Being “Done For” in Analysis: Commentary on Paper by Stuart A. Pizer

Stuart A. Pizer's fascinating article explores through a relational lens analytic impasse, and its manifestation through transference and countertransference love. How this love is demonstrated (or not) and the ways in which we provide for our patients will have profound effect on the process (and progress) of any treatment. But, too often, reluctance to “do for” our patients compromises our ability to provide what may be needed in any given moment. Perhaps an expansion of the “doer—done to” dyadic paradigm into a “doer—done for” model might allow more analytic leeway and more possibility of growth within our patients.     

‘I love you’. How to understand love in couple therapy? Exploring love in context

Acknowledging the place of love in couple therapy requires therapists to reflect upon what love means to them. We propose that love defines the couple relationship and in turn the relationship defines love. In this article we explore and focus on our conceptualization of love and its influence on couple therapy. Exploring love in the context of the phrase ‘I love you’ leads us to consider built‐in contradictions. These contradictions can be contextualized and understood in a relational dialectic framework. Implications for therapy are explored and briefly illustrated in a case vignette.     

When Love Hurts: Treating Abusive Relationships

This paper describes an integrative approach for treating couples in abusive relationships. Because of the power inequities that often obtain in such cases, the therapist faces special challenges. Both partners must be defined as clients, yet the two are not on equal footing. Sustaining moral clarity in a context of such psychological ambiguity is crucial, and it requires skills beyond those we typically associate with the art and craft of the interview. A mutative factor in any therapy requires bearing witness to injustices large and small—leading the author to raise questions about the place of the moral work of psychotherapy in our therapy-saturated society. She poses an urgent social question: Is it possible to intervene therapeutically in abusive relationships to make love safer for women and less threatening to men?     

A Lover’s Shame

Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed.     

Self-Efficacy,Emotions and Work Engagement Among Teachers: A Two Wave Cross-Lagged Analysis

The aim of this study was to examine the reciprocal relations between teachers’ work engagement and their emotions, both positive and negative, and experienced in relation to their students, by implementing a two-wave panel design. The predictive role of self-efficacy with respect to teachers’ emotions and work engagement was also explored. The study included a sample of 941 teachers from various state schools in Croatia. A cross-lagged analysis demonstrated the reciprocal nature of the relationship between emotions and work engagement. Teachers who reported higher levels of positive emotions of joy, pride and love at first time point, tended to be more engaged in their work at subsequent assessment. The association between negative emotions and work engagement showed the opposite direction—teachers who experienced more anger, fatigue, and hopelessness in the first measurement point, were also less engaged at second time of assessment. Furthermore, teachers who were more engaged in their work in the first time point, also reported about lower levels of negative emotions but higher levels of positive emotions 6 months later. At last, teachers with higher perceived self-efficacy are more engaged in their work, experience more joy, pride and love, and less anger, fatigue and hopelessness, towards their students. However, these effects did not hold upon control of baseline levels of emotions and work engagement.     

THE LOVE RACKET: DEFINING LOVE AND AGAPEFOR THE LOVE‐AND‐SCIENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM

Abstract. Scholars of religion and science have generated remarkable scholarship in recent years in their explorations of love. Exactly how scholars involved in this budding field believe that love and science should relate and/or be integrated varies greatly. What they share in common is the belief that issues of love are of paramount importance and that the various scientific disciplines—whether natural, social, or religious—must be brought to bear upon how best to understand love. I briefly introduce the emergence of the love‐and‐science research program and note that scholars have not done well defining what they mean by love. I suggest that the present surge in love scholarship will fail to produce the positive results that it otherwise might if love is not defined well. I provide and defend a definition of love adequate for those doing love‐and‐science research: To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including God), to promote well‐being. To explain better what this simple definition entails, I explore its three main phrases. Love is said to have many forms, but agape is the form to which the love‐and‐science literature most commonly refers. I comment briefly on the debates about how to best understand agape, noting sixteen different definitions proposed by major scholars. I identify weaknesses in many of them and then offer what I argue is a more adequate definition of agape as intentional response to promote well‐being when confronted by that which generates ill‐being. In short, agape repays evil with good. While research on love and science requires much more than adequate definitions, I believe that the definitions I proffer can prove useful in furthering the love‐and‐science research program.     

The Write of Passage From Candidate to Analyst: The Experience of Writing Analytic Process

This article describes my experience of learning to write analytic process. It illustrates how the depth of understanding I achieved from learning to write transparently about analytic work was instrumental in the consolidation of my analytic training and my development of an analytic identity. Practicing analysis requires letting our minds function at multiple levels—integrating, synthesizing, free-associating, attending, and maintaining our own reverie—simultaneously. This is a large task for any analyst, much less a beginning analyst. Writing about this process necessitates not only understanding what has transpired in our offices with our patients but also developing the ability to explain that intimate and unique interpersonal dyad to our peers. Learning to do analytic work is not the same as learning to write about it; and writing about psychoanalytic process is very different from participating in it (Reiser, 2000). The goal of writing analytic process is not primarily to tell the story of the patient but to demonstrate our thinking, experience, and understanding as analysts. To do this requires both a depth of understanding of what we do and a mastery of analytic process.

While there may be different ways to synthesize and integrate our analytic training and to accomplish the significant task of progressing from candidate to analyst, learning to write analytic process was pivotal for me. It was a “rite of passage,” culminating in the development of an increased sense of identity, maturity, and confidence as an analyst.     

Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love

Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes our love for them appropriate, just as being fearsome is what makes our fear of certain situations appropriate. I finally propose a general account of this property which avoids the major problems facing the extant accounts of reasons for love.     

Ontology for an Uncompromising Ethical Realism

I begin by distinguishing two general approaches to metaethics and ontology. One in effect puts our experience as engaged ethical agents on hold while independent metaphysical and epistemological inquiries, operating by their own lights, deliver metaethical verdicts on acceptable interpretations of our ethical lives; the other instead keeps engaged ethical experience in focus and allows our reflective interpretation of it to shape our metaphysical and epistemological views, including our ontology. While the former approach often leads to deflationary views, the latter may lead us to enrich our metaethical picture as needed to capture robust objectivity and categorical normative authority for ethics. Assuming, as I have argued elsewhere, that this requires positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts, the question I take up here is what ontological implications this has. I argue against quietist (or nonmetaphysical) non-naturalist views, which maintain that positing such properties and facts either has no ontological implications (Parfit) or has only domain-specific ontological implications that likewise imply nothing about what the world contains (Scanlon). Against these views, I advocate a worldly, dual-aspect view, locating irreducibly evaluative or normative properties as features of relevant worldly things. But while I have previously defended this view as a form of non-naturalism, I here explore the possibility of instead seeing it as a new, more expansive form of naturalism—what might be called “Non-Scientistic Naturalism”—inspired by parallel attempts in the philosophy of mind to accommodate irreducibly phenomenal properties within a more expansive physicalism.     

Love as a Problem of Knowledge in Kierkegaard's Either/Or and Plato's Symposium

At the end of the essay “Silhouettes” in Either/Or, Kierkegaard writes, “only the person who has been bitten by snakes knows what one who has been bitten by snakes must suffer.” I interpret this as an allusion to Alcibiades' speech in Plato's Symposium. Kierkegaard invites the reader to compare Socrates with Don Giovanni, and Alcibiades with the seducer's women. Socrates' philosophical method, in this light, is a deceptive seduction: just as Don Giovanni's seduction leads his conquests to unhappy love—what Kierkegaard terms “reflective sorrow”—so the elenctic method leads Socrates' interlocutors to aporia, not to knowledge. I offer a critique of Socrates' ironic stance as a philosopher, which stance is reflected in the theory of love he presents in the Symposium, and suggest that philosophy should be modeled on the romantic love of persons—a love that can be reciprocated—not the love of an impersonal Form, a one-sided love.     

Sacred mountains and beloved fetuses: can loving or worshipping something give it moral status?

Part One addresses the question whether the fact that some persons love something, worship it, or deeply care about it, can endow moral status on that thing. I argue that the answer is “no.” While some cases lend great plausibility to the view that love or worship can endow moral status, there are other cases in which love or worship clearly fails to endow moral status. Furthermore, there is no principled way to distinguish these two types of cases, so we must conclude that love or worship never endow moral status. Part Two takes up the hard question of why we have to be careful of things that others love or worship, given that the things do not thereby have moral status. I argue that it is sometimes bad for those who love or worship the things if we mistreat them. I develop an account of when love and worship, and person projects more generally, succeed in expanding the scope of what counts as good or bad for the person engaged in the project.     

Sexual Perfectionism and Women’s Sexual Assertiveness: Understanding the Unique Effects of Perfectionistic Expectations about Sex Originating from and Directed toward the Sexual Partner

Marriage has significantly changed since Becker proposed his specialization model yet some scholars maintain that specialization characterizes modern couples. Specialization occurs when one partner, traditionally the man, concentrates on market work while the other partner, traditionally the woman, focuses on nonmarket work such as housework or childcare. Using innovative time diary data from primarily highly-educated, White, dual-earner U.S. couples, we examine how couples manage their time in market and household work and leisure across a momentous, gendered life course turning point—the transition to parenthood. We find little evidence of specialization, but stronger evidence of nonspecialization where both partners concurrently engaged in market work or leisure. Yet gender still mattered. Men enjoyed more leisure time, particularly on nonworkdays, whereas their partners performed more nonmarket work. Our study is the first known to uncover exactly what men were doing while women performed additional minutes of housework and childcare. On nonworkdays, fathers engaged in leisure 47% and 35% of the time during which mothers performed childcare and routine housework, respectively. Mothers engaged in leisure only about 16% to 19% of the time that fathers performed childcare and routine housework. In sum, although our study challenges economic theories of specialization by suggesting that nonspecialization is the norm for new parents’ time among highly-educated, dual-earner couples, persistent gender inequalities continue to characterize family work and leisure time.     

The World Is Not the Way It Is: the Twice-Told Tales of Biblical Narrative

In my paper I examine the relationship between biblical principles and modern western philosophy. I begin with various biblical passages, including the twice-told tale of the miracle of the loaves and fish from the Gospel of Matthew, the story of creation, and the story of Adam and Eve, contrasting them with what I argue are the non-tales of Plato’s Republic. I then move on to modern philosophical texts—Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (with passing mention of Vico and Buber) in order to examine the idea that what constitutes the ‘twice’ in our modern twice-told tales is the biblical, self-reflexive recognition that it is the core of values underpinning our stories—love of neighbor—that is itself the story that we tell.     

Love,Ethics, and Authenticity: Beauvoir's Lesson in What It Means to Read

Beauvoir's distinction between romantic and authentic love offers us an opportunity for thinking through the complex relations among philosophy, reading, and love. If we accept her account of romantic love as a flawed, dependent mode of being, and her suggestion that an authentic love—one that engages maturely with the other—is possible, then we might take the risk of thinking of reading in these terms.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

‘The Extremely Difficult Realization That Something Other Than Oneself Is Real’: Iris Murdoch on Love and Moral Agency

Abstract: In the last few years, there has been a revival of interest in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. Despite this revival, however, certain aspects of Murdoch's views remain poorly understood, including her account of a concept that she famously described as ‘central’ to moral philosophy—i.e., love. In this paper, I argue that the concept of love is essential to any adequate understanding of Murdoch's work but that recent attempts by Kieran Setiya and David Velleman to assimilate Murdoch's account of love to neo‐Aristotelian or neo‐Kantian theories of moral agency are misconceived. We will not understand what Murdoch is trying to do unless we understand her position as a radical alternative to such theories. Here, I present a reading of Murdoch's account of love as a form of Platonic eros directed toward two objects: the Good and the particular individual. It is in navigating the tension between these two objects that we find ourselves facing what Murdoch famously described as ‘the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real’. When properly understood, Murdoch's account of love opens up conceptual space for an alternative approach to some of the central questions in contemporary moral theory.     

Multidimensionality of Well-Being and Spillover Effects Across Life Domains: How Do Parenthood and Personality Affect Changes in Domain-Specific Satisfaction?

Whether having children improves our well-being is a long-standing topic of debate. Demographic and sociological research has investigated changes in individuals’ overall well-being and partnership satisfaction when they become parents. However, little is known about how becoming parent may produce vulnerability—observable as an enduring decrease in well-being—in life domains that are strongly interdependent with the family domain, such as work and leisure. Linking life-course and personality psychology perspectives, the authors examine the trajectories of subjective well-being—measured as satisfaction with life, work, and leisure—3 years before and 3 years after the transition to parenthood. The authors particularly focus on the moderating effects of gender and personality. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984–2013) and multilevel growth curve modeling, the authors show strong gender-based vulnerability in how people react to parenthood. Although men display a nonlinear pathway of decreasing life satisfaction and a stable trajectory of job satisfaction, women experience more changes in their satisfaction with work and more dramatic decreases in leisure satisfaction. Contrary to most of our expectations, the moderating effects of personality were modest. Extraversion influenced the trajectories of work satisfaction, whereas neuroticism and conscientiousness affected the pathway of leisure satisfaction for women only. This article shows that the transition to parenthood influences well-being trajectories in specific domains, and this influence differs between women and men.     

Having the will,finding the ways,and wishes for the future: A model of relational hope and well-being

Hope is a ubiquitous experience in daily life and acts as a force to help individuals attain desired future outcomes. In the current paper, we review existing research on hope and its benefits. Building on this work, we propose a new model of hope in romantic relationships. Our model seeks to expand the study of hope, addressing limitations of past research by bringing hope into the interpersonal domain and adding a future-oriented perspective. More specifically, we argue that relational hope encompasses three facets, including relational agency, relational pathways, and relational aspirations, or what we call the wills, ways, and wishes people have in their relationship. We outline specific ways that these three facets may promote well-being in romantic relationships. First, we propose that relational agency—the motivation to achieve relational goals—fuels approach-motivated goals, which in turn promotes higher quality relationships. Additionally, we posit that relational pathways—the perception of sufficient strategies to pursue relational goals—enhance self-regulation to support effective communication and conflict management with a romantic partner. Finally, we propose that relational aspirations—the positive emotions felt in anticipation of future relationship outcomes—foster growth beliefs which in turn promote relationship maintenance and commitment over time. While our model posits that relational hope has many potential benefits for relationships, we also discuss key contexts in which hope may undermine relationships and well-being. Overall, our proposed model of relational hope offers a new area of insight into how hope may shape well-being in romantic relationships.     

How successfully can we measure well-being through measuring happiness?

Happiness is currently the topic of a wide range of empirical research, and is increasingly becoming the focus of public policy. The interest in happiness largely stems from its connection with well-being. We care about well-being – how well our lives are going for us. If we are happy it seems that, to some extent, we must be doing well. This suggests that we may be able to successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness. The problem is that both happiness and well-being are elusive and their measurement is far from uncontroversial. What exactly does information about happiness tell us about well-being? Is there more to well-being than happiness? If so, to what extent is happiness connected to well-being? These are controversial questions, but answers to them must be given if we are to make progress in the measurement of well-being. I argue that we should view happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being. I call this the Indicator View. According to this view, someone can be doing badly yet be happy insofar as their well-being is improving (and vice versa). More precisely, the Indicator View is the view that happiness is a defeasible indicator of local changes in well-being. Thus, we can successfully measure an important aspect of well-being through measuring happiness. I argue in favour of this view on the basis of an understanding of well-being that is widely acceptable. The Indicator View, therefore, has the potential to unite divided opinion over what happiness research can tell us about well-being.