explanation (i.e. ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game because they are smart and really good at drawing’). This work uncovers when and how generic statements that refer to the ability of one's social group hinder performance, informing the development of practices to improve student motivation and learning.     

Are Lesbians Women?

I argue that Mordque Wittig's view that lesbians are not women neglects the complexities involved in the composition of the category “woman.” I develop an articulation of the concept “woman” in the contemporary United States, with thirteen distinct defining characteristics, none of which are necessary nor sufficient. I argue that Wittig's emphasis on the material production of “woman” through the political regime of heterosexuality, however, is enormously fruitful for feminist and queer strategizing.     

Are Counterpossibles Epistemic?

It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand‐and‐fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear‐headedly intend a metaphysical reading.